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ABSTRACT
Climate Change and the Ancestors
Rain, Gender and Politics in an African Water Catchment
by
Jessie Fredlund

Advisor: Gary Wilder

Uluguru, a small mountain range in eastern Tanzania and one of the rainiest places in
East Africa, serves as the principal water catchment for Tanzania’s largest city, Dar es Salaam,
and for commercial farms along the country’s central coast. Home to smallholder farmers who
cultivate a variety of crops on mostly rain-fed farms, the catchment has been a site of struggle
over water and nature since the nineteenth century. Today, climate change has rendered rainfall
increasingly unpredictable, and a wave of “sustainable development” interventions has pressured
farmers to change their practices and to engage in unpaid forms of ecological labor for the sake
of downstream water users. Such projects are structured by relations of power across multiple
scales and by global divisions of nature and labor. These dynamics converge in the space of the
catchment, rendering it a site for the extraction of both resources and ecological labor.
Uluguru has also been home to regionally important rainmaking rituals for at least several
centuries. Rainmaking rituals are a form of “social healing” which link questions of human
health, agricultural success, and environmental wellbeing to care for the dead and the natural
places they reside (Feierman 1985). Throughout the history of the mountains, discourses and
practices surrounding rainmaking have served as key sites of ecological theorizing and political
iv

struggle. As political and economic relations have shifted in the mountains, these rituals have
also changed, but they continue to emerge as spaces of debate over the proper relations between
humans and the environment. Seen in this way, rainmaking and social healing are a dynamic
form of politics which center questions of social reproduction.
Outside interventions aimed at protecting the watershed and the long history of political
rainmaking can be understood as intertwined struggles over water, nature, and labor. Viewing
these as struggles over the terms of social reproduction reveals that conflicts over nature are
fundamentally bound up with questions of gender and with long histories of colonialism and
neocolonialism. While the invisibility of ecological labor and ecological care has led to growing
precarity in the mountains, discourses and practices of social healing reveal other possibilities.
They suggest that human relationships to nature need not be limited to those of harm and
extraction but can be rooted in more complex dynamics of ecological labor and ecological care.
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GLOSSARY
Ahmadiyya – a heterodox Muslim movement originating in Pakistan which believes in
continuing revelation (considered heretical by most mainstream Muslims)
AGRA – Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
akida – a title under the German administration for mid-level African officials who acted as
police, tax-collectors, and judges
Bakwata – the main Muslim civic organization in Tanzania since 1968, often used as a shorthand
for mainstream Muslims
baraza – a meeting or council for decision-making
bibi – grandmother, elder woman; I use this as a honorific throughout the text
bida – innovations, that which Islamic reformists seek to eliminate from Islamic practice
CBFM – community-based forest management; a form of participatory forest management with
administration at the local level
CCM – Chama cha Mapinduzi; the successor to TANU and Tanzania’s ruling party since 1977
CSO – civil society organization
chipsi mayai – Tanzanian street food; french fries cooked in egg
dawa – medicine
DAWASCO – Dar es Salaam Water Company; the municipal water utility company in Dar es
Salaam
desturi – custom
dhikr – the Arabic term for devotional chants common in Sufi orders globally, the origin of zikiri
dini – religion
DOAG – German East Africa Company (Deutsch-Ostafrikanishe Gesellshaft)
FAO – the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
GEF – Global Environmental Facility
hadith – records of the words and actions of Muhammad
xiv

hitima – memorial services performed at regular intervals after a death, involving the
performance of zikiri as well as a shared meal
IWRM – Integrated Water Resources Management
JFM – joint forest management; a form of participatory forest management with joint
government and local control
JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency
jumbe – a local level official or headman
kanga – a wrap worn by women
kaniki – a garment of plain, black cloth
kazi – work
Kiluguru (kil. Chiluguru) – the Luguru language; also an adjectival from of Luguru
Kingalu – an important political figure widely recognized as “chief” of Waluguru. The name/title
Kingalu has been passed matrilineally since the eighteenth century and designates the
head of the Bena lineage in Kinole. British, under indirect rule, named Kingalu “chief” of
Uluguru, but deposed him in 1936.
Kolero – a powerful mzimu spirit and its attendant place of residence in southern Uluguru
kurithi (-rithi) – to inherit
kutawala (-tawala) – to rule
kuzikiri – see zikiri
kuzulu – see -zulu
maadili – ethics
madrassa – Quranic schools
mapepo (sing. pepo) – a kind of spirit that resides in natural places; today they are often (but not
always) considered malevolent
masika – the long rains which fall from March to May
matambiko (sing. tambiko) – rituals where the living reconcile with the dead through offerings
and the recitation of sacred words
maulidi – the Islamicized version of girls’ initiation ceremonies
xv

mazimbo – lineage medicine (dawa)
mganga (pl. waganga) – traditional healer
miiko (sing. mwiko) – taboos
mila – tradition
mitishamba – herbal medicine
mizimu (sing. mzimu) – ancestral shades or territorial spirits, those to whom offerings are made
during matambiko
mjomba – singular of wajomba
Mkuyuni – a ward in Uluguru, as well as one of the villages in the ward, the central site of my
research
Mluguru – sing. of Waluguru
Morogoro – a city of approximately 300,000 which sits at the northern edge of Uluguru.
Morogoro is the capital of Morogoro Region and the former capital of Morogoro District,
in which Uluguru is located
Muhhabia – singular of Wahhabia
MVIWATA – Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania (National Network of Farmers’
Groups in Tanzania), the main smallholder organization in Tanzania and a member to La
Via Campesina
mtawala – administrator or “subchief” under British indirect rule
mwiko – singular of miiko
mzee (pl. wazee) – elder man; I use this as a honorific throughout the text
mzimu – singular of mizimu
Native Authority – the principle institution of British indirect rule. The Native Authority
consisted of “traditional” or local authorities who administered African populations on
behalf of the British.
NGO – nongovernmental organization
ngoma – lit. dance or drum; mostly used in Uluguru to refer to girls’ initiations
ngoto – payment in cash or kind paid by outsiders for the use of lineage land
PELUM – Participatory Ecological Land Use Management, a regional NGO
xvi

pepo – singular of mapepo
PES – Payment for Ecosystem Services
PFM – participatory forest management
pombe – locally brewed beer
pori – wilderness
Qadariyya – one of the main tariqa in Uluguru
SAT – Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania
shamba – farm plot
sharia – law (Islamic or secular)
shehe (pl. mashehe) – sheikh, elder or learned Muslim. In Uluguru, the term typically refers to
the leader of a Sufi order
shughuli za kibinadamu – human activities
SUA – Sokoine University of Agriculture
Sunna – the traditions and practices of Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims
-tafsiri – to translate or interpret
tambiko – singular of matambiko
TANU – Tanganyika African National Union. The main political party in Tanzania from the
1950s until 1977, when it merged with the leading party in Zanzibar to become CCM
TANU Youth – the youth wing of TANU, popular in Uluguru prior to independence
tariqa – Sufi orders
ugali – stiff cornmeal porridge; the staple food in most of Tanzania
Ujamaa – lit. familyhood; Tanzanian socialism
ukoo – matrilineal lineage or clan
Uluguru – a small mountain range, part of the Eastern Arc Mountains, located in eastern
Tanzania
Uluguru Land Usage Scheme (ULUS) – a forced terracing program implemented in the
mountains, 1953–1955, which ended in mass protests
xvii

ULUS – see “Uluguru Land Usage Scheme”
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
utamaduni – culture
VDC – Village Development Committee
vijana – youth
waganga – plural of mganga
wahhabia – Wahhabi; exonym for Islamic reformists associating them with Saudi tradition
wajomba – matrilineal uncles; in this case, the term refers in particular to the male heads of
matrilineages
wali – Sufi saints
walimu – teachers, including Islamic teachers
Waluguru – members of the Luguru tribe. Most residents of Uluguru consider themselves
Waluguru
wapwa (sing. mpwa) – nephews and nieces
wazee – elders
wazungu (sing. mzungu) – white people, Europeans
WRRBO – Wami-Ruvi River Basin Office
WUA – Water Users Association
WWF – the World Wildlife Fund
zamani – before, in previous times
ziara – large Sufi gatherings, often but not always related to saints
zikiri – a Sufi practice of repeating Koranic verses or the names of God; in Uluguru, it refers to a
more specific collective vocal performance
-zulu –the practice of visiting graves to clean them and recite prayers
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INTRODUCTION

Just after midnight on March 1, 2018, I heard the tinny sound of rain sweep over my
corrugated metal roof. Masika, 1 the long rains which fall on Tanzania from March to May, had
arrived, almost comically on schedule. Unlike the more fitful “short rains” of November and
December, this downpour was light but steady. Some of the drops from my roof fell into waiting
buckets my landlady’s family had placed under the eaves to spare themselves a trip to the tap at
the foot of the hill. Others ran down the steep, rust-colored slope, soaking into the small and now
muddy footpaths that connected my house with others on the hillside and spilling into the ditch
along the packed-earth road a few dozen meters below. During the day, this road rumbled with
trucks full of fruit and cases of soda, crowded buses, motorcycles, and occasionally the tintedwindow vehicles of government officials and the high, bouncing jeeps of tourists on safari. The
road was originally constructed under the orders of the German colonial administration to
connect the settlement at Mikese on the railroad to the north with their outpost at Kisaki a
hundred kilometers (60 mi.) to the south. Today, it serves as the main artery of the eastern
Uluguru mountains, a small and breathtakingly steep cluster of peaks that extend a mere 65
kilometers (40 mi.) from north-south and half that distance east to west, but which reach
elevations exceeding 2,500 meters (8,200 ft.).

1

All non-English words are in Swahili unless otherwise indicated.
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As I looked out across the road from my house, the line of peaks to the west was lost in
darkness. For much of the coming months, clouds would obscure the top of the mountains from
view, hiding the emerald green of the Uluguru Nature Reserve that runs along the mountains’
spine, its sharp boundaries another legacy of German rule. Nearly every day, waves of rain
would sweep over the valley, gradually saturating the road into a thick mud until several
stretches became nail-biting ordeals, trucks and buses sliding perilously toward the banks or
sinking into immobility. The mountains’ streams and rivers would swell and turn reddish brown
with soil as they tumbled from the high forests through twisting valleys before finally spilling
into the lowlands to the east. The rain that escaped my landlady’s buckets would make its way to
one of these rivers, known locally as the Mbezi. The Mbezi emerges from the Uluguru Nature
Reserve high in Tegetero Ward. Another major stream to the north passes through an area known
as Kinole, where it plunges thirty meters down the dramatic Kisimbi Falls. The two branches
meet near Kinole market, forming a wide and rapid stream that twists along Kinole road before
veering to the south to snake along the eastern edges of a village called Mkuyuni, where I sat that
night listening to the sound of rain on my iron roof.
Uluguru is one of the rainiest places in East Africa, especially the eastern slopes which
catch moisture from the Indian Ocean, two hundred kilometers (125 mi.) to the east. Rainfall
averages 1,500 to 3,000 mm. (60–120 in.) per year (Burgess, Doggart and Lovett 2002: 141;
Nobert and Skinner 2016). The mountains are also the origin of one of Tanzania’s most
important rivers, the Ruvu, which serves as the primary source of fresh water for the country’s
largest city, Dar es Salaam. The Ruvu, which is the name of the Mbezi after it exits the
mountains, gathers tributaries from all sides of the mountains, first the Mvuha River to the south
and then the Mgeta, which flows from the mountains’ drier western slopes and encircles the
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range to the south. As it bends north, wending past century-old sisal plantations, the Ruvu meets
the Ngerengere, which emerges from northern Uluguru and serves as the main water source for
the regional capital, Morogoro. Past this juncture, several intake stations draw water for Dar es
Salaam, while the river itself arcs northward, finally spilling into the Indian Ocean near the
breezy coastal town of Bagamoyo. Dar es Salaam, already home to over six million people, is
one of the fastest growing cities on earth and the population is projected to exceed ten million by
2030 (Rosen 2019; UN DESA 2018). It also serves as Tanzania’s main port and commercial hub.
While Dar es Salaam expands, however, flows of the Ruvu River are declining. Despite a lack of
clear evidence of the causes of these declines, official blame for shortages has mostly fallen on
smallholder farmers in the watershed, especially those in Uluguru near the river’s source. The
government has responded by enacting measures barring cultivation along riverbanks and
banning other activities believed to contribute to declining flows, and by launching a series of
development projects in conjunction with international donors which aim to change the
purportedly harmful behaviors of the farmers (Lopa et al. 2012; Muthui and Mariki 2018; URT
2009).
I had come to Mkuyuni in large part because of the importance of Uluguru as a rainwater
catchment. I was interested in the ways that conflicts over spirits and rainmaking served as sites
of ecological and political debate over the responsibility to care for the Earth. I also wanted to
understand how residents of the mountains, mostly smallholder farmers who use hoes to cultivate
small rainfed plots, were responding to an increasingly unpredictable climate alongside
escalating pressure from the government and international agencies to change their practices for
the sake of downstream water users. The water catchment is a critical vantage point from which
to understand the politics of environmental change. Its existence is predicated on asymmetrical
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relationships, as geographical, historical, and political factors converge to render it the source of
one of the most vital resources for human life, fresh water. The relationship between the
catchment and downstream areas also at once echoes and overlays further asymmetrical relations
between Africa and the Global North, rendering Uluguru a nexus of relations of power and
inequality.
Dar es Salaam emerged as a commercial center reliant on fresh water from Uluguru out
of a complex series of historical factors, key among them the selection of the former fishing
village as the administrative capital of German East Africa in 1891. Through the development of
this new port town, German administrators hoped to circumvent the commercial dominance of
Bagamoyo to the north. 2 Dar es Salaam lies in a coastal catchment and not at the outlet of a
major river. The Ruvu Basin encircles Dar es Salaam to the west and north and serves as the
nearest major source of fresh water. The first Ruvu intake for Dar es Salaam was constructed
near the Ruvu Bridge on Morogoro Road in 1956, drawing Uluguru and the growing city on the
coast into a tighter and lasting relationship (DAWASA 2021). Each time water runs short in Dar
es Salaam and experts look to the mountains for the problem and its solution, the connection
becomes further sedimented in layers of reports and projects.
Recent interventions aimed to protect the water supply to Dar es Salaam are the latest in a
long history of attempts to secure fresh water from the mountains. Since at least the eighteenth
century, pilgrims from the north and east would visit the mountains’ sacred forests with offerings
and prayers during times of drought. If the powerful mizimu spirits were pleased, rainclouds
The reasons for Dar es Salaam’s selection are complex. The deep harbor was well suited to steamships, but likely a
more significant factor was the German government’s realization, following the Abushiri Revolt of 1888–89, that
direct commercial and political control over Bagamoyo would be extremely difficult to achieve and that
circumventing Bagamoyo’s control over trade routes through the development of an alternative port offered a more
realistic path to political and economic power in the region. Both Omani and British forces had previously attempted
to develop a port at Dar es Salaam for the same reason (its name a legacy of the former) but they were unsuccessful
(S. Fabian 2019: 265–268).
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would gather and follow them home. Early European explorers and missionaries wrote effusively
of the mountains’ wealth of water. When German colonialists arrived in the late nineteenth
century, they became alarmed at what they believed was rapid deforestation on the mountains’
slopes and demarcated several heavily policed forest reserves to protect the mountains’ water
sources. The British, who took over administration under a League of Nations Mandate after
World War I, maintained these reserves and added others. In the 1950s, the British ordered
farmers in the mountains to dig terraces to stop the erosion they believed threatened downstream
flows. The farmers responded with escalating protests, leading to a confrontation in which police
shot and killed a local man, John Mahenge. The outrage that followed helped catalyze the
growing nationalist movement that would lead the country to independence in 1961. The
socialist government that led the country over the following decades took a more hands-off
approach to the mountains, in part out of concern of a repeat of the anti-terracing protests, but by
the 1980s, the winds of liberalization brought increased investment in Dar es Salaam and in
commercial agriculture along the central coast. This resulted in renewed concern about the
catchment and prompted a wave of laws and projects around watershed management that
continue today.
As the following chapters show, efforts which purport to protect the water source have
served as a pretext for the forcible appropriation of land and resources, the extraction of
compulsory, unpaid labor, and the extension of colonial, state, and international control into the
mountains. Rooted in Malthusian ideologies that see humans as existential threats to nature and
shaped by unequal relationships of power across multiple scales, these patterns of extraction and
control have marked life in Uluguru for over a century. Today, as climate change renders rainfall
increasingly unpredictable and as the large farms and cities downstream continue to expand,
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concerns over water have deepened and a new round of “sustainable development” projects has
emerged. Like prior interventions, these projects paint smallholders in Uluguru as inherently
destructive forces that threaten both the sustainability of their own livelihoods in the mountains
and the flow of water downstream.
Farmers in the mountains present a different understanding of changes in rainfall and in
the environment. Drawing on long histories of sacred rainmaking and a wide range of practices
of environmental care, they suggest that the relationships between humans and ecosystems are
more complex than Malthusian paradigms suggest. Practices of rainmaking, in which
reconciliation with ancestor spirits brings good rains, bountiful crops, and human health, show
the inseparability of human and ecological wellbeing. Longstanding farming techniques that
today might be labeled agroecology or agroforestry, alongside the maintenance of trees and
water sources, reveal forms of often ignored and unpaid environmental labor that allow life in the
mountains to continue. This is not to suggest that residents of Uluguru live in “harmony” with
nature. Care and destruction exist side by side. In the same way, rainmaking rituals are not only
expressions of cultural views toward nature but are longstanding sites of political struggle over
resources and authority.
The climate crisis marks an uneven geography, its costs accruing far from the sources of
emissions that are heating the Earth. While it highlights connectivity and defies borders, it has
also deepened longstanding inequalities across space and along lines of gender, race, and class.
These uneven relations converge on the catchments, mountains, and forests of the Global South.
Viewing the climate crisis from these places, then, can reveal not only the deep historical roots of
present ecological disasters but also the radical solutions these disasters demand. The following
chapters offer such a view, focusing on the history of rainmaking in the catchment as a site of
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ecological theorizing and political critique which draws together questions of gender, health,
environment, and labor across multiple scales. Attending to rainmaking as a space of debate
marked by history and power, I suggest that the epistemologies and politics it entails open radical
possibilities to rebuild our relationships to nature. These relationships would be grounded not in
a shrinking of humanity’s place on Earth but in an expansive view of human capacities to build a
world of collective flourishing.
Social Healing and Social Reproduction
Rainmaking and Social Healing
Rainmaking is an old topic in the anthropology of Africa. It was a source of fascination
for early European explorers and ethnographers, both for the questions it raised about rationality
and belief, and for its intimate links to politics and power across much of the eastern and
southern continent (e.g., Cole 1910; Dornan 1927; Flatz 1936; Livingstone 1858; Spire 1905).
Studies across a broad area and range of time show that rainmaking had a significant role in the
centralization and exertion of political power in the region for at least five centuries (Feierman
1990; Kodesh 2007; Krige and Krige 1943; Lan 1985; Landau 1993; McKittrick 2017; Packard
1981; Schoenbrun 2006). 3 In other words, demonstrating control over the medicines, sacred
sites, and spirits necessary to bring rain was crucial to the power of many precolonial African
states and their leaders. The linkage between rainmaking and politics, moreover, has continued in
various forms into the twentieth and twenty-first century, even if it no longer serves as the
primary paradigm of political power (Lan 1985; Schoenbrun 2006).

Another body of literature on rainmaking has explored its intersections with ideas of the body and the social
construction of gender (Kaspin 2009; Sanders 2008).
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My approach to rainmaking builds heavily on the work of Steven Feierman, who several
decades ago highlighted the social nature of health and healing in much of East Africa. This
understanding of health means that kinship groups are often implicated in the illness and healing
of individual members, and that ensuring the health and fertility of people often goes hand-inhand with ensuring the health and fertility of the land. In this context, questions of social health
are also inseparable from questions of politics (Feierman 1985, 1990; Feierman and Janzen
1992). Rainmaking is the most well-known and important form of social healing in East African
history, binding political leaders’ authority to their ability to bring rain and heal the land. In the
chapters that follow, I show that this form of politics has persisted in East Africa in different
iterations, serving as a framework for political discourse and praxis that places questions of
social and ecological health at the center of political legitimacy (Feierman 1985, 1990; Feierman
and Janzen 1992; Kodesh 2007; Schoenbrun 2006).
Some historians use the term “public healing” in place of “social healing.” Discussions of
“public healing” have the benefit of highlighting the political role of practices like rainmaking
(Kodesh 2007). Here, however, I primarily use the term “social healing” because one of my aims
is to highlight continuities between the political paradigm of rainmaking at its political apex in
the centuries before colonialism and other attempts to heal the land across time and away from
centers of power. This term also highlights the potential for social healing to serve as a form of
social criticism at critical junctures of political change, rather than only as a tool of the powerful
(Feierman 1995). Finally, I also use the term because it invokes some of the underlying
connections to another concept, that of “social reproduction,” which I argue lies at the heart of
the politics of rainmaking.
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Social Reproduction
As Cindi Katz (2001: 711) aptly described it, social reproduction refers to that “fleshy,
messy, and indeterminate stuff of everyday life” through which communities, structures and
environments are sustained and perpetuated through time. Feminist scholars have long noted that
capitalism comes into being through the cleaving apart of social reproduction from production,
and the subordination of the former to the dictates of the latter. In making this claim, they draw
on the insights of Marx (1990), who identified the origins of capitalism in processes of
enclosure, whereby the mass of people were separated from the means of their own survival and
reproduction. These individuals, “freed” of their land, were then forced to sell their labor to
survive, generating surplus value for the emerging capitalist classes. However, Marxist feminists
point out, waged labor was not the only form of work on which capital relied. People also carried
out unpaid work necessary to sustain and reproduce the working class and the conditions of
society more broadly. A gendered division of labor served to naturalize this work and obscure its
social value. Capitalism, in short, demands and is subsidized by unpaid reproductive labor, while
at the same time undermining the material and social basis of social reproduction (Federici 2004,
2012; Katz 2001; Meillassoux 1972; Picchio 1992; Razavi 2009; Vogel 2013). In recent years,
converging economic and ecological crises have prompted a resurgence of work about the role of
social reproduction in society (Bhattacharya 2017a; Cielo, Coba and Vallejo 2016; Cousins et al.
2018; Fraser 2016; Naidu and Ossome 2016). Social reproduction has proven a powerful
framework to address these issues because it highlights the inherent connections between gender,
environment, health, and labor.
As many of these scholars have argued, issues of social reproduction are deeply linked to
questions of land. Especially in agrarian contexts, the conflict between social reproduction and
accumulation manifests in struggles over land and its uses (Cousins et al. 2018; Meillassoux
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1972; Moyo 1995; Naidu and Ossome 2016; Razavi 2009). Indeed, processes of primitive
accumulation, whether in medieval Europe or in the contemporary Global South, have always
been marked by appropriation of land for capital and the enclosure of commons, undermining
rural people’s ability to subsist without wage work (Federici 2004). While capitalism tends to
render land as a productive resource, social reproduction relies on land in its multiplicity, as a
locus for social relations, sacred geographies, and shared histories as well as a place to live and
farm (Ferguson 2013; D. Hall 2013; Li 2014).
Labor has always stood at the heart of feminist discussions of social reproduction
(Bhattacharya 2017a). Research on reproductive labor has explored the role of unwaged forms of
work, especially housework, care work, pregnancy, and sexual labor, under capitalism. It has
also considered the role of race, class, and geography alongside gender in structuring uneven
distributions of this work in both waged and unwaged forms, highlighting for instance the
growing role low-paid immigrant women from the Global South play in childcare and
housework in the North (Constable 2009; Dalla Costa and James 1972; Duffy 2007; Federici
2012; Fraser 2016; Glenn 1992; Pande 2014; Parreñas 2000; Picchio 1992). Together, this body
of work explores how the division of reproductive labor relies on and perpetuates interlinked
forms of inequality. It also illuminates the changing articulations of reproductive work with the
capitalist economy and asks what liberatory potentials might be found in reproductive work and
the social alliances and movements it enables.
In the following chapters, I take an expansive view of reproductive labor, including forms
of work that have received less attention in this literature. One such form is the work of ritual,
which includes caring for the dead, passing down cultural knowledge, and healing affliction.
While Wolf (1966) long ago recognized the “ceremonial fund” as a component of social
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reproduction, the role of labor in ritual and its place in processes of social reproduction remains
undertheorized, especially as it relates to questions of gender (Bernal 1994: 58; Cousins et al.
2018: 1080). Reproductive labor also encompasses forms ecological labor, the work of
cultivating and caring for ecosystems that support the continued flourishing of human and nonhuman life. Marxist ecofeminists have long argued that care for nature is intimately linked to
other forms of reproductive work (DiNovelli-Lang and Hérbert 2018; Mies and Shiva 1993;
Salleh 1997, 2010; Shiva 1988). Practices of social healing in Uluguru highlight these
connections, showing the inseparability of ecology, human health and fertility, the preservation
of knowledge, and care for the dead.
Ecologies of Social Reproduction
Ecological labor is a critical component of social reproduction, but its role is often
obscured by views which posit nature and society and distinct and opposed spheres. To
understand it as labor thus invites a radial rethinking of the relationship between humans and
their environment. Scholars have long pointed out the social construction of nature and
challenged the nature/culture dualism that has characterized the Western intellectual tradition
(Coronil 1997; Cronon 1996; Descola 2013). Political ecologists and environmental historians
have also shown that humans have played active roles in cultivating healthy and biodiverse
ecosystems for thousands of years (Amanor 1994; Armstrong et al. 2021; Balée 1989, 2013;
Fairhead and Leach 1996; Fraser, Leach and Fairhead 2014). This work directly contradicts
pervasive depictions of humans as inherently destructive forces disrupting a natural equilibrium
that excludes them. Indeed, ecological research in recent decades has highlighted the need to
rethink ecosystems not through the framework of equilibrium at all, but rather through a more
complex array of dynamics (Scoones 1999). Equilibrium views informed early ecofeminist
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interventions around ecological labor, at times lending itself to a romanticized and essentialized
understanding of both women and nature (Shiva 1988). In contrast, a nonequilibrium approach to
ecosystem dynamics allows for a more nuanced understanding of the ecological role of this
labor. Viewed this way, it is not limited to preserving and maintaining a given set of resources
but is active in cultivating and shaping them for a wide range of purposes and with a wide range
of ecological outcomes.
Such an understanding of ecological labor directly undermines Malthusian beliefs that the
Earth has a natural carrying capacity and that excess human populations pose an existential threat
to the continuation of life. Rather, attending to ecological labor offers a richer and more
expansive view of relationships between humans and their ecosystems. Such a perspective is
partially indebted to Ester Boserup (1965), whose research on agricultural systems countered
neo-Malthusian assumptions that increasing population would inevitably lead to downward
ecological and economic cycles. Rather, Boserup showed, increasing population could serve as a
spark for innovation which would allow for agricultural intensification. At the same time,
processes of agricultural intensification are hardly coterminous with preserving biodiverse
ecosystems or life-sustaining climate conditions. Indeed, the opposite is often true. Attending to
the multiple dimensions of social reproduction allows an analysis that expands beyond measures
of agricultural output or food production which are essential but not adequate to support life.
In part to counter Malthusian depictions of people as threats to the environment, some
scholars have argued incorrectly that reproductive labor can be defined by sustainability or the
absence of a metabolic rift. If Malthusian views depict racialized peoples as existential threats to
life, these counternarratives posit those associated with reproductive labor—especially women,
peasants, and Indigenous peoples—as the natural guardians of an environmental balance
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upended by patriarchy, capitalism, and colonialism. For instance, Ariel Salleh suggests that the
work of peasants, Indigenous people, and parents is “eco-sufficient without externalized costs in
social, ecological or embodied debt” (2010: 212). Similarly, although in somewhat different
language, Vandana Shiva (1998) valorizes peasants’ and women’s work as maintaining
ecological balance. This view, however, relies on a fundamental simplification of the role of this
labor. Social reproduction, after all, entails the reproduction of capitalism and unsustainable
relations of production. Moreover, and more importantly, the levels of consumption that social
reproduction demands are not metabolically determined but rather are a product of class struggle,
history, and culture (Bhattacharya 2017b; Thompson 1980). One part of this struggle is shaped
by capital’s need for increased consumption in the interest of its own reproduction and expansion
(Bhattacharya 2017b). 4 It is true that social reproduction is, by definition, concerned with
sustaining the conditions for human life, but it does not follow that its consumption of use values
is limited by metabolic factors.
Understanding social reproduction as historically and not naturally determined not only
pushes against romantic views of peasants, Indigenous people, or women as naturally in
harmony with nature. It also unsettles proposals to solve environmental problems through a
reduction of consumption based on natural or “authentic” needs (Löwy 2019: 174; Shiva 1988:
8–9). Rather, this analysis locates the source of current environmental crises in the capitalist “law
of value” which makes ever-expanding consumption fundamental to the reproduction of the
system itself. Indeed, the contradiction whereby capitalism demands increasing levels of
consumption while undermining the material conditions of social reproduction leads to an
intensifying exploitation not only of reproductive labor but of nature as well. In other words, the
This is also the root of Shiva’s deleterious distinction between “culturally perceived poverty” and “real material
poverty” (1988: 8–9).
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problem is not “growth” or “(over)consumption” as a quantitative factor exceeding natural
limits, but a qualitative form of growth driven by the tyranny of exchange value maximization.
The solution, then, is neither a technical fix nor a return to romanticized simplicity but must
begin with a process of delinking social reproduction from global exchange values. Given the
elasticity of social reproduction, this would not necessarily lead to sustainability. Rather, it
would open space for other regimes of value through which less harmful relationships with
ecosystems and the climate could be struggled for and built. By making ecological labor visible,
the terrain of this struggle would not only rest on questions of consumption but on the diversity
of possible relationships between humans and their environments.
Practices of agroecology provide a useful example. In agroecology, farms and “natural”
environments are not seen as distinct and opposed spaces. Rather, agriculture is understood as
situated within ecosystems and reliant on methods of cultivation which support biodiversity and
sustainability. Agroecology, thus, is built on ecological labor and offers a space in which use
values for human consumption and ecosystems as such are produced together rather than
understood in zero-sum terms. As Chapter 4 shows in more detail, agroecology is possible in
some cases under terms set by capitalism when it is as productive as other forms of agriculture.
However, as Max Ajl (2018, 2020) suggests, we can also find in agroecological practices a more
radical potential, in which ecological concerns (understood as use values) can be measured
alongside the exchange values of agricultural output instead of inherently being subordinated to
them. For such a practice to become possible, however, it necessary to delink agrarian spaces
from the tyranny of the market. In making this argument, Ajl builds on the work of Samir Amin
(1990), who suggested delinking as a strategy by which nations on capitalism’s periphery could
develop on their own terms and not those set by global capital. The latter terms, Amin showed,
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led to an inevitable draining of value away from the Global South. Ajl reads Amin’s theory
expansively, showing that although Amin himself largely focused on questions of production, his
work created space for forms of transformation that could value ecology as “the ultimate use
value” (2020: 5). Here, I extend Ajl’s argument, suggesting that if we understand use value to be
bound up in questions of social reproduction, delinking also makes space to revalue reproductive
labor (including ecological labor) and to bring gender, ecology, and colonialism into a single
frame.
Uneven Terrains of Reproductive Labor
The question of reproductive labor is always also a question of its distribution. Globally,
reproductive labor tends to fall disproportionately, but not only, on women. A simplistic view of
this pattern can lead to an essentialized view of gender and sex in which biological reproductive
capacities inherent in certain bodies naturally bind those bodies to broader processes of social
reproduction. Such a view is bound up with persistent portrayals of women as inherently closer
to, and thus better suited to care for, nature (Jackson 1993; Leach 2007; Resurrección 2013). In
contrast to essentialist explanations, I argue here that gender itself emerges through the division
of labor which, far from dictated by the “natural” properties of bodies, has been shaped by long
histories of struggle. This understanding builds on the work of Marxist and postcolonial
feminists who have challenged the naturalization of “women’s work” by revealing the historical
processes through which both gender and gendered inequality have emerged over time
(Amadiume 1987; Engels 1972; Leacock 1972, 1978, 1983; Okeyo 1980; Oyěwùmí 1997; Sacks
1979; Tamale 2020). Such an approach not only pushes against the naturalization of women’s
roles in social reproduction but allows us to analyze gender itself as a contested political terrain.
Viewed in this way, men’s memories of a time when they could carry pregnancies for their wives
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(see Chapter 2) and increasing anxieties over LGBTQ rights among conservative Muslims and
Christians illuminate changing political struggles over the terms of social reproduction.
Such an anti-essentialist view also draws into focus the ways in which other axes of
inequality become bound up with struggles over social reproduction. As noted above, a robust
body of literature has explored the uneven distribution of reproductive labor along lines of race
and class. For instance, as white women in the Global North are increasingly drawn into the
waged workforce, their social reproduction in many cases rests on the work of low-paid
immigrant housekeepers and nannies from the Global South. Processes like this have resulted in
both the increasing commodification of reproductive labor and the continuing entrenchment of
racial, ethnic, and class inequalities (Constable 2009; Duffy 2007; Fraser 2016; Glenn 1992;
Parreñas 2000). Even pregnancy itself has followed this pattern through the increasing use of
surrogacy in countries like India (Deomampo 2016; Pande 2014). As I will show, ecological
labor is also distributed unevenly along lines of race and class, falling disproportionately on the
Black and Indigenous rural poor.
These inequalities in the division of social reproduction are structured spatially on
multiple scales, including along urban-rural and North-South axes. In the Global South, as many
scholars have shown, reproductive labor at the generational level occurs disproportionally in
rural areas, where children are raised and the sick and elderly cared for, supported by a
combination of meager remittances, subsistence agriculture, and petty commodity production.
Wage labor occurs elsewhere—at cities, mines, or plantations. Because the unequal valuation of
labor underlies the distinction between Global North and Global South, the role of reproductive
labor (including subsistence agriculture) at the global margins is fundamental to structures of
neocolonialism and global inequality (Amin 1990: 80; Meillassoux 1972; Wallerstein 1983:
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146–147). A recent and helpful iteration of these issues has come from Sirisha Naidu and Lyn
Ossome, who have argued that gendered labor in the agrarian South, including subsistence
farming, must be understood in part as engaged in the reproduction of a reserve army of labor
who may never directly enter the ranks of waged workers but whose presence suppresses wages
and weakens labor’s political strength (Naidu and Ossome 2016; Ossome 2021). Such a
perspective is helpful understanding social reproduction in Uluguru where relatively few
residents find long-term wage work but rather move in and out of informal opportunities within
and beyond the mountains.
As Fernando Coronil (1997) has argued, the international division of labor is bound up
with a parallel division of nature. I argue here that this is not only the case because national
economies in the Global South disproportionately rely on the sale of raw materials but also
because the work of social reproduction—including the reproduction of the environment itself—
is unevenly distributed across space. Scholars taking a world-systems approach to environmental
justice have long shown how colonial patterns of extraction, exploitation, and violence are
maintained through the circulation of resources and waste in circuits of uneven exchange
(Doringer et al. 2021; Frey et al. 2018; Givens, Huang and Jorgenson 2019; Hornborg 1998;
Mintz 1985; Moore 2003). Such processes of uneven exchange occur alongside more grounded
forms of environmental colonialism through which the principle of “conservation” has served as
a justification for the territorial expansion of colonial and neocolonial control, the enclosure of
the global commons, and the displacement of populations (Mei-Singh 2016; Nelson 2003;
Neumann 1998).
The work presented here can be read, in part, as a “spatial ethnography of labor” (Chari
and Gidwani 2005). Drawing together literature on unequal exchange with that on environmental
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colonialism, I expand on both by showing the ways in which rural labor in the Global South
continually absorbs ecological costs generated in capitalist centers. Just as the agrarian question
has been “exported” to the Global South, so has the ecological question with which it is
entangled (Moyo, Jha and Yeros 2013). Forests of the Global South are touted as solutions for
climate change, such as the promised “Great Green Wall” which will traverse the Sahel and soak
up carbon emissions emanating from the North (Baker 2019). That Africa can be imagined as a
source of clean air and water depends at once on its depiction as empty land and on the
invisibility of the ecological labor entailed in tending water sources, trees, and other parts of
“nature.” At the same time, a counter set of racist, Malthusian images paints Africa as crowded,
the resources it houses under perpetual threat from an unruly, backward, and ever-expanding
population. Although such depictions stand in apparent contradiction, they work in tandem to
displace responsibility for care of the Earth toward the South.
This process enables the appropriation of land and labor not only to meet material needs
of the global economy but also, and perhaps more importantly, to defuse political threats to
capital. Global climate change and other ecological crises have sparked a constellation of social
movements, many of them global in reach. While many such movements operate within a liberal
or reformist framework, others offer a more fundamental challenge to capitalism. “Sustainable
development” projects in the Global South have been useful for diverting some of this political
energy away from the capitalist core. They do so by continually reinscribing peasants,
pastoralists, and other rural dwellers as both the source of environmental harms and the solution
to them. The “Great Green Wall” is a powerful example. As a physical entity, it is expected to
absorb carbon dioxide and cool the earth, but even without its physical instantiation, the promise
it entails helps to soak up and dampen rising political anxieties around climate change. Although
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the magnitude of the Great Green Wall project makes it a powerful example, similar patterns are
repeated on a smaller scale across the Global South through a seemingly endless stream of
projects enacted through the apparatus of development. These projects, which often focus on
changing behaviors of rural people, typically demand both land and labor. However, depictions
of “nature” as a space devoid of human activity obscures these costs, while the global division of
nature ensures they accrue at the margins.
As a water catchment, Uluguru is a critical vantage point from which to trace the spatial
dynamics of social reproduction. As the argument laid out above indicates, the catchment is not
only a place for the extraction of clean water but also for the extraction of uncompensated
ecological labor. The material fruit of this labor, clean water, flows downstream. Some of it
supports the urban working class in its own processes of social reproduction. More is consumed
in processes of industrial production and endless construction in the urban center. It also feeds a
variety of large and small agricultural operations. Coca-Cola bottled in Dar es Salaam uses water
originating in Uluguru. Infused with syrup and carbon, the water returns to the mountains via
truck for 1000 TSH (0.43 USD) a bottle. Meanwhile, farmers in Uluguru also serve as
scapegoats when water supplies run dry downstream. It is difficult to know what the effect would
be on the flow of the Ruvu River if the Uluguru’s farmers were one day evicted, but it is certain
that the state and international agencies like the World Bank would no longer be able to respond
to crises of scarcity with a series of rural development interventions in the mountains.
The Politics of Social Reproduction
Katz has called for “a politics focused around social reproduction [which] reconnects
culture, environment, and political economy in opposition to capitalist globalization across a
wide and differentiated terrain” (2001: 718). The central argument of the chapters that follow is
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that rainmaking is—or can be—such a politics. The language of rainmaking and social healing
has served to place questions of social reproduction at the heart of political legitimacy in
Uluguru for at least two centuries. Practices of social healing are premised on the inseparability
of human health and fertility from the flourishing of the environment. Through rituals known as
matambiko (sing. tambiko), care for the dead serves to ensure the wellbeing of future
generations. These relationships are woven through the landscape in a sacred geography that
links humans, forests, and water. In this context, discussions over ancestors, rituals, and memory
serve as sites to theorize and make demands about the proper allocation of responsibility for
social reproduction in general and the climate more specifically.
The politics of rainmaking are neither singular nor timeless. They have always been sites
of political struggle, used by powerful men to justify their control over people and land as well as
by ordinary people to challenge those who abuse their authority and who fail to bring rain. Social
reproduction, as Katz rightly warns us, is not in itself revolutionary. Indeed, it is concerned with
reproducing the social relations which have generated inequality in the first place. Discourses of
rainmaking can be used to support a range of political stances and are neither inherently anticapitalist or nor inherently anti-authoritarian. Rather, what the politics of social healing offers is
a way of un-fragmenting the gendered, environmental, and labor dimensions of social
reproduction, and instead insisting on their interconnections as a basis for political mobilization.
By placing social reproduction at the heart of politics, it also serves to shift responsibility for
reproduction upward toward the centers of power. When the rains fail, the logic of rainmaking
suggests that those in positions of power are primarily to blame and political change is in order.
Such a politics has important implications. As Katz wrote:
Redistributing responsibility for social reproduction back to capitalists and the
state…would begin to recalibrate the costs and benefits of globalization in ways
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that would pinpoint its widely distributed costs and promulgate increased social
justice and equality across classes, nations, localities and gender (2001: 719).
Social healing, by placing responsibility for social reproduction on those in power, bears this
potential, but its use toward this end depends on how it is taken up, and by whom.
Katz’s discussion of the politics of social reproduction shares much in common with
James Scott’s (1976) concept of the moral economy of the peasant. Drawing on work by E.P.
Thompson which theorized the moral economy as an explanation for marketplace revolts, Scott
argued that peasant societies tend to form a moral framework around the principles of
subsistence and reciprocity, rather than an ethic of profit maximization or egalitarian ideas about
the distribution of resources (Edelman 2005; Scott 1976; Thompson 1971). Violations of these
principles, Scott showed, gave rise to peasant resistance and sometimes rebellion. The principle
of subsistence in this formulation is closely related to ideas of social reproduction developed by
feminist scholars.
Recent work has built on Scott’s foundation to consider environmental questions,
positing a framework of “moral ecology” to understand struggles over nature in a wide range of
contexts. Griffin, Jones and Robertson (2019) trace this conversation to Karl Jacoby’s (2001)
synthesis of the idea of moral economy with work on social banditry. Jacoby examined
poaching, squatting and other violations of North American conservation laws as sites of
resistance grounded in moral frameworks that stood in contrast to the dominant forces of colonial
expansion. In José Martinez-Reyes’s (2021) work in Quintana Roo in Mexico, “moral ecology”
serves as a description of Mayan relationships to nature which contrast to the neoliberal
understandings of nature imposed by development and conservation agencies. Caterina
Scaramelli (2021) offers a more dynamic approach to the term, considering the co-constitution of
wetlands and moral ecologies in Turkey as a contested political project.
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While my work resonates with these discussions, I find the framework of social
reproduction more useful than moral economies or moral ecologies in part because it allows for a
deeper analysis of the ways in which ecological concerns intertwine with issues of gender, labor,
and health under changing political and economic conditions. Indeed, it was my interlocutors’
frequent and insistent invocations of work (kazi), especially along gendered lines, that first led
me to approach my research through a lens of social reproduction. These connections were made
clear to me by a woman named Mama Kimwe, one of my key interlocutors in Uluguru. As
Chapter 2 discusses, Mama Kimwe frequently complained that men in her family had abandoned
their ritual roles, leaving her and other women without necessary help in times of drought or
illness. “Tradition is work [mila ni kazi],” she explained emphatically. This comment resonated
with others I heard, such as when Justina John, a traditional healer, reflected: “Healing is work.
My gosh, healing is hard work” (interview, April 18, 2018), or when Asha Selemani Matikula,
struggling to answer a question I had posed about local history, exclaimed, “remembering is
work, really!” (interview, August 15, 2018). In remarks like these, I heard echoes of feminist
scholars and activists who had placed unrecognized forms of labor at the center of their
struggles.
Attending to practices of social healing through the framework of labor inverts recent
efforts to decenter humans in environmental scholarship. Discourses of rainmaking challenge the
human/nature binary not through an emphasis on “more-than-human” agency (Tsing 2013), but
rather by recognizing nature as bound up with human history and human labor. Natural places
are not those where humans are absent but where the spirits of those who died long ago reside
and where ethical relationships between human generations are continually remade. In this sense,
rainmaking also troubles temporalities which view the “Anthropocene” as a radical rupture. In
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Uluguru, there is no prior time, no pre-Anthropocene, when the rains existed apart from human
agency and human politics. This perspective, by turning climate change on its head, renders
other sorts of relationships between humans and their environments possible.
Such a view also draws attention to the uneven spatial dimensions of climate change. As
the following chapters show, if anything has changed in Uluguru in the “Anthropocene,” it is not
that humans have begun to shape the weather but that they have lost the ability to do so. This
perspective reflects the geography of climate change, in which causes and effects become
separated across space. Climate change is structured by and reproduces longstanding divisions of
nature (Coronil 1997). As a result, the ghost of colonialism appears to haunt the map. Harms
flow from the center and accumulate at the margins, reinscribing longstanding boundaries of
North and South. Seen from the slopes of Uluguru, then, the climate crisis is colonial and
requires an anticolonial response.
As Chapters 1 and 4 discuss, critiques of those in power through the language of social
healing have often suggested that leaders jeopardized social reproduction through the violation of
taboos. These taboos demanded those in power remain present in Uluguru near the sacred sites
where social healing practices were carried out and forbade the use of particular “modern” or
imported technologies and styles. I argue that these confrontations highlight the inherent
contradictions between the pulls of colonial and global regimes of power and value and the
situated demands of social reproduction in the mountains. As such, they resonate with Amin’s
formulation of “delinking” discussed above as a rejection of the capitalist law of value and a turn
toward locally determined structures of value instead. However, while Amin focuses primarily
on production and accumulation at the level of the nation, the claims of social healing orient us
toward social reproduction at a more local scale. Amin’s formulation is important because the
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nation remains a key site of decolonial struggle and offers a structure through which the robust
political action needed for delinking can become possible. However, as the language of
rainmaking reminds us, such political action does not emanate from the nation as such. Rather,
the nation itself emerges through the coalescence of political mobilizations across multiple
scales.
The claims rendered through the framework of social healing demand not only change on
the terrain of political economy but also a radical epistemic opening up that emerges when
knowledge is no longer measured in terms set elsewhere. In Amin’s formulation, the strategy of
delinking is marked not only by a shift in economic policy toward other regimes of value but
also by the development of knowledge untethered from colonial and capitalist logics (1990: 60).
Sylvia Wynter has similarly identified epistemology as critical site of a decolonial and antiracist
response to climate change (Wynter and McKittrick 2015). Drawing on Aimé Césaire’s call for a
“science of the Word,” she has suggested that the climate crisis demands not a decentering of the
human but rather an expanded understanding of humans as homo narrans, linguistic and
storytelling beings. In understandings of humans as mere biological organisms among others,
Wynter finds the roots of eugenics, racism, and climate crisis itself, driven by Malthusian ideas
of natural scarcity and competition. Rather, by comprehending humanness as a praxis irreducible
to biology, we can see beyond the horizons of the science of homo oeconomicus to new domains
of knowledge and to other ways of relating to nature. These calls also echo the work of
Indigenous scholars like Kyle Whyte (2017), Zoe Todd (Davis and Todd 2017), and Nick Estes
(2019) who have insisted that the climate crisis is inseparable from histories of colonialism and
that by attending to other ways of knowing, less destructive relationships to nature become
possible.
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Delinking, Amin hoped, would permit the construction of a “polycentric” world (1990:
ix). At its root, this vision asks us to turn away from the “blinding light” of the market, and
toward other values, relationships, and forms of knowledge (Coronil 1997: 46). Conflicts over
rainmaking have long served as sites to theorize questions of nature, climate, gender, health, and
labor, but their epistemic and political content is largely invisible to the forces of capital,
“development,” and the state. Several recent works have considered the ethical and
environmental implications of rainmaking traditions in the context of climate change (Halperin
2017; Ombati 2017; Omotoso 2019). However, where this work has tended to frame rainmaking
in cultural terms, I approach it through a lens of history and political economy. By attending to
social healing as a site of ongoing debate and struggle over the terms of social reproduction, I
also suggest that the ideas and relationships it entails, although situated in the space of the
catchment, are not parochial.
The catchment at once reinscribes and dismantles ideas of the local. If, as Katz (2001:
709–711) has argued, social reproduction is bound in particular ways to place, the discourses of
rainmaking described here are tangled up with specific histories and geographies that converge
in the Uluguru Mountains. At the same time, however, the catchment has only emerged as a
place in relation to the cities, villages, plantations, and farms downstream. The feminist
geographer Doreen Massey (1994) warned against associations of place with boundedness,
suggesting instead that place be understood as a nexus of relationships that necessarily extend
beyond itself. Such relationships are always contested and continually remade through struggle
and through work. The catchment reminds us of the porous and political nature of place. The
perspective it affords on global crises is not a product of its terrain or of the water that it sends
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tumbling toward the coast, but of the histories which have rendered it a site of struggle over
nature and social reproduction.
“Hapa Kazi Tu”
The chapters that follow, I, like Kathi Weeks (2011), “run roughshod” over traditional
distinctions between work and labor, using the two words largely interchangeably. Scholars draw
a variety of distinctions between “work” and “labor,” but the difference usually hinges on the
social nature of labor and/or on the reduction of an expansive category to its narrow and
alienated instantiation as wage labor under capitalism (Arendt 1958: 79–93; Braverman 1998:
31–35; Marx 1990; Weeks 2011: 14–16; Wolf 1982: 74). John and Jean Comaroff (1987) offer a
particular formulation of this in the context of South Africa, highlighting the ways Tswana
involved in wage labor in the mines distinguished between two categories, dira (work) and
bereka (labor), the latter used only for waged work. In contrast, in Uluguru, there was a single
word invoked in my conversations: kazi. The words work and labor here both stand as
translations of kazi. “Work” is the more literal translation. However, because I understand certain
kinds of kazi to fit the framework of what is usually called “reproductive labor,” I also draw on
that term, placing my interlocutors in dialog with feminist scholars who likewise insist that
sustaining communities and their environments is, as Mama Kimwe would say, kazi.
When my interlocutors in Uluguru invoked kazi, I understood them to at once be
registering a complaint—that their efforts were perhaps not adequately recognized—and
expressing pride. There is a widespread valuation of hard work in Tanzania, in part a legacy of
the ideologies of Tanzanian socialism. In the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania’s first president
Julius Nyerere valorized work and called for Tanzanians to increase their hours of labor as part
of a duty to develop the new nation. Lacking in financial resources, he proclaimed, the fate of the
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new nation rested on Tanzanians’ ability to work harder and longer, a demand he made of all but
rural woman whose working hours he recognized as exceeding that of any other demographic
(1968: 29–31). Tanzania’s president at the time of my research, John Pombe Magufuli, proved
skilled at invoking Nyerere’s legacy. During his first presidential campaign in 2015, he
popularized the slogan “hapa kazi tu,” which literally translates as “here, only work.” The phrase
carried a dual sense, on the one hand a promise from Magufuli that he would roll up his sleeves
and get down to business, and on the other, an invocation of the need for hard work from all
Tanzanians. Its popularity shows some of the weight the word kazi carries. At the same time, the
pride I encountered in the term kazi from women like Mama Kimwe and Justina John was
something more than simply a state-cultivated work ethic. Rather, the work they described—
from rainmaking and healing to farming and caring for children—was always bound up with
specialized knowledge and skill. In the discussions of labor that follow, I maintain this sense of
work not only as a process of expending effort but as a skilled practice inseparable from
carefully cultivated forms of knowledge and the social relationships through which such
knowledge is produced and sustained.
Uluguru
Most residents of Uluguru are descendants of several waves of famers who arrived in the
mountains beginning sometime between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The most
important social institutions among these settlers were matrilineal lineages. Accounts agree that
by the nineteenth century, these lineages held significant control over land tenure in many areas
of the mountains. According to accounts recorded since the colonial era, political power in
lineages was concentrated in the hands of elders while male lineage heads, selected by the
women of the lineage, served as the primary administrators of the land, allocating farming plots
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Figure 1. Map of Uluguru in Tanzania. (Map created using images retrieved from
Wikimedia Commons, © Sémhur / Wikimedia Commons / CC-BY-SA-3.0)

to lineage members. This depiction of the lineage, as Chapter 1 discusses, was a simplification of
more complex and contested dynamics and was produced by predominately elite men and the
colonial administrators, missionaries, and ethnographers who recorded their accounts. In
practice, lineage control over land and people was often tenuous and stood against other forms of
social organization and shifting political dynamics within and beyond the mountains.
Nevertheless, the lineage was not simply an invention of colonial ethnography. Its ubiquity in
discussions of the mountains’ history for a century and a half indicates that as an institution and
an idealized charter for social life, it played a significant role in the ordering of politics, land, and
social relations in the mountains and in making claims about power, obligations, and access to
resources.
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Those who settled Uluguru cultivated and maintained a constellation of sacred groves
where farming was prohibited. These groves were associated with powerful spirits and were the
site of a set of rituals today known as matambiko. Matambiko varied widely over time and place,
but in general, they served to maintain relationships between the living and their ancestors, the
former offering ritual beer and reciting sacred words and the latter bringing health and fertility to
the lineage and its land, including abundant rains. Many groves were associated with particular
lineages and their ancestor spirits. Others were home to more powerful territorial spirits. These
spirits were understood to have the ability to heal or harm both the land and its people and were
particularly known for their control over rain across broad areas. It is to the sacred forests
inhabited by these territorial spirits that people would travel from far and wide during times of
drought, bearing black cloth, 5 chickens, and other offerings to secure good rains and fruitful
harvests.
Sacred forests served as spaces for the consolidation of political power and were the
frequent site of political struggle between both individuals and lineages. Indeed, the line between
lineage and territorial spirits and the forests associated with them changed frequently as centers
of power rose and fell. Rainmaking was the central and most powerful instantiation of
matambiko, marking an ability to command the health and fertility of entire regions. As Chapter
1 shows, powerful leaders did not become so because of their rainmaking abilities, as many early
colonial observers believed. Rather, rainmaking was a practice through which control over
people and resources gained in other ways was consolidated and reproduced. At the time of my
research, both ancestor and territorial spirits were known as mizimu. The slippage between spirit
categories is also a product of these political struggles. As elsewhere in East and Central Africa,
Black cloth and other black items are widely associated with rain and water across the region (Sunseri 1997:
243n37).
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spirits have long been intimately bound up with questions of power (Feierman 1990, 1995;
Fields 1985; Glassman 1995: 23–24; Gordon 2012; Hinfelaar 1989; Kodesh 2007; Schoenbrun
2006).
By the nineteenth century, residents of the mountains had become known as Waluguru
(sing. Mluguru), a geographical term meaning “people of the mountains.” The language they
spoke was referred to as Kiluguru by Swahili speakers and Chiluguru locally, although residents
of Uluguru often note the wide differences in dialects spoken throughout the mountains.
“Luguru” was recorded as a tribe by the German and British colonial administrations in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, despite uncertainty about its exact boundaries and
relations to neighboring groups. Today, “Luguru” is considered an ethnic group although many
Luguru people note its recent origins.
Uluguru, like other mountain landscapes, is best defined by its heterogeneity. Rainfall
varies widely between east and west, but also often falls unevenly from slope to slope.
Temperatures at the base of the mountains are typically 5–10 degrees Celcius warmer than the
highest occupied elevations. A biodiversity hotspot, the small range is home to hundreds of
vertebrate species and thousands of varieties of insects and plants. Fourteen species of vertebrate,
along with numerous insects and plants, are found only in Uluguru (Bracebridge et al. 2005;
Doggart et al. 2004). Soils vary widely from ruddy clays and sandy browns to rich black loam. In
some places, limestone outcroppings tower over patches of forest, frequently concealing
openings to jumbled caves which serve as gateways to the spirit world below the earth and in
which Waluguru once hid during times of war. In this rich and variegated landscape, it is
difficult to make generalizations: about the causes of soil erosion, about how much rain to
expect, about what crops will grow best.
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Residence in the mountains is concentrated in villages, largely the result of compulsory
villagization under the socialist regime of the 1970s in which thousands of families were forced
to relocate from scattered hamlets to planned villages. Most contemporary residents of Uluguru
identify farming as their primary occupation, cultivating a few acres of land, most often owned
but sometimes rented or borrowed. In addition to farming, many also run small businesses and
engage in a wide range of formal and informal labor in and beyond the mountains. Most houses
in the mountains are made of baked bricks, with corrugated metal roofs and dirt floors, though
the wealthy live in cinderblock homes with cement or tile floors and the poorest live in rented
rooms or in small homes with wattle and daub walls and thatch roofs. 6
Farmers in Uluguru grow a dizzying number of crops, although maize and rice are the
most common. These crops are primarily grown for household consumption and serve as staples,
supplemented by cassava and banana. Farmers also grow a variety of vegetables and legumes for
both consumption and sale. Fruit 7 and spices 8 serve as the principal cash crops in the eastern
mountains. Tree crops also include species used for oil, timber, and pole production, along with
kapok. 9 A few farmers in the mountains grow coffee, and sugar is common in small patches of
wetter land. Millet, once the region’s staple, remains only in small quantities, primarily used to
brew beer (pombe). Some crops are grown for local sale, most notably cassava, while fruits and
vegetables are usually sold in the markets of Morogoro, Dar es Salaam and other cities. Some
spices make their way to international export. Most farmers sell their crops to middlemen either
at their farms or at the local market since few have vehicles to bring crops to Morogoro or Dar es

Unbaked brick sits between wattle and daub and baked brick in terms of expense and desirability but is less
common than the latter.
7
Fruits grown include jackfruit, mango, pineapple, guava, soursop, custard apple, avocado, passion fruit, breadfruit,
coconut, and a variety of citrus fruits, along with berries and peaches at higher elevations.
8
Most commonly cloves, black pepper, vanilla, and cinnamon
9
Cultivated for silky fibers used in locally made mattresses and similar products
6
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Salaam themselves. Remittances from relatives working outside the mountains are common. The
wealthy and upwardly mobile—including a small number of salaried government employees as
well as some successful traders and shopkeepers—get additional income from a variety of local
and non-local investments, most commonly buildings and vehicles for rent. Those who invest
significantly in farmland usually do so outside the mountains, as terrain in most of Uluguru
renders tractors useless and makes larger-scale cultivation impractical.
Because of the terrain and the lack of paved roads, areas that are only a few kilometers
apart on a map can feel much further away and it can take hours to travel short distances. At the
same time, Uluguru is not “remote” or “isolated” in any sense. Buses and minivans known as
Noahs 10 ferry people to and from Morogoro and Dar es Salaam each day, while trucks haul fruit
and timber to the markets in the cities or arrive with cases of soda and beer to restock the bars,
restaurants, and shops along the roads. Meanwhile, hundreds of motorcycles weave across the
slopes carrying passengers and cargo to villages off the main roads. Only in the height of the
rainy seasons do areas sometimes become cut off from this constant movement for days or
occasionally weeks at a time.
Mkuyuni
This study focuses primarily on an area in northeastern Uluguru called Mkuyuni.
Mkuyuni is at once a village, a ward, and a division, each administrative unit referring to a
successively larger section of the northeastern mountains. My work traversed these scales,
although the bulk of my interviews and the entirety of my household survey were conducted in
Mkuyuni Ward. Mkuyuni emerged as a market town and the seat of the Native Authority early in
the British colonial period (1920–1961). The central market sits just below the main road as it

10

A Toyota brand name
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Figure 2. Map of Mkuyuni Division. (Map based on terrain and satellite images
retrieved from Google Earth © Google 2021)

curves south to Matombo and the Selous Game Reserve, a jumble of corrugated metal and
temporary stalls where everything from vegetables to cell phones to Qurans are sold. The village
itself encompasses a broader area extending behind the market and along the main road to the
north and south. South along the road from the market, a row of small shops and bars gives away
to a cluster of three small Pentecostal churches and a small guest house around the turnoff to
Changa Village. The Catholic and Lutheran churches lie just beyond, alongside a few small
mosques, satellites of the main Friday mosque, tucked in a valley behind the market.
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Mkuyuni Ward includes six villages: Mkuyuni, Changa, Kivuma, Kibwaya, Madamu,
and Mfumbwe. Seated high above Mkuyuni Ward to the west are Kinole and Tegetero Wards,
accessible by a road that climbs steeply westward from Kibwaya. To the east lies Kibuko Ward,
which contains the villages of Luholole, Kibuko, and Mwalazi. The population of Mkuyuni
Ward is approximately 17,000. Our household survey, conducted between December 2017 and
March 2018, found an average household size of around five people. Most households had a few
chickens and at least one cellphone, bed, and mattress, but larger livestock, motor vehicles, large
appliances, televisions, and gas and electric stoves were rare. A few households near the roads
had been connected to the electric grid in the preceding decade, but this was not the norm. Indoor
plumbing was nearly non-existent, and most households fetched water from scattered taps or
wells, the former only operating on certain days of the week in several villages. Most households
farmed a few acres of land (avg.=3.5) scattered across two or three separate plots. People
generally owned their farms individually or jointly with spouses or siblings, but some rented or
borrowed. 11 Plots averaged about fifty minutes from home on foot. 12
Mkuyuni Ward is in many ways an intermediate area in Uluguru. It lies at a far lower
elevation than the villages of Kinole and Tegetero, and little more than an hour from Morogoro
town when conditions of both the weather and the vehicle permit a smooth ride. It is
predominately Muslim (approximately 90%, with nearly all following Sunni Islam) but it also
has a sizeable Catholic population and several small but growing Pentecostal churches, as well as
even smaller Adventist and Lutheran congregations. Kinole, in contrast, sits high on the hills and
is considered one of the important centers of Luguru tradition (mila). It is the home of Kingalu, a

Of farms on which we collected data during our household survey, 70% were owned and 30% were rented or
borrowed.
12
This figure excludes a small number of farms lying outside of the broader Mkuyuni area and requiring vehicles to
commute.
11
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man many consider the hereditary “chief” of Uluguru. This title, in part a result of the careful
political maneuvering in the early years of British indirect rule and in part a reflection of longer
processes of consolidation in the nineteenth century, is widely recognized in Mkuyuni and the
surrounding areas. Kingalu’s home and a neighboring grove containing the graves of his
predecessors remain an important destination for rainmaking rituals in the mountains.
I selected Mkuyuni as a research site because of its position between Morogoro and
Kinole. Many residents of Uluguru described areas higher in the mountains as more authentically
“Luguru” and credited those at higher elevations with better knowledge of mila and of Kiluguru,
the local language which has been largely replaced with Swahili in everyday life. Several people
told me I should have done my research higher in the hills if I wanted to know about mila and
utamaduni (culture). In this imaginary, history is mapped onto elevation, and Mkuyuni stands in
an intermediate place, on the cusp between past and present. Many in Mkuyuni described this as
a deficit—a space lacking deep historical and cultural roots but also excluded from the
conveniences of urban life in Morogoro town. At the same time, those who live in Mkuyuni
travel regularly between the areas uphill and the urban areas further down, traversing both
vertical space and the temporal senses grafted onto it as they move between markets, farms,
relatives, jobs, places of worship, and places of business. Put simply, they know their way
around.
Environmental Change in Uluguru
As we have seen, interventions in Uluguru have often been premised on a need to protect
the water supply, especially in light of declining downstream flows. These concerns date back to
the earliest years of colonialism and while they have been intensified by the growth of Dar es
Salaam, they are also tied to concerns about water to Morogoro city and to largescale agricultural
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enterprises in the central coast region. There is little doubt that flows of the Ruvu have declined,
but the reason is unclear. While many interventions focus on Uluguru, measurements showing
the river’s decline come from far downstream and thus reflect not only changes in the mountains
but growing agricultural, industrial, and residential uses in the lowlands below (Lopa et al.
2012). Most reports suggest in addition to increased upstream water use, soil erosion plays a
particular role in decreasing flows as well as increasing turbidity and pollution. In eastern
Uluguru, some furrow and hosepipe irrigation diverts flows from the Ruvu’s tributaries, but most
farms are rainfed. Erosion and deforestation are thus the primary points of intervention. The
cutting and burning of trees, along with other poor farming practices, experts suggest, have led to
increasing erosion, threatening not only the rivers but also the livelihoods of farmers in the
mountains.
While there seems to be broad consensus in official reports that erosion has threatened
downstream flows, it is unclear whether the rains in Uluguru are also changing, and if so why.
While at least one official report suggests there has been no change in rainfall in the Ruvu Basin
since the 1950s, this conclusion was based on dry-season averages at three downstream stations
(Lopa et al. 2012). The climate patterns in Eastern Uluguru are significantly different from those
in other parts of the basin, so this data is inconclusive. Conflicting predictions about the longterm effect of global climate change on rainfall in Uluguru abound, although most agree that
rainfall patterns will grow more erratic and polarization between wet and dry seasons will
accelerate, increasing the risk of both floods and droughts (Chamshama, Iddi and Mvena 2008:
3; Muthui and Mariki 2018: 79; Ngana, Mahay and Cross 2010: 29; Paavola 2008). Farmers I
spoke with in the mountains most often stated that rainfall had declined overall, while others
noted an increase in heavy storms and flooding. Nearly all felt that the weather had become less
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predictable, making it difficult for farmers to prepare their fields each season. Moreover, many
farmers told me that the government largely agreed that rainfall was decreasing, and that local
deforestation was primarily to blame. These messages, apparently received from extension
agents, outreach campaigns, and a variety of other official sources, warned farmers that tree
cutting would lead to processes of desertification and decrease the rains upon which farmers
rely. 13 There are no clear data on overall changes to rainfall in the eastern mountains, let alone
data that would point conclusively to local or global factors. At the same time, concerns about
declines caused by local deforestation bleed into concerns about the role of deforestation in
increased erosion, which, as we have seen, is also believed to have contributed to declining flows
downstream. Thus, while there is widespread consensus that tree loss bears some of the blame
for decreases in the availability of water, there is considerable confusion about the exact
mechanisms through which this happens both on the part of officials and on the part of residents
of the mountains.
Depictions of Uluguru from scientists, government officials, and development agencies
tend to paint a Malthusian view of the mountains as overcrowded and increasingly degraded.
Many such reports predict that the mountains will become uninhabitable within a few years, and
official discussions about the feasibility of evicting the whole population from the mountains
have recurred since the early colonial period (see Chapters 1 and 4). It is true that Uluguru is
densely populated (although exact statistics are difficult to find) and that soil fertility has
declined in many areas. There are few within the mountains or outside of them who question that
forest cover has also been significantly reduced both from cutting wood for timber and firewood

It is possible that some of these messages have focused on the processes of desertification and deforestation in
general and that they were not accompanied by claims that this had already occurred in Uluguru. The latter
connection may have been made by the farmers themselves, who believe there both rain and forest cover have
declined.

13
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and from the clearing of new fields through controlled burns. At the same time, when the erosion
began, when the flows declined, and when the forests were cut are difficult to pinpoint. Reports
from a hundred years ago and from today are remarkably similar. Whatever the case, the
mountains’ farmers have defied these fatalistic predictions for over a century, continuing to eke
out a living on the mountains’ steep slopes.
One of the reasons they have been able to do so is by diversifying livelihood strategies
and finding ways to increase yields (Mdee et al. 2018; Ponte 2001). Another reason is that
residents of Uluguru engage in significant but often unseen forms of ecological labor, caring for
critical aspects of the environment under conditions of increasing constraint and scarcity. This is
not to suggest that Waluguru are inherent environmentalists or that they have lived “in harmony”
with the ecosystem. I do not question that many farmers in the mountains have engaged in
unsustainable practices of tree cutting and water usage. However, I also argue that many people
in the mountains also work hard to maintain the ecosystems on which their own livelihoods rely,
and that they do so in the face of increasing economic and political constraint and the breakdown
of collective institutions which once helped to manage resources and heal the earth. This
ecological labor, however, is not distributed evenly and has been the source of gendered,
generational, and classed struggles since people settled in the mountains several centuries ago.
Research Methods
My research was conducted over 18 months: 15 months from October 2017 to January
2019, and three months in the summers of 2015 and 2016. Over this time, I carried out a
household survey of 224 households in Mkuyuni Ward, conducted over 150 interviews, and
engaged in a number of activities that fall under the broad umbrella of participant-observation. I
conducted research in several archives, most notably the Tanzania National Archives, the East
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Africana Collection at the University of Dar es Salaam, and the archives of the Sokoine National
Agricultural Library. I also spent many Friday mornings in the clerk’s office at the Mkuyuni
primary court, where the clerk and judge generously let me dig through piles of dusty folders to
review hundreds of civil and criminal cases related to land, inheritance, forests, and water. As a
foreign researcher in Tanzania, I was affiliated with the Department of Agricultural Extension
and Community Development at Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in Morogoro with the
official title of research associate. From January 2018 to January 2019, I lived in a rented house
in Mkuyuni Village, a five-minute walk from the market. During the summers of 2015 and 2016
and for the first few months of my main research period, I lived in Morogoro town, with periodic
stays in Dar es Salaam.
Throughout this research I collaborated with my research assistant, Gerald Berege, whom
I first met in 2015 in Falkland, a small area on the edge of Morogoro near SUA. Gerald was with
friends and he rather pointedly introduced the group: “We are the unemployed graduates of the
university.” Gerald had graduated from SUA with a degree in Rural Development but, aside
from a few short stints, had been unable to secure a job, an issue he attributed in large part to a
lack of family connections. Gerald, whose mother is Mluguru from the western side of the
mountains, soon began assisting me with my research and attendant logistical hurdles. As
someone of partial Luguru descent but who grew up in town, graduated from university, and
lacked family connections in Mkuyuni, Gerald was mostly seen as an outsider by those we
interviewed. At the same time, he was much less of an outsider than I was, as a white American,
and his social proximity to communities in Uluguru helped put at least some of those we spoke
to at ease, especially through conversations about his lineage and their home on the other side of
the mountains. Gerald and I conducted the entire household survey and most formal interviews
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together. However, he commuted from Morogoro town and only came to Mkuyuni four or five
days a week. The archival research, participant-observation, and informal interviews and
conversations I did mostly alone.
All research was carried out in Swahili, which is the most spoken language in daily life in
the mountains. Kiluguru is also spoken in greetings and ritual settings, to baffle nosy outsiders,
and to simply to relish in the sorts of social and cultural connections the shared language
represents to residents of Uluguru. Many in Mkuyuni took time to tutor me in Kiluguru and by
the end of my time there, I could engage in lengthy but basic pleasantries with my neighbors.
Because Kiluguru and Kiswahili share significant similarities in grammar and vocabulary, it was
also possible for me to make out some meaning in conversations that otherwise exceeded my
linguistic abilities.
The household survey (n=224), which was conducted from December 2017 to March
2018, used a random walk sampling method. 14 We surveyed every fifteenth house in the six
villages of Mkuyuni Ward, asking about household composition, age, place of birth, religion,
clan, occupation, education, socioeconomic markers (such as house type and ownership of
livestock and household items), farm ownership, size, and location and crop selection. We also
asked which crops were sold and where. We further attempted to capture information on sources
of income such as remittances but found the answers we received inconsistent and ultimately

Households were defined as those who prepared a majority of their meals together. We paid local government
officials or individuals they recommended to us 10,000 TSH (4.00 USD) per day to help find the locations of hamlet
and homes, since many are scattered away from the main roads and boundaries of villages are not clearly marked.
However, we made certain that our guides waited well out of earshot both when asking for informed consent and
during the survey itself. We explained to each participant that the survey was optional and unaffiliated with the
government. We also worked to find somewhat unpredictable counting methods that would make it difficult for our
guides to influence our household selection. We believe we were largely successful in maintaining a random
outcome and avoiding undue influence.
14
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unusable. 15 Formal interviews, which were conducted primarily from April 2018 to January
2019, were semi-structured, with a flexible schedule of questions about local history, Luguru
culture and traditions, issues of environmental change, religious beliefs, challenges faced by the
community, and hopes for the future. Most questions were open-ended, and we tried to follow
the lead of our interviewees on topics to highlight. To select interview subjects, we asked
existing contacts to identify individuals who were particularly knowledgeable about local history
and culture. We strove for gender balance, focusing primarily on elders but over time
incorporating more young interviewees. Later we also engaged in more targeted sampling
focusing on particular religious groups (Islamic reformists and Pentecostal Christians) and
traditional healers (waganga). We also carried out several group interviews with elders in
Ludewa Village (Kinole Ward) and with youth in Mkuyuni and Kibwaya Villages (Mkuyuni
Ward). Beyond this, I also had interviews or informal conversations with many village and ward
officials, individuals who had worked as surveyors during villagization in the 1970s, religious
leaders, and individuals involved in specific NGO-run development projects, both residents of
Uluguru and current and former project staff in Morogoro town. Most interviews were done in
single sessions but occasionally, we returned for one or more follow-up sessions and/or informal
conversations. To compensate for time and labor expended on participation, we paid all
household survey and interview participants 5,000 TSH (approximately 2.00 USD) 16 per survey

There are several possible reasons for this. Some respondents suspected, despite our repeated protests to the
contrary, that we might be screening for eligibility in some sort of development program with direct material
benefits, and thus they were hesitant to indicate cash income. In other cases, remittance income was too inconsistent
to be easily reported to us or did not seem to respondents to fall within the parameters of our questions.
16
I settled on this amount in consultation with Gerald as well as my advisor at SUA, Gabriel Nzalayaimisi. It was
intended to rest at the upper end of rates for informal labor in the area but not to be so high that poorer individuals
would feel compelled to participate. I had originally intended to pay more for interviews than surveys, since the
former took considerably more time (45–120 minutes instead of 20–30 minutes) but we quickly realized that paying
two amounts would lead to confusion and ill-will and we settled on a single rate instead.
15
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or interview session, with the exception of government officials, religious leaders, and NGO staff
who we spoke to in their professional capacities.
During my time in Mkuyuni, I also visited one of the village’s churches nearly every
Sunday, rotating between the three small Pentecostal congregations and the larger Catholic
church. As a non-Muslim, I was not permitted in either the main Friday mosque or the newer
reformist mosque. However, one smaller satellite mosque permitted me to attend a few sessions
of madrassa where women and children were instructed in Quran and proper Muslim prayer, and
numerous Muslim leaders and teachers met with me to explain questions of religious practice
and belief throughout my research. I also attended girls’ initiation ceremonies in both their
traditional and Islamic iterations, as well as weddings, public holiday celebrations, and memorial
and funeral services. After finishing interviews each day, I often spent late afternoons drinking
soda and eating chipsi mayai 17 in one of Mkuyuni’s small restaurants, sipping small cups of
coffee with old men along the road, or visiting with vendors around the market. I also developed
lasting relationships with several key interlocutors whom I would visit regularly to talk
informally about my research questions and other topics of interest. On such visits, I would often
bring small gifts of sugar or tea. I also received many gifts, most often freshly harvested fruit.
*

*

*

Throughout research, I tried to bracket questions of “truth” or “accuracy” in my
interviews and conversations (although this is easier said than done, I quickly found). Feminist
researchers and other scholars have long questioned the notion of an objective truth against
which accounts can be measured, instead pointing to the ways in which knowledge is always
shaped by processes of narration and memory, as well as by power relations (Brooks and Hesse-

17

Tanzanian street food, French fries cooked in egg.
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Biber 2007). Moreover, misrememberings, silences, and lies often reveal as much as they
obscure, although the “truths” they contain may be in a different register (Portelli 1991). In the
interviews and conversations that constituted the bulk of my research, I approached speech not as
primarily representational but as a social act bound up in relations of power, an act that carries
intentions and demands response—not only words but also actions. In this, I follow Bakhtin:
[The speaker] does not expect passive understanding that, so to speak, only
duplicates his own idea in someone else’s mind. Rather, he expects response,
agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth…. The desire to make
one’s speech understood is only an abstract aspect of the speaker’s concrete and
total speech plan (Bakhtin 1986: 69).
Language is not simply used to transfer information but is embedded in complex social relations
of which it is an integral part. It not only conveys content but seeks response. Following from
this understanding, I focused not on whether responses I received were “true” (in the sense of
accuracy or genuineness) but what they aimed to achieve and what they asked of me. Because
the people I interviewed knew I was writing a book, I typically understood their answers to my
questions as, in part, requests to share particular pieces of information, opinions, and framings. I
have tried to treat these requests with care and respect, although I have certainly not met them
all—indeed, it would be impossible not only for reasons of space but because many requests
stood in direct contradiction and because I, like others, had my own agendas as well.
Some requests were more explicit. One day in June 2018, I went to the village office to
meet with the Village Executive Officer who was supposed to show me documents related to
several recent land cases. When I arrived, three SUA professors from the Department of
Agricultural Extension and Community Development (DAECD) were in the midst of a meeting
with the village livestock officer and several other village leaders, following up on research done
by a student the prior year. I was told to have a seat and wait, so I sat awkwardly against the back
wall, listening to the ensuing conversation. The village leaders were explaining to the professors
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that people in Mkuyuni were tired of SUA students showing up to do research, getting their
degrees, and departing, leaving those in Mkuyuni to wonder about the results of the research to
which they had contributed. As a graduate student researcher affiliated to DAECD at SUA, I
understood the message was also directed at me, whether by design or chance. And indeed, I
heard similar sentiments many times during my research. Many of those who participated in my
household survey or interviews asked whether results would be shared. I agreed that they would,
and that I would ensure that a copy of this study would be deposited at the ward office in
English, and that Swahili summaries, to be followed eventually by fuller translations, would
follow as soon as I was able to find the time or funds.
One outcome of this research will therefore be the creation of a small archive in
Mkuyuni. This will contain copies of this text and related articles along with copies of several
published books about the region, and some accounts by elders I recorded explicitly for
preservation and sharing. I also hope it will contain copies of additional books, dissertations and
theses pertaining to the area. During my research, Mkuyuni lacked stable internet beyond a 2G
level, and few people had access to smartphones. The flow of knowledge from Uluguru, like the
flow of water and other resources, has been extractive. Taking the small measures I have
proposed will not reverse these larger flows. For that, structural change is needed (Chitere and
Mutiso 2015; Edelman 2009; Hale 2007).
Finally, it should be noted that most of the names I use in the following chapters are real.
A few people requested anonymity, but the vast majority wanted to be cited and recognized for
their knowledge. Even in cases where accounts involved direct criticism of relatives or neighbors
or otherwise involved controversial opinions, my interlocutors typically insisted that I should
record their names. I am thankful for this permission, because it allows me to cite them alongside
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scholars whose articles and books have also contributed to this study. Together, these two groups
make up my main interlocutors—that is, those with whom I am in conversation and whose
knowledge and theorizations I draw on to make sense of the questions addressed in the following
chapters.
As this suggests, I engaged my interlocutors in Uluguru as experts and fellow theorists
(F. Harrison 2016; Nordstrom 2009). Jan Kees van Donge (1993), in his work in Western
Uluguru, reported that, despite his best efforts, he could not elicit sophisticated interpretations or
theorizations of social life from those he spoke to in the mountains. In my conversations, I found
the opposite to be true. Many people I spoke with in Uluguru had rich interpretations of social
and environmental change. Often, such interpretations came to light through small statements,
like Mama Kimwe’s exclamation, quoted above, that tradition is work. The analyses embedded
in such statements emerged over the course of multiple conversations and through the process of
building social relationships. In our ongoing discussions, elders shared with me complex
analyses of shifting relationships to land in the socialist period and their links to broader
philosophical questions about the nation, equality, and labor (Chapter 2), and of the changing
economic pressures that had contributed deforestation and upended relations to the past (Chapter
4). Due to the asymmetrical flow of knowledge out of the mountains (and from Swahili into
English), there are limits to which most of those who live in Uluguru have been able to read and
engage with the scholarly publications I cite here, but I do not think that their knowledge or
theories were therefore more parochial or bound to the horizons of the “local.” Rather, all
knowledge is assembled from diverse sources and all is informed and limited by positionality in
particular ways. Of course, my own is no exception.
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Spies, Lizards, and the Politics of Knowledge
In 2016, while at SUA, I met a young Tanzanian anthropologist named Sylvester Haule
who had conducted extensive research about the sacred forest at Kolero, Uluguru’s most
important rainmaking shrine. As Haule was wrapping up his research and I was just beginning
my own, he warned me that I should prepare to be met with obfuscation if I tried to carry out
ethnographic research in the mountains. In the first nine months of his research, Haule had
eagerly recorded interview data about the community’s relationship to the sacred forest, but as he
began to assemble his findings, they began to fall apart. While he had found many people willing
to speak to him and answer his questions, the accounts he gathered did not hang together.
Instead, they appeared to be a series of misdirections and partial truths which led him in circles.
Haule was discouraged but he persevered, returning to Kolero to continue his research. Over the
time he had stayed in the area, he found, he had gradually built trust, especially through offering
rides to the hospital in town and in providing other forms of material assistance to members of
the community. Extending his stay in Kolero to nearly two years, he was able to develop
relationships and to gain significant information about the Kolero spirit and its forest.
Haule’s difficulty gaining information was in part the result of tensions around poaching
and illegal logging in Kolero. Both the Kolero forest’s potential as a site of illicit logging and its
proximity to Selous Game Reserve to the south meant that the area had come under scrutiny
from the state, and several area residents had been arrested and faced charges for poaching just
before Haule began his fieldwork. Haule was a Tanzanian but not Mluguru and did not have any
connection to the area beyond his research. In light of this, residents of the area were
understandably suspicious of their new visitor and his deep curiosity about their use of natural
resources (Sylvester Haule, personal communication, July 2016).
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Concerns about anthropologists as agents of the state or foreign interests resonate with
the long history of colonial anthropology in the area. 18 As Chapter 1 shows, colonial
ethnography was an important tool for the consolidation of administrative power by both the
British and certain elite men in the mountains. Fears about the role of anthropologists in
struggles over power were further amplified during the Cold War, when Tanzanian socialism and
the country’s political and material support of liberation movements around the continent made it
a target for espionage. Indeed, I heard a rumor of a foreign spy who had posed as a researcher
interested in traditional Luguru dances and who used this cover to smuggle vital information out
of the country some decades prior to my research. Although no one was able (or willing?) to tell
me to what this smuggled information may have pertained, I suspect it was related to the African
National Congress (ANC) training base located in the Uluguru area during the struggle against
apartheid in South Africa.
To the best of my knowledge, the people I spoke with in Uluguru did not suspect me of
being a spy for a foreign government 19 nor of gathering information for antipoaching policing (a
subject of considerably less interest in Mkuyuni than in areas closer to forest and game reserves
like Kolero). I also made little secret of my politics during my fieldwork, although I generally
abstained from commenting on Tanzanian electoral or party politics, a subject that became
increasingly fraught during my time in Uluguru. For related reasons, I avoided dealing with
government bureaucrats and police as much as possible, except for local authorities such as
village and hamlet chairmen.

The use of anthropologists as spies has been widely documented elsewhere (Edelman 2009: 252–253; Gusterson
2003; Price 2002, 2008).
19
One possible exception may be the reformist Muslims, who did understandably suspect I was there to gather
unfavorable information about them that might be used to justify U.S. imperialist wars. See Chapter 3 for details.
18
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Despite my general distance from the Tanzanian and American governments, however, I
was still subject to several suspicions from my interlocutors, chief among them that I was in
search of the gold and gemstones that are found in small quantities in the mountains. Foreign
interest in Uluguru, especially during Kikwete’s largely laissez faire administration (2005–
2015), centered on the region’s mineral resources and the area was home to several small mines
with a mix of domestic and foreign owners and investors. 20 Gerald patiently fielded countless
calls inquiring whether I was interested in buying gemstones. Men would frequently approach
me, show me a palm full of dusty gems, and ask if I knew their value or if I could connect them
with potential buyers. Others would describe rock formations or mineral deposits on their land to
see if I had any insight into their potential value. I heard rumors of other white people appearing
with maps, digging, and leaving with unknown items. Many wondered if I had come for similar
purposes.
Over time, however, I came to understand that gold and gemstones are not the only
wealth believed to lie below the surface of the mountains. Rumors about deposits of mineral
wealth blur with rumors of buried wealth, hidden by the Germans when they were driven out by
the British. I first remember hearing these rumors on the back of a motorcycle down the long
southward descent out of the mountains on my way to get a letter from the district office at
Mvuha approving my research. The young motorcycle driver, an acquaintance from years before,
told me that on a farm belonging to his family, there was a trunk that had been left by the
Germans. He wanted to know if I knew what it might be and whether it was safe to open. When I
asked why he had not looked himself, he said he was afraid it might be dangerous. He seemed to
believe the box had been left by Germans during wartime and I initially understood his fear to be
In addition to these mines, the Mkuyuni area sees a steady trickle of artisanal miners from around Tanzania. The
region is also home to several foreign-owned marble quarrying operations.
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about the potential for unexploded munitions. About six months later, in June 2018, my research
assistant and I were interviewing a seventy-two-year-old former village official named Ali
Ming’walu about local history when the conversation veered in an unexpected direction. Mzee
Ming’walu began telling us that he knew where the Germans had buried their treasures of gold,
mercury, and rupees (interview, June 4, 2018). 21 Gerald and I looked at each other in
bewilderment and attempted to redirect the conversation back to the topics we had come to
discuss. Eventually, however, I was able to place Mzee Ming’walu’s comments in the context of
a constellation of rumors about subterranean riches in the mountains.
The boundaries between natural and buried treasure in Uluguru are unclear. Instead,
whispered rumors paint a picture of an underground laced with stores of wealth that are
inseparable from questions of history. The underground is often understood in Uluguru to be the
residence of ancestors and other spirits who live and farm below the earth. From this perspective,
the location of mineral wealth is never “natural.” It is always entangled with the ghosts of the
past. Like discourses of rainmaking, this understanding of mineral wealth troubles the distinction
between humans and nature not through an understanding of non-human agents acting on
humans but through an understanding of nature as a place where relationships among humans,
living and dead, are inscribed in the landscape. Underground riches are guarded by spirits of
ambiguous identity and origin, perhaps conjured by long-gone Germans to protect their ill-gotten
wealth or maybe simply angry mapepo 22 who do not like their subterranean homes disturbed.
Rumors of harm befalling those who try to access buried wealth abound, and indeed the area’s
small-scale mining operations are dangerous and sometimes deadly (Ramadhani Bakali, personal

Mzee is a term referring to an elder man. I use it as an honorific throughout the text. For women, I use the
honorifics Bibi (grandmother, elder woman) or Mama (mother).
22
A category of spirit widely believed to occupy certain places in the landscape including rocks and trees. Mapepo
are often described as malevolent.
21
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communication, December 27, 2018). When people asked me about mineral wealth on their land,
some did see me as a potential geologist with relevant scientific knowledge, but there was
another reason some approached me. I was suspected of being a grandchild of German settlers,
back to claim their treasure. Perhaps, it was thought, I knew how to get past the guarding spirits
and bring the treasures to the surface. To understand this suspicion and its importance, however,
we also have to understand something about lizards and medicine.
*

*

*

On a sweltering day in October 2018, Gerald and I took the bumpy motorcycle ride
northeast from Mkuyuni to interview an elderly man named Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko in
Luholole Village. We introduced ourselves to the tall, gaunt 75-year-old and settled in for our
interview, taking shelter from the glaring sun in the narrow strip of shade offered by the eave of
his daughter’s small house. As we began to discuss the history of the mountains, his daughter
and son-in-law joined our conversation. Mzee Sipriani’s daughter, Berinada, was sparing in her
comments, but her husband, Deodat, an energetic man in his late forties, was eager to share his
thoughts about local history and tradition. Although he was relatively young, Deodat has been
initiated into the society of elders after inheriting a lineage name (see Chapter 2) and he held
considerable knowledge of Luguru medicines (dawa). One such medicine was mazimbo, a
widespread term for lineage medicine. As Deodat explained, each lineage had its own such
medicine, which was made during matambiko rituals and stored in a pot in the home of the
lineage head. If someone from another lineage attempted to open the pot and steal the medicine,
Deodat told us, that person would see only a lizard (Deodat Gaspar Kunambi, interview, October
3, 2018).
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The term dawa in Swahili refers to medicine in a broad sense. Medicines, in this view,
are assemblages of substances, words, and acts which bring healing, protection, fertility, or good
fortune to those who use them properly. Medicines received at the hospital are considered dawa,
as are herbal medicines known as mitishamba, many of which rely on wild plants collected in
forests or other uncultivated areas. Pesticides to protect crops, whether chemical or organic, are
dawa, as are the substances made during rainmaking rituals at Kolero and Kinole. Deodat had
learned how to make certain dawa during his initiation into the society of the elders, a ritual
which involves a period of isolation and intensive all-night instruction by already-initiated
elders.
Dawa bears some similarities to another category in Uluguru, called maadili in Swahili.
Usually translated as ethics, maadili invokes a sense of correct and upright behavior and like
dawa, knowledge of its rules are shared during initiations, specifically those of boys and girls
into the ranks of adulthood. Those I interviewed often considered the forms of dawa and maadili
taught during these ceremonies to be specifically Luguru, and along with the rituals themselves,
they were considered one of the cornerstones of Luguru tradition (mila). Both dawa and maadili
are products of esoteric knowledge and can only be shared with authorized individuals who have
gone through proper processes. The kinds of dawa taught through the initiations of elders and
traditional healers are not simply recipes of herbs that could be recorded and replicated. They
rely on relationships to place, spirits, and the origins of the knowledge itself. Likewise, maadili
cannot be shared with the uninitiated. These ethics too are relationally bound forms of knowing
laden with social responsibility. Both dawa and maadili can be dangerous in the wrong hands.
There are, then, protections in place to prevent unauthorized use of knowledge, including
disguising medicines as lizards.
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As Haule had warned me, I met with a fair amount of what might be described as
obfuscation during my research. Regardless of my ability to dodge suspicions about being a
geologist or a spy, my questions often met with answers that led in oblique directions and which
simply did not make sense. I was very rarely told that the information I was asking for was secret
or could not be shared. Instead, people would typically answer my questions with small pieces of
information which together proved inconsistent and confounding. When I tried to point out the
obvious contradictions, most people gave answers that left me further baffled. I came to see these
answers as so many lizards, protecting secret knowledge from unauthorized eyes—mine and
those of the people who would one day read the products of my research. Over time, however,
my knowledge grew and I found that some of the answers I had initially written off as nonsense
or misdirection proved meaningful—indeed they might be called, in a rather uncomplicated
sense of the word, true.
This transformation, of a lizard back into dawa, however, was not a sign of the triumph
of my clever sleuthing over attempts at obstruction. Rather, it was part of the way that
knowledge is protected, shared, and passed down. In the end, the points of misdirection,
confusion, and frustration I encountered were not merely clues but also lessons in the politics of
the knowledge that constitutes mila. Traditional knowledge is not generalizable, and much
cannot be written down. What appears in ethnographies of Uluguru is a shadow of mila, an
outline or form which corresponds to something unseen. True knowledge of mila, in contrast,
exists only where it is woven in social relationships. As my relationships in Uluguru deepened
and became more meaningful, my ability to make sense of the statements I heard also changed.
How, when, and to whom to communicate esoteric knowledge is part of the knowledge itself, a
form of maadili—ethics—that I have tried my best to learn and follow. Readers of the chapters
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that follow may encounter some lizards. They are neither truth nor lies. Rather, they show the
ways in which knowledge, power, and relationships are always bound together.
Requests for knowledge during my research were not unidirectional. My potential
connection to German settlers and their buried treasure meant I was suspected of knowing the
dawa needed to get past the spirits who guard the hidden stores of gold and rupees. In this too,
knowledge was relational, linked to place, history, and power. The rumors shared with me about
the location of these treasures were often attempts to draw secret information from me. However,
although I am the granddaughter of German settler colonialists, my ancestors did not settle in
East Africa but rather East Texas, and if they knew the whereabouts of any buried treasure, the
information did not find its way to me. I was likewise found to be wholly ignorant of the geology
of gemstones and gold in the mountains and of the markets on which to sell them, another piece
of information it was hoped I could provide. I was able to help with certain other kinds of
information—the prices of various fruits and spices in the United States, the process of applying
to universities abroad, the answers to English class homework, the causes of global climate
change, and the reasons that USAID spends so much money on development projects in
Tanzania. Gerald and I were also frequently asked about improving agricultural practices,
questions Gerald was often able to answer with concrete and helpful advice. In the complex
politics of knowledge in which we had become implicated, these were small offerings, but they
did provide a starting point for the collaborations of which this research is a part.
Organization of the Text
The remainder of the text is organized in a loosely chronological order, although each
chapter moves between the time of my fieldwork and points in the past. Chapter 1, which is the
most strictly historical, offers an overview of the history of the mountains from the eighteenth
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century through the end of colonial rule in 1961. It shows how competing regimes of politics, of
which social healing was one, served as spaces of struggle along gendered, generational, and
classed lines. It reveals both the process of political consolidation by certain elite men and the
ways in which that process was continually contested by women, youth, and non-elites.
Throughout this history, questions of water were deeply linked to questions of power, although
in different ways at different moments.
Chapter 2 explores the legacies of Tanzanian socialism and forced villagization in the
mountains. It analyses changes in land tenure and land inheritance that resulted, often indirectly,
from socialist policies. Alongside these shifts, it also examines men’s growing reluctance to
inherit ancestral names and the complaints of many women that men have abandoned their
obligations to their matrilineal kin, especially obligations related to rainmaking and social
healing. By viewing these changes together, I show that shifts in control over land sparked by
villagization upended structures of reproductive labor in the mountains. Ultimately, I argue that
Tanzanian socialism fell short of its goals in part because it neglected to account for the richness
of social reproduction and because it continued to subordinate social reproduction to questions of
production, ultimately removing the material basis of social reproduction from the institution that
had long managed it—the matrilineal lineages. While this effect may have been desirable for
many reasons, it also rendered social reproduction precarious and left lasting conflicts along
gendered and generational lines.
Chapter 3 focuses on conflicts among Muslims over funeral and memorial rituals for the
dead. It argues that these conflicts are connected to the politics of social healing and to growing
concerns about the unpredictability of the environment. Tracing the emergence of these rifts to
the process of liberalization, deagrarianization and the increasing monetization of the rural
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economy, I suggest that a shift in the relationship of labor to land led to a partial ungrounding of
economic life in general and social reproduction in particular beginning in the 1980s. These
changes occurred in the wake of the collapse of the socialist project and widespread
disillusionment with both the socialist government and Sufi leaders. In this context, the Islamic
reform movement known as Ansar Sunna offered young men an alternative model of authority,
ethics, and knowledge, one which marked their growing independence from elder generations.
The reform movement also marked changing relationships to the dead and place, sparking new
conflicts over the terms of social reproduction.
Chapter 4 examines the contested connections of knowledge, labor, and the environment
in the management of forests and waterways in Uluguru. Exploring both changes and
continuities in the state’s approach to resource governance since independence, it suggests that
persistent understandings of humans as inherently apart from and harmful to nature, alongside
regimes of knowledge which reinscribe the roles of “experts” as the bringers of both
development and sustainability, have rendered invisible and tenuous other ways of caring for the
environment. I trace the use of development in Tanzania as a site for the extraction of unpaid
labor, including ecological labor, under coercive conditions. Ultimately, I argue that approaches
which make ecological visible and render it a source of value can serve as the foundation for
feminist and decolonial approaches to environmental crisis. To bring this insight to bear,
however, requires a refiguring of politics and an openness to radical epistemologies that trouble
the temporalities of development and the market.
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CHAPTER 1
RAIN, GENDER, AND TERRACES: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF ULUGURU, C. 1800–
1960

In early 1953, a few British colonial administrators of what was then Tanganyika decided
to breathe new life into a plan to build terraces and plant trees in the small mountain range of
Uluguru in east central Tanzania (Brain 1980; Young and Fosbrooke 1960). They believed the
mountains, which provided a key water catchment for the colony, had been unsustainably farmed
and that deforestation and soil erosion were threatening livelihoods in the highlands and
downstream. In particularly, they blamed farmers in the mountains for floods and unreliable
water supplies in the Ruvu Delta which had affected important commercial rice and cotton farms
(Pels 1999: 149). They were also eager to develop coffee as a local cash crop. Coffee had
become a major cash crop in several other regions of the colony and was at the height of a postwar boom in the early 1950s (Eckert 2003: 301). Several members of the colonial service were
brought in to implement the project, including James Brain, who would go on to earn his
doctorate in anthropology and author several important articles on Luguru culture and history,
including an important paper about the events of this project (Brain 1980). After a two-week
seminar with local government officials and religious leaders, the project’s staff fanned out
across the mountains to teach the benefits of terracing to local leaders in “bush schools.” At the

56

beginning, these schools were held outdoors and brought together lineage leaders, religious
authorities, teachers, shopkeepers, the women who owned beer clubs, and any other men or
women deemed to be influential (Brain 1980: 182). The lessons focused on terraces but also
encouraged tree planting and coffee cultivation. In Mkuyuni, according to Brain’s account of
program, the scheme initially met with resistance, but local leaders were eventually convinced of
the value of terracing. However, over time, the form of the bush schools changed. Instead of
including only local leaders, elders, and elites, the meetings in Mkuyuni became open to the
public. Brain, who was not in charge of the Mkuyuni area and did not approve of the public
meetings, would later compare them to tent revivals, generating an “enormous emotional
response.” Whatever the accuracy of Brain’s characterization of the meetings, the results of the
program were astounding: the creation of nearly five million yards of terraces in Mkuyuni
between September 1953 and February 1955, at least according to official reports (Brain 1980:
183–185).
However, the tenor of the project quickly changed. The colonial administration decided
to implement a mandatory quota system for terracing. Officers of the program also put into effect
a ban on burning fields and began imposing large fines for violations, especially in eastern
Uluguru (Brain 1980: 186–187). Corruption blossomed; evidence suggests that some local
officials were accepting bribes to falsify records showing households’ terracing quotas had been
met. Several local powerholders who had been shut out of the Native Authority threw their
weight against the scheme. On July 1, 1955, over 1,500 people attended a meeting about the
project at Mkuyuni, brandishing sticks and demanding an end to the terracing program (Young
and Fosbrooke 1960: 153). Several subsequent meetings were similarly met with protest and at
one point, a large crowd marched on the district headquarters to demand an end to the project.
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The District Commissioner said he would come to the mountains to hear their grievances. He
arrived with armed police and reiterated the importance of continuing the terracing program. The
crowd was ordered to disperse, but they refused and violence erupted. The police used tear gas,
but the crowd quickly reassembled and, according to official accounts, began throwing rocks and
clumps of dirt at the officers. Eventually, one of the officers opened fire, killing one man, John
Mahenge (Brain 1980: 187–188; Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 151–157).
Following the incident at Matombo, Roland Young and Henry Fosbrooke described
“ribbons of smoke” rising from the mountains, where burning was resumed in defiance of the
ban (1960: 157). After a brief attempt to modify the terracing program in response to the
protests, the scheme was abandoned altogether. Four men perceived to be leaders of the “riots”
were arrested several weeks after death of Mahenge. The incident was still widely remembered
during my research in Uluguru, where many recounted the intense labor of terracing and the
resistance against the program. Some, who were youth at the time, recalled being hidden by their
parents, while others remembered their parents themselves hiding to avoid the grueling labor
required (H. R. Malekela, interview, August 15, 2018; A. M. Ng’omanga, interview, October 4,
2018). The Uluguru Land Usage Scheme (ULUS), as the program was known, appeared in
retrospect as an early flicker of the independence movement that would eventually win
Tanganyika’s freedom from Great Britain in 1961. It also ensured that for several decades, the
post-colonial state would take a hands-off approach to management of the water supply in
Uluguru, fearing a repeat of the protests.
As we will see, the unrest that occurred in 1955 was born of an unlikely political alliance
between educated elites, traditional authorities, Islamic leaders, and ordinary farmers, both men
and women. To understand how this group united and how they understood their challenge to the
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colonial administration requires an exploration of the layered politics of Uluguru that had
emerged since the eighteenth century. This chapter explores that political history and makes
several related arguments. The first is that the political paradigm of rainmaking and social
healing has recurred throughout the mountains’ history, although in vastly different forms over
time. This form of politics was layered with several others but was distinguished by the way in
which it placed questions of social reproduction at the center of political legitimacy. The second
is that politics in Uluguru have always been bound up in struggles to control the mountains’ rain
and water. The third is that much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century was characterized
by the increasing centralization of political power by certain elite men at the expense of women
and non-elite men, although the composition of the elite group changed considerably over time.
The politics of social healing worked on both sides of this process, allowing some men to shore
up their authority while also providing the grounds for political critique from below, especially
by women. After exploring political change in the mountains over the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, this chapter returns to ULUS to make sense of the confrontation over
terracing, showing that the unrest was the culmination of several long and intertwined political
struggles over a century in the making.
Early Settlement and the Emergence of Luguru Politics
Oral histories of Uluguru broadly agree that people today known as “Luguru” were
descendants of various groups that moved into the mountains over the last several centuries.
Young and Fosbrooke (1960: 21), drawing on lineage genealogies, place the arrival of the
ancestors of Waluguru to the mountains around the middle of the seventeenth century while Paul
(2003: 38–43), using the same information, arrived at a date about a century later. Pels (1996:
757), again based on lineage genealogies, estimated the first settlers arrived in the early
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nineteenth century. Debates about when Luguru people arrived in the mountains have held
particular significance around environmental policy since the colonial period. Young and
Fosbrooke’s longer estimate was intended in part to counter colonial officials who believed the
mountains had only been inhabited since the late nineteenth century, and consequently thought
that massive deforestation had taken place on the slopes in a matter of only decades. Estimates of
the arrival of settlers in the mountains have also served to legitimate or delegitimate Luguru
communities’ claims to the land. As we will see, a closer examination of the evidence suggests
established settlements by at least the mid-eighteenth century, but the area likely saw additional
in-migration through the mid- to late-nineteenth century, driven by conflict in the surrounding
lowlands.
Political and kinship structures in Uluguru, as elsewhere, are relayed in ideals that at once
belie and make sense of more complex and messy realities. Accounts from Uluguru agree in
large part on the ideal social structure and its relationship to settlement, although this should be
understood as ideological rather than a reflection of historical fact. As the Introduction suggests,
the fundamental unit of this ideal was, and is, the matrilineal lineage. Most recount the history of
their lineage by beginning with a story of the lineage founder and their relatives arriving from a
specific location or direction to settle on previously unoccupied land. The lineage founder, often
said to have had magical abilities, was typically given a special name related to some personal
characteristic or event in the story itself. After the death of lineage founder, their name and spirit
(mzimu) passed down along matrilineal lines, and with it, the responsibility for administering the
land they had settled. Frequently in such accounts, the lineage founder is said to have been a
woman, but subsequent heirs to the name were inevitably male. In Swahili at the time of my
research, the holder of this name was referred to as the mjomba (pl. wajomba), or maternal uncle,
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of the lineage. 1 When an mjomba died, the women of his lineage would convene to pick a
successor among his brothers and nephews. In theory, all members of a lineage and their children
were entitled to plots within the lineage territory to farm and build homes, distributed by the
mjomba. Outsiders could also ask for land in the territory but would be expected to offer a
payment called ngoto, usually in crops, to the lineage mjomba. Lineages in turn were part of
larger clans, many of which correspond to clans in groups outside the mountains. 2 Often, land
would be subject to at least two layers of tenure, one of the clan recognized as owners of the
larger valley, and a second of the lineage who had been given rights to some section (Pels 1996:
745). Lineages and clans were exogamous, and cross-cousin marriages were considered ideal
(Pels 1999: 180; Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 39–77). Outsiders were absorbed into areas
through processes of adoption and marriage, and lineage members could also move to unclaimed
and unsettled land to begin a new branch, thus producing cascading affiliations and genealogies,
with newer lineages often returning to their founders’ places of origin to carry out the set of
rituals known as matambiko.
As the Introduction outlined, matambiko rituals served to manage relationships with a set
of spirits which are today elided under the term mizimu. Although most people in Uluguru at the
time of my research described mizimu as “waliokufa zamani” (“those who died in the past”), they
also used the word to refer to powerful territorial spirits associated with names such as Kolero,
which are not necessarily ancestral. The term mizimu, which in older Bantu languages referred to
certain ancestral spirits, appears to have become the dominant term for territorial spirits in
In Kiluguru, this position termed mkolo, and several other titles have applied to these figures over time. Here, I use
the term mjomba because it was mostly commonly used by my interlocutors. Mjomba can refer to any matrilineal
uncle but here refers to lineage heads unless otherwise noted.
2
“Clan” refers to units that claim a common ancestor but are not able to provide an exact genealogy whereas
lineages are descent groups of known relations, but the boundary between the two is somewhat slippery in Uluguru.
I typically refer to lineage, rather than clan, because it is the lineage that typically structured land tenure and social
relations.
1
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Uluguru by the 1950s (Mzuanda 1958: 74; Vansina 1990: 95–96, 297). As we will see, the
slippage in the term mzimu points to historical processes by which clans or lineages sought to
extend their power by claiming kinship linkages to territorial spirits or by elevating lineage
spirits to the rank of more powerful territorial ones. Within the category of ancestors, the term
mizimu can refer to certain named ancestors or to the nameless society of ancestors who are often
described as living below the earth. The names of particular mizimu of this type are inherited by
the living, most commonly their matrilineal descendants, and with these names flow the powers
and identities of the spirits themselves. The names inherited by wajomba, the male lineage heads
who administer the land, fall into this category, and each mjomba of a particular name has an
identity that blurs partially with his predecessors and the spirit itself. The names of territorial,
non-ancestral mizimu were not inherited by the living but these spirits remained connected to
communities in other ways. For example the territorial spirit Kolero in southern Uluguru
typically took a human wife who, under the name Bibi, served as the spirit medium and shrine
guardian at his sacred forest. In all cases, mizimu were thought to be powerful spirits who shaped
the wellbeing of humans and their environments. Those who inherited mizimu names or were
bound to them through other linkages like marriage were obligated to perform matambiko rituals
related to their spirits.
The term matambiko refers to an array of practices of reconciling with mizimu to ensure
good health, good rains, fertility and prosperity for the community (Pels 1999: 121). 3 Such
rituals have been practiced across wide areas of East Africa and vary widely in their details.
While those with special relationships to mizimu have critical roles in matambiko, the rituals are
typically collective activities led by a group of elders that necessarily includes both men and
“Reconciling” is the verb used by Pels (1999: 121). I have adopted it throughout the text as it better captures the
complex social relations enacted through matambiko than other phrases associated with ancestor rituals.

3

62

women. In Uluguru, matambiko practices typically begin with the coming together of
participants and the brewing of millet beer. When the beer is ready, participants don black kaniki
cloth, removing all other forms of clothing and shoes, and proceed to a series of sacred locations
connected to mizimu. At these locations, beer is poured into the earth and sacred words are
recited, including ancestral names. Elders or healers may also gather and prepare particular
medicines during this time to be consumed by participants or stored for later use. Today,
individual healers often carry out matambiko for clients, but historically the practice was most
commonly carried out collectively at several levels: the lineage, the clan, and the regional.
Ideally, lineages would gather once a year, as well as in times of hardship—particularly illness,
infertility, drought, or crop failure—to carry out matambiko. Lineages might also send
representatives to participate in such practices with the clans from which their founders
originated, or at the important regional shrines associated with the territorial mizimu of Kolero
and Kingalu. These regional shrines were of particular importance in bringing rain, the most
capricious and vital component of ecological and societal wellbeing, and have been visited in
times of drought not only by residents of Uluguru but by people from wide areas of east-central
Tanzania beyond. Matambiko rituals also helped to regulate agricultural cycles, as they tended to
correspond with agricultural seasons and often preceded planting.
The central practice of matambiko, the procession to sacred sites to make offerings and
recite sacred words, marked out a complex sacred geography across the landscape. The most
significant feature of this landscape were the groves or forests described in the Introduction
where cutting was forbidden. In the colonial and immediate pre-colonial period, lineages
typically each had at least one such area within their territory, which served as the site of lineage
matambiko. Both within and outside of these groves, there were several more specific sacred
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features visited during matambiko. In Luguru cosmology, ancestors and other spirits are typically
described as residing under the earth as well as in wilderness spaces, and many sacred sites are
areas where the boundaries between the above-ground and the below are blurred: rock features
and caves, springs and pools, and certain sacred trees. In addition, the graves of important
ancestors formed a critical part of this sacred geography; lineage matambiko typical involved
visits to the graves of past lineage heads, while matambiko at Kolero involved visiting the graves
of the past holders of the title Bibi who served as Kolero’s wife and intermediary (Haule 2018:
81–82).
Sacred forests appear to have served immediate ecological functions as reserves of forest
resources and as buffers around key water sources, but beyond this, this network of sacred sites
bound communities to the land and the environment. Bridging the gaps between living and dead,
and inhabited and wild, matambiko rituals linked human health to the wellbeing of forests, water
sources, and the land in rich and reciprocal ways. The presence of ancestors in the landscape also
wove kinship through the environment itself. While these systems of sacred places and
matambiko rituals proved resilient mechanisms for managing ecological and social relations,
they should not be romanticized as symbols of timeless harmony between indigenous
communities and their environments. On the contrary, a close look at this sacred geography
reveals traces of several centuries of political conflicts and social change. The visitation of
lineage graves, which follows known genealogies, served to reinforce lineage claims to land and
bolster the power of lineage wajomba. Indeed, sacred groves in Uluguru, as elsewhere, were
often cultivated and protected by lineage heads in order to maintain claims to land and authority
(Sheridan 2009). Other sacred sites appear to transcend or evade lineage control. These point to
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different, and probably older, political structures with different relations to kinship. Within each
of these are additional layers of struggle for control over resources and people.
The story of Kingalu I, the Bena lineage mjomba whose heirs would come to be
considered “chief” of Uluguru during the colonial period, provides some clues about early
settlement and political power in the mountains. Two versions of the story about the founding of
the Bena lineage and the emergence of Kingalu I were collected in the 1950s (Brain 1971;
Mzuanda 1958: 8–16). According to the myth, the lineage founders originated in Ubena, to the
west of Uluguru and upon arrival in the mountains first settled high in the southeastern area of
Kibungo or Nyingwa. From there, two children of a man known as Msumi, a son called Mleke
and a daughter variously called Mkirindila or Mwanadindiro, travelled north to Kinole looking
for a place to settle (Brain, 1971; Young and Fosbrooke 1960:47–48). However, they found the
area already occupied by the Nyani lineage, whose mjomba was known as Magoma. Magoma
welcomed Mleke and allowed the newcomers to stay, eventually marrying Mkirindila.
Mkirindila, however, was loyal to her brother and reported to him all Magoma’s military secrets.
Mleke then attacked and defeated Magoma, seizing his land and taking the name Kingalu, which
suggests fickleness or unpredictability. After driving Magoma out, Kingalu continued his
military campaign to the south. There, he became locked in ongoing battle and was ultimately
killed after being betrayed by his son. Upon dying, Kinglau’s body disappeared, and soon
thereafter, his voice was heard at the sacred shrine at Nguru a hundred kilometers north of
Uluguru. Young and Fosbrooke recorded the same lineage history as Brain, but, significantly,
were told by Kingalu Mwanamguo that the first Kingalu was not Mleke but his sister Mkirindila,
from whom he inherited the name (1960: 47).
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This story encapsulates several aspects of early history in the mountains, including the
origin of clans and linages in locations and groups outside the mountains as well as their
staggered arrival. It offers hints about the contested process through which previously patrilineal
groups like the Bena came to conform, at least in part, to the area’s matrilineal norms. It also
suggests that the ascendance of Kingalu and the Bena lineage were due to military strength,
rather than any establishment as first-comers, in contrast to accounts of the ideal Luguru social
system. Importantly, there is also no coherent group considered Luguru in this story, and no
indication of shared ethnic identity between Magoma and Kingalu. Indeed, in 1859 Richard
Burton offered a somewhat jumbled account of “tribes” in the mountains suggesting that a group
known as Waluguru were confined to the highest peaks, with Wasuop’hanga and Wakubaku
tribes below (Burton 1860: 85). Suopanga and Kubaku are in fact names in Kingalu’s Bena
lineage, and on his 1870 visit to Kinole, the missionary Antoine Horner described them as
individuals who served as “ministers” under Kingalu (Ricklin 1880: 237–238). In the early
colonial period, those residing in northern Uluguru and associated with Kingalu were referred to
as Wakami rather than Waluguru, but British colonial officials ultimately decided the two
constituted a single “tribe” due to the similarities in their social structures and traditions
(Hutchins n.d.). As Kingalu’s story suggests, clans predate the overarching identity of Waluguru
in the mountains.
Kingalu’s authority in this foundational myth, though gained militarily, was subsequently
consecrated by his apparent supernatural abilities, especially his association with the ancient and
powerful rainmaking shrine at Nguru. There, holders of the name Kingalu would perform annual
rainmaking matambiko that were said to ensure the health of the land in and around Uluguru.
This shrine predated the founding of Kingalu’s lineage and the territorial mzimu there was also
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associated with the name Kolero 4 and possibly the name Mundo (Glassman 1995: 136–137;
Iliffe 1979: 29; Mananga 1968). Kingalu and the Bena lineage’s ability to appropriate this shrine
and establish or take over an ancillary shrine at Kinole consolidated their authority and
positioned Kingalu as a political leader in the tradition of other precolonial rainmakers and social
healers. As the Introduction described, “social healing” refers to the social understanding of
health and healing across central and eastern Africa, and to the inseparability of questions of
health from those of politics. Rainmaking and other forms of social healing emerged as a
powerful political paradigm in the region in the several centuries prior to European colonization.
Speaking of the emergence of the Ganda kingdom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
Neil Kodesh wrote:
During this period, efforts to establish control over the collective conditions of
health characterized the very nature of political practices. Public healers, in short,
operated as political leaders, and healers’ shrines emerged as sites of creative
ambition where aspiring leaders fused ritual and political power and where they
composed stories to explain the nature of the authority (2007: 531)
Steven Feierman’s (1990) work on the Shambaa kingdom has shown similarly that political
leadership was understood through the idiom of social healing, particularly rainmaking. Good
leaders were those who “healed the land” while those who harmed it lost their legitimacy. Social
healing as a form of politics placed questions of social reproduction—ecological, agricultural,
and human health and fecundity—at the center of political discourse.
In his work on the Ganda kingdom, Kodesh (2007) has shown how legends related to the
healer’s shrine reveal a layered history, with traces of older political structures discernable
preceding the centralization of Ganda authority. Hugo Hinfelaar made similar observations in the
Bemba-speaking regions of what is now Zambia, showing how the Crocodile Clan appropriated

Kolero is a territorial mzimu name associated with several important shrines including the one previously
mentioned in southern Uluguru.
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prior ritual practices and relationships to spirits, subordinating household and nature spirits to
their own ancestral spirits (1989: 24–33). In northeastern Uluguru, although political power
never became as centralized as it did in the Ganda or Bemba kingdoms, similar changes can be
decerned. In the account recorded by Mzuanda, Kingalu captured a spirit belonging to his
paternal lineage at Kibungo and brought it to Kinole (1958: 247–248). Subsequently, this spirit
not only merged in identity with Kingalu I but also with the powerful territorial spirit at Nguru.
At the time of my research, the only spirit names associated with Kingalu’s rainmaking shrines,
at least among residents of northeastern Uluguru, were the name Kingalu and the place name
Nguru. The older connections to the territorial mizimu Kolero and Mundo were no longer
recalled. This replacement of a territorial spirit by an ancestral one illustrates the shifting power
dynamics of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, in which certain lineage heads consolidated
power through the appropriation of earlier systems of social healing. This increasing
concentration of power was also gendered. Evidence suggests that in Uluguru, women had key
roles to play in mediating relationships to forests and territorial spirits. As ancestral spirits of
elite men such as Kingalu’s came to dominate the healing landscape, women’s political roles
were weakened. 5
In contrast, at the Kolero shrine in southern Uluguru, this consolidation of power was less
pronounced. There, the territorial spirit is not understood as ancestral and the shrine, as of 2018,
was guarded by elders of the Mlali and Hega clans. As mentioned above, the principal guardian
at the shrine was previously a woman called Bibi who was chosen from the Mlali clan to be the
wife of the spirit. The spirit itself today is affiliated with Hega clan (Haule 2018: 100). The most
important political figure in southern Uluguru in the early colonial period was the mjomba of this
Hinfelaar’s work shows a similar, but more extreme, version of this process in Bemba-speaking areas (1989: 24–
33).
5
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clan, also called Hega, whom colonial administrators listed as an important rainmaker alongside
Kingalu (Hutchins n.d.). Kolero’s association with Hega’s lineage is likely a result of similar
political shifts to those we have seen with Kingalu. The ritual role of Bibi has been lost, and the
male power of Hega as a mediator of the spirit increased. However, in this case, the Mlali have
nevertheless remained the true “owners” of Kolero’s sacred forest, and Kolero remained a nonancestral entity. As we will see, one reason for this difference was the ability of holders of the
name Kingalu to accumulate power through outside connections, first to coastal trade networks
and later to European colonizers, due to political changes to the north and east of Uluguru in the
nineteenth century.
The Nineteenth Century and the Rise of the Mrima Coast
In the nineteenth century, several significant events in the region surrounding Uluguru
shaped life in the mountains. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the region known as the
the Mrima coast was growing in political significance through an expanding trade in ivory and
other commodities. Since the seventeenth century, the Mrima had been occupied by two major
groups: those who claimed local origins, such as the Waluguru’s close linguistic relatives, the
Wazaramo, and those who claimed origins in the middle east or Persia, often called Shomvi (S.
Fabian 2019; Iliffe 1979: 44; Owens 2006; Sheriff 1987: 175). The Shomvi were Muslim and
sources suggest that they gradually became politically dominant over towns along the coast
during this period. The term Shomvi refers at once to a ruling class and to a (purported) descent
or ethnic group. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these communities were largely
focused on farming and fishing, but also engaged in trade, especially trading salt for agricultural
and wild products from further inland.
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Slavery was also a part of this coastal economy. Enslaved Africans carried out a variety
of domestic, agricultural, and commercial tasks as well as a range of skilled trades. There was no
single mechanism through which individuals became slaves; some had been sold or pawned by
relatives, others captured or demanded in payment for a relative’s wrongdoing. As Marcia
Wright has shown, the boundary between pawn and slave has often been one of degree, as
repeated exchanges gradually erase social connections and move individuals toward the status of
commodity (1993: 7). Moreover, the definition of “slave” and “free person” were continually
contested by those subject to enslavement (Glassman 1995). By any definition, however, slave
holdings on the coast were typically small. Moreover, slavery on the Mrima coast, especially
before the nineteenth century, was a far cry from the chattel system of the Atlantic. Rather,
enslaved men, women, and children were seen as dependents who would be absorbed to a greater
or lesser degree into their owners’ kinship systems over time. Enslaved men and women also
often had a significant amount of autonomy, although the exact degree depended on their status.
Conditions varied widely between skilled tradespeople agricultural laborers, domestic servants,
and concubines. Nevertheless, the oppressiveness and inequality of the slave economy was
evidenced by frequent rebellions, large and small, by enslaved men and women (S. Fabian 2013:
100; Fabian 2019: 114–117; Glassman 1995: 79–114).
In the nineteenth century, several political changes occurred. First, new caravan trade
routes appeared, predominantly transporting ivory to feed the growing market in South Asia and
China (S. Fabian 2013; S. Fabian 2019: 80; Iliffe 1979: 43; Sheriff 1987: 175–179). One of these
routes passed directly north of Uluguru. At the terminus of these routes, the town of Bagamoyo
grew rapidly into a commercial center. In the early decades of the century, the Omani-Zanzibari
Sultanate also began to extend its influence over the coast and to vie for political and economic
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control of coastal towns and caravan routes along the Mrima and its hinterland. In the midnineteenth century, the Sultanate in Zanzibar became independent of Oman and intensified its
political grasp along the mainland. Meanwhile, British forces were also expanding their political
control along the East African coast, in part through attempts to abolish the slave trade.
Ironically, however, attempts to curtail the transoceanic slave trade helped fuel the intensification
of plantation slavery on Zanzibar and along the coast. Booms in demand for particular export
crops, increasing demand for food for traders along the coast, and declining prices of slaves due
to the collapse of the export market all fueled the growth plantation agriculture, and existing
slave labor systems were increasingly retooled to serve this economy. The move toward the
planation economy led not only to an increased use of slave labor but also the rapid deterioration
of conditions for enslaved men and women. A growing credit-based economy further fueled
these shifts, as enslaved people were either exchanged to pay off debts or subject to increasingly
demanding labor conditions to keep up with the demands of their masters’ creditors (Glassman
1995: 74–107). By the late nineteenth century, guns had also flooded into the region, traded from
the coast for ivory and other commodities, and several groups, including the Zigua and the
Zaramo, gained military dominance in the lowlands north and east of Uluguru (Glassman 1995:
48; Iliffe 1979: 50–52). The presence of guns and the expansion of the plantation sector at the
coast led to a volatile situation in which slave raiding and the gun trade formed a positive
feedback loop. Those seeking political dominance in the hinterland could obtain guns by trading
slaves to the booming plantations at the coast, with the guns allowing for further slave raiding.
Overall, throughout the nineteenth century, the increasing trade in ivory and other
commodities, as well as the gradual intensification of the slave-based plantation economy in later
decades, led to accumulations of wealth and the rise of “big men” connected to trade routes both
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at the coast and inland (Becker 2008: 25–52; Glassman 1995: 48–49). 6 It also saw increasing
flurries of instability through the intensification of warfare, both through the influx of guns from
the coast and the arrival of another group in the middle of the century from the opposite
direction. This group, known as the Mbunga, brought novel military techniques from southern
Africa. Through the middle of the nineteenth century, the Mbunga carried out wide-ranging raids
around the Kilombero area, including in Uluguru (Larson 1977; Gallagher 1974; Young and
Fosbrooke 1960: 22). Although Young and Fosbrooke (1960) place the Mbunga era prior to the
rise of coastal politics in the mountains in their periodization of Luguru history, accounts show
that the Mbunga remained active in the area until at least 1880, by which time Waluguru in the
north had already been drawn into significant relationships with the coast and had already faced
significant military incursions from Zaramo and Zigua forces as well.
In addition to these political and economic shifts, the nineteenth century was also marked
by the spread of Islam beyond the coast. On the Mrima coast, Islam had become heavily
associated with the Shomvi elite and conveyed both high social status and connection to broad
social networks reaching across the Indian Ocean. It also often indexed literacy and could
facilitate access not only trade but also to credit. As trade with the hinterland increased, Islam
also spread inland. Tabora was established as a Muslim trading post by the 1850s and two
decades later, much of the immediate area beyond the Mrima coast had seen largescale
conversions to Islam (Becker 2008: 25–52; Glassman 1995: 34, 58–78, 137). In Uluguru, Islam
appears to have arrived as a religion of the elite, especially “big men” who sought to capitalize
on the caravan trade and the new politics it engendered. Although it is difficult to assess the

As we will see, the rise of “big men” was overwhelmingly male-dominated. However, some “big women” also
played significant roles in these new power structures (e.g. Biersteker 2007: 71; S. Fabian 2019: 150–151; Farler
1882: 740; Stanley 1872: 75, 116–120). The Swahili term wakubwa is not gendered.
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exact spread of Islam in the interior, many elites in the eastern mountains likely identified as
Muslim as early as 1870 (Alpers 2005; Ricklin 1880). What “becoming Muslim” entailed varied
and might be marked by abstention from pork or alcohol, participation in Muslim rituals, and the
adoption of Muslim names, among other practices. Conversion to Islam also overlapped with
adoption of elements of Swahili culture, including language, clothing, and architecture, but the
latter could and did also occur without conversion (Becker 2008: 25–26). In addition to its role in
indexing social status and solidifying links with the coast and beyond, Islam could also provide
an alternative charter for governance, kinship, and relations to place and community. In this
sense, it was bound up with other social changes of the nineteenth century in complex and
sometimes contradictory ways.
Once again, a turn to the history of Kingalu is informative. From Kingalu Mwanamsumi,
the name Kingalu was passed down to Kingalu Mwanamkova, Kingalu Mwanamkasi, Kingalu
Fimbo Mbili and Kingalu Mwanadundaga before it was inherited by a man known as Kingalu
Mwanashaa. This early lineage hints at close linkages between Kingalu’s family and the coast.
The name Fimbo Mbili is Swahili, not Luguru, and although we know little about Fimbo Mbili,
Young and Fosbrooke were told that he died at the coast (1960: 48). These coastal linkages are
even clearer in the time of Kingalu Mwanashaa, about whom considerably more information is
available, in large part through the writings of Father Antoine Horner and his fellow
missionaries, who visited Kingalu at Kinole in 1870 (Ricklin 1880). Kingalu Mwanashaa was
born at the coast near Bagamoyo. Edward Alpers estimated Mwanashaa’s birth at 1788, based on
Kingalu’s stated age at the time of Horner’s visit (2005: 34). While it is possible that Kingalu
exaggerated his own age by some years, he was certainly born before or near the turn of the
nineteenth century, the product of a marriage between two elite families—Kingalu’s Bena
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lineage in the Uluguru Mountains, to which his mother was born, and an influential Shomvi
family to which his father belonged (Alpers 2005). Such inland-coastal unions between powerful
families were not uncommon at the time and served to bolster both families’ statuses as well as
their control over trade (S. Fabian 2019: 40; Owens 2006: 740). Because Shomvi followed
patrilineal descent and the Bena lineage was matrilineal, Kingalu Mwanashaa was an heir to both
families. The title he bestowed upon himself, Shenekambi, indicated his patrilineal status, while
the name of Kingalu, which he had inherited from his brother by the mid-nineteenth century,
indicated his matriline. Early sources agreed that Kingalu Mwanashaa was the first Muslim to
hold the title Kingalu and Horner’s accounts of Kingalu’s sons indicate that at least some had
Muslim names (Ricklin 1880: 156, 199).
Further information about Kingalu Mwanashaa is evident from a dispute that arose over
half a century later, when in 1931, the British administration received a petition from a man
bearing the name Machupa bin Shenekambi suggesting that he, not Kingalu, was the rightful
chief of the Uluguru Mountains. On investigation, the administration determined that Machupa
was the patrilineal grandson of Kingalu Mwanashaa, and that the title of Shenekambi has been
passed from Kingalu Mwanashaa to his sons and grandsons in succession after his death. The
Morogoro District Book offers family trees for both Kingalu and Shenekambi, labelling the latter
“Ukoo Punguji” (“Punguji lineage”). Below the family tree, there is a note, presumably written
by District Officer E. E. Hutchins, which says: “The Ukoo Punguji is apparently the only clan to
adopt the Mohamedan line of succession and the heirs descend from father to son” (Hutchins
1931a). The accompanying note stated that while Kingalu Mwanakonza had inherited the name
Kingalu, he was concerned primarily with ritual roles (“rain-making and witchcraft”), while
Kingalu Mwanashaa’s son, Shenekambi II, took over political administration. Significantly,
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“Punguji” is derived from the name of the Shomvi settlement near Bagamoyo on the coast,
where Kingalu Mwanashaa’s father and grandfather held sway.
If Kingalu Mwanashaa’s birth is a testament to the longstanding linkages between the
hinterland and coastal elites, his reign as described by Horner in 1870 illustrates the political
trajectory of such linkages with the intensification of trade and slavery after 1850. Horner’s visit
occurred after repeated invitations from Kingalu’s sons, sent as emissaries to the coast to
welcome the missionaries (Ricklin 1880: 150–156). The missionary’s visit was an opportunity
for both men to affirm their political significance, especially in light of the growing dominance
of the Zanzibari Sultanate. Kingalu had recently suffered military defeats in the north of Uluguru
from a Zigua leader named Kisabengo. Despite this, Horner’s account detailed Kingalu’s
apparent power, describing him as a “king” with an elaborate array of ministers and significant
wealth and firepower. Horner also described Kingalu as a “turbulent neighbor” who had made
“continual wars” in his youth, and as a “despot” and “tyrant” disliked by his subjects (Ricklin
1880: 212). The missionaries were told by Kingalu’s niece that he had violently overthrown his
brother, her father, to ascend to his current position. While Horner’s account bears the marks of
the missionaries’ own motivations to present themselves as needed civilizers, it also stands in
stark contrast to the image of Luguru lineages as first settlers collectively governing land, as well
as the common colonial-era assertion that prominent individuals came to power through
rainmaking abilities. Instead, struggle over important rainmaking shrines and important trade
routes, sometimes through direct military force, shaped the overarching political dynamics of the
time.
From Horner’s account, we can see several ways in which Kingalu was working to
consolidate and shore up his power inland, along the coast, and beyond, as well as the way his
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critics used tensions in his authority against him. For instance, one of Kingalu’s daughters had
married a Muslim from Muscat who was reported to have been living in Uluguru for 40 years at
the time of Horner’s 1870 visit and who assisted Kingalu in his administration. Horner also
described goods in Kinole originating at the coast or overseas, including a Persian blanket and
numerous guns, which appear ubiquitous in the missionaries’ account (Ricklin 1880: 192–215).
As Glassman has shown, such prestige goods helped elite men consolidate their status and
cultivate networks of clients (1995: 25–52). However, these markers of power in the coastal
networks of “big men” sit alongside references to other forms of authority based in social healing
and rainmaking. Horner wrote:
The King…ordered his slaves to bring a stool replete with mysterious properties.
But they did not dare obey this injunction. “Ah! they cried,—Lord of the
country!—We will die if we touch this sacred object! Ah, we are afraid. We don’t
dare!” Kingalu repeated his order, and as his slaves 7 refused to expose
themselves, one of the nephews of the king went to look for it, and presented it to
us, trembling with his whole body. It was nothing but an old worm-eaten seat,
covered with a monkey skin half eaten away by insects. “Look! said Kingalu, I
only have to touch this precious talisman and instantly clouds amass and the rain
falls in torrents.” (It is the Minister Makoussi—storm cloud—who gives to the
King, on his accession to the throne, the turban which renders him invincible and
the magical seat.) (Ricklin 1880: 242).
Later, per this account, Horner condemned Kingalu for allowing witch-burning in his kingdom,
appealing to Kingalu as a “civilized man” who was “born at the coast.” Kingalu, according to the
missionary’s account, exited the conversation, feigning spirit position. “Yes,” Horner allegedly
called after him, “you are possessed by the Spirit, but the spirit of evil, who opposes you hearing
the truth. You imagine that a white man ever believes in these extravagances? It is God, Kingalu,
and not you, who makes the rain fall!” (Ricklin 1880: 243–244).

It is probable that Kingalu, as a “big man,” did hold slaves, but there are little details from Horner or other
nineteenth century sources about who these individuals were or what roles they played in Uluguru.
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The next day, Kingalu came under a different verbal attack, also related to his role as a
rainmaker and social healer. Horner and Kingalu had put the previous day’s conflict behind
them, and the missionary offered to have a portrait of Kingalu made and sent to Europe. Kingalu
agreed, but the portrait session was briefly interrupted by an old woman who Horner understood
to be one of Kingalu’s wives. Horner recounted her shouting, “What, Kingalu, here you are
obeying the whites? Are you going to have another figure done? Is the one you have no longer
good? You will bring all the calamities to the country: all the people will fall ill, all the goats will
perish, you yourself will die!” The audience cried out, apparently in support of the woman’s
case, but Horner persisted and Kingalu acquiesced to the missionary, his picture appearing in the
Catholic mission bulletin a few years later (Ricklin 1880: 244–245).
The attacks on Kingalu from the Catholic missionary and the unnamed woman each took
up the language of social healing to place demands on Kingalu, and together illustrate the
tensions in his authority. In his criticism of Kingalu, Horner astutely played on the prestige
politics of the coast, in which status was linked to “civilization” (and its corollary, Islam) in
opposition to washenzi (a term variously translated as barbarian, heathen or bumpkin), explicitly
counterposing civilization to rainmaking. Horner had previously touched Kingalu’s sacred
regalia, despite warnings that he would die, and ridiculed Kingalu for suggesting that a white
man would believe in such superstitions. This deliberate attempt to delegitimize Kingalu’s
leadership, however, was counterposed with an appeal to his power as a leader, and especially as
a Muslim with coastal linkages. The unnamed woman who confronted Kingalu the next day also
counterposed Kingalu’s connection to the coast with his obligations as a social healer, but sought
to delegitimize the former, suggesting that participation in having his portrait taken would
jeopardize the health of the land and the community, and intractably, Kingalu’s own well-being.
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Her critique appears targeted at the concentration of power in the individual person of Kingalu
Mwanashaa, epitomized through portraiture, as well as at Kingalu’s connection to coastal politics
achieved through political networks with Europeans, Arabs and coastal elites, control over trade,
and the accumulation of private wealth. Rainmaking authority across East Africa typically came
with strict prohibitions, especially around particular technologies and certain foreign goods.
Indeed, while Horner expressed shock at Kingalu’s humble living arrangement, his simple home
in Kinole was doubtless a compromise between Kingalu’s desire for “big man” style authority
oriented toward the coast and the strict prohibitions demanded of a rainmaker. To the woman
who confronted him, and likely to others in Kinole at the time, Kingalu’s entanglements with
other forms of authority posed ecological threats to social reproduction, namely drought and
disease. Put otherwise, rainmaking as a political form placed questions of social reproduction at
the center of political struggle, while for coastal “big men,” ecological control and social wellbeing were secondary to the accumulation of wealth and military strength.
It is also no coincidence that this complaint was brought by a woman. The rise of “big
men” in connection to the coastal economy meant the increasing concentration of power in the
hands of individual men and the increasing marginalization of women. We also see echoes of
women’s historical loss of power in the many lineage histories, including Kingalu’s, which
depict lineage founders as women but subsequent lineage heads as exclusively men. While these
stories should not be taken as literal records of events, the persistence of the cliché, together with
other evidence, does match the trend by which certain wajomba consolidated their power over
others in their lineage. While matambiko were always a collective action carried out by elders,
both men and women, it appears that the roles of individual rainmakers to affect the outcome
grew during the shifting politics of the nineteenth century.
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While Kingalu’s lineage provides a stark example of the consolidation of authority by a
single individual, similar processes took place on a smaller scale in other lineages and other
areas. This can be seen in another widespread cliché, that of uncles selling their nephews and
nieces into slavery. 8 I heard these accounts not only in response to questions about the slave
trade and the nineteenth century, but also in reply to general questions about the matrilineal
system. For example:
In Luguru tradition and custom (mila na desturi), one’s child is the child of one’s
mjomba.…The livestock (mifugo) of the elders at that time, their livestock were
their nephews and nieces, their sisters’ children. If one had a problem, he would
take two or three of them to Bagamoyo to sell them (Mwishehe Juma, interview,
April 11, 2018).
Back then, [for example] my uncle (mjomba) would take me—or my brother
would take my child, he would go and sell them there at Bagamoyo or wherever.
They were sold there. They were given salt (Muhando, interview, August 14,
2018).
In lineages then, we were with the mother [matrilineal]. The mjomba, who was
the mother’s brother, would come and chose [from] his sister’s children. He
would go to sell them…. For example, he would take them and go to sell them at
Bagamoyo, where there was a big a market of slaves (Abdallah Ali Kawambwa,
interview, October 9, 2018).
Many in Uluguru today believe that those taken to Bagamoyo were subsequently sent to the
Middle East or Europe, citing as evidence the fact that their relatives never came home. In fact,
there little evidence of a significant transoceanic slave trade at Bagamoyo (S. Fabian 2013).
While it is difficult to ascertain how many people from Uluguru were sold into slavery at the
coast, there is likely some truth to these accounts. If it is true that those enslaved never returned,
this is likely because they were absorbed into the social and kinship networks of the coast, either
because they were forcibly severed from prior kinship relations through the act of enslavement or
because conversion to Islam and claims to coastal citizenship marked the best path out of
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Becker recorded similar accounts of nephew-selling uncles in other previously matrilineal areas (2008: 43).

79

oppressive conditions (S. Fabian 2019; Glassman 1995). Megan Vaughan has noted that slavery
served as a form of social death in Central Africa, because it meant an existence outside of
kinship (Kalusa and Vaughan 2013: 20). The permanent loss of kin relations seems to similarly
define slavery in Luguru memory. The repetition of these accounts in conjunction with a
discussion of the matrilineal system offers a critique of the concentration of power in the hands
of wajomba that is coherent regardless of the actual extent of the slave trade out of Uluguru. In
this discourse, wajomba acted not as rainmakers and healers of their lineages, but as those who
most immediately threatened the reproduction of the lineage and community through the
consumption of its youth and the breakdown of family relations. In such accounts, fertility was
traded—quite literally—for wealth in the form of salt.
However, despite the implication of wajomba in the slave trade, coastal power networks
based on trade also stood somewhat at odds with the matrilineal system. This was evident in the
struggle between Kingalu Mwanashaa’s matrilineal descendants, heirs to the name Kingalu, and
his patrilineal descendants, heirs to the name Shenekambi, mentioned above. Matrilineal kinship
provided an expansive set of kin relations which powerful wajomba could call upon as
dependents in the framework of social healing. In the hands of powerful individuals like Kingalu,
this system allowed for the extension of power over space and population. Patrilineal kinship, in
contrast, provided fewer heirs and dependents in each generation, allowing for the greater
concentration of power and wealth, and limiting networks of kin-based obligation. Power based
on rainmaking and other forms of healing required social links to elders and healers with the
diverse forms of knowledge needed to bring rain and heal the land. Power gained through control
over trade, conversely, rested on linkages to coastal elites and authority over caravan routes.
Military power tended toward the latter, obviating the need for kinship, relationships to spirits,
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and effective rainmaking as grounds for territorial expansion. However, despite the changing
politics of the nineteenth century, matrilineal links ultimately proved more critical and enduring
in Uluguru. Only in the case of Kingalu Mwanashaa was this seriously threatened, but the
attempt of Kingalu and his heirs to bifurcate power through two lines of inheritance—that of
Kingalu and that of Shenekambi—floundered and ended when Shenekambi III ran afoul of the
German administration and was hung at Kisaki, marginalizing the patriline’s linkages to
European power just as colonialism made such linkages critical to continued authority (Hutchins
1931a).
Islam had a significant but not causative role in these politics as well. Flowing along
trade routes and through political networks from the coast inland, Islam provided an alternative
charter to the ideal matrilineal lineage system in places like Uluguru. In his note on the conflict
between Kingalu and Shenekambi, Hutchins (1931a) described Shenekambi’s patrilineal kinship
explicitly as Muslim. On the coast, Islam had become a religion of the political elite. Inland,
Islam served as an index of connection to long-distance trade. “Big men” like Kingalu rarely
engaged in proselytization, preferring to maintain the exclusive nature of Islam (Becker 2008:
25–52). Islam would also prove useful in the early period of European expansion in East Africa,
as Horner’s appeal to Kingalu’s religion makes clear. Islam, especially when accompanied by
literacy, offered particular forms of legitimacy in the eyes of early Europeans in East Africa.
Luguru identity, more recent than clan identity and even than many of older lineages in
the mountains, emerged from these nineteenth century struggles. Most scholars writing of
Uluguru explain that the word “Luguru” to mean “people of the mountains” (Mzuanda 1958;
Young and Fosbrooke 1960). However, many elders I spoke with in Uluguru gave a different
etymology—the name, they said, referred to a powerful man with a bad leg who lived high in the
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mountains. Mzee Sipriani,, introduced in the Introduction, gave a particularly interesting version
of this story: There was once a man named Msawanga who had no children of his own. When
the parents in the area went to work, they left their children in his care. However, when the
parents were away, Msawanga took one of the children and sold him to the Arabs. 9 When the
parents returned, they were enraged to find their child missing. When they discovered that
Msawanga had sold the child, they shot him in the leg with a shotgun. He ran away into the
forest, but his leg was permanently disfigured. After this, he became known as “Luguru”
(Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko, interview, October 22, 2018). Whether or not such an individual
existed, this story is significant because it explicitly traces the origin of “Luguru” as a category
to the form of politics associated with the slave trade and to the presence of guns, distinctive
features of the late nineteenth century. Indeed, Mzee Sipriani added to his story that the guns
such as the one used to shoot Msawanga were common at that time, explaining that the Arabs
gave them as gifts to “watu wakubwa” (lit. big people).
Taken together, these accounts—of Kingalu and Shenekambi, of rainmaking matambiko
and sacred geography, of slave-selling uncles and guns—offer a layered history of the mountains
from the eighteenth century. It is clear from the dates associated with Kingalu Mwanashaa that
Bena lineage, despite being late arrivals to Uluguru, had already ascended to power and had
forged coastal connections by the turn of the nineteenth century. It is difficult to make sense of
these dates if the mountains were not already populated by the mid-eighteen century, although it
is highly likely that additional groups entered the mountains a century later, pushed by increasing
raiding from Mbunga, Zigua, and Zaramo groups as well as Zanzibari and Shomvi political
expansion. Whatever the exact date of settlement, traces in the sacred geography and in
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Arabs serves as a general term for coastally-linked traders in oral histories of this period (e.g. Becker 2008: 43).
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rainmaking practices suggest a general trend to the increasing concentration of power by certain
wajomba and growing anxieties about social healing (and its corollary, social reproduction) with
the rising influence of coastal trade networks. Social healing provided the basis for the
consolidation of power on the part of rainmakers like Hega and Kingalu, but also provided a
framework by which ordinary people could make demands upon and critiques of those in power.
In either case, this form of politics wove kinship into the landscape and placed questions of
social reproduction at the center of political legitimacy.
Early European Encounters and German Rule
When Europeans began extending their reach in inland East Africa in the second half of
the nineteenth century, their understanding of these political dynamics was limited. However,
they immediately recognized the mountains’ importance as a source of water. One of the first
European accounts of Uluguru is from Richard Burton, who passed near the mountains on his
1857 expedition. Burton wrote:
Dut’humi, one of the most fertile districts in K’hutu, is a plain of black earth and
sand, choked with vegetation where not corrected by the axe. It is watered by the
perennial stream of the same name, which, rising in the islands, adds its quotum
to the waters of the Mgazi, and eventually to the Mgeta and the Kingani [Ruvu]
Rivers….The mountains of Dut’humi [Uluguru] form the northern boundary of
the plain….This chain is said to send forth the Kingani River, which, gushing
from a cave or fissure in the east, is swollen to a large perennial stream by feeders
from the southern slopes, whilst the Mgeta flows from the western face of the
water-parting, and circles the southern base (Burton 1860: 86–87).
Burton’s emphasis on water and its sources is perhaps not surprising since he passed Uluguru on
his ostensible search for the source of the Nile. Nevertheless, his concern with the mountains
primarily as a source of water and the tales of the Kingani (today known as the Ruvu) “gushing
from a cave or fissure” are typical of early European accounts of the mountains. In the same
passage, Burton noted that Zaramo pilgrims frequented a sacred place in the mountains inhabited
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by a pepo (spirit) named “Kurero” (Kolero) or “Bokero.” This place, Burton wrote, was visited
by pilgrims from as far away as the coast seeking “fruitful seasons” as well as help with matters
of war and fertility.
Horner’s account of his 1870 visit to Uluguru also frequently focused on the mountains’
ecology and their seeming abundance of water. He wrote:
The air there is very crisp, the vegetation splendid…. These mountains contain
abundant sources of water which give rise to numerous streams…. Here stand
ancient trees seven meters in circumference and which reach 30 meters height
before the base of their branches. There torrents of roaring water fall in cascades;
farther away flow creeks shaded by a luxurious vegetation; even on the highest
summits of the mountains spreads a brilliant parure of forests. A magnificent
country where God has poured out in plenty all the splendors of nature (Ricklin
1880: 202).
However, Horner, who ventured into the mountains themselves, added to these images of natural
abundance remarks on population density, noting that the mountains in the north were
“cultivated to their peaks” (Ricklin 1880: 192). As we will see, these two conflicting images—
the untouched wilderness from which poured abundant water and the baren land of deforestation,
erosion, and overpopulation—would become the major motifs in European descriptions of the
mountains, occurring again and again over the decades.
While both Britain and Germany initially eyed the area as a potential space for empire,
the mainland of what is now Tanzania was officially colonized by Germany in 1885, when the
German East Africa Company (DOAG) was granted imperial charter. One year before, the
founder of DOAG, Carl Peters, had travelled through the eastern interior, returning with a dozen
“treaties” with various “chiefs” that he believed gave him legal rights to a significant part of
what would become German East Africa (Iliffe 1979: 89–91). In 1891, after further territorial
expansions, DOAG ceded control of the territory to the German government, which began to
administer the colony directly. However, German control was more quickly established in the
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northern part of the colony, which was favored among early settlers. In the southern half of the
territory, German presence was weak until the early twentieth century. In Uluguru, as elsewhere,
the German administration relied on a mixture of local authorities (designated jumbes) and
outside akidas to enforce rules, collect taxes and otherwise administer the colony. A few German
settlers also eventually entered the mountains, establishing small plantations of rubber and
kapok, including in the area of Mfumbwe, Luholole and Madamu. Oral accounts in Mkuyuni
emphasize that these settlers also acted as de facto administrators who enforced stringent rules
and inflicted punishments—especially viboko (whipping)—on Africans living near them.
Prior to the arrival of these settlers, the first “scientific” accounts of Uluguru were written
by the German zoologist and naturalist Franz Stuhlmann, who first described the mountains after
passing near the base of them in 1894. A year later, he published a more extensive account of the
geology, vegetation, climate, and inhabitants of Uluguru. In his first letter, he described the
extent of water flowing from the mountains and argued that more intensive cultivation would be
possible with irrigation. As his route passed along the north and west of the mountains, however,
he also described foothills as denuded of trees, writing that “the treelessness…can surely be
traced back to the destruction of forest by culture” (1894: 288). The area, he continued, was said
to be very populated, though he does not say who told him this. In his second account, which
took him through the mountains themselves, he again remarked extensively on the mountains’
abundant water, describing “magnificently picturesque, incomparably fertile and water-rich”
valleys (1895: 215). However, he also emphasized rapid ecological decay through deforestation
and erosion, writing of what he described as “the clearing zone” in the central mountains:
Very few trees are present here, yet all circumstances suggest that the entire zone
was previously occupied by mountain jungle. In the lower regions, it seems to
have been cleared a long time ago, but further up one can still see tree stumps
everywhere and in some places large stretches are covered with freshly felled
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trees…. Here and there, especially along stream courses and valley trenches,
small stands or groups of trees remain standing (1895: 218).
He noted that the lower edges of forests were always sharp, stating that “from this, one can
already deduce the activity of the people who pushed the forest back.” Stuhlmann attributed this
apparent deforestation to “the Negro’s peculiar economic system” of clearing new fields “almost
every year” in search of fresh topsoil rather than using fertilizers, a practice he believed was
shared across the continent (1895: 220).
Stuhlmann blamed both cutting and burning for what he believed to be the permanent
loss of primeval forest. Removing the trees, he believed, resulted in a loss of the topsoil through
erosion and thus prevented new forests from growing once cultivation was abandoned. In
particular, he remarked that the water supply was being adversely affected and that the
missionaries at Tununguo had reported a decrease in water in the Kingani (Ruvu) River over the
prior eight years. He argued that the only solution would be the creation of forest reserves and
the imposition of rules on the local population:
In order to prevent or at least check the defacement of this magnificent mountain
forest, something must happen as soon as possible, which of course is only
possible through the supervision of the natives; because admonitions are
unquestionably ineffective (1895: 222).
Instead, he argued that burning should be banned and punished, forest boundaries delineated, and
a forest assessor and staff appointed. Moreover, he wrote, the administration should push for the
cultivation of exportable crops like coffee, tea, and cocoa, which he believed would be well
suited to the climate.
That year, the Crown Land Declaration declared all “ownerless land” property of the
colonial administration (Gissibl 2016: 120). This declaration rested on the division between
occupied and empty lands that left no room for patterns of shifting cultivation and periodic
resettlement. It also saw forests as indicators of the absence of human settlement and agriculture,
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rather than a space of coexistence. Convinced that rapid deforestation was taking place, the
declaration banned swidden cultivation and burning, and placed a tax on all tree cutting for
purposes other than the construction of homes. Also in 1895, the Usambara Forest Ordinance
took aim at a part of the Eastern Arc Mountains northeast of Uluguru, banning burning, cutting,
and grazing in protected areas and requiring forest preservation along ridge tops, valleys, and
water courses. While the limitations imposed by the Crown Land Declaration were difficult to
enforce in areas with limited German presence such as Uluguru, the Usambara Forest Ordinance
was enforced with harsh penalties including heavy fines, jail, whipping, and chains. In 1899, the
Forest Conservation Ordinance extended similar provisions to Uluguru out of concern for the
water supply (Schabel 1990: 133, 140).
In 1904, the Forest Protection Ordinance aimed to shift land from crown lands to formal
forest reserves and initiated a significant increase in forest reserve land across German East
Africa, with a priority placed on creating reserves in mountain and watershed regions (Schabel
1990: 133; Sunseri 2009: 54). The next year, the Maji Maji War swept across the southern half
of the colony, passing near eastern Uluguru on all sides. This armed uprising against the
Germans, which traversed linguistic and political divisions, was in part sparked by a crisis in
social reproduction. Taxation in currency, along with compulsory labor on cotton-growing
schemes and infrastructure projects in some regions, drew male labor away from food production
while increasing restrictions on forests blocked access to critical resources including foodstuffs,
wood, and medicines (Sunseri 1997, 2003). Following the failure of the agricultural season in
1904, new medicines began to circulate, including both war medicines and agricultural
medicines, and new sets of social healers emerged as regional contenders for power. Followers
of these healers attacked several German forts and settlements, sometimes also including
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missionaries and Muslims in their attacks and sometimes sparing them. The German
administration responded with a scorched earth campaign that lasted two years and led to
significant displacement and hunger. In Uluguru, the main participation in the war came from the
western side of the mountains, under the leadership of Mbago (also called Mwanambago), a “big
man” and rainmaker who had influence in Mgeta, along with his son. Medicines associated with
Kolero were among those circulating during the war, but residents of Eastern Uluguru do not
appear to have joined the fighting and the Germans did not attack the area as they did the
surrounding lowlands (Giblin and Monson 2010; Gwassa 1972; Iliffe 1967, 1979; Pels 1999;
Wright 1995).
In the aftermath of the war, the German administration’s grip on Uluguru tightened. A
forest administration was created at Morogoro and several small reserves were established at
Bunduki and Kasanga in 1908 (“Bekanntmachung No. 8” 1908; Fuchs 1907: 91). In 1909, these
holdings grew by several orders of magnitude with the establishment of a 27,800 hectare reserve
along the highest reaches of the mountains, as well as the addition of smaller reserves at
Kimboza and Mvuha. While this land had previously been protected by the Crown Land
Declaration and the 1899 Forest Conservation Ordinance, with the creation of the Uluguru Forest
Reserve, forty-four forest police officers were brought in from neighboring regions to prevent
cultivation in the reserve (“Sonderberichte der Forstverwaltung” 1909). In the years that
followed, men, women and even children were fined and sentenced to labor in chains for
farming, burning, and grazing in the forest (Sunseri 2009: 73). Restrictions on forest use not only
limited access to material forest resources and land, but also threatened access to sacred sites and
thus threatened the ritual work of social reproduction, rainmaking, and healing. When I asked
elders in 2018 and 2019 what they had heard about the German period, they almost universally
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discussed punishment by whipping, which they described as capriciously applied for even minor
infractions.
The closest forest reserve to Mkuyuni was the small reserve at Kimboza, along the Ruvu
River. Like others, this reserve limited access to key forest resources as well as important sacred
sites. I interviewed Asha Ramadhani Msisimizi, an elderly woman in Changa village, in August
2018. Early in our interview, she noted that relationships to forests had changed with the creation
of forest reserves. Before, she said, people had farmed in the forest, but during the colonial
period, people were expelled from the forest and farming was banned (interview, August 22,
2018). At Kimboza, in particularly, she recalled, people were forbidden to enter to forest,
because it was “shamba la bibi” (“grandmother’s farm”) (interview, August 29, 2018). The term
“grandmother’s farm,” interestingly, evokes a local rather than colonial form of forest
reservation, denoting a forest in which restrictions must be followed out of respect for the
ancestors. As described above, such sacred forests were used for the collection of medicines and
other resources, as well as for matambiko. In many cases, they were deliberately cultivated and
maintained by lineages, part of the consolidation of power by lineage elders and lineage heads.
In Bibi Asha’s account, such forests were not asocial spaces in need of protection from extractive
human beings, but rather were places in which human relations were continually remade through
intergenerational practices of care. In other areas, as Bibi Asha’s account also shows, other forms
of forest existed as spaces of farming and food production, a patchwork of agroforestry and
clearing through shifting cultivation. German forestry, which viewed human activity as alien to
“natural” forests, not only rendered the agroforestry practices and forest management practices
of forest-dwellers invisible but froze boundaries and limited the uses of forests for matambiko
and medicinal purposes, critical components of social reproduction in Uluguru. While this attack

89

on both agroforestry practices and healing practices had material consequences for residents of
the mountains, they were not totalizing, and indeed, referring to the Kimboza forest reserve as
“shamba la bibi” serves to reinscribe the colonial forest in the terms of kinship and social
healing.
The Arrival of the British and Indirect Rule
German control in East Africa ended with World War I. The war itself passed through
Eastern Uluguru, as German forces retreated from Morogoro and Mikesse to Kisaki, passing
through Mkuyuni and Matambo, the British close on their heels. As Germans retreated, they
destroyed many of their records. Writings by British troops and officials, arriving in the chaos of
war, reflect a profound unfamiliarity with the area. One of the first and most detailed written
accounts of the period in Uluguru came from British Lieutenant E. William Bovill, who was part
of the contingent that pursued the Germans through Uluguru from Mikesse to Kisaki. Bovill’s
account of the war offers useful details not only about the war but about the demographic and
ecological history of the area. Like many of the Europeans who passed through the mountains
before him, Bovill wrote effusively of the landscape:
These highlands are of extraordinary beauty, and have been compared to those of
Kashmir…Great rocks crop out on the floors of the valleys as well as on the
hillsides; but nowhere does this ruggedness meet the eye, for the whole landscape
is clothed in dense tropical vegetation through which only an occasional gaunt
peak rises above the general conformation of the hills. The rising sun turns the
brilliant green of the virgin forest to a wonderful medley of soft shades of pink
and mauve and violet; but during the heat of the day the heights are enveloped in
a veil of the softest blue (1918: 16).
He also offered descriptions of the rivers flowing from the mountains and added, “Of wild fruit
the banana, mango, and paw-paw are plentiful” (1918: 17).
When Bovill shifted from descriptions of the landscape to a discussion of the inhabitants
and their conditions, however, the image he presented changed dramatically:
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The Uluguru Mountains were formerly thickly populated, as shown by the
extensive clearing of the lesser hilltops, marking the sites of former farms on
which much millet was grown. Sugar-cane and bananas may have been cultivated
near villages…. Occasionally a few naked children come to the road and sell
mangoes to the passing troops (1918: 20). 10
While Bovill’s comments make clear that he was aware of the cultivation and sale of bananas
and mangos by residents of the mountains, the fruit trees he described seeing along the way were
marked as “wild” in his account, presumably because they were interspersed with the other
species that composed the forest. Where Bovill saw “virgin forest” with an abundance of “wild”
fruit, however, we might just as easily see signs of agroforestry, intentional patches of fallow,
forest, and cultivation tended and maintained by the mountains’ inhabitants. Like other European
commentators of the time, Bovill saw agriculture and the mark of human activity only in spaces
of deforestation and not in the growth of trees (save the several German rubber and kapok
plantations they passed on their way, from which other growth had also been cleared).
Upon assuming formal control of the former German East Africa via League of Nations
Mandate, the British began collecting both scientific and ethnographic information about their
new colony, now called Tanganyika. At the district level, this information was compiled in
district books, large binders that served as the basis for local administration. Bovill’s account,
which was excerpted in the Morogoro District Book, was quickly supplemented by further
research concerning the environment and people of Uluguru, driven in particular by the
administration’s transition to indirect rule. After the war, the British government initially
retained the German administration’s mixture of direct and indirect rule through akidas and

Bovill’s belief that the mountains had been depopulated through war, conscription, and potentially genocidal
policies such as those recently uncovered in German Southwest Africa proved unfounded. Oral accounts of WWI
from those in Uluguru recall that many people hid in caves as the armies passed, as they had during prior periods of
raiding (T. I. Digonile, interview, December 3, 2018; J. R. Lipeluke, personal communication, December 24, 2018;
L. P. Dimoso, personal communication, January 10, 2019).
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jumbes, but with the arrival of Donald Cameron as Governor in 1925, a model of indirect rule
was officially implemented across the territory. Indirect rule required ethnography both in order
to identify proper authorities for appointment in the Native Authority and to create a standard
account of “customary law,” which would serve as the basis for the administration of the African
population. At least in the early years of his administration, Cameron believed that African
societies were composed of bounded tribes, each under the authority of a chief, and upon his
arrival to Tanganyika, he ordered district officers to gather notes on “the original constitution” of
the tribes in their districts (Pels 1996: 741–743).
Morogoro District Officer E. E. Hutchins compiled the main set of notes upon which
indirect rule in Uluguru would be based. In the second half of the 1920s, he wrote broad outlines
of Luguru history, politics, and culture, beginning with a discussion of the lineage system. From
his writings, it is clear that Hutchins subscribed to a theory of political evolution, in which
individual “family heads” became “village heads.” Although political organization did not
“originally” go beyond these figures, Hutchins noted that some further consolidation of authority
had occurred:
Later on, as the successful rain-maker become more powerful, he gradually took
over the control of the Wandewa [lineage heads] in his particular sphere of work
and this appears to have been the way that the families of Kingalo, Hega, and
MwanaMbago, gradually became chiefs in their respective areas (Hutchins n.d.).
This evolutionary view of African politics was hardly unique to Hutchins. It was shared by many
British administrators, including Cameron, who saw indirect rule not only as a mechanism to
expand British power through the absorption of local authorities, but as a system that would
encourage the gradual development of political authority in each “tribe” toward what were seen
as more rational forms of rule (Pels 1996: 741–742).
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However, Hutchins and Cameron diverged on the question of chiefs and their role in
precolonial politics. At the beginning of his tenure, Cameron believed that all African societies
would appear as distinct tribes under chiefly authority and argued that absence of chiefs in some
areas was due to the destruction of indigenous political systems by German direct rule (Pels
1996: 742). In contrast, Hutchins failed to find evidence of a clear chiefdom in Uluguru prior to
German control (Hutchins n.d.). A few months before Cameron’s directive to implement indirect
rule, Hutchins had agreed to the installation of two “chiefs” to replace the German-installed
akida: Chief Muhina Goso Kingo (heir to the Zigua conqueror Kisabengo) in the north and Chief
Kingalu Mwanamfuko in the south. Only a few months later, however, Hutchins suggested an
alternate arrangement granting Hega and Mbago powers equal to those of Kingalu. Cameron was
unconvinced of this more decentralized administration and took advantage of Hutchins’s leave in
1926 to reaffirm the selection of Kingo and Kingalu as sole chiefs (Hutchins 1930).
Under Cameron’s directives, the traditional authorities had both executive and judicial
functions and thus the chiefs identified through colonial anthropology were to serve as the judges
in the native courts, enforcing “customary law.” This law, in turn, was assumed to already exist
as a general, but unwritten, consensus among tribal members, waiting only for the government
anthropologist to discover its precise content. While this form of colonial anthropology tended to
take social structures at face value, Pels reminds us that in fact, “descent categories were a
discourse through which political and economic relations were organized and discussed” (1996:
744, emphasis original). Once inscribed in the District Book, forms of social organization that
had been flexible and shifting became increasingly ossified. Of course, the written form of
Luguru custom did not immediately efface the complex practices unfolding off the page. Rather,
a double was created, one to which reality was gradually shifted to conform. A match between
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the written system and the one in practice was never achieved, but the pieces of political
discourse and practice that were missing from colonial accounts became increasingly sidelined in
daily life. If what appeared on the pages of the District Book was initially a mere shadow of
politics in practice, over time, the shadow gradually began to appear as the figure to which
practice should conform.
British administrators based colonial ethnography and thus indirect rule on information
gathered in meetings (known as barazas) with select informants, predominantly elite men. Pels
(1996) has described indirect rule as process of “pidginization.” Like a pidgin language, which
emerges from the interaction of a substrate and superstrate language, indirect rule emerged
through an unequal but creative process of negotiation between these two groups. Although the
colonial administration always held the upper hand, the process of implementing indirect rule
created complex political opportunities that exceeded not only their control but quite often their
knowledge. Such political negotiations between British and Luguru men happened almost
universally at the expense of Luguru women. The British authorities overseeing Uluguru were
universally men, and almost never spoke to women when recording the colonial ethnography that
served as the basis for indirect rule (Pels 1996: 751; Pels 1999: 162–166). As a result, the only
significant political role granted to Luguru women in official ethnographies was their selection
of the succession of wajomba, and even this role is absent from the District Book itself (Pels
1999: 162; Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 53). Women’s other economic and political roles
became increasingly invisible to official eyes during the British period. This process by which
women were marginalized from the sphere of official state politics was not simply the result of
oversight; rather, it should be understood as the result of active efforts by elite men, both Luguru
and British, to consolidate their power. As we have seen, both the consolidation of lineage and
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rainmaking power by individual men over the course of several centuries and the increasing
influence of coastal trade networks in the rise of nineteenth century “big men” had already led to
losses of power by women. Indirect rule pushed this process to even further extremes.
Kingalu Mwanamguo, who inherited the position of Kingalu from his uncle in 1927, was
one of the men who succeeded, at least at first, in using indirect rule to his advantage. In the
early years of his reign, Kingalu proved to be particularly skilled at navigating the complex
political landscape and using British presence to consolidate his authority. Upon assuming the
title of Kingalu, he moved from Kinole, high in the mountains, to Mkuyuni, which had recently
surpassed Madamu and other villages as a commercial center. As the appointed chief of Uluguru,
he presided over the Native Court there. While in office, he quietly reduced the power of Mbago
and Hega, who had each been appointed as subchief (mtawala) under him, subordinating them to
his assistant. He also ousted Hega’s son from the Native Authority and took action to limit the
power of several relatives of Hega and Bambarawe, another “big man” and rainmaker who had
previously held sway in the mountains (Pels 1996: 751). Kingalu also appointed Shenekambi, his
uncle’s patrilineal heir, to the position of mtawala, the same rank held by Hega and Mbago, thus
temporarily neutralizing the threat of an alternative claim to chiefship while widening his
family’s political clout. His political maneuvering can also be seen in a 1931 letter from
Hutchins requesting the deposition of an mtawala, in which Hutchins wrote that “both Kingalo
(sic) and I feel that a more sophisticated native should be in charge here.” Hutchins accused the
incumbent of corruption and nominated a relative of Kingalu in his place (Hutchins 1931b).
Kingalu Mwanamguo also moved to shore up his power in 1929 when F. J. Bagshawe,
then the Land Development Commissioner for the colony, conducted a land development survey
of Uluguru. Bagshawe distrusted Hutchins and set out on his tour in part to challenge Hutchins’s
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research in the area. He began his tour with a baraza at which Kingalu and other members of the
Native Authority affirmed the information Hutchins had compiled in the District Book.
However, the next day, Kingalu apparently realized that Bagshawe was looking for something
different, and changed his approach, using the opportunity to claim a wider territory and to
sideline his political rivals (Pels 1996: 750). As Pels (1996) has shown, Kingalu rarely left
Bagshawe’s side during the remainder of his tour, and his presence at nearly every meeting with
Bagshawe made it difficult for his rivals to contradict his accounts. Bagshawe, who had been a
strong adherent of Cameron’s vision of distinct tribes led by power chiefs, was happy to entertain
Kingalu’s claims, although even he was not convinced that past Kingalus had held lasting and
meaningful authority over the southern and western mountains (Bagshawe 1930; Pels 1996).
Administering Nature in the Colony
While colonial researchers were concerned with ethnography for the purposes of indirect
rule, they were equally eager to gather environmental data that would help them turn the colony
into a source of agricultural profit. In Uluguru, the British administration quickly focused on
questions of soil erosion and its potential impact on the water supply downstream. They
reaffirmed the boundaries of the German forest reserves, to which Hutchins credited the survival
of any forest at the mountains’ peak:
There is little doubt that originally the whole of the Uluguru Mountains were
covered with primeval forest and that they have gradually become denuded from
the foot-hills upwards by the encroachment of the Waluguru. As these people
have increased so they have pushed further up, and it is only the timely
intervention of the European that has prevented this encroachment from reaching
the actual summits (Hutchins n.d.).
British accounts such this consistently describe settlement on the mountains as having spread
from lower elevations to the tops of the mountains, thus viewing the boundaries of the forest
reserves as the only thing holding back cultivation from the last vertical frontier. Luguru
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accounts, however, indicate an opposite movement, whereby the earliest settlements were high in
the mountains at Mgeta, Kibungo and Nyingwa. Lineage genealogies bear out Luguru versions,
with the oldest lineages found at high elevations near the forest boundaries. This suggests that
population spread was in fact downward, with lower areas like Mkuyuni settled later. This
version of the population of the mountains offers a rather different image of the relationships of
farms to forests, suggesting that the preservation of forests on the mountains’ peaks was
maintained prior to the colonial period and that populations had indeed moved from denser areas
to less dense areas over time.
Had British authorities taken more seriously Luguru histories of their own settlement,
they might have taken a different approach to forest management in the mountains. However,
convinced that the few remaining forests had been saved just before their inevitable destruction,
colonial administrators focused on convincing Luguru people not to cut down trees. The monthly
report for Morogoro District in September 1922 already expressed grave concern that “the rapid
denudation of the hills to the S. west of Morogoro, coupled with the resulting erosion of the soil,
will, within the next 20 years, render this area uninhabitable.” The report said that the after a
baraza regarding the perceived problem, “the local inhabitants…have agreed to plant a minimum
of 20 [wattle] trees per man on the hill tops” as long as they would have a right to use the trees
when they fell down, usually after four or five years. A note on this agreement in the colonial
archive says that two trees should be planted for every one cut down (“Morogoro District
Monthly Report” 1922).
Bagshawe’s 1929 tour of the mountains, during which Kingalu Mwanamguo sought to
solidify his claims to authority, was also predominantly concerned with these issues, as
evidenced in the resulting report. Deforestation in particular troubled Bagshawe:
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It must be noted that Waluguru have destroyed all the unreserved forest to get
land for cultivation, trees of any description remaining only where the ground is
unsuitable for planting. The desire for fresh land is overcoming the objection to
cold which formerly kept the tribesmen below certain limits. They are already
beginning to encroach on the edges of the main reserves (1930: 6).
Although Bagshawe saw the rate of erosion as relatively slow, he wrote that “it is vitally
necessary for the tribe to take steps to preserve their soil,” and suggested that teachings about
preventing erosion could be included with lessons in coffee growing, anticipating the attempts
during ULUS to combine coffee-growing with soil preservation (8). In the report, Bagshawe also
remarked that “it is obvious that Southern Uluguru proper will soon be very crowded” and
warned that “if and when their own country can no longer support them, the Waluguru will have
nowhere to go.” Nevertheless, the report noted that the soil was “good and fertile” and produced
surplus crops (4, 7–8). In the agricultural report that was included with Bagshawe’s land survey,
W. J. Hill (1930) wrote that landslides were uncommon in the mountains and that soil wash was
also not a major issue on the eastern side of the mountains because the moisture led to almost
immediate plant growth. Nevertheless, he suggested terraces, citing an article extolling the
virtues of new contour terracing projects in slowing erosion in cash crop producing areas of
Ceylon, also a British colony.
In 1930, the colonial administration attempted to create additional forest reserves,
arguing that designating such reserves was the only way to prevent complete deforestation in the
mountains. Ironically, while the primary evidence of this was purportedly the lack of forests in
non-reserved areas, the safari undertaken by the Assistant District Officer and the Forester to
identify forest reserves found a significant number of viable forested areas, including 900 acres
of forest just south of Mkuyuni and identified as belonging to the lineages of Msume and
Rufesuwa. Nothing in the administration’s report suggests they had knowledge of a ritual
significance of these forests although it is almost certain that some were spaces of lineage
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matambiko and indeed, many are consistent with oral accounts I gathered in 2018 from elders of
these lineages.
The process of designating sacred lineage forests as government forest reserves had
mixed political consequences for authorities in the mountains. Designating forests may have
helped some lower level officials stake claims to power, by combining their ritual authority with
new bureaucratic forms of power, but for more powerful individuals, the government’s apparent
intent to manage and impose limitations on these forests appeared to pose a threat to their
autonomy. Kingalu, for example, seems to have avoided designating the ritual forest at Kinole as
a forest reserve. As he was residing near the court in Mkuyuni at the time the survey was done,
he designated a small forest near the Mkuyuni market instead (Fletcher 1931). Msume and
Rufezuwa, in contrast, volunteered their lineage forests as official reserves.
Following the survey, Hutchins summarily placed these forests under the administration
of the Native Authority and banned all cutting and cultivation (Fletcher 1931). Sacred forces
were thus incorporated into the administration’s regime of scientific forestry. Because lineage
heads filled many of the positions in the Native Authority responsible for such forests and
because prohibitions did not appear to include ritual practice in these areas, the shift was initially
subtle. Nevertheless, the change was significant, as access to the forests and their resources now
depended on the colonial government and its official agents. Moreover, while Hutchins and his
staff seemed largely oblivious to the ritual significance of forests, commenting only on water
sources and valuable timber in their reports, they inadvertently joined a long tradition whereby
those seeking political authority attempted to appropriate sacred places. While the British did not
see these forest reserves as abodes of spirits, they did believe preserving the forests was
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necessary to ensure the continued healthy rains as well as preserving water sources that fed the
major rivers of the central coast.
Social Healing and Indirect Rule
To existing forms of politics based on social healing and on commercial connections,
British rule added yet another layer, this one founded on bureaucratic administration. The
relationship between indirect rule and social healing was complex. As we have seen, Hutchins,
like many other Europeans, believed that political authority in Uluguru had been derived from
rainmaking abilities, which were seen as a natural step in the process of political evolution and
contrasted with the unnatural power of those who had gained control through conquest.
Hereditary rainmaking was the basis through which Kingalu’s claim to chiefship was
legitimated, while Kingo, as an outside conqueror, was considered at best an exception who must
be tolerated in lieu of a local alternative. Indeed, when Kingo III died in 1942, his heir was not
installed in his place. At the time, Acting District Officer D. S. O’Callaghan noted, “He had
become Chief of the whole Uluguru not because of any hereditary right but because of the failure
of the Chief and subchiefs of Southern Uluguru which left his as the only Chief of any standing
in the Uluguru” (O’Callaghan 1944). 11 However, while rainmaking was the basis for legitimate
authority prior to colonization in the eyes of the British, the practice was largely relegated to the
realm of magic and superstition in the colonial imaginary and was to be replaced, over time, with
rational forms of governance. Colonial documents have few notes on ongoing rainmaking
activities by Kingalu or others. In the eyes of the British, the main role of the Native Authority
was to oversee tax collection, implement agricultural programs like ULUS, enforce rules such as
those protecting forests, and resolve disputes through the Native Courts. However, communities
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Kingalu had been deposed in 1936.
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still expected Kingalu to provide rain and social healing. Oral accounts in Mkuyuni suggested
that Kingalu continued to carry out rainmaking matambiko throughout the colonial period, and
written documents indicated that he continued to use the shrine at Nguru through the 1950s
(Brain 1971: 832; Mzuanda 1958: 74). 12
However, the contradictory demands of bureaucratic administration and social healing
were difficult to navigate, in part, because of the colonial government’s definition of corruption.
Rainmaking involved payments of gifts and tributes, and as rainmaking powers had become
consolidated by men like Kingalu and Hega, they served as sources of enrichment, as well as
providing famine reserves and bases for limited redistribution. As Pels has argued, such practices
met British definitions of corruption and were sources of concern for the colonial administration
(1996: 754). Certainly, many members of the Native Authority did use their combined roles as
“traditional” and bureaucratic authorities to enrich themselves at the expense of others, using
their status in the British administration as a shield against local criticism. At the same time,
charges of corruption could easily be leveled at almost any authority to whom British
administrators objected; in order to carry out the roles of leaders expected by the community,
authorities were bound to violate British rules and indeed, nearly all figures initially appointed in
the top levels of the Native Authority in Uluguru were ousted by the end of the 1930s. The heir
to the title Shenekambi was removed in 1929, prompting his plea for the chiefdom mentioned
above. In 1930, Mbago was removed for ineffective rule and Hega was deposed for embezzling
taxes the same year. In 1936, Kingalu himself was deposed for “grave abuses of authority and

At the time of my research, Kingalu continued to use the shrine at Nguru and there is no evidence of significant
interruption of this practice since the nineteenth century, although ceremonial processions to Nguru declined after
the end of the colonial period (see Chapter 2).
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corrupt practices” and the entire territory was placed under the jurisdiction of Chief Kingo until
his death in 1942 (“Native Administration” 1940: 15).
Even after these individuals were removed from power, concerns about their misuse of
“traditional” authority continued, as exemplified by the conflicts over payments known as ngoto.
In the discourses of Luguru kinship and land tenure recorded by colonial administrators and
other ethnographers, outsiders were permitted to settle on lineage lands where there was land to
spare but were required to make a payment called ngoto in return. Historically, this was often
given as a portion of crops, but as currency became increasingly important in the area, cash
payments became the norm. Over time, colonial authorities became increasingly concerned that
ngoto was becoming a source of corruption and in 1942, it was banned. H. D. Curry, who wrote
the proclamation banning ngoto, noted that ngoto served as payment “for the performance of
sacrifices” (a reference to matambiko), as well as the basis for famine reserves and as a safeguard
against the permanent alienation of land. Curry complained, however, that individuals were
collecting ngoto for personal enrichment rather than as wealth for the lineage as a collective
entity. He also worried that such practices were leading to overcultivation and soil erosion in
some areas (Curry 1942). This proclamation did little to stop ngoto payment, but it drove such
payments underground, where they faced less scrutiny not only by the colonial administration
but by lineage and community members as well. In this sense, the act posed a double threat to
social healing in the mountains. On the one hand, the British threatened the material basis of
matambiko both through the loss of payments of ngoto themselves and through the
destabilization of ngoto as a critical marker of land tenure. Without stable control over land,
lineages could not be sure of access to the human and material resources needed carry out
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matambiko. On the other hand, pushing ngoto underground reduced landholders’ accountability
to their lineages and the residents on their land.
The struggle over ngoto was part of a larger pattern of efforts on the part of the British to
contain forms of economic and political power exercised by Africans. Concerns over ngoto were
inherently connected to wider worries about the development of a land market among Africans.
Indirect rule linked ethnicity to territory and thus tied people to land and to “traditional” political
and economic institutions. African mobility, accumulation of wealth, and participation in a larger
economy threatened British power and administrators sought to curtail it by barring land sales
and other forms of land commodification among Africans. The banning of ngoto also reflected
the increasing tensions within indirect rule between the forms of authority which indirect rule
attempted to capture—forms related to kinship and social healing—and the kinds of political
authority it deemed legitimate in the actual administration of the colony. As this contradiction
became increasingly fraught, indirect rule was jarred loose from the precolonial forms of
authority it once claimed to encapsulate. While this destabilized some authorities’ control over
land, including the sacred forests to which the administration had earlier laid claim, it also
generated the expansion of the political sphere operating outside and alongside the Native
Authority, through mechanisms largely invisible in official bureaucratic accounts.
Cash Crops, Sufi Orders, and Changing Patterns of Authority
Several other important changes took place in the mountains during this time. One was
the rise of Islam as a popular religion. Although Islam had arrived through trade networks as a
religion of elites by the mid-nineteenth century, a new wave of Islam appeared in the mountains
from the 1920s to the 1950s: Sufism. Brought by teachers from outside Uluguru, three Sufi
orders (tariqa) had spread in the area by the early 1930s and grew in popularity in the final
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decades of the colonial period. These orders, Qadariyya, Askariyya, and Shadhiliyya, brought
new ritual practices including zikiri, the rhythmic recitation of devotional phrases, performed at
major ceremonies including funerals and girls’ initiations (see Chapter 3). Based on esoteric
knowledge passed from teacher to student, the tariqa offered access to Islam for those unable to
read and write, and notably, all three orders that took root in Uluguru permitted women as well
as men to join and to take part in key rituals. 13 These tariqa, which had first spread on the coast
among former slaves and other low status groups during the German colonial period, were of
constant to concern to authorities, who saw them as potentially subversive organizations (Becker
2008: 179–208; S. Fabian 2019: 143–146; Glassman 1995: 139–142; Nimtz 1980). Indeed, a
1933 circular from the administration fretted over the possibility of “communistic or other
subversive influences” spreading through the tariqa and zikiri was banned in some parts of the
colony around this time, although Uluguru was not among them (“Confidential Circular” 1933;
Nimtz 1980: 81–83).
Prior to the arrival of these orders, Mkuyuni and Kinole were already understood as
Muslim-dominated areas, as evidenced by the Catholic mission’s lack of presence in the
immediate area (Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko, interview, October 22, 2018; Pels 1999: 115).
However, the introduction of tariqa brought both additional conversions and a changing
engagement with Islam. For many, this is remembered as the birth of a deeper and more
meaningful involvement with religion. When I asked Ali Tondolla, one of my key interlocutors
in Mkuyuni, about this, he explained to me that Islam was already present in the mountains prior
to the tariqa, but that people had very limited religious knowledge. When the Qadariyya teacher

As discussed in Chapter 3, some orders did not permit women to join (Nimtz 1980: 79). Those in Uluguru did, but
this should not be mistaken for full equality. No orders allowed women to become leaders or teachers except in
single-sex settings subordinate to male leadership.
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Senei bin Juma arrived in Uluguru, he brought “real understanding” of Islam (A. T. Tondolla,
personal communication, August 11, 2018). Of course, this assessment of tariqa and the forms of
religiosity that preceded it reflect the claims of the tariqa leaders themselves and thus overstate
the lack of religious practice and understanding prior to their arrival. Nevertheless, the popularity
of the orders and the discourses surrounding their history suggest that the forms of religious
knowledge, practice, and community they brought were indeed powerful and compelling to
many in the mountains.
The spread of Sufism had significant political implications at the local level. The new
religious teachers opened rural madrassa (Koranic schools) which challenged the authority of
both prior Muslim elites and the mission-run school system. Whereas Islam had previously been
entangled with social class and the politics of “big men,” the tariqa tended to flatten prior
distinctions and espoused equality in the religious community, except along gendered lines and
between teachers and students. Likewise, the orders offered an alternative to lineage-based
structures. While the direct passage of secret knowledge and other Sufi practices such as
visitations to graves resonated with Luguru mila, the orders and their leaders stood outside the
matrilineal lineage system. Like other Islamic institutions, their teachings promoted patrilineal
descent and inheritance patterns. Likewise, their ritual practices, including care for the dead,
were based not on matrilineal kinship but on affiliation with the tariqa.
Around the same time that the tariqa were spreading, some areas of the eastern
mountains, including Mkuyuni, also saw a marked shift from uxorilocal to virilocal residence
patterns, as well as a general shift away from residence on lineage land and toward new
settlement (Fosbrooke 1954). While these changes corresponded closely with the growth of
popular forms of Islam, the causative relationship between the two was not straightforward.

105

Rather, it appears that the shifting residence patterns were primarily an outcome of growing
economic importance of cash crops. Cash crops first emerged via an internal food market, with
millet sold locally by the late 1920s. Farmers began to grow cotton and coffee in small amounts
a few years later. Kapok had served as a cash crop since the German period and peas and beans
were also grown for the emerging urban markets in Morogoro and Dar es Salaam. Beginning in
1928, the Agricultural Officer also began working with the Native Authority to encourage the
production of cash crops. Based on this sequence, Pels convincingly argues that the increase in
cash cropping after 1926 was first driven by the growth of the local cash economy, and only
subsequently in response to external markets and colonial policy (Pels 1999: 138–141, 180–182).
In Mkuyuni, relatively more recent settlement and shallower lineage control over land
coincided with lower population densities. As cash crops made land increasingly appealing,
significant numbers of families moved from lineage lands higher in the mountains to Mkuyuni
and requested land from lineage heads there. Colonial data show that it was almost exclusively
men who secured these “outsider” land rights. It is not clear why this was so, but it may have
been a result of men establishing farms prior to marriage, or of the relegation of matters
involving cash transactions to men. Whatever the case, this change meant that children of such
families lived away from their own lineage and relied heavily on their fathers for access to land.
This evidence also suggests men had primary control of cash crop revenues. The increasing
reliance of the household on the male household head along with distance from the lineage itself
added pressure to the matrilineal system (Fosbrooke 1954; Pels 1999: 137–145, 180–182). At the
same time, increasing independence from the matrilineal system combined neatly with Islam,
which espoused patrilineal kinship norms and offered alternative forms of authority outside of
the lineage itself.
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It was in these parts of the mountains that the tariqa had their largest growth, and their
popularity must be understood in this context. Just as the patrilineal framework of Islam had
proven attractive to certain “big men” of the nineteenth century, it similarly appealed to a new
generation of young men living away from their lineage and dealing increasingly with a cash
economy. Moreover, the community offered by the tariqa, including ritual practice, drew in both
men and women who had settled far from their extended families and who sought new
connections in areas like Mkuyuni. The forms of authority promoted by the orders, based on the
mastery of novel kinds of esoteric knowledge, also offered an alternative to the entangled
structures of colonial administration, lineage elders, and the remnants of the “big men” and other
prior elites. As the colonial administration shifted from its original principles of indirect rule
toward a vision of development and modernization throughout the 1930s, 40s and 50s, the tariqa
and the alternative structures of community they embodied would continue to grow.
Erosion and the Malthusian Threat
As Samantha Jones pointed out in her overview of the discourses around land
degradation in Uluguru, Bagshawe’s 1930 land development survey followed a Malthusian
ideology, viewing the carrying capacity of land as a fixed variable that could not be increased
through any amount of labor increase or innovation (Jones 1996: 188). However, despite his
concerns about population growth, Bagshawe had ultimately praised Luguru farmers for their
hard work and productivity. The 1938 annual report dispensed with this respect altogether,
marking deepening fears about the catchment and the environment of the mountains. The report,
written by Agricultural Officer H. P. Smart, accused local communities of “rapidly denuding
these essential watersheds of trees, vegetation and soil” (Smart 1938, quoted in Jones 1996: 190).
Smart’s report highlighted the importance of the area as a water catchment and suggested that for
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the sake of downstream water supplies, populations should be relocated to the plains (Jones
1996: 190). Indeed, concern about soil erosion was growing among British administrators across
Africa at this time (Beinart 1984; Carswell 2003; Moore and Vaughan 1994; Showers 2005). As
alarm about erosion grew, plans to mitigate its effects proliferated, especially in key catchments
like Uluguru. Notes were shared across empire on best practices around tree planting, terracing
and other measures, often with relatively little concern for the particularities of place.
The main instigator of ULUS was A. H. Savile, the Regional Assistant Director of
Agriculture. In the 1940s, Savile issued severe reports on the conditions of soils in the
mountains, writing that “the African cultivator in the greater part of the Uluguru and Ngurus still
remains completely apathetic to the ravages caused by erosion” (Savile 1945, quoted in Jones
1996: 190). He emphasized that what he perceived as poor practices on the part of those living
in the highlands not only affected those communities but harmed those downstream. In 1947, he
wrote: “There can be no doubt that a proportion of the population, varying in different areas, will
have to be resettled on the plains,” although he admitted that a total depopulation of the
mountains would be unwise given the mountains’ tendency to act as a famine reserve in years of
lowland drought (Savile 1947). When arguing for the need to intervene in Luguru agricultural
processes, he claimed that cultivators downstream had been adversely affected by floods during
the rainy season followed by a lack of water during the dry season, a problem he dated to 1929
(Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 143). Importantly, he believed that the Luguru had only arrived in
the mountains in the 1880s, a timeline that gave force to his view of farmers ignorant of their
own environment, rapidly growing in population and causing ecological destruction at a
breakneck pace.
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While Savile’s estimation of the beginning of inhabitation in Uluguru was clearly
incorrect, his concerns about soil erosion were more ambiguous. There was evidence of erosion,
but it was difficult to judge whether the erosion was increasing at a significant rate and if so,
whether it was due to farming. Henry Fosbrooke recorded evidence of significant flooding and
concomitant erosion in the area well before the mountains would have reached the population
densities that concerned Savile (Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 144). Even Henry Morton Stanley,
on his pass to the north of the mountains on his expedition to find Livingstone in 1871, noted a
massive flood that wiped out entire villages and changed the course of the Ngerengere River
which flowed from the northwestern side of the mountains (Stanley 1872: 517). A note from
1956 in the “Soil Conservation” file of Morogoro District remarked that German documents
from 1911 described the river as erratic and prone to annual periods of desiccation (“Ngerengere
River Flow” 1956). While this river has its source on the opposite side of the mountains from
Mkuyuni, these observations raise greater questions about the assumptions made by
administrators that uneven flow in the rivers was a recent problem resulting from increasing
population density. However, most of this information was ignored by the colonial authorities of
the 1930s and 1940s.
The Uluguru Land Usage Scheme
ULUS officially began in 1947, largely under the direction of Savile and in accordance
with the concerns about soil erosion that animated his work. However, there was disagreement
about the proper course of action. The forestry department advocated for tree planting on
overworked land and for the creation of special reserves around water sources, while an
agricultural officer pushed for a program centered around the construction of terraces. Experts
involved in the project, however, disagreed over the value of bench-terraces. A terracing
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experiment on the northern side of the mountains in 1949 was a remarkable failure; crops did not
grow. However, despite sustained objections from critics of the bench-terrace plan, terracing
carried the day and remained the primary focus of ULUS until the 1955 unrest forced the
administration to abandon the project (Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 143–146).
While terracing was the centerpiece of ULUS, it involved several additional components.
There was an effort to alleviate population pressure by attempting, through a variety of measures,
to relocate people from the mountains to the plains below. This was met with resistance, but
eventually some people did move to the newly opened and irrigated lands made available at
Mlali (Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 146–147). Tree planting and encouragements to plant coffee
were also included in ULUS. The scheme also forbade cultivating near streams or on slopes
deemed too steep. The project moved forward in lurches but only showed success in Mgeta.
There, terracing was already common, and the scheme focused instead on small amounts of tree
planting and improvements in crops, especially vegetables grown for the urban market.
Elsewhere where terracing was introduced, little was accomplished and after the officer at
Tangeni began to focus on coercive legal measures, his house was burned down, along with
those of two of the project’s African instructors (Brain 1980: 179–181).
In 1953, Savile returned to Uluguru after an extended absence and, seeing an opportunity
in the appointment of a new District Commissioner, R.H. Gower, set about reinvigorating ULUS.
Gower had experienced the land usage schemes of Usambara to the northeast prior to his
appointment in Morogoro and was better positioned than his predecessor to win the cooperation
of a diverse group of local powerbrokers. Gower astutely invited a broad selection of leaders to a
two-week seminar to launch the renewed scheme, including representatives from various
interested administrative agencies, several important figures in the Catholic church, and key
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members of the Native Authority. However, the meeting did not include Kingalu, who had been
deposed almost two decades before, and when the program reached Mkuyuni, Kingalu declared
that terraces were “taboo.” Gower dispatched Brain to run a two-day seminar on the benefits of
terracing at Kingalu’s residence at Kinole, after which Kingalu agreed to the plan (Brain 1980:
181–183). The category of “taboo” was almost certainly what is called in Swahili miiko, which
are implicated in Luguru ideas of social healing. Items and activities considered miiko threaten
the social reproduction of society by angering ancestor spirits, leading to infertility, drought, and
death. It was also likely miiko that the woman evoked when she confronted Kingalu Mwanashaa
in the same spot nearly a century earlier, as Horner attempted to have his portrait made. The
invocation of miiko against terracing suggested that the program threatened social health. While
Kingalu ultimately changed his stance and permitted terracing to go forward, the exchange
directly implicated terracing in the politics of social healing and rainmaking. Late in the year,
Kingalu Mwanamguo died, and rumors circulated that this death was caused by his violation of
miiko by allowing terracing (Brain 1980: 185–186).
At the time, the beginnings of what would become the independence movement were
emerging in Tanzania. The Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU), the party that would
ultimately lead to Tanzanian independence in 1961, was officially founded in 1954. TANU itself
was a manifestation of a broader growth of a new kind of politics, led predominantly by educated
and upwardly mobile young men, which was beginning to coalesce in opposition to colonial rule
(Iliffe 1979: 485–486). In many instances, this new politics was at odds with traditional
authorities who had their power bolstered through the Native Authority. However, in Uluguru,
Kingalu’s family had been shut out of the Native Authority since 1936 and had little interest in
sustaining the British administration. Upon his death, Kingalu Mwanamguo was succeeded by
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his nephew, Kingalu Mwanakinoge. Kingalu Mwanamguo’s sons, not in the line of succession,
joined TANU early after its inception and began encouraging their cousin to push back against
the colonial administration (Brain 1980: 186).
Meanwhile, public opinion against ULUS was shifting. The major theme in stories of
terracing I gathered in 2018 was the amount of labor involved, which drew labor away from
agriculture as well as other tasks. From the perspective of the British administrators, the labor
used to build terraces resulted directly in capital development in the mountains. Terraces were
understood as a form of capital that would permit the increased extraction of profit from the soil
while protecting the prospects for economic development downstream. Paired with coffee
planting initiatives, the scheme was intended to increase incomes and promote economic growth.
However, increasing the value of land through labor in Uluguru was complex and politically
fraught. The matrilineages which, in theory, controlled the land itself were not typically
understood to have ownership over improvements to the land; those belonged to individuals and
were passed from parent to child. Thus, adding terraces and trees to the land threatened lineage
land tenure. The future of matrilineal tenure, which had already been weakened by the ban on
ngoto payments, the cooptation of lineage forests, and the rise of cash crops, seemed increasingly
uncertain. However, the matrilineal lineage was not only an entity concerned with land tenure. It
was also the foundation of social reproduction through practices of social healing. While not all
in the mountains were happy with matrilineal authority—as evidenced by the increasing draw of
Islam and shifting residence patterns away from the lineage—it nevertheless maintained a
monopoly on rainmaking, the core of social health.
The promotion of cash crops, while never the central focus of ULUS in the eastern
mountains, further complicated this picture. Although small amounts of cash crop production had
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emerged since at least the 1920s, the pushing of coffee, a semi-permanent crop, also raised
difficult questions over the control of land and the wealth it produced. Cash crops had been a
particularly losing enterprise for women, as we have seen, since men captured most of the
profits. The slow move away from uxorilocal residence that cashing cropping accelerated was
particularly threatening to women. Removed from their own kinship networks and sidelined
from the major cash earning activities of the household, many women found themselves
increasingly dependent on their husbands. This growing vulnerability was especially noticeable
in areas like Mkuyuni, where most households lived away from their lineages and relied upon
land rights secured by men. This gendered tension was exacerbated by the work required for
terracing, which was demanded of both men and women. Maack (1996) reported that ULUS
received complaints that the program made men and women work together. One interpretation of
such complaints is that they voiced a gendered conflict over land; farms in Uluguru typically
belonged to individuals, not households, so mixed gender working parties raised a critical
question—who would own the terraces and the land attached to them after the work was
complete?
In addition to these changes in land tenure, ULUS became increasingly coercive and
stringent in its imposition of rules, including the ban on burning, which farmers had previously
practiced not only to clear fallowing fields but to control for cutworms and other pests (Brain
1980: 186). The demand for labor also became compulsory as the quota for terraces was made
mandatory. Threatened with jail or fines and fearing an increasing loss over the ecosystem and
institutions of social reproduction, farmers’ skepticism of the program began to grow. In their
original enthusiasm for the project, many hoped that terracing would improve crop yields, and in
some cases, good harvests occurred, but results were mixed and in many cases negative. In some
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places, terracing caused a loss of topsoil, which was either turned under or washed away before it
could be planted. The varied results were a result of the highly variegated mountain landscape
and caused increasing dissatisfaction with the scheme. A critical turning point appears to have
been irregular and low rainfall in late 1954 and early 1955. The interruption of rains, which
followed the sudden death of Kingalu Mwanamguo, appeared to confirm that terraces were
miiko. Terracing had angered the mizimu and damaged the fertility of the land they protected.
When public energy began to shift against ULUS, Kingalu and his cousins were quick to
channel the energy toward their own causes, casting blame on the colonial administration for
interfering with rainmaking. The unlikely alliance between Kingalu’s chiefly family and TANU
was also joined by new religious authorities. One of the main instigators of the unrest was the
son of Senei bin Juma, the founder of the Qadariyya order in Mkuyuni. The Sufi orders sat in
tension with both the matrilineal system, due to their patrilineal structure and nominal rejection
of “pagan” rituals, and with TANU, the nationalist focus of which contradicted Islam’s more
global orientation (Becker 2008: 209–240). However, Kingalu Mwanamguo himself had joined
Qadariyya (likely after his 1936 deposition) and many lineage elders in the area were active in
the spreading of this new form of Islam (Asman Kingalu Said Setembu, personal
communication, December 30, 2018; Pels 1999: 212). For them as for others, participation in the
tariqa marked access to powerful forms of knowledge and connections to Muslim communities
beyond the mountains. It also offered a challenge to colonial authority among those increasingly
shut out of the Native Authority. Muslim communities in general were also resentful of their
long marginalization in the British administration, which tended to favor mission-educated
Christians. These vastly different authorities—TANU, Kingalu, and the tariqa—thus shared a
common enemy in the British administration. Together, were able to seize on the growing
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discontent of the farmers, offering an alternative vision of political authority. In so doing, they
harnessed anxieties around social reproduction and social healing, laying the blame for the lack
of rain at the feet of the British administration.
By June 1955, after two seasons of poor rain, people began showing up at meetings about
ULUS armed with machetes, demanding an end to the program. In Mkuyuni, several agricultural
instructors were attacked. On July 13, 1955, District Commissioner Gower scheduled two
barazas in eastern Uluguru to address complaints about the program. He was accompanied by
Sultan Sabu bin Sabu, who had taken over the top position in the Native Authority after Kingo’s
death 1942. Sultan Sabu did not have a hereditary claim to his title but was chosen by the British
for what they deemed his administrative competence and because his appointment appeared to
draw the least complaint of any candidate (Pels 1996). At both meetings, Gower demanded an
end to the threats and unrest, while offering to hear individual grievances. He also explained that
the lack of rains was not caused by terraces, arguing that they had also affected unterraced land.
The first stop at Mkuyuni was attended by around 2,500 and ended peacefully. Gower then
traveled to Matombo, where an even larger crowd waited. He repeated his earlier speech, but this
time, the crowd did not disperse, instead continuing to hurl accusations at Sultan Sabu. A scuffle
broke out and Gower read the riot act, threatening the crowd with force. Unrest continued to
spread, and the riot police who accompanied Gower took matters into their own hands, shooting
and killing John Mahenge, whom they accused of inciting the crowd and throwing rocks (Young
and Fosbrooke 1960: 151–157).
Gower’s insistence that terracing had not caused the year’s irregular and inadequate
rainfall attempted to answer a political and moral complaint with a scientific explanation. There
is no indication that Gower grasped the larger political discourse invoked when he was blamed
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for the lack of rain. Indeed, none of the ethnographers involved in reporting on ULUS and its
aftermath—James Brain, Henry Fosbrooke, and Roland Young—recognized the importance of
rain as a way of invoking the broader politics of social healing. Kingalu’s family, in contrast,
seized the moment, promising “more rain and better crops” if Kingalu was reinstalled as chief of
Uluguru (Young and Fosbrooke 1960: 152). This promise appealed to the politics of social
reproduction, speaking to several centuries of rainmaking and alluding to the power of mizimu to
heal the land. The appeal was powerful among women, who were threatened by the decline in
the lineage system, and among the young TANU members and Islamic leaders who resented
British rule. The administration was caught off guard by the demands for the reinstatement of
Kingalu as chief and by the apparent coalescence of power behind Kingalu’s family, but they had
largely ignored politics outside of the Native Administration, except to charge individuals with
corruption. They failed to notice the continuing importance of rainmaking matambiko and the
rise of Sufi orders as alternative forms of social organization. The British politics of development
ignored questions of social reproduction and rain, thus providing their opponents an opportunity
to harness the power of political critique emerging from crop failures, rain shortages, and other
signs of social illness.
Conclusion
The history of Uluguru from the turn of the nineteenth century until independence was
marked by the proliferation of political paradigms, which formed a complex and layered social
landscape. Forms of authority linked to spirits, rain, and the sacred landscape intersected with
new networks of power branching across caravan routes and arcing toward the Indian Ocean.
Guns and the slave trade offered leaders new opportunities for the consolidation of power, but
also stood in tension with those forms of legitimacy tied to healing the land. Colonial rule and
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the arrival of Islam added additional strata to this shifting configuration, especially as indirect
rule attempted to conform to and reshape local political formations. While indirect rule did lead
to the reification of many traditions, it also became increasingly disjointed from the structures on
which it claimed to be based, creating new opportunities for political action outside official
bureaucratic channels. Throughout these changes, water remained a critical point of conflict, and
control over the mountains’ water supply—whether through rainmaking matambiko or forced
terracing—stood at the heart of political struggle. The appropriation of forests and other sacred
places provided leaders with increased power, but also placed upon them complex sets of
obligation to the people and the environment.
While these changes led to the increasing marginalization of women from the political
sphere, the politics of social healing remained a powerful framework by which demands could be
placed upon those in power. This politics of healing, expressed through the core image of rain,
placed questions of social reproduction—human, agricultural, and ecological health—at the
center of politics. As such, it became a potent paradigm by which the disenfranchised, especially
women, could resist, critique, and contest poor leadership. When crowds gathered to confront
District Commissioner Gower over the failures of ULUS, they invoked social healing and the
obligations it entailed. The British administration showed little understanding of these
obligations, offering instead scientific explanations of climate and a promise of economic
development through cash cropping. While the colonial government refused to take
responsibility for rain, new members of TANU in the mountains astutely drew upon ideas of
social healing to provide an alternative image of leadership, one that would come with
agricultural and ecological flourishing. Although this vision was ultimately contradictory—
premised on both the reinstallation of Kingalu and the removal of traditional authorities as a
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whole—it nevertheless proved successful in channeling criticism of ULUS toward the
establishment of a new form of politics, that of the nationalist independence movement.
After ULUS was abandoned, the colonial administration repealed their ban on ngoto and
took a lighter hand to the administration of the mountains. Much of the energy that had brought
an end to terracing was redirected toward the growing independence movement, and TANU
Youth membership rose quickly in the mountains. At the time of my research, elders still
recalled the songs they sang calling for independence from colonial rule, and proudly
remembered confronting the District Commissioner with the demands of the party. Women in
particular joined in large numbers across the eastern mountains. After half a decade of internal
and external struggle, TANU won its appeal for independence, and on December 9, 1961, a new
flag was raised over Uluguru. Celebrations in the mountains lasted well into the night. The
promise of TANU and independence generated a wave of optimism and ushered in a set of
radical experiments in development, this time lead by TANU under an explicitly socialist
framework. These experiments and their lasting impacts on the communities of Uluguru are the
subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
REFUSING NAMES: SOCIAL REPRODUCTION AND SOCIALISM 1

When I first spoke with Mama Kisangile, in early June 2018, Gerald was with me. We
had asked a young village official to help us find elders who were knowledgeable about local
history and he brought us to her house, introduced us, and left to attend to other matters. The
house was built of unbaked earth bricks, with a bowing wall and a weathered door. Through the
trees, you could see the main road as it curved toward the south. When we arrived, Mama
Kisangile cleared the cups from the small wooden table in her kitchen and called to her young
granddaughters to bring us chairs. Her kitchen, an open area behind her house with a wood stove
under a low thatch roof, was crowded with furniture and cookware. Her granddaughters lingered
nearby, listening curiously, as we began working through our tattered schedule of questions.
Mama Kisangile opened the conversation by informing us that she’d spoken to other researchers
in the past, and indeed, she seemed to find our questions routine. Her answers were at once
incisive and circuitous, compressing complex information in seemingly offhand statements while
skillfully redirecting the conversation away from more secret matters. I would later learn she was
the most senior person in the local Mlali lineage, but I failed to notice the few oblique hints she
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dropped about her status during our first conversation (A. A. Kungugu, interview, June 12,
2018).
Not long into our conversation, Mama Kisangile repeated a refrain that was already
familiar to us—young people today disrespect tradition (mila), she said. They don’t understand
its benefits. When I asked her what those benefits were, she immediately began telling us about
past rainmaking practices, in which people would travel to the sacred forest at Kolero and return
with rain. Those responsible for making the trip were holders of a specific set of names that were
passed down through the matrilineal lineage from uncle to nephew. The name in Mama
Kisangile’s lineage was Sugusugu. 2 However, she informed us, the holders of these names had
died. I asked why the names hadn’t been inherited as they had in prior generations. She said she
didn’t know. Hoping to get her to explain a little about the structure of the matrilineal system, I
asked who would normally inherit a name like Sugusugu. She laughed heartily and said, “the one
you came with.”
I later learned that the young village official who had brought us to interview Mama
Kisangile was one of two men that lineage members speculated might inherit the name
Sugusugu. When I asked them about this, both men told me that the prior Sugusugu, on his
deathbed, warned them that no one should inherit the name until an unspecified period had
passed. If someone tried to take it prematurely, he would die within a few years. However, the
men said, the name (and the ancestral spirit it represents) would eventually choose someone,
causing that person to fall ill until they assumed the name. If the name selected them, they could
not refuse without risking sickness and ultimately death. Mama Kisangile, however, gave a
different story. She said that after the death of Sugusugu, the heir was supposed to be caught and
Elsewhere in the mountains, there were also inherited women’s names, but my interlocutors in Mkuyuni agreed
that those tasked with rainmaking were men.
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put inside like a girl undergoing initiation but the young men of today were afraid and ran away.
When I asked her why, she chuckled. “I don’t know, even me. They are my children but I don’t
know.”
During my research, many in Mkuyuni, like Mama Kisangile, reported that mila was no
longer being followed. When I asked people why not, they often shrugged and said, “everything
has its time.” Many said religion was the driving force in the abandonment of older practices—
whether religion (dini) opposed mila was a subject of debate in Mkuyuni when I was there (see
Chapter 3). It is likely that religion did play a role in the decline of mila, but when I asked when
mila was abandoned, the majority of those I spoke to pointed to the decades following
independence, the 1960s and 1970s. This was not an era in which religion—either Islam or
Christianity—saw significant changes or growth. The large waves of conversion to Sufism and
Catholicism occurred in the 1930s and 1940s, while Ansar Sunna and Pentecostalism did not
arrive until the 1980s. However, the period when mila is most often understood to have waned
was one of significant social change: it was the time of a radical social experiment on the
national level, the socialist project engineered by Tanzania’s first president, Julius Nyerere and
his party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).
This chapter consists of two parts analyzing this pivotal period in Tanzanian history and
its lasting legacy on the communities of Uluguru. The first lays out the history of Tanzanian
socialism and villagization. I argue that while Tanzanian socialism in general and villagization in
particular are often framed as failures, they succeeded in bringing about two related and deeply
significant changes in the management of land. First, Tanzanian socialism upended prior
institutions of land tenure. In Mkuyuni, this led to the fracturing of the matrilineal lineage.
Second, socialist land policies contributed to the growing understanding of land as a form of
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capital. By centering land’s “productive” uses, the post-independence state rendered the role of
land in social reproduction increasingly invisible in both policy and law. The first section
explores why the government brought about these changes, asking why so many in Mkuyuni
assess villagization as a good thing, despite the violence and suffering it entailed.
The second section turns to the lasting effects of this period in Mkuyuni, arguing that the
changes in land tenure sparked conflicts over social reproduction that remain sites of struggle
today. To illustrate this, I examine interlinked changes in the inheritance of land and of ancestral
names. Inheritance encapsulates relationships between the living, their ancestors, and future
generations. As such, it is a key site of struggles over social reproduction. As the Introduction
outlined, feminist scholars have argued that the separation of social reproduction (and
reproductive labor) from production has been integral to the establishment of capitalism
(Federici 2004; Katz 2001; Picchio 1992; Vogel 2013). However, in Mkuyuni, conflicts over
reproductive labor emerged most acutely because of socialist land policies. I argue that this was
because the form of social reproduction assumed by the socialist Tanzanian state was still
“unhinged” from and subordinate to production and that the government failed to account for the
richness of social reproduction in practice (Katz 2001: 710). As such, the socialist government
was unable to replace the older social forms it had dismantled, leaving gaps which women and
men in Mkuyuni are still laboring to fill.
Ujamaa and Villagization
After independence in 1961, the government of the country then known as Tanganyika 3
embarked on an ambitious plan to build an authentically African socialism, called Ujamaa, a
word meaning familyhood in Swahili. Nyerere first laid out the principles of Ujamaa in 1962,
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Known as Tanzania after union with Zanzibar in 1964.
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and the government took initial steps toward this vision of socialism under its First Five Year
Plan (1964–1969), including the nationalization and expansion of “settlement schemes,”
originally colonial era projects intended to promote capital intensive cultivation of certain
commercial crops. Under these schemes, voluntary settlers from land-poor regions would be
allocated land in settlement areas and paid to produce particular cash crops. After independence,
these schemes were nationalized, and the government announced ambitious plans to expand the
model to new areas. The schemes were intended to modernize agricultural production and
increase productivity through capital-intensive development. However, the plan was abandoned
in 1966 due to high cost, low output, and poor morale in the new settlements (Cliffe and
Cunningham 1973; Resnick 1981: 50–53; Schneider 2004: 348).
A period of more radical change began a few years later with the Arusha Declaration of
1967, in which Nyerere announced a broad, explicitly socialist program for the country.
Following the declaration, the government nationalized banks and large import/export houses
and began acquiring majority shares in the Tanzanian subsidiaries of many multinational
corporations (Coulson 2013: 22). The Arusha Declaration emphasized agriculture as “the basis
of development,” and later that year, Nyerere further elaborated his policies for rural
development in the policy booklet Ujamaa Vijijini 4 (Nyerere 1968: 29, 106). Following the
Arusha Declaration, the ruling party, TANU, began to encourage rural communities to
voluntarily form cooperative villages that would conform to the party’s vision of collective rural
development. By 1973, however, TANU’s vision for the voluntary formation of Ujamaa
collectives and villages had failed to come to fruition and the government, under Nyerere’s
leadership, decided to take more drastic action, implementing a policy of compulsory
The official translation in English is titled “Socialism and Rural Development.” The title translates literally as
“Socialism in the Villages.”
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villagization. In the ensuing three years, about five million Tanzanians were relocated into
planned villages, their old homes often razed or burnt to the ground (Coulson 2013: 280–309;
Scott 1998: 224–254).
Today, Tanzania’s program of compulsory villagization is widely regarded as a failure.
James Scott (1998) critiqued Tanzanian villagization as a “high modernist” project by an
aesthetically-motivated state, calling it “among the greatest human tragedies of the twentieth
century” (3). While other scholars of Ujamaa have been less hyperbolic in their analyses of
villagization’s shortcomings, the depiction of villagization as a failure is widespread (Ibhawoh
and Dibua 2003). In some ways, villagization, and Ujamaa more broadly, clearly failed. Faced
with an angry public and a deteriorating economy, the government revoked its policies requiring
Tanzanians to live in planned villages only a few years after their forcible relocation, and many
returned to their previous homes (Boesen, Madsen and Moody 1977; Schneider 2004). Plans to
further collectivize agricultural production were scaled back or abandoned due to lack of both
resources and popular support. Less than a decade later, after significant pressure and
interference from the United States and Europe, Tanzania began to formally liberalize its
economy and agreed to the terms of structural adjustment. By 1985, the dream of socialism was
over before many of the original plans for Ujamaa had even been attempted (Lugalla 1995;
Mbilinyi 1990).
The narratives often told of this period, those of an overreaching government and of
massive failure, contrast with the stories I heard about villagization in Mkuyuni. While most of
those I spoke with in Mkuyuni recalled anger at being moved and widely acknowledged the
central government’s unilateral power in the process, they also often laughed at their anger and
explained that back then, they hadn’t yet come to understand the benefits of moving to the
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village. When I asked whether they thought the policy was ultimately good or bad, the
overwhelming majority said it was good and most saw the program as a success. They gave
several reasons for this assessment, including greatly increased access to schools, hospitals, and
clean water, but the most common benefit they cited was the proximity of neighbors. Many
people told me that if someone needed help, there were neighbors nearby you could call on.
Many told me they simply liked living close together. Moreover, the depictions of villagization
as simply imposed from above, while not incorrect, obscured the many ways in which people in
Mkuyuni claimed degrees of authorship over the process. Attending to these tensions is
necessary to understand the complex legacies of Ujamaa.
Although I have described this period of Tanzanian history as “socialist,” some critics of
Nyerere and TANU would contest the accuracy of this characterization. In the 1960s and 1970s,
many industrial, agricultural, financial, and commercial enterprises in Tanzania were
nationalized, but control was largely through parastatals which functioned similarly to private
corporations, operating for profit with little public oversight (Coulson 2013: 319–346; Loxley
and Saul 1975). Moreover, Nyerere argued that African socialism need not be based upon class
struggle, a position which put him at odds with many Marxists. In an early and influential
critique of Nyerere’s government from the Tanzanian left, Issa Shivji (1973, 1976), argued
forcefully that far from being free of class struggle, Ujamaa was the product of a “bureaucratic
bourgeoisie,” petit-bourgeois officials who made up the bulk of the administration and whose
interests were largely aligned with international capital. In this view, the policies of Ujamaa
marked an expansion of the bureaucratic class’s ownership over the means of production and
control of labor rather than a deeper shift away from capitalist structures. Other observers were
more sympathetic to Nyerere and the principals of Ujamaa, but many nevertheless found that
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efforts to build socialism in Tanzania were repeatedly undercut and distorted by lower tiers of
the bureaucratic class and their allies, especially an emerging class of “kulak” farmers (Boesen,
Madsen and Moody 1977; Raikes 1975; Resnick 1981; van Velzen 1973; von Freyhold 1979). In
addition to these internal limitations to socialism, some also pointed out that Tanzania’s
continued integration into the global capitalist system meant the country’s economy was still
ultimately market-driven rather than truly socialist (Cliffe 1973; Loxley 1979).
Even though socialism never came fully into being in Tanzania, I use the term “socialist”
to describe the post-independence period because I wish to take seriously the project of those
who attempted to build an alternative to capitalist structures. Many among the “bureaucratic
bourgeoisie” did act according to their class interests, ones which cannot be understood as
meaningfully aligned with socialism. Others, however, acted against those own interests, drawn
by the political forces of anticolonial struggle and the utopian vision so powerfully articulated by
Nyerere (Coulson 2013: 24; Nursey-Bray 1980; Resnick 1981). They were joined by ordinary
people, including many smallholder farmers in Uluguru who actively participated in efforts to
build Ujamaa. Together, they sought to limit exploitation by capitalists and landlords and to
redistribute wealth generated by the economy to the Tanzanian public. They also worked to
construct the village not only as a physical space but as an institution through which people
could work together for their collective wellbeing. They built schools and water pumps,
improved roads, and taught literacy skills to adults and children alike. I do not think these efforts
can be reduced to processes of capitalism. Considering possible futures for the Global South,
Samir Amin wrote of the transition to socialism: “it is not linear; […] its still distant point of
arrival is largely unknown. After all, socialism has still to be built” (1990: 55). In one sense,
socialism has not yet existed in Tanzania or elsewhere. In another, for that very reason, it can be
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found in fragmented and winding efforts toward a hoped-for future. The term “socialist” allows
us to trace one trajectory among many that existed in Tanzania from 1961 to 1985. It must be
understood as always contested, contradictory, and incomplete. Nevertheless, Tanzanian
socialism brough real change to the lives of those in Uluguru and its legacies, good and bad,
continue to reverberate. Viewed from this perspective, Ujamaa’s ruptures appear not as endings
but as waypoints on an unfinished map.
Socialism and Nationalism in the Post-Independence Era
Tanzania’s post-independence land policies must be understood in light of both the
socialist principles of TANU’s vision of Ujamaa, under the leadership of Nyerere, and the
challenges of nation-building and nationalism in the post-colonial context. While in the years
leading up to decolonization, debates had raged among Nyerere’s pan-Africanist peers across the
continent regarding the form independence should and could take, an Africa composed of
independent nations carried the day (Wilder 2015). Frantz Fanon, who argued that the nation was
the necessary site of anticolonial struggle, presciently identified many of the challenges that
would be faced by the leaders of these new independent nations. He warned of “how easy it is
for young independent countries to switch back from nation to ethnic group and from state to
tribe—a regression which is so terribly detrimental to the development of the nation and national
unity” (2004: 97). This, he wrote, was due to both “the colonial subject’s mutilation by the
colonial regime” and the “apathy…mediocrity, and…deeply cosmopolitan mentality” of the
national bourgeoisie (98). Fanon argued forcefully that the solution was a national consciousness
that gave way to a humanist political and social one, and a government with a substantive
economic and social policy that focused on the interior.

127

Nyerere’s vision for nation building and socialism in Tanzania differed in fundamental
ways from Fanon’s analysis of decolonization. Most notably, Nyerere rejected the applicability
of Marxist-Leninist models of socialism for Africa. He claimed that Tanzania was effectively
lacking in entrenched class divisions and that its socialism could not be based in class struggle.
As we have seen, Nyerere’s Marxist critics, in contrast, identified the post-independence
government as one of petit-bourgeois bureaucrats, an assessment that echoes Fanon’s predictions
for post-colonial Africa (Shivji 1976). Tanganyika had also gained independence without the
kind of violent struggle Fanon felt was necessary to truly liberate colonized peoples. Instead,
TANU had leveraged the colony’s status as a United Nations trust territory to pressure for a
peaceful withdrawal of the colonial administration (Coulson 2013: 144–158). However, despite
the clear contrast in thought between Nyerere and Fanon, Nyerere’s government did face the
challenges Fanon had predicted in building postcolonial national consciousness. Like other
independence leaders, Nyerere shared Fanon’s concern about the dangers of tribal and ethnic
division. In response, the TANU government embarked on a broad nation-building program
rooted in the country’s lingua franca, Swahili. In line with Fanon’s prescriptions, TANU’s
national consciousness was tied to a robust program aimed at improving economic and social
conditions, focused on the nation’s interior and driven by humanist values of equality across
gender, race, and ethnicity.
In laying out his program for African socialism, Nyerere claimed to draw inspiration
from pre-colonial African institutions which colonialism had interrupted, but not fully
extinguished. These institutions, he suggested, were inherently egalitarian and classless.
However, these traditional institutions, Nyerere explained, were not be maintained in their
current forms but rather used as inspiration for something new. In 1962, he wrote:
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We, in Africa, have no more need of being ‘converted’ to socialism than we have
of being ‘taught’ democracy. Both are rooted in our own past—in the traditional
society which produced us. Modern African socialism can draw from its
traditional heritage the recognition of ‘society’ as an extension of the basic family
unit. But it can no longer confine the idea of the social family within the limits of
the tribe, nor, indeed, of the nation. For no true African socialist can look at a line
drawn on a map and say, ‘The people on this side of that line are my brothers, but
those who happen to live on the other side of it can have no claim on me’; every
individual on this continent is his brother (1968: 12).
Here, Nyerere is explicit that his understanding of socialism is incompatible with the indigenous
institutions from which he claims his inspiration. While Nyerere promoted ahistorical,
romanticized and generalized images of these “traditional” institutions, he also recognized in
them the potential for conflict and even fascism (Nyerere 1968: 38–43). Decades of British
indirect rule had reified and racialized these institutions as “tribes” and tied them to new legal
regimes of authority over populations and land in ways that magnified this danger. In addition,
Nyerere himself emphasized that the indigenous kinship-based institutions he gestured toward
did in fact contain structures of inequality, especially along gendered lines (1968: 108–109).
What Nyerere proposed, then, was a new institution, modeled on the extended family (or
lineage), but free of patriarchy, racialization, and ethnonationalism—the village. This new social
formation was envisioned as a deeply linked, cooperative community with internal equality. It
would not tie people to the land on the basis of descent or tribe. It would also undo the structures
of gerontocracy and patriarchy that Nyerere identified as an impediment to national
development. Instead, youth and elders, women and men, would work together on equal terms to
build the nation. But this utopian vision was not the only goal of villagization. As the next
section discusses in more detail, it would also mitigate the danger of two potential threats to
TANU’s power by undermining the tribal landlord class associated with indirect rule and the
Native Authority and simultaneously curtailing the further development of a class of capitalist
landholders.
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Land Under Ujamaa
Majeshi Juma Setembo, a farmer in Mfumbwe Village, was twenty when Tanzania
gained independence from Great Britain. He remembered TANU’s inroads into the area in the
years between the terracing scheme of 1953–55 and independence in 1961 and recalled the
policies the party implemented after it gained control of the government. When I asked him what
TANU had achieved, he answered that it had made all Tanzanians equal and had forbidden
discrimination on the basis of religion or tribe. Beyond that, it had ended what he referred to as
land discrimination. Previously, he explained, Tanzanian land had been controlled by tribes, but
TANU placed land under control of the government. Indeed, the post-independence government
abolished the Native Authority in 1963 and vested all land in the new central government. This
meant that land was no longer controlled by “customary” authorities appointed by the British
under indirect rule and that land cases and other matters were no longer adjudicated by these
same authorities (interview, June 2, 2018).
Mzee Setembo was not the only one in Mkuyuni to tell me about the importance of the
changes in land law following independence, but these comments contrast with the writing of
Tanzanian legal scholars who have often emphasized continuity between colonialist and postindependence land policy (Ramadhani Jenera, interview, April 17, 2018). For instance, R.W.
Tenga (1987) argued forcefully that the post-independence government failed to effect a
significant change in land tenure and could largely be characterized as continuing colonial
patterns, especially in its suppression of the land market and in the government’s reluctance to
grant freehold titles. For most of its rule, the British colonial administration sought to limit the
sale of land by Africans. Africans, subject to customary law under the Native Authority, were
said to have usufruct rather than property rights to land and thus, officially, could neither sell
their farms nor use them for credit (Tenga 1987). Such policies not only limited the development
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of a capitalist class of African farmers, but also sought more generally to act as a brake on
African mobility by binding smallholders to the land. Of course, land sales did occur, much to
the consternation of some British authorities, who worked to avoid making records of such
transactions that could be used as evidence of ownership (“Native Authority Ordinance” 1932).
Only in 1955 did the administration change its stance and begin permitting Africans (in certain
cases) to claim freehold tenure. TANU, assuming leadership in 1961, promptly reversed this
change and again barred freehold titles (Tenga 1987). While on the surface, the reasons the new
administration gave for limiting the development of a private land market differed from those
invoked by the colonial government, the policies shared fundamental concerns and assumptions.
In his first major statement on Ujamaa, in 1962, Nyerere argued that land privatization was
antithetical to authentic African socialism (1968: 7). When he later laid out his socialist policies
in detail, he described land as part of the means of production and the necessary foundation for
development in Tanzania, a point I return to below. He went on to argue that it must be
“controlled and owned by the peasants through the machinery of their Government and their
cooperatives” (16, 118). While drawing on the language of Ujamaa, this approach to land rights
bore much in common with pre-1955 colonial policy, beginning with the argument that
“traditional” African societies had usufruct rather than property rights and that they were
properly understood as collective rather than individual. Both administrations feared that
allowing land sales would result in the growth of a class of landless poor (Tenga 1987: 41).
However, such policies were never straightforward in practice, and government prohibitions on
land sale proved no more possible to implement after independence than they had during the
colonial era.
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While these policies can be broadly understood in terms of socialist principles, they
should also be understood in terms of the class interests of the new government itself. As Marxist
critics like Shivji have pointed out, Nyerere’s administration was composed predominately of
petit-bourgeois bureaucrats who were competing for power with both traditional and capitalist
landholders (1998: 9). The administration’s relationship to the latter group, was complex,
because in practice, the lower tiers of TANU were deeply linked to and allied with the “kulak”
class, and these farmers were often able to use post-independence land policies to their
advantage (von Freyhold 1979). This was possible because Nyerere adhered to modernization
theory with regards to agriculture and prioritized the development of more capital-intensive
agricultural methods (Coulson 2013: 283). The “kulak” class, although seen as exploitative, was
also understood as the vanguard of modern agricultural techniques favored by the
administration. 5 However, at the higher levels of TANU, the emergence of such a class not only
contradicted the principles of Ujamaa, but also posed a political threat, as did its presumed
corollary, the creation of a class of landless peasants. Capitalist farmers were described as a
central problem in Nyerere’s statement on rural development (Nyerere 1968: 112–118). The
state’s attempts to limit the development of a land market and individual freehold tenure were
aimed at preventing the emergence and growth of both a capitalist agrarian class and a landless
one. In this, the British administration (at least until the final decade of the colonial period) and
the post-independence petit-bourgeois government were aligned.
However, as the comments from Mzee Setembu make clear, the new government’s
relationship to customary law and customary authority marked a more significant shift from

As von Freyhold (1979) showed, this class was in fact often not “progressive” or interested in investing in
increased production. Nevertheless, the administration generally believed they were and this belief, in combination
with the class’s close linkages to the bureaucracy, allowed them to use policy to their advantage.
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colonial era policies. 6 As mentioned above, the post-independence government abolished the
Native Authority in 1963. This was the final step in the process that began with the creation of
district councils in some areas after 1953 (Fimbo 2004: 34). The final dismantling of the Native
Authority after independence had a significant impact on the administration of land law in
Uluguru. Although customary land rights continued to be the basis for rural tenure, their
enforcement in contested cases depended on the interpretation of those rights by the courts. The
Native Authority, even after the deposition of Kingalu, consisted of Luguru men who were
versed in local systems of tenure. The new courts relied on judges from elsewhere in the country
who were often less familiar with Uluguru’s matrilineal institutions. In Mkuyuni in particular,
where the lineage was already relatively weak and coexisted with patrilineal patterns of
inheritance and virilocal residence, those rights based on the matrilineage were rendered
particularly tenuous. As we will see below, this did not only impact those cases that went to the
courts but also shaped the flow of land more broadly.
The continuation of customary law posed another problem for the new government.
Although the Native Authority had been abolished and land had been formally unbound from
ethnicity, customary law recognized complex and overlapping claims to land. In Uluguru, who
had the right to a given a plot: the lineage mjomba who at least nominally administered the land
in the valley, or their nephew or niece who had worked that plot over a period of years?
Although arrangements like these varied widely across Tanzania, the post-independence
administration tended to frame such relationships as landlord-tenant, and to equate them with
feudal structures. It was in this context that the government introduced a new principle of land

I use the term “customary” throughout this chapter in the legal sense of “customary law.” As prior chapters have
shown, “customary” law and “customary” authorities were not remnants of timeless tradition but often the products
of relatively recent political struggles.
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law, known as “land to the tiller.” According to this principle, tenure was directly linked to labor,
and “tenant” rights were prioritized over those of the “landlord.” The rule of “land to the tiller”
was brought to bear on customary landholders with the passage of the 1968 Customary
Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act, which provided a legal mechanism for the breakup of the
holdings of customary landlords such as chiefs or lineage heads. Although this law was only
applied to areas with commercial agricultural production and not to places like Uluguru, it also
marked the beginning a more general recognition of the principle of “land to the tiller” by the
courts (Tenga 1987; Tenga and Mramba 2014: 59; URT 1968). This change served to weaken
the threat posed by the “traditional” land holding class, but it ran counter to other principles of
the administration because it promoted individual rather than collective tenure.
Post-independence land law was also shaped by the administration’s view of the
economic role of land and nature in development. As noted above, Nyerere described land and
other natural resources such as forests, minerals, water, and oil, as part of the “means of
production” (1968: 16). This understanding of land as a form of capital informed the new
government’s policies, which largely focused on increasing the value of outputs, especially cash
crops for export, in order to grow the economy (Nyerere 1968: 106–144; Coulson 2013: 283).
This trend had begun during the late colonial period, when projects like ULUS pushed for
increased cash cropping and encouraged the development of the class of “progressive” farmers
discussed above. However, even at the height of such policies, the colonial administration
betrayed a marked ambivalence about the development of the rural African economy and the
potential political threat emerging capitalist farmer and landless classes might bring (cf. Moore
and Vaughan 1994: 116). As we have seen, Nyerere’s government was also fearful of the
development of such rural classes. However, TANU did not share with the British any
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ambivalence about the need to develop the rural sector. Economic growth was the goal and rural
lands were to be its basis. Instead, the threat of individualism and the emergence of capitalist
rural classes needed to be managed through the creation of collective forms of production which
would allow farmers to rationalize production, increase their use of inputs, and extract more
value from the land.
In this context, the policy of villagization proved useful in managing two conflicting
trends in land tenure. On the one hand, in areas where “land to the tiller” principles had been
applied, individual tenure was taking root. Following the Arusha Declaration, the government
attempted to encourage voluntary collectivization, but these efforts failed to spark change at the
speed and scale the authorities envisioned. On the other hand, in areas where “land to the tiller”
laws had not come into force, customary landholders continued to pose a political threat to the
ruling party. Because customary law served as the basis for both the power of this class and the
land rights of vast majority of the peasantry, it could not simply be eliminated as a legal
framework. At the same time, the principle of “land to the tiller” was difficult to apply to areas
like Uluguru where relationships were difficult to collapse into the landlord-tenant framework
and they did nothing to promote the collectivization the government sought.
On its surface, villagization addressed the problem of collectivization by establishing the
village as an institution that would serve as the foundation for collective, rather than
individualist, rural development. At the same time, although less explicitly, it served to interrupt
customary landholdings, to weaken the power of “traditional” authorities and institutions, and to
begin a process of indirect land reform by encouraging the dissolution of older forms of
collective land tenure. Shivji has argued that villagization amounted to a major land reform, but
that it was not intended or carried out as such (1998: 12). Here, I go one step further, arguing that
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this indirect land reform was one of the key factors in shaping the policies of villagization, even
if it was not explicitly stated as such. As numerous Tanzanian legal scholars have pointed out,
villagization proceeded largely outside the law, but was rarely challenged in court, and when it
was, courts tended to side with the government for political reasons (Shivji 1998; Fimbo 1992).
Land for villages was often appropriated from customary holders like lineages. Although the
land used for villages was typically only a fraction of larger customary landholdings, its
appropriation by the state served to undermine such forms of land tenure more broadly. In short,
it made clear the precarity of such claims to land without directly abolishing them, while
simultaneously introducing forms of tenure which sat in tension with customary law. The village
itself, as an institution formed to offer a collective basis for land administration and rural
development, also undermined the authority of preexisting structures like the lineage. This
process not only shifted control over land away from longstanding local elites toward a broader
base of the peasantry, but also from elders to the younger generations that made up much of
TANU. However, it did so in an uneven and legally ambiguous way. As we will see, the
resulting uncertainty, in combination with the shift toward principles of “land to the tiller,”
effected a much larger shift away from “customary” forms of collective tenure in places like
Uluguru. The result was, in essence, a generational and class-based processs of land reform,
albeit by another name.
Villagization in Mkuyuni
In 1974, the government forcibly relocated the residents of Mkuyuni Ward into planned
villages, where any household could claim a residential plot and build a home. Those who
refused to leave faced arrest and their homes were destroyed. Most of those who already lived in
the areas now designated villages were able to remain in their homes, but many were relocated,
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some only a matter of meters, others several kilometers or more, to new plots. The land taken for
residential plots, most often either personal or lineage farmland, was appropriated without
compensation. As elsewhere in the country, this was extralegal, but the courts upheld the
government’s right, leaving those losing farms without recourse.
Zaina Athmani Zengwe, in her 70s when I met her in 2018, spoke to us in the shade of
her small house along the main road in Madamu Village. She and her co-wife were both
pregnant at the time of villagization. Although they were already settled near the main road in
Madamu, they were told they had to move to Mkuyuni to make room for people being moved
down from the hills. She recalls that the day she gave birth, men came with a truck, threw her
possessions in the back, and offered her, her new baby, and her pregnant co-wife a ride down the
rough dirt road to their new plot in Mkuyuni. They were dropped off on an undeveloped piece of
land, where they cooked dinner and went to sleep. In the night, her co-wife woke up in severe
pain. She was rushed to the hospital, but she died, along with her baby, a few hours later. Her
family blamed the death on the stress of the forced relocation, and in particular, the bumpy ride
from Madamu to Mkuyuni. Less than a week later, Zaina Athmani was told her family had been
moved in error and she was brought back to Madamu. Her old home had been destroyed and the
plot had been occupied, so she was left to rebuild further down the road (Z. A. Zengwe,
interview, June 29, 2018). While Zaina Athmani’s experience with villagization was the most
traumatic I heard during my research, it was not the only tale of loss and pain. Many told secondhand stories of deaths as people were left on undeveloped plots, where they fell sick or were
attacked by lions. Others remembered the anguish of seeing their homes demolished and of being
deposited in the wilderness (pori) without shelter. Many recalled anger, although often, like
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Zaina Athmani, they kept the anger “in their stomach,” knowing it was fruitless to resist the
government.
The actual planning of the villages, however, was not entirely an outside imposition.
Implementation involved numerous local actors as well as outside bureaucrats. Many local
people were TANU members and active participants in villagization, in official capacities or
otherwise. The texture of villagization and its impact on individuals was shaped in small but
meaningful ways through ad hoc advocacy, as when residents in one area successfully resisted
attempts to move them to the nearby road and had been allowed to stay in their homes
(Ramadhani Jenera, personal communication, December 11, 2018; Zena Ramadhani Sadala,
personal communication, December 20, 2018). The implementation also depended on local men
who were hired to measure new plots, demolish old homes, and forcibly relocate those who
resisted. Omari Ahmedi Budi, more commonly known as Maandishi, who helped measure plots
in Mkuyuni Village, recalled that he and other surveyors had a large amount of discretion as to
where to begin measuring. Maandishi was not a bureaucrat; he had simply been selected for the
task along with a group of other young men. He still remembered his work with pride, recounting
how they would make decisions about where to measure, and how they would always leave
space for football pitches, churches, and mosques. The optimism with which he recalled these
days provides an image of villagization often missing from the scholarly discourse—a moment
of progress, promise, and collective pride (O. A. Budi, interview, December 20, 2018).
I spoke to several other men who been involved in the process of villagization, and they
also took pride in their contributions to the process. Mwangila Mbwali, who worked to measure
the plots in Kivuma, told me that despite his own participation in the process, he was initially
angry at being relocated. However, he said, he later came to see villagization as a good thing.
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Even despite his personal anger, he seemed to recall the moment with a sense of excitement
(personal communication, December 11, 2018). Mohamed Salum Dogero, in Kibwaya Village,
was involved in more than just measuring plots. Already serving as a low-level village official at
the time of villagization, he also helped in enforcement, patrolling old homesteads and arresting
those who failed to relocate. He and other village leaders designated an area for the Christians,
mostly recent transplants from further south in the mountains, making space for them to build a
church. 7 The work, as he described it, was important, shaping the geographic contours of the
community that still exist today (interview, December 12, 2018). While the experiences of these
men differed, they all shared in taking pride in their work and remembered the time as one of
excitement and promise.
This is not to say that the villages were democratically planned; they were not. Indeed,
many of my interlocutors, like Zaina Athmani, stressed the indomitable power of the
government. The official who had final say in the placement of the villages was a TANU
bureaucrat not native to the mountains, although most I spoke to remembered him fondly.
However, crediting such bureaucrats with full authorship for the process of villagization
obscures the important ways in which local people helped shape the form villagization took,
including many local members of TANU youth who were enthusiastic about TANU’s plans for
development as well as those who resisted forced resettlement.
My purpose in offering these accounts is not simply to provide an antidote to more
caricatured depictions of an undifferentiated, conservative peasantry resisting a modernizing
state (Scott 1998). Local participation in villagization is significant because it indicates that the

Although discrimination by religion was illegal in Tanzania, villages in the Mkuyuni area were often somewhat
segregated by religion. Many of the area’s Christians were settlers from further south in the mountains who had
moved looking for land or to work in the kapok or sugar processing for the Indian or German farmers in the area.
Their position in the community was somewhat marginal, especially in the village discussed here.
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temporality of the socialist project and the radical future it imagined were meaningful to many in
Mkuyuni, and many, especially the youth who had been mobilized through TANU, not only
believed in the vision of progress Ujamaa offered but helped shape that vision. It is also
significant in a more specific way; as the rest of this chapter shows, generational conflicts today
originate in part with the moment of villagization. These conflicts cannot be understood without
a consideration of the unique historical experience of those who were elders at the time of my
research. This generation was the very generation that called for and participated in projects of
radical change in the post-independence period. The ambivalence of many elders toward mila
cannot be understood without attending to this history.
Recalling this moment of collective idealism, many in Mkuyuni are nostalgic. During my
research, the remnants of socialism were tangible. It left behind not only schools, hospitals, and
the bureaucratic institutions of village governance, but also a vision of progress premised on
collective effort and government provision of certain forms of social welfare. Villagization
shaped not only the village geography and village governance but the sense of the village as a
meaningful social unit through which collective action might be taken. In this way, it seems to
me that Ujamaa’s legacy is perhaps best understood not as ruins but as embers, a sense of
futurity and community that continues to burn even as other structures displaced the socialist
program itself (Sanjinés 2013; Coronil 2019: 262–263). However, this legacy is also deeply
ambiguous. Starting from an examination in changes in social reproduction brought about by
Ujamaa and villagization, the second part of this chapter explores this ambiguity through the
gendered and generational conflicts over inheritance that have emerged in the aftermath of the
socialist project.
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Inheritance, Land, and Reproductive Labor
While the future that the socialist project imagined never came to be, it did succeed in
upending systems of land tenure and in destabilizing the forms of authority upon which
customary tenure depended. The socialist government also succeeded in erecting primary schools
and hospitals in many rural areas and improving infrastructure, including water supplies. The
second part of this chapter analyzes the ways in which these changes unsettled structures of
social reproduction and reproductive labor in Mkuyuni. I do so by examining shifts in two kinds
of inheritance: the inheritance of land, and the inheritance of ancestral names. As I suggested at
the beginning of this chapter, inheritance, spanning past, present, and future generations, is an
important site of struggle over questions of social reproduction. In Mkuyuni, the indirect land
reform carried out through villagization aimed to undermine customary institutions like the
lineage and delink those institutions from control of land. However, as the remainder of this
chapter shows, the lineage was not only an institution for managing land tenure over time. It was
also a key institution of social reproduction. By uncoupling land from lineage and by framing
land as capital, the post-independence government undermined the material and social basis for
key forms of social reproduction. The remainder of this chapter explores the consequences of
this shift, which has opened gendered and generational conflicts that are still sites of struggle
today.
Land Inheritance in Mkuyuni
As outlined in prior chapters, land tenure at the time of colonization was generally
organized through matrilineal lineages, with a male lineage head in charge of administering land.
When he died, the women of the lineage would typically convene to select his successor from
among his younger brothers and nephews. Men and women both had rights to farmland under
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this system, and any person could request land from the lineage of either parent, as a member of
their mother’s lineage or a “child” of their father’s. Importantly, although land rights ideally
flowed along matrilineal lines, permanent crops and other improvements to land like terraces and
buildings were understood to flow from parent to child. As Chapter 1 showed, the matrilineal
system was ossified through the process of colonial ethnography and indirect rule, which sought
to regularize and codify it. Some in Uluguru were able to use this process to consolidate their
power, while others found their positions undermined. Women were particularly disadvantaged,
as colonial ethnography often rendered their authority invisible.
Today, land inheritance in Mkuyuni has changed. While old lineage boundaries are
remembered, the lands themselves have been fragmented into small farms held by individuals.
Under the matrilineal system, what had been inherited was a right to use land within the lineage
area. Today, what is inherited is a piece of land itself, which flows from parent to child. 8 Thus,
when someone dies, their farms are most often divided evenly among their children. While
women and men still have equal formal rights to land under this system, the weakening of the
lineage has given fathers more control over their children, increased women’s dependence on
their husbands and, in combination with virilocal residence patterns established during the
colonial period (see Chapter 1), made it more difficult for women to claim the land holdings to
which they have a legal right. Many of those I spoke with in Mkuyuni told me that this change,
though gradual, was cemented in the post-independence period. The shift was driven by the
changes in land policy at the national level described above. First, as we have seen, the
nationalist government vested all land in the government, removing it from tribal control and

All land in Tanzania is vested in the government (Tenga and Mramba 2014). However, land rights today, unlike
those under the lineage system, adhere to particular plots, and are treated effectively as individual ownership in most
cases.
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placing it largely under the control of the village as an administrative unit (Fimbo 2004: 11;
Tenga and Mramba 2014: 55–63). However, change on the ground was slow, as existing tenures
were rarely interrupted. It was villagization, beginning in 1974 in Mkuyuni, that sparked a more
radical, tangible change.
Villagization impacted land tenure and inheritance in several ways. When villagization
was implemented in Mkuyuni, the land used for the planned villages typically belonged to
particular lineages and was taken without compensation. While the plots given out were only big
enough for a house, not agriculture, they did help delink control of land from lineage. Young
men could now get a plot of land without asking their lineage elders. Moreover, since land
parceled out during villagization was decoupled from the lineage, it could not be passed down
through matrilineal lines, and patrilineal inheritance became the norm. Patrilineal inheritance had
already become more common in the villages around Mkuyuni over the preceding decades due
especially to the rise of cash cropping (see Chapter 1). Villagization further cemented this trend
by dramatically increasing the number of plots that were independent of lineage control. Some
villages also gained control over agricultural land that had previously been held by Indian and
German farmers and either redistributed this land or made it available to village residents by
lease. As younger generations depended less on their lineage elders for access to land, the
lineage system began to lose its authority. Speaking of Tanzania generally, Shivji writes:
Villagization in effect meant the expropriation of customary rights and the
compulsory acquisition of land under customary regimes. No recognizable legal
procedures were followed in carrying out the process…. Customary occupiers
occupied [their] lands not so much as a matter of legal right but at the discretion
of the president (1998: 13).
Villages, which I have argued were designed to wrest control from prior authorities and to take
on the role previously filled by extended family in rural life, competed directly with lineages in
questions of authority, the distribution of land, and the organization of labor. In this way,
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villagization did succeed in one of its principal, if unspoken, goals—disrupting existing systems
of land tenure and weakening the control of the older men over youth.
Beyond this, there was a more subtle shift in the understanding of land by the government
and by those committed to TANU’s vision. In the colonial and precolonial period, land in
Uluguru generally belonged to the lineage, but improvements on the land and permanent crops
such as trees belonged to individuals and could pass from parent to child. As Chapter 1
discussed, the colonial terracing and tree planting programs of the 1950s undermined collective
land tenure and the matrilineal lineage because the introduction of permanent improvements to
land like terraces and trees effectively shifted the category to which land belonged (Young and
Fosbrooke 1960). Post-independence land policies had a similar effect, although not through the
development of improvements like terraces. Indeed, the socialist government did not succeed in
creating significant improvements to the variegated mountain land in Mkuyuni. Rather, these
policies shifted the understanding of land because they were designed around land’s productive
capacity. In other words, they framed land itself as a form of capital, a part of the “means of
production” to which Nyerere referred (1968: 16). In Uluguru, such policies and the discourse
around them helped swing the logic of land inheritance toward the patrilineal, to which capital
was understood to rightly belong. The role of land as an ecosystem, a sacred landscape, and
locus of social relations became increasingly obscured in public discourse. Patterns of
inheritance shifted accordingly.
Villagization had an uneven impact on men and women, weakening women’s access to
land in several ways. Although in theory, post-independence land policies formalized women’s
equal rights to own land, in practice, specific conditions in Mkuyuni shaped the outcomes of
these policies in ways that favored men. First, although in many parts of Tanzania, women did
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not have land rights under customary law, Uluguru was a notable exception. Women in the
mountains had historically held significant rights to and control over land. They not only had a
right to plots of land from their lineage and that of their fathers, but also had roles in appointing
and potentially deposing the lineage heads who administered the land. However, as we have
seen, in Mkuyuni, unlike other parts of the mountains, a pattern of virilocality had emerged. A
1952 survey found that over four-fifths of households in Mkuyuni were virilocal, a result of
increased cash cropping and the spread of Islam (Pels 1999: 181; Young and Fosbrooke 1960:
57–58). During villagization, women had rights to claim plots equal to those of men, but most of
those I spoke with in Mkuyuni said that few women did so. There are at least two reasons for
this. First, the land was for residential plots. The pattern of virilocality in Mkuyuni meant that
prior to villagization, most women in Mkuyuni lived in houses belonging to their husbands. It
was these houses, then, that were to be destroyed and replaced during villagization. Older
patterns of virilocality continued in the new villages, but now the land on which houses were
built belonged to the husband and not his lineage.
In this context, villagization was not simply a continuation of older structures of gendered
inequality. In certain ways, the process increased women’s precarity, especially in the areas
around Mkuyuni. Although women in Uluguru had historically strong land rights under
customary law, these rights depended on the lineage as an institution. Even under virilocal
conditions, divorced or widowed women could return to their own lineage and be guaranteed
access to space to live and farm. As lineages lost control of land following villagization, this
option disappeared. Of course, a shift away from customary matrilineal inheritance was widely
replaced by patterns conforming to statute law, under which women continued to have equal
rights, though they inherited from their parents rather than their matrilineage. Patterns of
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virilocality, however, also put women at a disadvantage in asserting these rights. While siblings
should have inherited land equally on the death of their parents, brothers living near their
families were in a better position to establish a history of continuous cultivation on inherited
plots than their sisters, who were living with their husbands. Under the principle of “land to the
tiller” and in the eyes of courts that consistently valued continuous cultivation as evidence of
ownership, women’s rights have been harder to claim. Moreover, women’s absence from their
family, whether their matrilineal lineage or their nuclear or patrilineal family, has also weakened
women’s roles in overseeing the management of jointly held lands. Returning home after
widowhood or divorce, women may find that their uncles or brothers have sold family land and
left them with little recourse.
Villagization lasted only a few years before the policy was repealed. Liberalization will
be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, but it is important to note here that while
liberalization created more space for the recognition of customary law and opened up renewed
debates over land tenure (Odgaard 2002; Tsikata 2003), the impact of villagization on land
tenure and lineage authority was not reversed. Rather, the trend toward patrilineal inheritance
and the breakup of lineage lands continued. Increased access to the cash economy and
commodification of land itself meant that younger people, especially men, whose access to cash
was usually higher (see Chapter 3), could purchase farms rather than depending on lineage land
or inheritance. The growing land market also facilitated the permanent sale of lineage lands to
outsiders. The socialist-era principle of land to the tiller had helped lay the groundwork for a
legal system that focused on individual land tenure and obscured the possibility of a lineage
holding land in trust for their descendants (Tenga 1987). In addition, with economic
liberalization, many lineage heads and their potential heirs were drawn to economic
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opportunities outside of Mkuyuni. The absence of lineage leadership facilitated the breakdown of
lineage land as more transfers took place without the supervision of lineage leaders. In part, the
change also happened because many wanted it to happen. Many farmers I interviewed suggested
that with increasing population density, transfers from parents to children led to less
fragmentation and stronger access to land overall. Their stated reasoning was that a man had
fewer children, on average, than nephews or nieces. This understanding of fragmentation
assumes individual tenure as the only possibility, indicating the extent to which collective
landholding has been eliminated as a possibility in the mind of many in Mkuyuni, regardless of
its actual legal status. In addition to these views, movements within Islam toward a stricter
adherence to Islamic law were influential in the move toward patrilineal inheritance patterns (see
Chapter 3). According to Islamic inheritance law, wealth should flow from parents to children,
with sons receiving a larger portion than daughters.
The ways in which lineages lost control over their land varied, in part due to the plural
and often contradictory regimes and processes of Tanzanian land law. There are three legal
registers formally recognized in land cases, all dating back to the colonial period: statutory laws
that favor equal inheritance among natal children; Islamic law, in which inheritance passes to
children, but unevenly by gender; and customary law, under which the matrilineal lineage system
could be invoked. All three were officially recognized in the post-independence period and
remain recognized today. However, as we have seen, following the abolition of the Native
Authority, the court system was decoupled from tribe, with judges drawn from around the
country. While these judges were still expected to recognize customary tenure systems,
patrilineal inheritance was the norm in most areas of Tanzania, as well as being normative in
both statute and Islamic law. Thus, formal legal institutions often found claims based on
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patrilineal principals to be more legible. Moreover, because under Luguru customary law,
children had rights to their father’s lineage land as well as the land of their own lineage,
matrilineal inheritance patterns could be difficult to discern over the short-term, as land only
reverted back to the matriline on the second generation.
In one illustrative case, in 1979, Shabani Ally Hazeru sued for access to a farm that had
been passed to Alimasi Mhumba from Mhumba’s mother. On appeal, Hazeru claimed that the
farm belonged to his lineage. In dismissing the appeal, the District Magistrate M. A. Upaga
wrote:
This appeal is senseless. It has been established beyond dispute that the disputed
shamba [farm] descended up the respondent from his deceased mother…In
[Hazeru’s] petition of appeal he is now claiming that the disputed shamba belongs
to his clan, the respondent’s mother being a member of that clan. He does not
appear to dispute that it was always being cultivated by the respondent’s mother
(Hazeru v. Mhumba, 1979).
This case was not a conflict between members of different lineages; both parties belonged to the
lineage of Mhumba’s mother. However, the judge made two notable assumptions in this
dismissal. First, he recognized continuous cultivation as evidence of ownership. This is
consonant with Tanzanian land law’s emphasis on use. The principle of “land to the tiller”
discussed above served to challenge the power of customary landlords, but once implemented, it
fueled other kinds of inequality. For example, women who resided with their husbands, if their
families did not live close to one another, would have difficulty maintaining continuous
cultivation on their own farms, whether granted from lineage land or inherited from a parent. If
they wished to claim the land years later, they would not have evidence of continuous cultivation
in their favor. Second, the judge in this case appears to see the claims of a natal child as
automatically more valid than the claims of any other relative in lineage, in contrast to the
lineage system, which could entertain the claims as equal. The idea of land owned by a lineage
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rather than an individual is not explicitly excluded here, but neither is the possibility seriously
considered. Again, the principle of “land to the tiller” reinforced the idea of individual ownership
and the law proved ill-equipped to grapple with land held jointly. This was typical of many of the
cases I read at the Mkuyuni primary court. Courts rarely considered the possibility that land
belonged to a lineage rather than an individual and claims of inheritance from parents were
always more legible to the courts than other types of transmission.
While looking at the courts can be informative in understanding changes in land tenure,
most disputes never reach the primary or district courts. They are usually handled by relatives
without state involvement. Today, when conflict does arise, the courts are one of several
institutions that can be called into service. Within the family, lineage heads and elders can be
called upon to mediate conflict. Religious authorities can also adjudicate matters of inheritance,
whether through informal counseling on the part of Islamic and Christian leaders or through a
formal hearing at the local Islamic Council. Hamlet, village, and ward officials also help mediate
disputes. For more formal action, land cases in Mkuyuni are referred to the local land councils,
while inheritance cases proceed through the court, leaving the venue for proceedings ambiguous
in cases that straddle these categories. Within this array of institutions, which have multiplied
since liberalization in the 1980s, the plurality of legal norms—customary, statute and Islamic—
remain in place. 9
In this context of legal pluralism and uncertainty, the loss of lineage land was gradual and
emerged through a variety of processes. In some cases, the land was sold. Near the top of the

In some ways, they have become even more pronounced. Liberalization is associated with both the return to
customary law and the promotion of statute law as a liberal norm (under the guise of equal rights), while the
loosening of controls on religious organization has gone hand-in-hand with the rise of Ansar Sunna, the Islamic
reform movement that has pushed for stricter adherence to Islamic law, even among Muslims who remain affiliated
with mainline (Sufi/Sunni) Islam (see Chapter 3).
9
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mountains, far above Mkuyuni Ward, I spoke to Magoma XVIII, the heir to one of the oldest
lineages in Uluguru. When I asked about lineage lands, he said one of his predecessors had sold
much of the land for cash. Similarly, members of a once-powerful lineage in Changa Village told
me that their lineage head had sold the land and departed for opportunities in another district.
Such sales tended to come after liberalization, but villagization paved the way by eroding the
lineage institutions that could challenge sales and by shifting the logic of land rights toward
individual tenure. Even more common than the sale of lineage lands, however, was a more
straightforward shift to patrilineal inheritance. Many of the largest landholders in Mkuyuni were
the sons of former lineage heads.
On one of the final days of my research, I spoke with an mganga (traditional healer)
named Hamisi Mustafa Magana, in a lush valley in Kibwaya Village. A charismatic man who
seemed younger than his sixty years, Hamisi told me in detail about how he came to work as a
healer and showed me some tools of the trade. After discussing his profession, I moved to more
general questions about changes in the community:
JF: I heard that long ago, a lot of land was owned by clans [sic], but now many
farms belong to individual people?
HMM: Let me tell you something. See where we are? Up to that mountain? […]
Everything on this side was once ruled by my father, Sewanda.
[…]
JF: This used to be lineage land?
HMM: Yes
JF: But now it is private farms?
HMM: Yes.
JF: How did this change? Did he [Sewanda] sell the farms?
HMM: No.… Before, the head of the lineage owned the land. But with Ujamaa,
they said land was the property of the village, of the government…. Because the
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old man was clever, and because…he had many children and had his wapwa
[nephews and nieces], so he [distributed the land among them].
[…]
JF: Was there conflict between the children and the nephews?
HMM: No, because the wapwa used the land of their mothers, his sisters. He gave
his sisters their areas. His sisters and their children took this part, and his children
took this [other] part.
After he dies, Hamisi told me, his children will inherit his land. It no longer belongs to the
lineage. When I asked whether conflict might ensue, he dismissed the idea, saying that everyone
now inherits from their parents, including the cousins who might otherwise lay claim to the area.
Hamisi’s story highlights the ways in which post-independence land policies in general
and villagization in particular shifted land tenure in the mountains. It also points to another
pattern, that lineage heads often acted before their deaths to steer how their lands would be
inherited, increasingly favoring their children but often including their wapwa as well. Land
systems had previously recognized children of the lineage as holding land rights, so the change
away from matrilineality was not always a radical rupture. Sometimes, it entailed a more subtle
shift of weight within the existing system away from matrilineal descendants and toward natal
children. 10 The plurality of formal and informal institutions for adjudicating inheritance and land
disputes, the multiple and contradictory sets of laws in use, and the mutability of the lineage
system meant that the process of change was gradual, partial, and far from linear. Nevertheless,
considering the changes in retrospect, many of those I spoke with pointed to the moment of
villagization as the turning point in the inheritance of land.

Of course, for women, these categories are one and the same. However, as we have seen, from the colonial period
onward, women were increasingly marginalized in politics and the administration of lands. Women’s experiences of
these changes are the subject of the rest of this chapter.
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The Inheritance of Names and the Work of Social Reproduction
This change in land inheritance from matrilineal to patrilineal patterns coincided with a
significant change in another kind of inheritance in Mkuyuni, that of ancestral names. However,
in contrast to land, which is frequently subject to multiple competing claims, heirs of ancestral
names are increasingly refusing their inheritance, as Mama Kisangile’s account of the name
Sugusugu at the beginning of this chapter clearly illustrates. To understand why this is so, we
must first examine the institution of name inheritance in more detail. People I spoke to in
Mkuyuni generally recognized two main kinds of names, lineage (or ranked) names and
“regular” names. In either case, a person is given the name, and to some degree, the identity of
an ancestor. Previously, lineage names and their associated ranks could be bestowed upon men
or women, and in fact, were typically received by husbands and wives together. Those without a
husband or wife were not qualified (Pels 1999: 163–164). In Mkuyuni today, however, following
the invisibility of women’s leadership in colonial ethnography and the weakening of the lineage
system after independence, women’s lineage names are rarely invoked and have been
increasingly forgotten. Indeed, since many lineages in Mkuyuni were founded more recently than
those higher in the mountains, women’s names may never have been established the way they
were elsewhere. Nevertheless, certain men’s names, like Sugusugu, are still remembered,
discussed, and sometimes inherited. These are the names of the wajomba who previously
administered the land.
There are two main ways to inherit a name in Mkuyuni. The first, which applies only to
lineage names, is through the system already described; when the holder of a lineage name died,
the women of the lineage would select a successor from among the deceased’s brothers and
nephews. The second, which can apply to any name, occurs when a name has not been inherited
following an individual’s death. In that case, months or years later, a relative of the deceased
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(almost always of the same gender) may become ill. Often, the patient is brought to the hospital
where diagnostic tests show nothing or where the medicines dispensed fail to work. The patient
is then brought to an mganga who conducts a divination and discovers that the patient is being
afflicted by a name—that is, the spirit of the deceased wants the patient to take their name. After
procedures that confirm the diagnosis, a tambiko ritual is carried out to reconcile with the dead,
and the holder is thereafter known by their inherited name. If the mganga’s diagnosis was
correct, the illness disappears.
Ranked names, which are said to be “ruled” (kutawala), generally stay within lineages
and are inherited along matrilineal lines. “Regular” names, which are inherited (kurithi) but not
“ruled,” can pass along either matrilineal or patrilineal lines. Ranked names typically come with
a set of regalia: a three-legged stool, a wrist bangle, a ceremonial axe, and a carved spear or
walking stick. 11 Those inheriting these names go through an initiation process during which they
receive the special knowledge associated with their rank. They are typically put inside for a
week, and during this time are often compared to girls undergoing initiation. Those holding
names of the same rank come to the house and teach them secret knowledge, including
knowledge of certain medicines.
In addition to the name, regalia, secret knowledge, and authority over land, lineage names
also come with a set of obligations related to matambiko. As discussed in prior chapters, in
Mkuyuni, matambiko are generally understood as a set of practices of reconciling with the
ancestral or territorial spirits called mizimu. Mizimu are typically described as “waliokufa
zamani” (“those who died long ago”) although during my research, the term was also used to the
territorial spirits associated with Kingalu and Kolero. They are connected to sacred places in the
Some holders of “regular” names also wear wrist bangles and may inherit particular items from their predecessor
in the name, but they do not typically have the same set of regalia associated with ranked names.
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landscape: trees, pools, caves and graves—openings between the spirit world below the earth and
the human world above it. Those who inherit clan lineage inherit several obligations related to
matambiko. First, they are responsible for organizing annual lineage matambiko, wherein lineage
members gather, brew millet beer, visit sacred groves and graves of past lineage heads, and recite
ancestral names and sacred words that will ensure the health of the lineage and the fertility of
their fields. Second, they are expected to travel to the shrines associated with Kingalu or Kolero
to take part in rainmaking matambiko there. Third, they are expected to assist when a member of
the lineage falls ill, which may mean calling in an mganga and gathering people together for a
lineage tambiko. Finally, they are in charge of a medicine that is distributed to all members of the
clan or lineage to ensure their health each year. These medicines remain important, even being
transported to lineage members living hundreds of miles away.
The overlapping practices of healing, rainmaking, and matambiko should be understood
as forms of reproductive labor. In Uluguru as elsewhere, caring for ancestors is a central
obligation of kinship (Kalusa and Vaughan 2013: 28), and as the women quoted in the
Introduction would remind us, mila, healing, and even remembering are forms of work (kazi).
The work of remembering is part of the work entailed in matambiko, when names and lineage
histories are recited and remembered, and in initiations, when knowledge is recalled and passed
across generations. These forms of reproductive labor are essential for the health and
reproduction of the social body, by remembering and reconciling with the dead and ensuring the
flourishing of the lineage in the future. Names themselves link the past and present, binding
generations in recursive iterations that ensure their own reproduction—that of the names and that
of the lineage. When men refuse to inherit these names, they fail carry out their roles in this
system reproductive labor, and the health of the land and the lineage are thrown into peril.

154

Making Rain in the Era of Villagization
On several visits to Kingalu’s residence in Kinole, I spoke with the son of Kingalu XII,
Asman Kingalu Sadi Setembu, who was at the time of my research one of the most senior
members of Kingalu’s family and regarded as the most knowledgeable on matters of family
history. 12 More than once in the course of these conversations, Mzee Asman recounted that that
villagization had resulted in a severe nationwide drought, for which he blamed relocation of
Kingalu from his residence near the sacred grove in Kinole. Nyerere, the story went, recognized
the situation after drought struck the entire country and allowed Kingalu to move back to his old
residence, thus ensuring the return of the rains. This story succinctly highlighted how
villagization worked to undermine the power of local chiefs and other authorities who served in
the Native Administration. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, Kingalu’s relationship to TANU
was unusual; the 1936 deposition of Kingalu XI positioned his successors as opponents to
colonial rule and potential allies to TANU. This alliance was cemented during the protests
against terracing and Kingalu’s family had a close relationship with TANU (and its successor,
Chama Cha Mapinduzi [CCM]) from the 1950s onward. Nevertheless, after independence,
Kingalu became caught up in TANU’s attempts to dislodge “traditional” leaders through
villagization.
The truth of this story, which I only heard from Kingalu’s family members, is beside the
point. Families with histories of rainmaking often told stories emphasizing their fame and power
in ending droughts. What is important here is the underlying logic which makes this story legible
to people in Uluguru—the relationship between authority, rainmaking, and sacred places. One of
the goals of villagization was to disrupt the authority of customary leaders like Kingalu.

12

As the son of Kingalu XII, Mzee Asman is a child of the Bena lineage rather than a lineage member.
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However, in doing so, TANU also disrupted systems of social reproduction in the form of social
healing. The village, posited as an alternative to traditional institutions, was not capable of
bringing rain and ensuring social reproduction in the way older institutions had been, even while
it did attempt to provide other supports for social reproduction in the form of hospitals and
schools.
Feierman’s (1990) account of Shambaa rainmaking after independence is instructive. In
Shambaai, power had long been more centralized than it had been in Uluguru, and political
authority and rainmaking flowed together through patrilineal lines in a complex set of political
structures. Unlike Kingalu, the chief in Shambaai had retained his official position in the Native
Authority throughout British colonial rule and only lost his official status in 1963, when TANU
abolished the chiefship in all parts of the country. In 1966, a drought occurred that many
residents understood to have been caused by the old chief in protest of his removal from power
by the new government. In response to the drought, TANU arrested the sons of the chief “to
show that TANU had covered the land, and that the old chief was not powerful enough to
challenge its authorities” (1990: 257). In 1979, a local official of CCM also told Feierman that
during a drought several years earlier, when he was village chairman, he had paid tribute money
to the rainmaker from the village treasury without the knowledge of more senior party members.
Feierman also reported that people felt rain had changed after the death of the chief, years
after independence:
Through the sixties, people paid tribute to the chief, he made the rain. This did not
cut off his subjects from the politics of TANU, which many of them joined. Local
people took part in the new politics in other ways too. After the Arusha
Declaration, one village asked to be made an ujamaa village. Women in several
villages started cooperative farms under party leadership. But the women also
farmed together in the banana groves of the retired chief. For as he was alive, they
could act together, working on his farms and knowing when the rain drenched
them that it was his (1990: 248)
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However, after the death of the chief, a crisis of succession ensued:
In the nineteenth century the heirs might have fought it out with spears and
arrows, or the chiefdom might have been sent a new man, son of the Simba
Mwene at Vugha. In the 1920s it was the British who would have had the final
say. Under the new conditions the process of selection was driven underground,
and was therefore aborted, cut off before a clear successor emerged (1990: 248).
In Uluguru, the consequences of TANU’s policies were also often felt later. Lineage heads often
maintained their land holdings under the new system and many continued to carry out
matambiko. However, upon their death, their lands fragmented and the heirs to their names fled.
Kingalu remains the most powerful traditional authority in Uluguru, his status emerging
from the rise of nineteenth century “big men,” the institution of rainmaking, and the history of
British indirect rule. He was the closest figure in Uluguru to the powerful rainmaking chiefs
discussed in Feierman’s work. It was at this level in particular that TANU wished to disrupt
existing forms of authority. However, for most people in the mountains, the questions of social
reproduction raised by villagization did not play out at the lofty levels of “chief” nor in the
nationwide drought, but in more local concerns with lineage and extended family. In this realm,
feelings about existing structures of authority were often ambivalent. The history of the slave
trade, indirect rule, and the introduction of cash crops had all contributed to deepening
inequalities and many had reason to oppose the continued power of the lineage heads. However,
the upheaval caused by villagization raised more questions than it answered and generated new
conflicts along gendered and generational lines.
Ancestors, Healing, and Climate Change
In the Introduction, I recounted a visit to an elderly man named Sipriani Kasiani
Changadiko in Luholole Village whose son-in-law Deodat told me about medicines that appear
like lizards to unauthorized viewers. A holder of a lineage name like his wife and his father-in157

law, Deodat was enthusiastic when I arrived to discuss mila, which he felt has been neglected by
younger generations. When I asked about ancestral names such as theirs, Deodat and Mzee
Sipriani explained that before, when a lineage head would die, the women would meet to select a
new one, looking for someone responsible, with a proven history of helping the family. The
initiate would then be placed inside for seven days, undergoing various tests and receiving secret
teachings. Today, these practices still happen, they said, but more rarely. Deodat explained that
these days, people are afraid to take on the names, which he described as “difficult.” Likewise,
when I asked the men about matambiko, they answered that the rituals still exist in some form
but that they have diminished. Previously, if rain didn’t fall, Deodat recounted, the elders would
don kaniki, simple garments of black cloth, go to a special place of wilderness (pori), and pray
for rain. Each lineage had its own such area to carry out matambiko. There, they would also
make medicines, including one to protect the lineage from illness and another to assuage
conflicts within the lineage. There was even a medicine, Deodat said, that allowed a husband to
temporarily take his wife’s pregnancy so she could carry out other work such as pounding grain.
When she was done, he would pass the pregnancy back to her. But now, medicines like these are
no longer available, the men told me, because the elders who followed these traditions have all
died. “They didn’t teach you?” I asked. “They didn’t give a ‘seminar,’” Mzee Sipriani replied,
laughing at his use of the English word. When I asked again later why the tradition of lineage
medicines and matambiko had not been passed down, however, he gave a different answer: the
youth of today disrespect mila (Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko and Deodat Gaspar Kunambi,
interview, October 3, 2018).
While several important themes emerge from this conversation, including the close
relationship between bodily healing, rainmaking and lineage, the role of sacred places is
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particularly key. As Chapter 1 described, lineages once managed groves where cultivation was
forbidden and where they would carry out matambiko. These sacred groves typically contained a
water source—a well, spring, or pool—and strong taboos (miiko) forbid cutting the trees or
disturbing the landscape. Those who violated these rules could expect punishment from angry
spirits, who might cause injury, illness, or even death. During a later conversation, Deodat
pointed out that the sacred forests used for matambiko had often protected water sources and
suggested that the ancestors may have understood their importance for the environment
(interview, October 22, 2018). It is true that both the smaller lineage forests and those protecting
major sacred sites like the ones associated with Kolero and Kingalu often contained critical
sources of water. While a functionalist framing might depict sacred groves as an ecological
adaptation masked by cultural beliefs about spirits, such an interpretation would at once hollow
out the category of mzimu and flatten the political ecology of Uluguru by obscuring the ways in
which these forests served as sites of political power for certain lineage elders. Rather, these
forests should be understood, as Deodat and others in Uluguru described them, as manifestations
of the temporal and political links between ancestors, lineages, and the conditions of social
reproduction.
Similar to Deodat’s assessment, Sylvester’s Haule’s (2018) recent research around the
sacred forest at Kolero found community monitoring of the forest by the elders of several
lineages, coupled with strong social and spiritual sanctions against cutting around the mzimu
area, have proven effective in protecting water sources and other forest resources. At the time of
my research, the large forest there remained largely intact from prior generations, despite
occasional incursions by illegal loggers. Kolero, higher in the mountains and farther from major
transportation routes, is home to longer-standing lineages than Mkuyuni and did not experience
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the largescale settlement of non-lineage cash croppers that Mkuyuni saw during the colonial
period. As a result, lineages in Kolero were better able to withstand the changes sparked by
villagization and most land remains under lineage control.
In Mkuyuni, the lineage has atrophied. As lineages lost both control over land and
political authority, the forests they once cultivated and maintained began to disappear. A few
spirit areas remain around Mkuyuni and gravesites are still remembered and preserved, but
remaining groves are smaller than they once were and many are no longer visible at all. Indeed,
ariel and satellite images show the lineage forests of Msume and Rufezuwa, which were
designated as official forest reserves in 1930, were still standing late in the colonial period but
had dwindled to nearly nothing by 1984. 13 Following liberalization, some of these areas even fell
into private hands outside the lineage. The loss of the institutions responsible for rainmaking was
thus directly linked to the loss of forest areas and according to many in Mkuyuni, resulted in
damage to natural water sources. Without lineage oversight, boundaries of farms have come
closer to protected pools and springs. Moreover, many believe the loss of forests has reduced
rainfall. 14 There are still taboos on cutting trees and logging injuries are often attributed to
spiritual forces; several logging deaths during my fieldwork in Mkuyuni sparked rumors about
angry spirits. However, the resources and authority that once came with the protection of sacred
forests were based on the system of land tenure that socialist land policies dismantled.
The post-independence state was not oblivious to the need for forests. However, the
convergence of political and economic forces significantly shaped and limited the form of forest

Aerial photographs taken in 1955 as part of a government land survey project show forest boundaries that match
those on hand drawn maps in the Morogoro District Book (Fletcher 1933). Satellite imagery from 1984 shows a near
total loss of forest cover aside from scattered trees (Landsat/Copernicus, retrieved from Google Earth).
14
As Chapter 1 explained, data showing exact changes in rainfall in the eastern mountains and their correlation to
local or global factors is lacking.
13
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preservation after 1961. On the one hand, the legacy of the colonial forest system posed
significant problems for the new administration. In general, the government maintained the large
forest reserves that had previously been under direct British control. However, as we have seen,
the colonial administration had also designated lineage forests in Uluguru as reserves under the
Native Authority. The authorities that protected these forests disappeared after independence,
first with the abolition of the Native Authority in 1963 and then through the weakening of
lineage control over land resulting from villagization and other socialist land policies. Moreover,
although colonial limitations on Africans’ rights to cut trees may have served to maintain forest
cover in select areas, they were also rightly resented by inhabitants of Uluguru as political
measures meant to appropriate resources from Africans and to weaken their opportunities for
economic gain. The placement of lineage groves under the control of the Native Authority
rendered these forests sites of political struggle where male lineage elders and the British had
fortified their alliances at the expense of other residents of the area. After independence, control
over these forests and their resources were implicated in attempts of youth and non-elites to
overturn colonial power structures. At the same time that these political shifts occurred,
economic change put further pressure on forest resources. In the eyes of the new government,
forests were seen as a form of capital and were considered in terms of their value for a vision of
development geared toward commodity production and industrialization (Nyerere 1968: 16, see
also Chapter 4). As efforts to bring development and industrialization accelerated after
independence, demand for timber grew rapidly. Political and economic pressure converged on
those forests outside of direct government control and rapid forest loss in some parts of Uluguru
ensued (Fr. Philipe Neri Mkude, personal communication, December 10, 2018). While many in
Mkuyuni still saw forests as spaces where generations were connected and fertility ensured, this
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view became less and less legible in the economic and political order of the post-independence
state.
When I returned to speak to Mzee Sipriani and Deodat a few weeks after our first
conversation, Mzee Sipriani told me that when he moved to the area at the time of villagization,
there had been more forest, but the trees had all been cut down. As a result, he said, the climate
had changed. “We moved the rain. And now the rivers are drying up because the trees were cut.
There is just great damage [hasara]. There is great damage from cutting the trees.” Deodat
agreed. The only solution, they said, was to replant trees, but people were not doing so. They
hoped the government would provide seedlings for planting. Then, the forest could return and
with it, the rains (Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko and Deodat Gaspar Kunambi, interview, October
22, 2018). As Chapter 4 discusses in more detail, people in Mkuyuni often depict declining
rainfall as the result of local deforestation. The government, from colonial times to the present,
has repeated this message to local farmers, hoping to motivate populations to plant and preserve
trees. However, workshops, meetings, and fliers aimed at spreading this message have proven
less effective than the lineage institutions that once guarded critical groves. The loss of rain is
attributed both to the loss of moisture-producing tree cover and the simultaneous demise of
rainmaking practices. Nevertheless, the discourses of social healing have not disappeared.
One reason Mzee Sipriani and Deodat gave for the decline of matambiko is the lack of
lineage leadership as many youth today refuse to inherit names. However, they agreed that if the
spirit of the name selects someone, that person cannot refuse to inherit it. This apparent
contradiction marks out the terms of the gendered and generational debates over names. When a
name goes uninherited, the lineage members often say they are waiting for a potential heir to fall
ill. The right kind of illness, one that cannot be resolved by the hospital or standard herbal
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treatments, will indicate the name’s choice. On the other hand, if the wrong heir is selected, they
will fall ill. It is the ancestors, not any living member of the lineage, who have ultimate agency.
Mzee Sipriani told me that sometimes an heir has to wait until they develop problems to inherit
their name. The fact that names can be passed following illness if the transfer does not take place
following the previous holder’s death has given the institution of names some resilience in the
face of social change; although the names have not been passed down, the question of succession
is not closed but only deferred. Indeed, this deferral is often understood as coming at the behest
of spirits who, for reasons unclear to the living, are waiting for the right time to return.
Unclaimed Names and Struggles of Reproduction
The situation of Sugusugu’s uninherited name discussed at the beginning of this chapter,
is not unique in Mkuyuni. One of my closest interlocutors in Mkuyuni was a sharp woman in her
fifties named Mama Kimwe, who originally helped us during our household survey in Kivuma
Village. It was Mama Kimwe who had told me, “tradition is work” (see the Introduction). During
our conversations, Mama Kimwe often complained to me that when she falls ill, she has nowhere
to turn because the man who she believes should be the lineage head has refused to take on their
late uncle’s name. The lack of lineage support was frequently a source of distress and anger for
women. When I asked women in lineages with vacant names like Mama Kisangile and Mama
Kimwe why they hadn’t appointed a successor, they often told me they tried, but the potential
heirs had fled. When I asked these men, they rarely denied the accusation outright. Instead, many
told me that the last generation had held their names for an exceptionally long time and that the
next person to hold the name would die shortly after taking it. Some, like Sugusugu’s potential
heirs, said the previous holder of the name told them the name should sit unoccupied for a time
after their death. Younger men said they were too young, simply youth who could not take the
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names, which are said to be “heavy.” Older men, like Mama Kimwe’s uncle, said they were too
old. Many were waiting for someone to fall ill. The name would claim someone eventually and
when it did, the man who refused would grow sicker and ultimately die. The fact that they had
not was proof they had not, or at least not yet, been chosen.
When I began to ask about uninherited names, a few people mentioned to me that the
unclaimed names were being “stored” by the senior woman of the lineage, usually in a pot in her
house. The senior woman of the lineage was ideally responsible for safeguarding the name until
it could be passed on. This also meant housing the regalia, which are believed to be imbued with
power. While storing the name is not the same work as “ruling” it, the names and regalia are
“heavy,” even in storage. I asked one of the potential heirs of Sugusugu who was keeping the
name until an heir was chosen, and he told me Mama Kisangile had it in a pot. I returned to her
house and she confirmed she had the name in her house, but, she said, it was not in a pot, only in
a bag. Mama Kimwe, on the other hand, told me no one in her lineage was caring for the name.
“We are only youth (vijana),” she said. “We can’t carry it.” Descriptions of names as heavy were
common. For many women, then, men’s refusal to carry out their roles had shifted the burden of
certain kinds of reproductive labor onto them. However, women are not alone in shouldering this
burden. Certain elder men, including both those unqualified to inherit names and those who have
refused, have nevertheless taken on the role of acting lineage head. Indeed, Mama Kimwe’s
uncle, Rufezuwa, another one of my key interlocutors, was one such man. He used the lineage
name informally and took on a role of leadership in the family, although he declined to formally
inherit the name, claiming he was too old. However, without the name and its attendant spirit,
both the powers and the obligations of such men are limited. The situation is thus not one of total
abandonment, but rather one of renegotiation between genders and generations.
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Why are men refusing to inherit lineage names? With the loss of lineage land, and
therefore of the resources received through land rent and lineage labor, there is not only a lack of
economic motivation to take on the role of lineage leader but indeed, an absence of the very
resources needed to carry out the role’s functions. In addition to the material aid lineage
members expect during times of hardship, the carrying out of matambiko requires significant
amounts of food and grains for beer. Name-holders are also expected to provide some form of
payment to clan heads and to Kingalu or Kolero for matambiko. Previously, lineage members
provided labor on a lineage farm where such resources were produced but with the shift toward
individual land tenure, such farms are now rare.
Beyond this, changing relationships to space have also made it difficult for men to accept
lineage names. This topic arose one particularly hot day in December 2018, when I stopped at a
small stand on the main road above the market. There, in late afternoons, older men gather to sip
small, steaming cups of hot coffee and to exchange news. As we chatted that day, I brought up
the topic of ancestral names, which had come up in several recent interviews. One man, Juma
Jikwaya, said he himself held such a name. Originally from a nearby hamlet, he was then living
and working in Kilosa, about a three-hour trip to the west. He said when he had first been
selected to inherit his name, he resisted because he knew it would be “work.” He fled to Kilosa,
but once there, he became very sick and realized he would not recover until he returned home
and accepted the name. Although he still lives and works in Kilosa, where larger farms are
available, he must make frequent trips home to attend to the work of his name—helping heal sick
lineage members, resolving disputes in the family, carrying out lineage matambiko rituals, and
overseeing the production of lineage medicines. His work in Kilosa provides cash income, but
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the work he must do in Uluguru is necessary for his health and the flourishing of his family (J.
Jikwaya, personal communication, December 12, 2018).
Limitations on mobility were one of the main reasons men avoided inheriting names.
Pels, conducting research in Matombo in the late 1980s, observed the same and was told that
lineage heads could not be absent from their lands for periods long than one week (Pels 1999:
163n7). During my time in Mkuyuni, the rules were considerably less rigid but the requirement
to be present in the lineage area still stood in direct tension with the need to spend periods of
time living away from the area to earn cash. Even the last succession of the name Kingalu was
contentious because the heir was residing in Morogoro town at the time he assumed the name.
He reached a compromise of part-time residence in his ancestral village of Kinole, but some in
Mkuyuni doubt his efficacy as a rainmaker in part because of his absence from the area (see
Chapter 4).
As we have seen, not all lineages have been able to strike a compromise such as that
navigated by Juma Jikwaya or Kingalu, who move between the mountains and other areas as
they balance conflicting demands on their time. In some cases, the problem is manifested in the
refusal of qualified heirs to take lineage names. For those lineages, resolution has been deferred
as lineage members wait for the name to afflict its chosen heir. In other cases, however, a more
difficult problem has arisen—some lineage names have been conferred upon heirs only to have
the name-holder move away taking their name and regalia with them. In theory, illness caused by
the angry mzimu should drive them back to their homes, but in practice, this does not always
seem to be the case. Lineage members are left to wait, uncertain whether the name is still being
cared for and whether their mjomba will ever return and resume his role.
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One of the most powerful lineages in Changa found themselves in this position when, as
mentioned briefly above, their uncle sold their lineage lands to outsiders and absconded to
another part of the country with the money. However, land was not all he sold. He also sold the
sacred lineage regalia, including the three-legged stool that symbolizes lineage power. As one
relative remarked, “he sold mila” (S. M. Ngalawa, personal communication, December 24,
2018). Lineage regalia, imbued with spiritual energy and bound to the lineage name, is essential
for practices of matambiko and the making of lineage medicines. However, a global market for
such artifacts also rendered them commodities. Today, Luguru stools appear on auction websites
for European and American art collectors. 15 The sale of these items and the disappearance of the
nameholder from the area made it difficult for the lineage in Changa to continue matambiko,
even though the new owner of their former lineage lands has agreed to permit them to visit their
ancestral shrines for ritual purposes. Lineage leaders at the time of my research were in the
process of selecting a new heir for the lineage name, but without the regalia and direct control of
the land, his abilities to bring rain and health remained uncertain.
Although some men, like this lineage head, chose to leave behind their lineage
obligations in favor of new economic opportunities, many more expressed ambivalence and
feelings of loss as they struggled to balance demands placed on them by family. Deodat’s
nostalgic description of the medicine that allowed a man to take his wife’s pregnancy illustrates
eloquently not only the shifting of reproductive labor onto women within the household but also
many men’s feelings of powerlessness and loss at this change. Carrying the next generation into
existence is the most literal and visceral manifestation of reproductive labor and the sense that
men could previously share this burden, at least temporarily, is significant. For men like Deodat,

15

Chapter 4 discusses the return of one such stool to Kingalu in 2019.
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the inability to help women in their families in the work of social reproduction is seen not as a
refusal nor as a natural division of labor but as a loss with a recent history, rooted in the demise
of medicinal knowledge, the lack of lineage land, and the destruction of sacred places. As a
result, women must now bear the burden of carrying children alone. While this medicine is the
most literal example of the relationship between the loss of knowledge and lineage institutions
and the reconfiguration of household labor, it resonates with many other stories I heard in
Mkuyuni. Without the knowledge, land, and resources of their ancestors, men today find
themselves unable to provide the kinds of support their wives, daughters, sisters, and nieces
expect. Even Deodat, who did inherit a name, is not able to do what his uncles and grandfathers
once did for their families, a fact he regrets but cannot control.
When asked why men no longer inherited ancestral names, many responded like Mzee
Sipriani and Deodat in pointing to a generational rupture. Older people would complain that
youth, especially young men, were disrespecting and abandoning tradition, to the detriment of
their communities. In turn, young men would state that they liked tradition and wanted to follow
it but complained that their elders failed to pass on the knowledge they needed to take part.
Indeed, while girls’ initiation ceremonies continue in various forms, boys’ initiations have
largely disappeared from Mkuyuni. These initiation ceremonies were the venue for instruction in
Luguru ethics (maadili), part of the esoteric knowledge that underpin ideas of Luguru tradition
(see the Introduction). Changes in land tenure and the growth of the cash economy following
liberalization have given young men unprecedented independence from their fathers and uncles
alike. For women, who have fewer routes to economic independence and greater access to
traditional knowledge, generational conflicts are less pronounced. However, among men, the
question of responsibility for remembering and transmitting cultural knowledge and carrying out
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traditions like matambiko—particular kinds of reproductive labor—is a site of conflict between
elders and youth.
Importantly, within this generational tension, there is also an ambiguity: who is an elder
and who is a youth often unclear. Even Deodat and Mzee Sipriani, when describing why mila
was no longer being carried out, alternated between blaming youth’s disrespect of tradition and
their own elders’ failure to pass on their knowledge. There are two related reasons for this
ambiguity. One is that the definition of elders was once linked closely to the inheritance of
ranked names and initiation into the society of elders that came with it. Many in Mkuyuni at the
time of my research believed life expectancies in the past were higher, and people well into their
sixties frequently referred to themselves as “vijana,” a word usually translated as “youth.” Many
did not see themselves as elders because they lacked the knowledge that comes with being an
elder. This reasoning is, on the surface, tautological, but it is grounded in a real loss of
knowledge which has changed the significance of aging in the mountains. This ambiguous nature
of the boundary between youth and elders is also rooted in the specific history of today’s older
generations; they were youth at the time of villagization, and many were deeply invested in the
socialist project, including its rejection of many things associated with mila. Many, like Mzee
Sipriani, vacillate between attributing the end of practices like matambiko to the prior generation
of elders for failing to teach them the necessary knowledge to carry out mila and their own
children for failing to respect mila. This ambivalence, expressed through indeterminate
narratives of cultural loss, reflects the ambiguity of the aborted socialist project, at once a
success and a failure, a site of potential and of loss, but above all, a moment of radical rupture.
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Social Reproduction in the Village
Villagization upended institutions of social reproduction and opened gendered and
generational rifts over reproductive labor. However, most of those I spoke to in Mkuyuni about
villagization told me that despite their initial resistance, resettlement had been good. For
example, when I asked Juma Mange, who was a child in 1974, how people felt about
villagization, he recalled that most were very angry. The government was demolishing homes (J.
Mange, interview, December 13, 2018). He paused in his explanation, then added, “but it was a
very good thing.” People could get services, he said, and schools and clinics were built in the
villages. Most of those I asked gave similar answers. As I mentioned above, the residents of
Mkuyuni who praised villagization named two major advantages of life in the new villages. The
first was the social services the village provided. Villagization was accompanied by the building
of schools, hospitals, wells, and water taps. Indeed, the construction of schools and hospitals was
a key component of, and justification for, villagization. Schools and hospitals were the main
contributions of the socialist state to social reproduction, providing particular forms of healthcare
and education, and they remain highly significant resources for Tanzanians today.
The second advantage to living in the village I heard many times was a general
enjoyment of living close to one’s neighbors. I was frequently told that if someone fell sick in the
middle of the night, help was now available, and that in general, people were happy to live near
one another. These new forms of social life, which traverse lineage, are valued, especially by
women who socialize with neighbors while they carry out domestic work. Although villagization
failed to transform agricultural labor into a collective endeavor, at least in the long term, it seems
to have succeeded in transforming certain kinds of reproductive labor, including housework and
particular types of care. Hospital medicines may not have fully filled the void left by the decline
in lineage healing, but the community of the village has provided a new kind of social solidarity
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in times of sudden illness or other emergencies, when neighbors could be summoned for help.
Silvia Federici (2019) has written about the importance of collectivized domestic work as a site
of solidarity that resists the forces of neoliberal capitalism. While the village did not fully replace
the extended family as the architects of Ujamaa once hoped it would, it did provide new forms of
sociality and reconfigured the reproductive labor of mutual care in meaningful ways.
However, as the gendered and generational conflicts described here show, the new
schools, hospitals, and informal communities of neighbors that emerged in the villages still left
many holes in fabric of social reproduction. Formal education and access to biomedical treatment
did not fully replace the forms of education and healing that were disturbed by the erosion of the
lineage system, nor have the new water pipes and wells replaced the natural springs and streams
that feed crops and make life possible in the mountains and downstream. Concerns about the loss
of traditional knowledge suggest that formal schooling has not adequately replaced all that was
disrupted when lineage institutions were dismantled. Likewise, women’s complaints about the
lack of lineage support during illness reveal gaps in healing that the local hospital cannot fill.
Hospitals, many acknowledge, are excellent for treating particular diseases, but they are helpless
in the face of afflictions related to spirits, witchcraft, and family relations. Village institutions
also do not address ecological practices like rainmaking and the maintenance of sacred groves. 16
In dismantling the land tenure system that served as the basis for social reproduction in the past,
villagization interrupted more than it replaced. As the subsequent chapters show in more detail,

A few villages in Uluguru do manage traditional forests, but this was not the case in Mkuyuni Ward. Changa
village has been involved in the management of the adjacent Kimboza Forest Reserve through a Joint Forest
Management (JFM) program, but ownership and ultimate control of the forest lies with the central state (see Chapter
4). The number of government-recognized traditional forests in Uluguru is negligible in comparison to the number
of lineages who currently or previously maintained sacred groves.
16
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liberalization added increasing pressures on households, stretching the holes in the fabric still
wider.
Nyerere described the village as replacing the extended family, a new institution for
collective governance that would draw on longstanding traditions of collectivity and democracy
while rooting out entrenched forms of patriarchy and dispelling the threat of ethnic violence.
However, the description of the village as a family obscured a fundamental difference; as
Nyerere’s own writings make clear, Tanzanian socialism was oriented toward increased
productivity, measured in terms set by the global economy (Coulson 2013, 283; Nyerere 1968,
106–144). Although the socialist state was committed to improvements in education, healthcare,
and the standards of living of rural people, it saw village management of land predominantly as a
mechanism to facilitate the development of capital-intensive agriculture. In this way, the socialist
project replicated rather than overcame the contradictions between accumulation and
reproduction that characterize capitalism. The forms of social reproduction prioritized under
socialism—Western-style schooling and medicine—were narrowly conceived and largely
delinked from the land. Villages were set up to manage land for development, not to maintain the
ancestral graves and sacred groves that had long been central to matambiko practices of healing
lineages and their lands. This was left to lineage institutions, but without control of the land,
these institutions began to disappear.
It is likely that villagization would not have been as successful in disrupting existing
lineage-based institutions if at least some residents had not wanted it to. This was especially the
case for the generation of youth at the time of independence, who joined TANU, fought for
independence, and worked to build a different future for the Uluguru. Schools and hospitals
represented for many the foundations of the kind of progress they desired for their communities.
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The modern education provided by government schools was geared not only toward producing
workers but to cultivating and participating in new, worldly subjectivities, while the hospitals
gave patients access to the kind of powerful, allopathic medicines used in wealthy countries.
Moreover, as subsequent chapters show, while some in Mkuyuni have called for a return to the
lineage, others resent the past tyranny of their uncles, and others still believe the matrilineal
system is counter to development or God or both. Nevertheless, anxiety at the decline of
initiation rituals and worries about the loss of herbal and lineage medicines, as well as the need
for waganga to address afflictions the hospital cannot treat, suggest that existing state-sponsored
forms of social service failed to adequately provide for social reproduction in all its prior
richness.
Conclusion
While the processes by which capitalism cleaves social reproduction from production are
widely discussed in feminist literature, there is significantly less work on the way socialist
policies impact this process (Croll 1981). However, in Uluguru, continuing tensions over
reproductive labor can be traced back to the moment of villagization. As we have seen, the
socialist state was not blind to the need for social reproduction in its new villages. Indeed, the
construction of schools and hospitals was a key component of villagization and one of the main
justifications given for the resettlement program. However, as the gendered and generational
conflicts described here show, these services have left many holes in the fabric of social
reproduction, from the more immediate questions of housework to matters of tradition and
remembering and ecological practices like rainmaking matambiko and the maintenance of sacred
groves and forests. The authorities who implemented villagization largely failed to grasp the
richness and complexity of social reproduction and its linkages to land. Instead, land was
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primarily seen in terms of its capacity to produce commodities for the market. Social
reproduction was envisioned as the process of producing modern workers and citizens for the
new nation and its productive economy, the growth of which, in turn, would raise standards of
living. This thin understanding of social reproduction has proven inadequate to meet the complex
and interconnected needs of those in Uluguru, as ongoing gendered and generational tensions
attest.
Many scholars who have written of villagization and its shortcomings have focused on
the government’s lack of understanding of local conditions and its dismissal of local knowledge
(Coulson 1975, 1977; Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003; Scott 1998). This is certainly true of the
administration’s understanding of social reproduction, which failed to account for the thick web
of connections between kinship, health, and the environment. Scott’s (1998) famous chapter on
villagization has drawn attention to the phenomenological differences between the perspective of
“the state” and peasants and its role in the project’s failures. However, in contrast to Scott, my
conversations in Mkuyuni pointed not so much to attempts by the state to render rural
populations legible but rather to the efforts by several groups to build a radical and “modern”
future for Tanzania. One such group was the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie,” who vacillated between
their own class interests and commitments to the ideology of Ujamaa. Another was the youth of
TANU who wished to break the power of their elders and the social and economic stagnation
imposed by decades of colonial rule through the construction of something radically new. Pels
found that the era of independence marked a generational rupture, “a period in which youngsters
could no longer be sufficiently controlled by elders in Luguru society” (1999: 150). Generational
and class divisions both inflected the project of villagization and shaped the struggles over social
reproduction that followed in its wake.
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It is important to note that the policies that undermined collective land holding enacted by
the socialist government in the 1960s and 1970s were aimed at decolonization and the rooting
out of undemocratic, ethnonationalist, and patriarchal forms of land control. Colonial policies,
which sought to limit individual land ownership and the sale of land by Africans, were rooted in
the logics of racism and imperialism and served to create racialized structures of inequality by
trapping “tribal” people on their lands and denying them economic access while their labor and
resources were exploited and extracted by colonial powers. Nor, as Nyerere (1968) pointed out,
were precolonial systems of land tenure egalitarian utopias or the unchanging, harmonious,
functional structures imagined in much of colonial ethnography. Rather, as Chapter 1 shows,
they were also sites of inequality, struggle, and violence. Both colonial land policies and the
invocation of precolonial systems have been powerful tools for denying coevalness of Africans,
especially rural Africans, and perpetuating their economic, political, and cultural marginalization
(J. Fabian 1983).
Tanzanian socialism sought to bring about radical change by uncoupling land from
lineage and dismantling the latter. As the case of Mkuyuni shows, this led to crises of social
reproduction. However, it would be a mistake to read this merely as a cautionary tale about the
dangers of making large scale change. To do so would be to condemn rural African communities
to conservatism and to deny the possibility for radical futures (Coronil 2001; Scott 1998). Many
residents of Mkuyuni fought for radical change following independence, and the future promised
by the socialist project, though never realized, remains a powerful source of meaning for many.
Rather, where TANU policies fell short was in adopting an understanding of social reproduction
as a mere means to an end. Schools and hospitals were welcomed but their lacunae can be felt in
the complaints of young men that they were never taught tradition (mila) or ethics (maadili), in
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the work of waganga who step in when hospital cures fail, and in anxieties of women like Mama
Kinsangile about the dissolution of rainmaking institutions. Had the newly villagized country of
Tanzania not been prized open by the forces of neoliberal capitalism so quickly, it is possible
that richer forms of social reproduction would have grown up in the cracks of the new villages,
filling in the holes left by bureaucratic shortsightedness. It is also possible that had villagization
been designed and led by rural people, especially women, the result might have been a more
robust and resilient form of community from the beginning, one that could have made room for
forms of social reproduction oriented not toward the calculus of the global market but to the
thick linkages between spirits, nature, and human flourishing.
In any case, the socialist project undertaken by Nyerere and TANU was cut short. Only a
few years after villagization, the requirement to live in villages was lifted. In the 1980s, Tanzania
was forced to liberalize its economy in accordance with structural adjustment (Mbilinyi 1990;
Lugalla 1995). The dream of collectivized land ownership and communal agricultural labor
faded as the market extended its grasp. These changes were coupled with others, like the rise of
new religious movements in both Islam and Christianity. Chapter 3, tracing conflicts over
funerals and memorials in contemporary Uluguru, begins to explore these shifts, which occupy
the remainder of the text. Where villagization was implemented almost overnight, neoliberalism
and its attendant ruptures happened slowly in Tanzania, spreading piecemeal and transforming
the political and economic landscape in fragmented but significant ways. However, as the
subsequent chapters also show, the embers of socialism and of the lineage system that preceded
it, continue to burn, providing alternative modes of politics that, again and again, serve to
challenge the new order.
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CHAPTER 3
ISLAM, FUNERALS, AND THE UNGROUNDING OF SACRED SPACE

Storms in Uluguru tend to strike at night. During the fitful short rains, I would sometimes
be awakened by a clap of thunder that seemed to shake my entire house. Through the cacophony,
my ears would often catch the faint pop of my circuit breaker and I would watch helplessly as
my small fan whined to a halt. Even with ceilings, the corrugated metal roof amplified the
downpour to a deafening roar. In both 2017 and 2018, the short rains came early and even more
intensely that usual, miring northeastern Uluguru in a thick layer of mud and rendering even the
main road nearly impassable.
On the morning of October 25, 2018, I awoke after such a night to a text from Gerald
informing me that he would be late. The vehicle he was in was stuck in the mud, a regular
occurrence in rainy months. We had arranged that day to meet with a group of older women in
Ludewa Village, high up the mountain behind Mkuyuni. When Gerald finally arrived, we were
almost two hours behind schedule. I asked our regular motorcycle drivers to take us to Ludewa,
but they refused. The roads were too muddy, they said, and it wouldn’t be possible to get there.
Thinking of the women who had already given up the chance to work their farms that day
waiting for us, I persisted and eventually found two young, foolhardy drivers who agreed to try
to make the trip.
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As we struggled eastward through the muck, I noticed an unusual number of people
walking in the same direction, and quickly learned they were headed to a funeral. During the
early part of my research, I had hesitated to attend funerals of those I did not know personally,
fearing that my presence would appear disrespectful and distracting. I was never explicitly
invited. However, I gradually came to understand that my presence would be welcome. Funerals
in Uluguru are extremely well-attended; I never saw a funeral with fewer than a hundred in
attendance and sometimes saw crowds exceeding five hundred mourners. Even so, I often failed
to learn about funerals until after they were over, since they tended to occur on very short notice
after a death. On this day, the funeral-goers appeared particularly numerous, wading through the
muck in flipflops as we lurched past them.
Perhaps the tenth time I had to jump off the motorcycle so the driver could maneuver
through a particularly waterlogged patch of road, I realized we would not make it up the
mountain. The road so far was relatively flat in most areas, but after the turnoff to Ludewa, I
knew, it climbed so steeply that motorcycles making the trip seemed to defy physics even in the
best of weather. Even if we maintained our current pace and didn’t get into an accident on the
harrowing slopes, we wouldn’t arrive until well into the afternoon. I reluctantly called the village
officer who had helped us coordinate the meeting to send our apologies. I gave Gerald cash for
the drivers and sent them and him back to the bus stand so he could at least get an early start on
what would likely be an arduous return trip to town. Deciding to make the most of what was
beginning to feel like a wasted day, I set out for the funeral, following the small groups of men
and women walking west. At the far back corner of Mkuyuni overlooking the Mbezi River, we

178

arrived. I quickly donned a kanga 1 over my muddy jeans and wrapped my hair clumsily under a
scarf before approaching. 2
The funeral was carried out in the open space between several small brick buildings
clustered on the hill above the road, houses belonging to the deceased and his relatives. Several
hundred people were already there, talking in small groups and waiting for the ceremony to
begin. Women sat crouched along the higher buildings and sprawled up the slope, teetering on
rocks because the ground was still far too wet for sitting. The men sat or milled around the space
below. Various community and religious leaders could be seen moving through the crowd to
attend to logistical matters. A few women busily toted water and food to the corner where others
stirred giant pots of ugali 3 over wood fires. Close family members could be heard in one of the
houses, the women wailing loudly. More distant relatives and neighbors darted in and out of the
buildings, tending to the needs of family and guests. I spotted an older woman I had come to
know well during my research, Mama Kesse, among the women sitting on the rocks further up
the slope and happily joined her. She informed me that the man who had died had been
prominent in the community and had left behind two wives.
After a time, a group of women began to gather in one corner, slowly forming a circle.
Quietly at first, but quickly growing, the sound of zikiri began to fill the yard. The Arabic term
dhikr, from which zikiri emerged, refers to the repetition of devotional phrases, often the names
of God. In Uluguru, zikiri refers to a collective vocal practice done at funerals and memorial
services as well as at Sufi gatherings called ziara and at the Islamicized versions of girls’

A wrap-around skirt worn by most rural Tanzanian women.
Muslim women in Mkuyuni vary widely in the extent to which they cover their hair. As a non-Muslim, I was not
expected to cover my hair in daily life, but it was required when participating in any Islamic events, including
Muslim funerals.
3
The main staple in Tanzania, a stiff porridge made of cornmeal, typically eaten with stewed vegetables, beans, fish
or meat.
1
2
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initiations (maulidi). The three Sufi orders (tariqa) of Mkuyuni each have their own style of
zikiri, but in each, participants form a circle or a series of concentric circles, which rotate slowly
or expand and contract around the center in time with the chant. Some participants create a
rhythm through breathy vocalizations, over which others recite melodic strands of religious text.
The performance can be done by men alone, by women alone, or by a mixed group, in which
case men typically make up the inner circles and women surround on the outside. Sometimes the
flag associated with the Sufi order is placed in the middle, although there was none this time.
I moved to the edge of the circle to observe the performance; I had heard zikiri many
times, but rarely seen it performed by only women. The women near me smiled and welcomed
me into the circle, indicating that I should join in. “Why are you out here? Get closer!” one
encouraged me, nudging me toward the center. As a non-Muslim and as someone with limited
skills as a vocalist, I was always hesitant to join zikiri, but I had learned at other events and from
Sufi teachers in the area that my participation was not only permitted but enthusiastically
welcomed. So, to the smiles of the women around me, I did my best, training my lungs to the
rhythm.
After around half an hour, the zikiri ended without ceremony and I returned to my seat. A
group of men were huddled near one of the buildings. Mama Kesse informed me that they were
discussing the costs of the funeral and the immediate financial needs of the family, for which
money was being collected. Eventually, a group of men entered the house where the close female
relatives sat wailing, and emerged with the narrow wooden casket, draped in fabric. A quiet fell
over the funeral. Everyone stood. Around fifteen men assembled behind the coffin, including the
imam from the main Friday mosque in Mkuyuni and the village chairman. One of the men led
the others in a prayer, and then the entire crowded prayed together quietly. After a few minutes,
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the men lifted the casket and carried it away to be buried, while the women remained standing in
silence. After the men disappeared around the corner, we returned to small talk. Large metal
plates heaped with ugali and beans were distributed among the women, and then the men as they
returned.
After eating, the crowd dispersed to make the muddy walk home. As I began to leave,
Mama Kesse pressed a 200 shilling coin 4 into my hand, saying it was my payment.
“Payment for what?” I asked, taken aback.
“For zikiri,” she replied.
When I first learned about zikiri, it was from followers of one of the local branches of the
Qadariyya tariqa. I had a terrible cough and was met with a laugh by my interviewee, who told
me this too was a form of zikiri, the sound of the cough replicating the name of God (Idi Amri
Waziri, interview, September 1, 2018). I learned from him and other Sufi leaders that zikiri, like
other Sufi practices, was a path—a shortcut—to God (Sheikh Magoso bin Ahmedi, interview,
September 2, 2018). However, it was only after receiving this small token from Mama Kesse that
I grasped zikiri as a form of work, a form of reproductive labor like the work of healing,
remembering, and carrying out tradition discussed in Chapter 2. As I would come to understand,
those organizing funerals and hitima (memorials) would often hire a group of men to perform
zikiri for the deceased. In this case, for reasons I could not discover, these arrangements had not
been made, so the women present decided to perform zikiri themselves. If zikiri was a shortcut to
God, performing it at a funeral was like making a bridge over which the deceased could pass to
draw closer to God. Zikiri eased their journey in the afterlife and helped ensure their ultimate
arrival in paradise. Even for those in Mkuyuni, however, 200 shillings was more of a token than

4

Worth approximately ten cents, at the time
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a meaningful sum. It was out of care for the dead, not for this small coin, that most women
joined together in zikiri that day. This was the meaning of my participation, formally
acknowledged by the coin Mama Kesse handed me. I doubt I would have received payment had
she not claimed it for me when she collected her own share. But still, I felt moved. I had helped
the newly deceased man find his way.
*

*

*

When I finally made the trip to meet the women of Ludewa the following week, the roads
had dried and we made the steep trek with little trouble. When we arrived, we found seven
women waiting for us in a small room of the half-built government dispensary. Chairs were
gathered from all corners of the building, and we apologized again for the cancelation of the
prior week. The women were understanding and still eager to talk to us about local history. 5 We
started, as usual, by gathering some demographic data. None of the women knew what year they
were born, but we estimated based on their ages at key events, finding the oldest among them
born in the 1930s, and the youngest in the 1950s. Then we launched into a discussion of local
history. They eagerly told us about the failed terracing scheme and the rise of TANU as well as
the events of villagization, and we recorded a song they recalled from their time in TANU
Youth. Toward the end of our conversation, I asked whether there had been any change in
religion in their lifetimes. No, they agreed. What about Ansar Sunna, I asked, referring to the
Islamic reform movement that had spread in Tanzania since the 1980s. Had that brought any
changes?

Mwanaisha Chande, Zaina Juma, Amina Mbega, Tausi Mbega, Asha Ally, Hadija Ramadhani, Asia Selemani
Mfomi, and Aziza Ramadhani Shomari, interview, October 31, 2018
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Suddenly, the echoey room sprang to life. Apparently, in the days leading up to our visit,
there had been heated controversy in the village. It had started some time back, when the local
shehe 6 passed away. His son had returned to the village and assumed leadership of the mosque as
an Islamic teacher. Recently, however, he had conducted a funeral for a child who had died, a
close relative of one of the women in our interview. At the funeral, the child was bathed and the
teacher was called to pray, but he refused, saying they should proceed straight to the burial. At
the grave, he was once again asked to lead prayers, but again refused and simply buried the body
and left. These actions shocked and outraged many in the community. Moreover, the woman told
us, relatives of this teacher had recently wanted to visit the grave of their mother to clean the
grave site and offer prayer, a practice known by the verb -zulu. They asked the teacher to lead
this visit, a common practice among Sufi Muslims in Uluguru, but he had refused. Beyond these
complaints, the women told us, he had refused to participate in girls’ initiations and although he
did attend memorials (hitima), he refused to take part in the shared meal. What’s more, he had
misled the community about the day of Eid, following a date that diverged by one day from the
official announcement by Bakwata, Tanzania’s main Muslim organization. Although the man
had never stated that he had joined Ansar Sunna or any other religious movement that would
represent a break with his father’s Sufi traditions, these differing practices caused the women to
speculate that he had become a “muhabia” and members of the mosque had held a meeting
earlier that week to express their concerns.
The term muhabia is a Swahilization of Wahhabi, a term that has become widespread in
Tanzania, as elsewhere, and which serves as a slightly pejorative exonym for followers of the
Islamic reform movement. This movement, which in Tanzania most often calls itself Ansar

6

The leader of a tariqa (Sufi order). Shehe (pl. mashehe) is derived from the Arabic term sheikh.
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Sunna, has been spreading in rural regions, especially in predominantly Muslim areas, since the
1980s and 1990s (Becker 2008: 241–275). In some parts of Tanzania, the term Ansar Sunna
refers to a specific movement or organization within a larger field of Islamic reform, but in
Uluguru, these boundaries were often blurred by reformists and non-reformists alike and I follow
my interlocutors in using it as a general term (cf. Gilsaa 2015). The term “reformist,” in turn, has
been used by Becker (2008) and others to highlight the religious goals upon which this
movement is based and which it shares with a global set of movements and organizations across
the Muslim world. In Tanzania, as elsewhere, reformist Muslims have sought to spread a
conservative and largely literalist reading of Islamic law and to eliminate practices and beliefs
they deem un-Islamic. Initially dominated by young men, the movement posed a radical
challenge to established forms of religious authority. As a result, Ansar Sunna’s arrival in rural
Muslim communities has often been accompanied by controversy and clashes over several key
issues: control of mosques, the practice of Sufi rituals, and the date of Eid. When I asked about
tensions around this movement in Mkuyuni, the topic that most consistently arose and that
sparked the greatest emotion was the reformists’ rejection of funeral and memorial prayers and
other practices of care for the dead, including zikiri (cf. Becker 2009).
These two incidents, linked in my experience through a chance rainstorm, help highlight
the stakes of struggles over funerals and memorials in Mkuyuni. While religious relationships
were largely amicable, at least in public, heated clashes over relationships to and care for the
dead were an exception. The subject came up frequently in my interviews and conversations. As
Chapter 2 argued, relationships with the dead lie at the heart of social reproduction. Zikiri,
performed at funerals and memorials, is a matter of kinship, relationships between generations,
and social healing, that nexus of politics, health, fertility, and ecology that has shaped life in the

184

catchment since the eighteenth century. Today, new political and economic configurations
wrought by liberalization have led to new struggles over the terms of social healing. In this
chapter, I argue that these changes have been marked by a partial ungrounding of social
reproduction as cash has come to outweigh land as the material basis of life. New forms of Islam
must be understood in this context, where they serve as sites for the renegotiation of
relationships—to authority, to elders, and between men and women.
Changing trends in Islam have coincided with economic liberalization across the Muslim
world. Samir Amin (1990) considered “Islamic fundamentalism” as an attempt to grapple with
the continued economic and political marginalization of the Global South, although one he
suggested would ultimately fail to bring meaningful change to the structures of neocolonialism.
More recently, scholars such as Daromir Rudnyckyj (2009) and Filippo and Caroline Osella
(2009) have discussed how Islamic reform movements have been deployed by emerging
managerial classes in Indonesia and India (see also Adas 2006; Hassan 2009; Sloane 1998).
Feminist anthropologists have also considered the ways in which Islam has served to mediate
changing gender roles under neoliberalism (Bernal 1994; Masquelier 2008; Ong 1987). As these
works show, the content of Islamic reform and its connection to economic change have varied
significantly across disparate contexts. Nevertheless, it is clear that the history of contemporary
Islamic reform since the 1970s cannot be understood apart from the emergence of a neoliberal
world order. In this context, religion has served as a key site for theorizing and navigating
changing relationships to work, land, and money—relationships always bound up with questions
of social reproduction.
As past chapters have shown, the framework social reproduction brings together
questions of politics, gender, and the environment. In Uluguru, relationships to ancestors and
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graves cannot be understood apart from the long history of rainmaking and matambiko which
link the dead with ecological and agricultural fertility and human flourishing. In this way, they
are also bound up with gendered and generational conflicts over reproductive labor. However, as
social reproduction has become increasingly delinked from land and as the weather in the
mountains appears increasingly unpredictable, relationships to place and the environment are in
flux. Conflicts over funerals are also sites in which these changes are theorized and debated. In
short, challenges to practices like zikiri are calls to reorganize relationships to kin and to the land.
They mark shifting ideas about which authorities are legitimate and what obligations come with
political power, and they have significant implications for relationships between genders and
generations. They are also inseparable from questions of rain.
Space and Politics in the Tariqa
Contemporary conflicts over ritual practice and care for the dead must be understood in
relation to Tanzanian Sufism’s complex relationships to space and to the nation. As Chapter 1
discussed, the tariqa arrived in Uluguru in the late 1920s and grew rapidly over the subsequent
decades, prompting both large numbers of conversions to Islam and an increased religiosity
among Muslims in the region. While Islam was already present in northeastern Uluguru since the
time of Kingalu Mwanashaa in the mid-nineteenth century, it was originally associated with elite
families and individuals as an index of coastal ties and participation in larger networks of trade.
Because Islam served as a status marker, most early Muslims in the region had little interest in
proselytization, preferring to keep their affiliation exclusive. Some non-elites also sought to
affiliate themselves with Islam, but they had relatively little access to religious education (Becker
2008: 25–52). The arrival of the Sufi order (tariqa) radically changed Islam in Uluguru from a
marker of political and economic distinction to a shared source of identity and community.
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Moreover, as we have seen, its growth was heavily correlated with the rise of cash cropping and
changes in land tenure, especially as more families migrated from higher elevations to relatively
sparsely populated valleys like Mkuyuni. The tariqa provided an alternative space of community
for those living far from their matrilineages and extended families.
Sufism has often been important to the geographical expansion of Islam, in part because
it offers space to negotiate between non-Islamic and Islamic forms of ritual practice (Ho 2006;
Werbner 2003). In Uluguru, Sufism arrived to the rich social fabric of ritual and tradition known
in Swahili as mila. As we have seen, there were several central components of mila. First,
matambiko rituals allowed the living to seek healing for their families and for the land through
reconciliation with their ancestors. Matambiko rituals involved brewing traditional beer, visiting
and tending to graves and other sacred sites, and reciting the names of ancestors. The most
significant forms of matambiko were the rainmaking rituals performed annually and during times
of drought. Alongside matambiko, initiation ceremonies for girls and boys and initiations into the
society of elders served as spaces where secret knowledge and ethics were maintained and
shared. However, as Chapter 1 showed, the landscape of mila was not a static or timeless entity
but contained striations which reveal histories of migration, conquest, and political struggle.
When the tariqa emerged in the mountains, they brought additional layers to this complex and
contested formation, adding to and shifting the topography of ritual, religion, and spirits.
Aspects of Sufi practice resonated with existing forms of mila but there were also
important points of divergence. Sufi rituals around the world often focus on visiting, tending to,
and praying at graves—those of the Sufi teachers (walimu) and saints (wali) who have died.
These figures form a genealogy which followers can recite, linking present followers of the
tariqa to Muhammad through a chain of personal connections (Ho 2006; Werbner 2003). These
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genealogies also trace the path of secret knowledge, which is relayed directly from teacher to
student. However, unlike lineage names recited during matambiko, tariqa genealogies are
patrilineal, not matrilineal, flowing directly from (male) teacher to student. The position of shehe
itself passes down along these lines, based on knowledge and leadership in the tariqa. In
practice, this has often meant the title remaining within families, moving from father to son,
although direct kinship is not required for succession. Knowledge in this system is also more
centralized, personified in the figure of the shehe. In mila, while male lineage heads had come to
exercise important ritual roles, knowledge was more diffuse, spread among elders of both
genders.
These spaces of convergence and difference became spaces of creative tension in the
lives of the residents of Mkuyuni, offering possibilities to renegotiate ritual practice, authority,
knowledge, and relationships to the dead. They also marked another step in the marginalization
of women. Although women were and are included in the tariqa of Uluguru, and perform zikiri,
they cannot become a shehe. Women can only serve as Islamic teachers to other women and girls
and are excluded from the higher leadership structures of the tariqa. In Uluguru, where women
had long held positions of power, this change was perhaps the most significant one brought by
the tariqa. At the same time, as we have already seen, structures in which women did have
power, most notably the matrilineage, continued to exist alongside the Sufi orders, although in
forms weakened by long political struggle since the mid-nineteenth century. Also, importantly,
as Chapter 1 discussed, while some tariqa in East Africa did not allow women to become full
followers and to participate in zikiri, the orders which took hold in Uluguru all permitted
women’s participation (Nimtz 1980: 79). Women, it appears, continued to assert a significant
measure of control over the changing ritual landscape, even within the new Sufi orders.
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The tariqa also shifted and expanded ideas of sacred geography. Sacred geography is a
part of what Henri Lefebvre (1991) has described as the social construction of space. Pnina
Werbner, tracing the history of a global Sufi order, has argued the process of “sacralising” space
is fundamental to Sufism, and that practices of pilgrimage and of dhikr inscribe the sacred into
the landscape, expanding and reaffirming the boundaries of the Islamic world against an outside
associated with wilderness and with unbelievers (2003: 43). Yogesh Snehi (2019), in his
consideration of Sufi shrines in Punjab, also argues that tombs and their visitation are critical in
the production of social space in everyday life, one that is often enmeshed with political struggle
and conflict. Engseng Ho (2006) has written of the ways in which Hadrami genealogies and
graves mark pathways of migration and movement across the Indian Ocean. Through tombs and
genealogies, Hadrami Sufis mark a wide geography of connectivity shaped by centuries of
transoceanic trade. In Sufism, space and genealogy, geography, and history, are co-constitutive,
marking out paths of connection and circulation.
In Uluguru before the arrival of Islam, graves and other sacred sites associated with
ancestors wove kinship through the landscape, linking family to forests, water, and the
mountains themselves. At the same time, this grounded kinship was not only centripetal. It also
linked communities to networks of movement and connection. Uluguru’s sacred sites were
always understood to be part of a broad web of shrines, one that sent Luguru people to far-off
places and drew outsiders into the mountains in crossing and shifting paths of pilgrimage. This
landscape included shrines to other territorial mizimu like those at Kilombero, Rufiji, Nguru, and
Ukaguru, as well as the Kolero shrine that drew pilgrims from the lowlands of Uzaramo and
beyond to Uluguru. As we saw in Chapter 1, boundaries between lineage graves and territorial
shrines were blurry and shifted with the changing influence of lineages and their male heads. The
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map of Sufi tombs overlay this geography as practices of zikiri and zulu incorporated existing
family graves into Islamic geographies. At the same time, tariqa also expanded this web of
graves and connections in new directions oriented toward and across the Indian Ocean. Sufi
genealogies linked the teachers who arrived in Uluguru to lines of learning and knowledge that
stretched across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
In Changa Village, the tomb of Senei bin Jumaa is remarkable for its contrast to usual
Luguru graves. Senei bin Jumaa, introduced in Chapter 1 as the teacher who established one of
the major branches of Qadariyya in Uluguru, was not himself Mluguru and did not belong to a
clan or lineage in the mountain. Following his death in Changa in 1955, his followers
constructed a large building with concrete floors and walls and a metal roof, in the center of
which sits his raised, concrete tomb (Maulidi Tamim Tondolla, personal communication, August
30, 2018; Idi Amri Waziri, interview, September 1, 2018). This burial stands in stark contrast to
Luguru lineage graves in scared groves, areas associated with nature (pori) in which cutting and
settlement were prohibited. Considering the shehe’s tomb, it would be easy to suggest that
Sufism broke the link between ancestors and nature long maintained by mila, but the reality is
more complex. Islam, both within and beyond the tariqa, introduced new practices of burial and
the tending of graves which allowed for an increasing separation of graves from nature.
However, most Muslims in Uluguru are buried in places that continue to blur the lines between
settlement and wilderness. Sufi practices of visiting graves have also served to reinscribe and add
to the significance of these places even as lineages lost control of the land and as the large
lineage forests that once surrounded graves began to disappear. Links to the land were not
broken but reconfigured. Moreover, although Sufi teachers generally say that ancestors do not
have the power to bring rain, graves remain important sites for Sufi prayers, including those
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related to rain, creating space for reinterpretations of old connections between climate and the
ancestors; as graves found new signification, new conversations opened about who could bring
healing and who could bring rain.
As Chapter 1 showed, the tariqa grew rapidly in areas like Mkuyuni, both because of the
prior prominence of Islam, brought by influential figures like Kingalu, and because many in the
area were living away from their lineages and were drawn to the tariqa as alternative spaces of
community and learning. In the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme (ULUS), the tariqa aligned with
the nascent nationalist movement and with the family of Kingalu to oppose colonial intervention.
Although it is unclear what, if anything, tariqa leaders said about rainmaking during the
struggles over ULUS, the fact that critiques of ULUS invoked rainmaking suggest at least some
tolerance on the part of some tariqa leaders for Kingalu’s claims to rainmaking abilities. After
independence, however, the relationships among “customary” rulers like Kingalu, TANU, and
the tariqa became strained. The last chapter showed the fissures between Kingalu and TANU
wrought by the party’s attempts to weaken “customary” authorities and to prevent their control
of land. While Kingalu’s family remained aligned with TANU and its successor, CCM, until at
least 2013, active collaboration reached its zenith at the time of ULUS.
While the alliance between the customary “chief” and TANU was unusual, the
collaboration of the tariqa with the new nationalist movement was part of a larger pattern
throughout much of southern and eastern Tanganyika (Becker 2008: 209–240; Nimtz 1980).
Although much of TANU’s central leadership, including Nyerere, was Christian, the
independence movement was popular among Muslims, many of whom were particularly
resentful of British policies that disadvantaged Muslims in the Native Authority. Although there
was no official policy of favoring Christians, the workings of indirect rule ultimately relied upon
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skills such as literacy in the Latin alphabet, which were taught in mission schools (Becker 2008:
210–211). Most schools during the British colonial period were mission-run and Muslim parents
were often reluctant to send their children. As several men who remembered the colonial period
told me, these parents feared—not without reason—that the missions would baptize or convert
their children or feed them pork. 7 There were also fewer mission schools in general in Muslim
areas, with the nearest to Mkuyuni over ten kilometers away. In Mkuyuni, a government school
was eventually constructed, but only after several generations of Catholic students had been
educated at the mission in Matombo. As a result of such discrepancies, Christians tended to
advance more quickly through the Native Administration and to be granted higher positions of
authority. Muslim opposition to colonial rule was also fomented in the tariqa more specifically
by the administration’s suspicious and negative attitudes towards Sufism, including a 1933
circular hostile to zikiri that led the practice to be banned in some jurisdictions (though not in
Uluguru) (“Confidential Circular” 1933; Nimtz 1980: 81–83; see also Chapter 1). This circular
was also the result of the administration’s tendency to trust orthodox Sunni leadership, especially
Arab and Zanzibari authorities, over African mashehe (e.g. ibni Hajar, n.d.). As a result of these
tensions, African Muslims in general and followers of the tariqa in particular joined TANU in
large numbers in the 1950s.
After independence, the government prioritized harmonious relationships between
Muslims and Christians, but the educational and political marginalization of Muslims did not
come to an end. Indeed, Christians continued to be privileged in the post-independence
government, in part because the bureaucracy retained the basic shape of British governance and
continued to require skills for which mission education had already given Christians an upper
Uliza Suapanga, Mrisho Ramadhani, Hussein Nasoro, Abu Omari Jangama, Abdu Mohamed, and Ahmad Idi,
interview, October 18, 2018; Mango bin Mango, personal communication, January 3, 2019
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hand. Moreover, a lag between the nationalization of schools and the building of new schools in
underserved areas meant that communities with a history of missionary presence continued to
have greater opportunities for educational advancement. At the same time, the push toward
formal, secular education that occurred after independence marginalized not only traditional
forms of knowledge but also Quranic education, which—unlike the teachings of mission
schools—was not seen by the state as part of “modern” knowledge (Becker 2008: 235). As
Muslim disillusionment with TANU grew, older tensions also became more pronounced. In
particular, Muslim leaders’ transnational alliances through global Islam had always sat somewhat
uneasily alongside the nationalist vision of TANU, generating mutual distrust. After
independence, this tension began to boil over.
This came to a head in 1967, the year of the Arusha Declaration, with the formation of
the Baraza Kuu ya Waislamu Tanzania (the Central Muslim Council of Tanzania, commonly
known as Bakwata). The foundation of this new Islamic organization appears to have occurred at
the wishes of the government, although the exact circumstances of its inception remain
somewhat obscure (Becker 2008: 237–238; Nimtz 1980: 90). Bakwata took the place of the older
East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), but reframed this organization in national,
rather than regional terms. With the formation of Bakwata, EAMWS was banned and many of its
leaders were arrested or exiled. This abrupt change was the result of a growing view on the part
of the government that the internationally-oriented EAMWS was fundamentally incompatible
with the nationalist plan for development. In short, the banning of EAMWS and the formation of
Bakwata was an attempt by the government to formalize and co-opt Islamic leadership and
contain it within a national paradigm. However, while Bakwata did replace EAMWS, it never
replaced or ousted the more acephalous networks of mashehe, walimu and tariqa that connected
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the Muslim community across the mainland. While many mashehe joined Bakwata and enjoyed
leadership positions in the organization, other Muslims were more reluctant to accept the change
(Gilsaa 2015; Westerlund 1997). Especially in light of the continuing marginalization of
Muslims, the state’s attempt to manage Muslim civil society through Bakwata became a growing
source of resentment.
The socialist period of Tanzania officially ended in 1985, but the decline of the socialist
state had been in evidence by the late 1970s, when the requirement to live in planned villages
was revoked and ambitious development plans were scaled back due to economic and logistical
difficulties (Boesen et al. 1986; Lugalla 1995; Mbilinyi 1990). Over the 1980s and early 1990s,
many of the regulations of the socialist state were rolled back and many plans for development
were abandoned. After 1985, structural adjustment reduced social services and opened markets.
It was at this moment of liberalization that the movement known as Ansar Sunna first emerged in
Tanzania, growing in particular among young men who had migrated to urban areas in search of
economic opportunity (Becker 2008: 241–274). Ansar Sunna’s emergence was further bolstered
by the lifting of the de facto ban on Islamic civil organizations outside of Bakwata at this time;
beginning in the early 1980s, new Muslim organizations were able to officially register, creating
institutional space for those critical of Bakwata’s stances (Westerlund 1997: 319). However,
more than this institutional change, it was the larger set of social changes wrought by
liberalization that drove the movement’s growing popularity and influence.
Liberalization, Commercialization, Deagrarianization
Abdallah Ramadhani Kambi was raised by followers of the Qadariyya tariqa in Kinole
and Kibwaya, but as a young man, he left the mountains for Dar es Salaam, where he lived and
worked on and off for several decades (interview, November 5, 2018). In the early 1990s, he
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began to pay attention to debates happening in the Muslim communities in the city. He was
intrigued. Was it proper to follow dates announced by Muslim leadership in Saudi Arabia, the
center of the Muslim world, or were Tanzanian Muslims to follow the dates announced by
national leadership in Bakwata? As he began studying Islam more deeply to find the answers, he
discovered much of what he had been taught as religious practice was absent from the Quran,
including memorials for the dead and visitations to graves. Sometime around 1992, he aligned
himself with a group of Muslims who were calling for a return to Islam as they understood it to
be described in the Quran and the Sunna and who were oriented toward likeminded Islamic
leaders and teachers in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and around the world. Abdallah changed his
behavior, no longer going out dancing or pursuing women. He and the other Muslims like him
were called Ansar Sunna, although he preferred—and still prefers—to eschew the label, arguing
that Islam does not have denominations or divisions.
Eventually, Abdallah returned to the mountains, bringing these ideas of Islam with him.
He was not alone. Around 1980, a man known as Mwalimu Kudula had already moved back to
his home in Mkuyuni after studying Islam in Dar es Salaam and had begun spreading the
teachings of Islamic reform in the village. Over time, he was joined by other returnees from the
cities, including Abdallah and men like Abdul Hussein Matemelela, who had joined Ansar Sunna
in the mid-1980s in Singida, where he had a small business (interview, December 3, 2018). In
1994, a group of reformist Muslims, under the leadership of Mwalimu Kadula and with funding
from a benefactor in Oman, constructed a new mosque just off the main market in Mkuyuni
(Masawanga Ally, interview, August 23, 2018; Fazili Amiri, interview, January 3, 2019). Since
then, reformist Muslims have built mosques in several neighboring villages including Changa,
Kibwaya, and Mfumbwe.
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The arrival of Ansar Sunna in Uluguru corresponded with a period of rapid economic
change in Tanzania. As the last chapter showed, the socialist period had its biggest impact on
Uluguru through its reorganization of land tenure, especially in the program of forced
villagization, which ultimately served to weaken control over land by matrilineal lineages,
especially in areas with high numbers of people living away from their lineages, such as
Mkuyuni. Yet, almost as soon as these changes started, the socialist program began to unravel on
the national level. The requirement to live in villages was repealed only a few years after the
resettlements in Uluguru. The national economy was shattered by several concurrent crises; a
series of nationwide droughts, the collapse of the East African Community, war with Uganda,
and the global oil shocks all did serious damage to the socialist vision by the end of the 1970s.
On top of this, protectionism from industrialized countries and hostile treatment from institutions
of global finance combined with internal problems including poor rural-urban linkages and
bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption to push the country into a downward economic spiral
(Boesen et al. 1986: 21; Coulson 2013: 3; Edwards 2016: 360; Ponte 2003: 47). In 1979, the
International Monetary Fund began to demand policy changes including decreased state
spending and currency devaluation. The government of Tanzania refused and was met with
punitive measures including decreasing foreign aid, which coincided with rising global interest
rates. It became increasingly difficult for the government to resist outside pressures and to
continue to follow Nyerere’s socialist path. By 1984, imports had been liberalized, and in 1985,
Nyerere declined to run for reelection. His successor, Ali Hussein Mwinyi, soon agreed to
submit to a structural adjustment program and rapidly liberalized sectors of the economy amid
much political strife (Edwards 2016: 360; Lugalla 1995; Ponte 2003: 47).
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This process of liberalization had several major impacts on farmers in Uluguru but
perhaps most important was what Ponte (2003) has described as the “commercialisation of rural
life.” This commercialization was accompanied by “deagrarianization” as agricultural incomes
declined and need for cash increased (Bryceson 1996). During the socialist period, Tanzanian
farmers were subject to minimum acreage laws and other regulations, and sold their prices
through regional cooperatives, which in turn sold to national marketing boards (Ponte 2003: 41–
42). In Uluguru, however, the main cash crops had long been fruits and vegetables, which were
unregulated and sold through domestic markets. Likewise, minimum acreage laws had gone
largely unenforced in the area. Thus, some of the major changes brought to other regions by
liberalization were relatively unimportant in the mountains. However, farmers in Uluguru were
significantly impacted by the loss of input subsidies and rising input prices as well as crop price
volatility and overall declines in prices for food (Ponte 2003: 102–105). In addition, shortages of
consumer goods in the 1980s were quickly reversed, something many of my interlocutors
remembered well. With the availability of new items from abroad, the need for cash increased.
The introduction of cost sharing mechanisms in healthcare and education also increased needs
for currency (Lugalla 1995). One outcome in Uluguru was a shift from “slow” crops with only a
few harvests per year to “fast” crops with year-round yields. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
rice and maize production declined in Morogoro rural district, where Uluguru is located, while
tomato and coconut production rose (Ponte 2003: 113–131). 8 These shifts meant quicker access
to cash for farmers in the mountains, but significantly, they did not lead to an increase in farm
incomes, which fell significantly during the period.

The schema of “slow” and “fast” crops, proposed by Ponte (2003), indicates the period of time between harvests,
thus rendering coconuts “fast,” despite the longer initial growing period.
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Instead, to compensate for falling farm revenues, households depended increasingly on
non-farm activities, sparking a trend of “deagrarianizaiton” (Bryceson 1996). This was
particularly true for young men, who increasingly sought off-farm employment, including
opportunities for paid labor or starting small businesses in urban areas. Ponte’s household survey
in Morogoro rural district found that over half of children who left home between 1986 and 1995
were residing in urban areas, most of them young men. He also recorded that around a third of
households in 1995 were receiving regular remittances from relatives working elsewhere, up
from only 12.5% in 1986/87. At a time when farm incomes were declining relative to non-farm
incomes, young men’s ability to migrate to cities as well as their tendency to adapt more easily to
changing crop patterns when they did remain in farming gave them an unprecedented level of
economic independence from their elders (Ponte 2003: 156). As we have seen, prior generations
had also seen increasing levels of independence from their elders. In the 1960s and 1970s, young
members of TANU participated in dismantling the power of authority of lineage elders, in large
part by transferring control over land from elders to new villages (see Chapter 2). However, as
village institutions themselves lost power, control of land passed largely to individuals. The
matrilineal system did not return, and the former youth of the independence period now were
themselves parents of adult children over whom they had little control through kinship, finances,
or state bureaucracy.
It was the sons of these former TANU Youth and their agemates who traveled to Dar es
Salaam and other urban centers and among whom Islamic reform took hold in the wake of
liberalization. This was the first generation of young men for whom initiation ceremonies had
been rare and who had thus received little instruction in Luguru ethics (maadili, see the
Introduction). The utopian visions of the socialist era had given way to visible failures. Coming
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of age during an economic crisis, lasting from the beginning of the 1980s through the mid-1990s,
in which farming was increasingly inadequate to meet basic needs and in which social services
were rapidly being withdrawn, these youth were left to piece together a living from small
businesses and wage labor. While these non-farm pursuits ultimately placed them at an economic
advantage relative to their parents and elders, as well as to young women whose mobility and
access to off-farm work was more limited, it did not raise standards of living or allow for a
significant accumulation of capital for most (Ponte 2003: 155–158). Considering these cascading
failures, it is clear why young men like Abdallah and Abdul were drawn to a movement that
promised something different—from mila, from the tariqa, and from TANU.
The question of ethics in particular was key for many who joined Ansar Sunna. The last
chapter described many men’s sadness at having lost the traditional knowledge imparted during
the initiations of the past. Those who joined the reform movement, of course, were not likely to
express nostalgia for the ways of mila, which is seen as a violation of religious law.
Nevertheless, many men described a sense of ethical unmooring prior to their conversion. When
I asked Abdul Rahman Thabit about his religious affiliation before he joined Ansar Sunna, he
responded that he had no religion (interview, November 5, 2018). “As for religion, you could say
I had none, because I was just a regular person. I was getting drunk. There was no religion in
that,” he said. Abdul, I later learned, was the son of an important shehe, and his description of a
lack of religion in his life prior to joining reform indexed a dissatisfaction with the authority and
ethics of tariqa. Abdallah Ramadhani Kambi, the man who joined Ansar Sunna in Dar es Salaam
in the 1990s, said when he joined, he stopped going dancing and pursing women, labelling these
activities and disrespectful and immature (interview, November 5, 2018). Religious study with
other Muslim reformists provided a space for ethical self-cultivation outside of kinship and away
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from home. Importantly, for these young men, it was text that provided moral authority and
offered guidelines for ethical living.
Ansar Sunna itself arose from a mixture of internal and external factors. It can be
identified as part of a global movement known as Islamism or Salafism, although neither term is
in wide circulation on the Tanzanian mainland (Becker 2008: 276n9; Gilsaa 2015). Each of these
terms encompasses a slightly different set of actors and indexes different dimensions and
genealogies. For instance, “Islamism” is most often used to highlight movements focused on
capturing the state for the purpose of implementing a particular form of Islamic law.
“Reformism,” in contrast, is more commonly used to refer to groups focused on changing
religious practice outside of state power. The term “Salafism,” in turn, points origins in particular
modernization movements within Islam that formed in opposition to European imperialism in
Egypt and other parts of the Middle East in the nineteenth century (Becker 2008: 242–244;
Haykel 2014). As we will see, these origins are only one part of Ansar Sunna’s genealogy. What
the groups referred to by these terms have in common is that they emphasize the textual authority
of the Quran and Sunna and advocate for a close adherence to a conservative interpretation of
Islamic law (sharia) and a return to the practices of the first generations of Muslims (Becker
2008: 241–276; Haykel 2014; Rosander 1997). Central to this broad movement is a rejection of
what followers call “innovations” (bida), practices added to Islam after the time of the Prophet.
The term bida has two main referents in reformist discourse: influences of Western/Christian
cultures, and practices associated with Sufism. The latter are often suspected of allowing for the
preservation of pre-Islamic rituals, traditions, and beliefs. Islamic reform has been particularly
prominent around the world since the 1970s.
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Definitions of this movement—what it consists of and who belongs to it—can be difficult
to pin down. There is no official organization or centralized leadership, and no settled doctrine.
In general, followers of the Islamic reform have advocated against Western (Christian)
colonialism and for a return to authentic Islamic practice as described in the Quran and the
Sunna. Importantly, these movements emphasize the Quran and Sunna as texts that can be read
and interpreted by all Muslims, rather than relying on teachers with esoteric knowledge or
interpretive precedent from Islamic courts. While this ostensibly open approach to Islamic text
and law is associated with modernization and a rejection of tradition, it has also been dominated
by conservative, literalist interpretations of sharia, and many reformists do adhere to the
interpretations of certain Muslim scholars and particular schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Thus,
the change in practice is not so much an opening of interpretation, but a move away from certain
stances toward knowledge and authority. For Sufi Muslims, sacred knowledge is secret and
passes through long, known genealogies of teachers. For reformists, knowledge is no longer
esoteric but is rooted in texts accessible to all Muslims, while authority is (ostensibly) unbound
from established genealogical lines (Becker 2008; Gilsaa 2015; Haykel 2014).
The term Wahhabia, used by the women in Ludewa to express their disapproval of the
shehe’s refusal to participate in funerals, points to one genealogy of the reform movement,
tracing it to the eighteenth-century Islamic leader Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in what is
now Saudi Arabia. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab opposed the visitation of tombs and veneration of saints,
central practices of Sufi tariqa, considering these to be innovations that amounted to idolatry
(Crawford 2014). Followers of Islamic reform typically reject the term Wahhabi, arguing that
their beliefs come not from a specific teacher but from the Quran itself. However, Saudi
institutions whose histories are linked to ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, did have a significant impact on
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the rise of Ansar Sunna. In the first decades following Tanzanian independence, an oil boom
enriched many Saudi Islamic institutions. Many of them used these funds to establish madrassa
(Quranic schools) and other Islamic organizations abroad, including in Tanzania, and to finance
scholarships which permitted Muslim students to receive Islamic education in Saudi Arabia.
Cheaper commercial flights also meant more Tanzanians could visit Saudi Arabia, whether on
hajj to Mecca or to study (Becker 2008: 241–275; Gilsaa 2015). There, they were exposed to
teachings influenced by ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. With liberalization and the loosening of Bakwata’s
monopoly on Islam in the public sphere, both the role and number of other Islamic institutions
expanded. Saudi influences have never been singular in Tanzania, though; Islamic organizations
from other gulf states, as well as Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, among others, have also had financial,
intellectual, and political impacts on Muslim institutions across Tanzania. For instance, Egypt’s
Islamic reform movement, associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and particularly anticolonial
in nature, was influential long before Tanzanian independence through the circulation of
publications like al-Manar along the coast and became more significant after the opening of the
Islamic Educational Centre in Dar es Salaam in 1968 (Glisaa 2015: 35, 41).
Despite these international connections, however, it would be a mistake to suggest that
the Islamic reform movement in Tanzania is an import from abroad, in contrast to “local” forms
of Sufi Islam. First, Islam in all its forms and from the first centuries of its existence involved the
circulation of ideas and practices across continents. Second, while Islamic reform has been
influenced by discourses from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and elsewhere, it also draws on very long
traditions of Islamic reform and theological debates within “African Islam” and Sufi traditions
(Becker 2006, 2008; Kresse 2007; Loimeier 2003). Already in the 1930s, discussions about bida
were circulating widely among Muslims in East Africa, originating with African Islamic scholars
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such as Sheikh al-Amin bin ‘Ali ‘Abdallah bin Hafi al-Mazrui of Mombasa and later Sheikh
Abdallah Saleh al-Farsy, originally of Zanzibar. As we will see, al-Farsy had a particularly
significant role in shaping the direction of Islamic reform in Tanzania. While these thinkers
never opposed the tariqa as a whole, their publications critiquing certain Sufi practices as bida
circulated widely in the middle and later decades of the twentieth century (Gilsaa 2015: 37–38;
Mraja 2010, 2011). Rather than understanding Islamic reform as an export of Saudi Arabia or
Egypt, the movement is better understood as a “multipolar” event, arising in multiple places from
similar but not identical local conditions, as well as from global discourses that traversed local
and national boundaries (Ma 2016). Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Gulf
States were important nodes in these global circuits of Muslim discourse, but they did not simply
export Saudi forms of Islam outward. Rather, Islamic reform in Tanzania was shaped through
both local and global discourses around theology as well as economic and political shifts at
multiple scales.
Translating Islam and Generational Rupture
One of my first formal interviews in Uluguru was with a man in his early 80s, Amaji
Rajabu, a farmer and a follower of the Qadariyya tariqa (interview, April 12, 2018). As we sat
under a tree watching young men ferry bricks to a new construction site nearby, I asked him how
religion had changed in his lifetime. He answered that before, people used to come together, but
now, they didn’t, especially at funerals. He worried about his own funeral; while he knew other
followers of Qadariyya would do everything necessary, he also knew others would refuse to join
them. Everyone goes their own way, he said sadly. I asked why this change had occurred. He
didn’t know, he said, but he thought it might have something to do with the translation of the
Quran. “Now people can understand.”
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The day before, I had spoken Hosain Shomari Kiyega, also in his 80s (interview, April
11, 2018). Mzee Kiyega had joined the reformist mosque ten years earlier. When I asked him
why he had joined, he replied that when Ansar Sunna arrived, “they came with strength.” Like
many others who joined, he hoped the religion would bring something new, a deeper
understanding and engagement with religion. However, he said that he and others who joined
discovered it was not what they expected. “Now we see that there is really no difference,” he
said with a sigh. He was disappointed that the movement had not proven more radical.
“What did you expect when you joined,” I asked.
“That they would tafsiri Islam,” he replied.
The verb tafsiri in Swahili is most often translated as “to translate” but in Arabic, its
meaning is closer to “to interpret,” in the sense of exegesis. Mzee Kiyega’s meaning, in this
context, is closer to the latter but it also not a coincidence that the word has both connotations.
Because the Quran consists of direct revelation as it was spoken to Muhammad, only the version
of the text in the original Arabic is the true Quran. Any version in another language is seen as a
form of exegesis, rather than a copy of the text itself. While translation theorists might point out
that all translations are interpretations, this is especially and explicitly so for Muslims. Learning
to recite the Quran in Arabic is the centerpiece of Islamic education and does not necessarily
require an understanding of the meaning of the Arabic words. However, many Muslims—
including those associated with Islamic reform—feel that Muslims should ideally understand the
meaning of the text so they can interpret it and apply it to their lives.
Translation of the Quran into Swahili was long a source of controversy. The first Swahili
translation of the Quran was published in 1923 by UMCA missionary Canon Godfrey Dale, and
a second was published in 1953 by Shaykh Mubarak Ahmad Ahmadi, a member of the
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Ahmadiyya movement. Ahmadiyya, a heterodox Islamic sect, has a few followers in Uluguru
(see Chapter 4), but because of the movement’s belief in continuing revelation and other radical
views, it is widely regarded as un-Islamic by mainstream Muslims around the world. Both
translations were suspect because of the religious affiliations of the translators, as well as doubts
about the translators’ fluency in Swahili and Arabic. A third translation was published in 1969 by
Shaykh Abdallah Saleh al-Farsy, an influential Muslim scholar of impeccable qualification,
mentioned above as one the principal influences on the budding Islamic reform movement in
East Africa. Although al-Farsy is cited by reformists as a major influence and his works on bida
remain foundational for the movement, he was not himself associated with any distinct
movement and his translation, along with his other works of Islamic scholarship and writing,
were popular among mainstream Muslims across East Africa (Gilsaa 2015: 37; Lacunza-Balda
1997).
Al-Farsy’s translation arrived at an opportune moment. In the decade and a half after its
first publication, literacy rates skyrocketed in Tanzania, from close to 60% in 1975, the first year
the government officially surveyed literacy rates, to around 90% by the mid-1980s (Ponte 2003:
149). The 1975 figure itself likely represented a rapid improvement since independence,
resulting from the government’s investment in literacy programs, but the building of universal
primary schools after villagization marked a particular turning point toward widespread literacy
across the country (Unsicker 1987). After the mid-1980s, literacy, along with school enrollment,
began to decline as structural adjustment forced the state to cut back its support for education
(Lugalla 1995). The generation of young men who traveled to Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, and
other cities during the early period of liberalization were the most literate generation Tanzania
had seen and they constituted a significant audience for al-Farsy’s translation and other writings.
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Tanzanian Muslims’ growing ability to read and interpret the Quran for themselves
undercut the authority of Sufi mashehe and teachers. In Sufism, knowledge passes from teacher
to pupil in a patrilineal genealogy that dedicated followers of tariqa can recite. This knowledge
is esoteric and can only be accessed through the personal process of teaching. In rural Tanzania,
Sufi leaders had long depended on their semi-monopoly on Arabic education to maintain their
positions of authority (Lacunza-Balda 1997: 114). When Amaji Rajabu remarked that translation
had fractured Islamic unity, he hit at the heart of the matter. The post-independence state had lost
much of its early legitimacy, the result of hardships under socialism and growing contentions and
crises after liberalization. The Sufi mashehe, who had become closely associated with the state
both in the independence struggle and through Bakwata, were also viewed with increasing
skepticism. Literacy gave young Muslims, especially men, an alternative route to knowledge.
They could read books and periodicals by Islamic scholars and could read the Swahili translation
of the Quran itself, undermining the monopoly of the mashehe.
Textual authority was significant for many followers of the reform I interviewed. When
asking what drew them to the movement or what set it apart from others, they repeatedly
mentioned the role of text:
I liked their honesty…. someone says this, someone says that, but [when Ansari
say something], if you look in the book, you’ll find it’s true what they said (Abdul
Rahman Thabit, interview, November 5, 2018).
I joined Ansar Sunna after reading the book [Quran]…. Ansar Sunna follow the
complete analysis of the book of Almighty God, that is, the Quran (Abdul
Hussein Matemelela, interview, December 3, 2018).
Ansar Sunna, they look closely at the book and they interpret [tafsiri] it (Mfalme
Fundi Mfalme, interview, December 5, 2018).
In Islam, there is book called the Quran, yes? And then there is the Sunna, which
is the teachings of the Prophet. Muslims should look, that is, in the Quran and in
the Sunna about how to act…. If we want to know what to do, we look in the
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Quran and the Sunna. Others listen to the shehe (Abdallah Shomari, interview,
December 5, 2018).
Popular literacy changed the contours of authority in Tanzania. Just as literacy rates rose, the
first authoritative and widely trusted Swahili translation of the Quran became available,
shattering the mashehe’s monopoly on Islamic knowledge. This new generation of Muslims
could eschew the mashehe and seek out other forms of religious knowledge, including numerous
books and periodicals from Muslim scholars alongside the Quran itself.
If You Name a Dog “Thief”
It took me some time to meet the leader of the Ansar Sunna mosque in Mkuyuni. The
movement’s mosque is quite visible, located just off the market in a large, well-constructed
building. For this reason, many men who work in and around the market pray there regularly
while considering their primary affiliation to be with the mainstream mosque further back across
the stream. Upon learning that this was the mosque associated with Ansar Sunna, I spoke to
many people I saw coming and going, asking them if they knew who the leaders of the mosque
were, so that I could approach them for an interview. One of those I inquired with was
Msawanga Ally, who I often saw selling vegetables in the market with his wife and whom I had
met in his capacity as the chair of the Village Land Council. When I stopped by his vegetable
stand to inquire about the mosque and its leadership, his answers were vague. Later, though,
several people informed me that he himself was in fact the leader of the mosque. I returned to his
vegetable stand and asked him directly. He said he was.
A sixty-year-old man with a large beard and a wide smile, Msawanga Ally had joined
Ansar Sunna in the early days, before the mosque was built. He had only recently been selected
as the mosque’s leader and hastened to tell me that this was an administrative position and that
he was not an Islamic teacher or expert on religion. I asked him if I could speak with him about
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the history of the mosque and he agreed, but I found it difficult to set a date, and it took several
months before we were able to sit down and have a formal conversation. When we finally
succeeded, I met him at his stand in the market and he outlined the history of the movement and
its general principles. He explained that the name “Ansar Sunna” meant followers of the Quran
and the hadith. When I asked about their differences from other Muslims in the area, he
explained that Ansar Sunna followed only what was in the text, while others mixed “mila na
desturi” (tradition and customs) with religion (Msawanga Ally, interview, August 23, 2018).
When I asked about arranging interviews with other Ansar Sunna, he told me that there is
a history (desturi, lit. custom) of being afraid of wazungu (white people) so it would be difficult
for me to find anyone to speak to. If he showed up with me, people might be afraid. I suggested
that if we scheduled the interviews in advance, we could make sure people understood the
purpose of the interview and would not be startled. He agreed this was possible and said we
should communicate about the date later. When I started to gather my things to leave, he stopped
me. He told me that there was a rumor that Ansar Sunna were wagomvi (quarrelsome). They
were accused of this because they violated mila, he said, and people were conspiring to fight a
“war” against them. If you name a dog “Thief,” he told me, everyone will join up and kill the
dog.
When I followed up about arranging interviews with other members of the mosque,
Msawanga continued to push back the date. Eventually, he told me that he had asked around, but
no one was willing to speak to me. Discouraged, I tried my contacts in other villages, and
quickly found myself with numerous interviews, especially in Kibwaya and Changa. I also asked
non-Ansar contacts in Mkuyuni to connect me to reformists there as well and they soon turned
up several willing participants. It turns out, members of the movement had not refused to speak
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to me, as Msawanga had told me. In reality, I came to learn that Msawanga had actively
discouraged people from talking to me about religion. In fact, the only interview subject I spoke
with who refused to let me record our conversation was a reformist belonging to this mosque
who did not want to provoke the ire of mosque leadership by speaking with me on the record.
I do not think Msawanga’s attempt to control and limit my access to Ansar in Mkuyuni
was born of malice but rather out of a desire to protect his community. Followers of the
movement in Tanzania had felt the impacts of September 11, 2001 as well as the bombings of the
U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya a few years before. The group had been heavily
surveilled and numerous leaders were violently arrested between 1998 and 2006. They were also
subject to widespread condemnation by mainstream Islamic leaders and by the state (Gilsaa
2015: 31). In some areas, I heard them jokingly referred to as al-Qaeda, a clear reference to their
widespread association with terrorism in the public imaginary (cf. Becker 2006). In Mkuyuni, the
group’s initial appearance was met with hostility by many. According to the interviewee who
asked not to be named, they had difficulty securing a plot for their mosque. Many of those who
joined the movement stated that they were met with anger from family members. Many Ansar,
including Msawanga, told me the group had been persecuted and conspired against. Moreover,
they were acutely aware of American Islamophobia and of attempts to lump Muslims like them
with terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and al-Shaabab. Some Ansar did refuse to speak
with me—a white American non-Muslim and usually unveiled woman—and many of those who
did agree to an interview were at pains to distance themselves from more radical organizations
and to emphasize the value they place on peace. I saw nothing to make me question their
commitment to peace during my time in Mkuyuni. 9 Indeed, while Ansar Sunna has generated
Followers of related movements in East Africa have carried out violent attacks, including armed conflict in
northern Mozambique that is ongoing at the time of writing. Ansar Sunna I met in Mkuyuni differed from these
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conflicts, these have taken the form not of violence but of thoughtful debates about community,
education, and ethics (Becker 2009). However, these debates have caused deep wounds in the
community that have yet to fully heal.
Caring for the Ancestors
Although the initial spread of Islamic reform in Uluguru was met with tensions, things
have since cooled. As one Sufi elder put it, “we have gotten used to them” (Ali Setembo Kiloko,
interview, August 14, 2018). The nature of the conflicts has also shifted. While generational
struggle was key to the rise of Ansar Sunna, its members have aged. The young men who joined
Ansar Sunna in the 1980s and 1990s, described by Becker (2008: 262) as jeans-wearing,
swaggering youth, are today well into middle age, and some are elders. Many have returned to
agriculture. Most of the mashehe of the 1990s have died and have been replaced by men the
same age as many Ansar. The conflict that was once generational has taken a new form. At the
center lie clashes over care for the dead.
As anthropologists have long recognized, funerals, memorials and gravesites play
important social and political roles. Graves bind kinship to place and mark out ideas of belonging
and history. They can be used to stake claims over land by individuals or by nations (Bernstein
2013; Verdery 1999). As cases from Kenya and South Africa show, the location of graves has
become a critical dimension of contests over rural property rights (James 2009; Shipton 2009).
Graves make space, mark connections, and bind communities to the land (Ho 2006; Shipton
2009; Snehi 2019). The dead and their graves can also be deeply linked to a sense of social
health (Verdery 1999: 48). In colonial Zambia, changes in funerals and burial brought by
groups not only in their explicit rejection of violence as a tactic but also in that their energies were primarily directed
toward shifting Islamic practice among Muslim communities rather than challenging the authority of the state. The
significance of this difference can be seen in the case of Mozambique, where the group known as Ansar al-Sunna or
al-Shabaab clashed directly with established Wahhabi reformists (Morier-Genoud 2020).

210

conversion to Catholicism sparked deep fears over changing relationships between the living and
the dead (Kalusa and Vaughan 2013: 1–46). The dead sometimes need care and sometimes
bestow it, but their social entanglements rarely end at the moment of death. They can also do
harm, especially if not properly attended to, as with the “ghosts of war” that have haunted
postwar Vietnam (Kwon 2008). In this way, burials and memorials also (re)establish kinship and
ideas of belonging and can reintegrate the dead and the living alike (Kwon 2008; Mueggler
2001). Funerals are also important social gatherings among the living, where food, gossip, gifts,
and payments are exchanged (Verdery 1999: 108). As the last two chapters illustrated, questions
of remembering and caring for the dead are also questions of social reproduction. The stakes of
debates about funerals in Mkuyuni must be understood in all these terms.
As Chapter 1 showed, graves and interactions with the dead were important in Uluguru
before the arrival of Islam. While this importance is generally ascribed to mila (tradition), we
have seen that the specific importance of names and graves in the mountains likely emerged
primarily in the last two centuries as certain lineages, and particularly their male heads,
consolidated power through control of land and participation in the Indian Ocean trade. In what
is now understood as Luguru mila, we can see the traces of other geographies, still marked out
through the recognition of sacred trees, springs, caves and pools. Today, these sites are combined
with graves and the groves that surround them to form a sacred landscape visited during
matambiko. As prior chapters described, lineage matambiko practices involve visiting multiple
sacred sites, saying words in Kiluguru, reciting a list of ancestral names, offering beer and food
at sacred trees or graves, and creating medicines for the purposes of healing the lineage, ensuring
fertility, and bringing rain. The living and future generations thus depend on the ancestors for
social reproduction, but the ancestors also depend on the living, who must feed them and
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remember their names. If these relationships break down, followers of mila say, the living will
experience illness, infertility, and drought. The inheritance of names, described in Chapter 2,
marks the process of social reproduction, linking each generation with those before and after and
winding kinship into a dense spiral of shared identities and responsibilities.
Under Sufi practices, matambiko were partially replaced with memorials known as hitima
as well as visits to graves (zulu) for purposes of cleaning the grave site and praying. Hitima are
gatherings at regular intervals after a death, generally forty days after the death, and then
annually. Family members and neighbors gather and perform zikiri, typically all night. In the
morning, the ceremony concludes with a prayer and a shared meal. Funerals themselves, like the
one described at the beginning of this chapter, also involve zikiri and certain prayers. In addition,
at the gravesite, the dead are given specific instructions about how to answer the questions they
will face in the afterlife. As we have seen, matambiko are still carried out, although mashehe
disapprove of them in their traditional form, which involves the brewing of beer. Mashehe and
some of their followers often contrast matambiko and Sufi practices around the dead by arguing
that under mila, people prayed to the ancestors, whereas Muslims carrying out hitima, zulu,
zikiri, and funeral prayers are praying for the deceased, helping them find their way to God. In
some ways, the presence or absence of beer, and, conversely, of zikiri, marks a clear line
between traditional and Islamic practices. However, in practice, prayers for the dead and visits to
graves blur the bounds between mila and dini (religion). Questions of how prayers and
responsibilities for care flow between the living and the dead are ambiguous and remain open to
play, as they do elsewhere in the Sufi world (Ho 2006: 11). Moreover, despite official
disapproval of matambiko by Sufi leaders, the result is rarely punitive; most mashehe simply
look the other way.
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Ansar Sunna eliminate hitima and do not participate in zikiri. They also say only shorter
prayers at funerals and do not instruct the dead about the questions they will face in the afterlife.
Many told me they continue to visit graves to pray for the dead but added that these practices are
only for the comfort of the living. The fate of the deceased cannot be influenced by those they
left behind; each individual will be judged by the life they lived and nothing after death can
change this record. As one member of Ansar put it:
Other Muslims, when they go from the grave, they bring a book [Quran] and
read…. What they say is that they are teaching him [the deceased]. They say that
after being buried, he will come to be asked certain questions, right? So they say
they are teaching him, they are reminding him [of the answers]. We say that
human beings, when they die, it means their acts stop then and there (Abdallah
Shomari, interview, December 5, 2018).
Another described it this way:
A person of Bakwata, if he goes to a funeral, if someone has died, they gather
together. After they have buried, they…cook food, they sit together, and they
pray…. But Ansar Sunna, by their teachings, if someone dies—even me myself
personally, I sit and pray [for the deceased] by myself (Mfalme Fundi Mfalme,
interview, December 5, 2018).
Significantly, when reformists visit graves and pray for the dead, they do so alone.
Followers of the Islamic reform typically reject funeral practices such as praying at
graves and zikiri because they see these as innovations (bida) without scriptural support. Usually,
they cite the origin of these bida as older, non-Islamic rituals. The resonances between the tariqa
and mila, reformists contend, are a result of the incorporation of the latter into the former. As
Msawanga put it, Sufi practices have “mila na desturi” mixed in. Reformists strongly oppose
matambiko in particular, describing it as tree worship. When I asked Mfalme Fundi Mfalme,
quoted above, whether Ansar Sunna oppose any traditional practices, he answered:
Yes, for example, a traditional person will go to a tree, a special tree, to pray. This
is forbidden…because there, there is no God. The one they are praying to is
God…. Also, when they go to pray to a grave, [it’s the same]. We Ansari are told
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go to pray for [the dead] to be forgiven, not to pray to [the dead] for help
(interview, December 5, 2018).
As another reformist put it succinctly, “you can’t worship two Gods.” Sufi funeral and memorial
traditions, which do not involve sacred trees, are nevertheless critiqued for maintaining the idea
that the dead are not fully dead and that the living can impact their fate in the afterlife. Both sets
of practices are suspected to be forms of ancestor worship. In this way, reformists explicitly link
Sufi practices to the visiting of graves and sacred sites in mila—in other words, to traditions of
matambiko, and rainmaking. While Sufism and mila also differ in important ways, Ansar Sunna
represents a more radical break with prior relationships of connectivity between generations.
Relationships of obligation between generations end at the moment of death.
Importantly, because Sufi practices and matambiko require collective effort, the anxiety
about reformists’ refusal to participate are acute. While individuals may place their hands
differently during prayer or wear slightly different clothing, these actions do not affect other
Muslims. But a refusal to participate in practices like zikiri threaten the community’s ability to
extend care to the dead. This is why the Qadariyya follower Amaji Rajabu, who I quoted early in
this chapter, expressed concern about his own funeral. If his relatives fail to attend and perform
zikiri, will his path to God be clear? This is also why the women in Ludewa Village expressed
alarm at the behavior of the shehe’s son; the child who died was not given instructors or prayers
to guide him on his way. Like the men described in Chapter 2 who were no longer helping
women in their family with matters of mila and social healing, Ansar Sunna—in the eyes of their
critics—endanger the relations that form the basis of social reproduction, kinship, and collective
well-being. In Uluguru, care for the dead is inseparable from ideas about social health. The
sustained relationships between the living and their ancestors, which operate in cyclical iterations
through the inheritance of names and spirits, move life forward. Moreover, these relationships
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are always shared—neither matambiko nor zikiri can be carried out alone and ideas of social
healing implicate lineages, other relatives, and even neighbors in illness and healing alike.
Social Reproduction on New Terms
At forty-seven, Mama Muhando was younger than many of our interviewees when we
met her in the village of Mfumbwe, in the northwest corner of Mkuyuni Ward. Mfumbwe, higher
in elevation than much of the ward, is particularly tree-covered and I relished the shade as we
settled onto chairs outside her house. During our preliminary questions, Muhando identified her
religious affiliation within Islam as “uwahhabia” (Wahhabism), the only time I heard a reformist
use that term for themselves. She told us that a reformist mosque had been built nearby around
2006 and that she had joined it six years later, together with her husband and children. When we
asked her why, she replied, “because you don’t have to carry out matambiko or throw ngoma
[‘dances,’ here a reference to girls’ initiations], so you can save money.” I asked whether there
were tensions between reformists and other Muslims. She said they were, especially around
hitima. She said that people accused reformists like her of pretending hitima is haram (forbidden
in Islamic law) to cover up the fact that they simply cannot afford to hold the events. Overall,
however, she felt that the new movement had not changed the broader community, only the lives
of those who joined, who, like her, have ceased to participate in rituals like hitima and girls’
initiations, and thus were better able to save money for their families’ futures (interview, August
14, 2018).
Nasma Nasoro, another reformist, was the only person we interviewed who was born into
Ansar Sunna rather than joining as an adult. She was born in 1980, in Kinole Village, higher in
the mountains, to a reformist father and a Sufi mother. She recalled tensions between her parents
when she was growing up over these religious differences, but she was raised in the tradition of
215

her father and as an adult, was fully committed to Islamic reform. We met with her under a tree
near a small quarrying site off the main road, our conversation punctuated by passersby en route
to a nearby funeral. When we asked Nasma about praying for the dead, she gave a similar answer
to what we had heard from Muhando. She said that while prayers for the dead didn’t ultimately
help them, members of Ansar Sunna prayed anyway, out of love for their late relatives.
However, they did not participate in hitima. Wouldn’t that money be better spent on taking the
person to the hospital while they are still alive, she asked us (interview, December 22, 2018).
While Muhando’s own explanation for the reasons of her conversion seem almost
Weberian, suggesting that Ansar Sunna allowed her to save money, it is telling that both she and
Nasma referred to saving money not for investment or to start a business, but to care for
relatives, paying for things like house repairs and hospital visits. Chapter 2 argued that
Tanzanian socialism, by delinking lineage from land, undermined the material basis of social
reproduction, and only partially replaced it with the institutions of the village. Followers of
Ansar Sunna, in contrast, seem to highlight cash, not land, as the necessary factor for social
reproduction. As we have seen, liberalization was marked by both the commercialization and the
deagrarianizaiton of rural life in Tanzania. Although money has long been a necessity in
Uluguru, rising costs of clothing, homeware, education, and healthcare coincided with declining
agricultural incomes at this time. Under these conditions, access to cash became more important
than access to land for many households. Followers of Islamic reform reflect the gradual
delinking of social reproduction from land and the shift toward money as its material basis.
Rather than participating in making space through grave visitations and ziara, reformists like
Muhando and Nasma worked to provide for their families through the accumulation of currency.
Such views were more often stated by women than men, but a few men also remarked that
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following Ansar Sunna permitted them to save money (Juma Mange, interview, December 13,
2018).
The actual economic impacts of joining Ansar Sunna vary. Although both women framed
their discussions of money in terms of concerns over questions of caring for family, Nasma was,
in fact, a successful businesswoman and had purchased several properties in town as
investments. Concern about matters of social reproduction—paying for a hospital bill—framed
her discussion of her withdrawal from the rituals of the tariqa, but the commercialization of life
has also widened inequalities in Uluguru, and Nasma was among those who had come out ahead.
Although not wealthy by international standards, she owned two cows and a television as well as
a home with cement floors, all rarities in Mkuyuni. Muhando, in contrast, was closer to the
average in socioeconomic standing, owning a few small farm plots, a house with brick walls but
no floor, and a few chickens. Although my data are not expansive enough to be conclusive, I did
not see evidence that followers of Ansar were more likely to be wealthy than their Sufi
counterparts, nor to conclude whether religion had played a significant role in their economic
fate. As the cases of Nasma and Muhando illustrate, withdrawing from the obligations of mila
and tariqa did not necessarily lead to the accumulation of wealth. Rather, it allowed both women
to reallocate limited household resources in response to the commercialization of life.
In doing so, followers of Ansar Sunna also withdrew both money and labor from
particular collective systems of social reproduction. One woman critical of Ansar Sunna, Halima
Musa, complained to us that not only did Ansar Sunna followers refuse to participate in aspects
of funerals, they also refused even to pay grave diggers (interview, August 29, 2018). They also
do not pay those who perform zikiri (like me). Moreover, they no longer contribute their labor to
matambiko or zikiri. As Chapter 2 showed, these are forms of reproductive labor, carried out for

217

the health of the lineage and the land. For their relatives, this denial of labor removes critical
links from the chain of social healing, which requires the entire lineage to participate. It also
breaks the chain of knowledge, as Ansar Sunna refuse to inherit names or participate in
initiations. For followers of the reform movement, however, this can also be a response to the
failure of prior systems to provide healing. Rain has become unpredictable and Kingalu’s ability
to summon it is increasingly in question. Lineages have lost their land, and with it, the ability to
provide for their nieces and nephews. The villages of the socialist period also fell short. Schools
still operate but educational expenses have risen, and formal education has failed to replace
ethics once taught at boys’ initiations. 10 Hospitals, clinics, and the medicines they offer have also
become more expensive. Ansar Sunna provides an alternative, rejecting the broken leadership of
past generations and accepting the processes of commercialization and deagrarianization.
These debates also have gendered dimensions. The first to join Ansar Sunna were
overwhelmingly young men. For these men, as we have seen, the movement provided a new
community and a space for ethical self-fashioning in the absence of boys’ initiations and the
failure of the socialist project. They authorized forms of knowledge founded on literacy rather
than personal teachings from elders or mashehe. Ansar Sunna’s teachings, by ungrounding
ethics, reinforced young men’s mobility at a time of increased labor migration. For women,
however, the movement has had a different impact. Ansar Sunna followers typically explain that

As Green (2014) points out, government spending on healthcare and education has risen since the turn of the
millennium, and many of the trends in the crisis period of the 1980s and 1990s have been reversed. There were no
school fees for primary schools or the first four years of second school in Tanzania at the time of my research.
Nevertheless, associated costs of books, supplies, uniforms, and transportation to and/or housing at the secondary
school for those who lived far away, as well as fees for private schooling, public schooling after Form 4, tutoring,
and other educational costs were significant for average income and poor households. Likewise, cost sharing for
healthcare posed a burden for many. While it is not clear from my data whether such expenses have risen or fallen
relative to household incomes since 2000, the expansion of some services and reduction of certain direct costs have
been at least partially offset by rising subsidiary expenses and an increase in culturally and historically constituted
needs for social reproduction (see Chapter 1).
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under Islamic law, women are subject to the authority of their husbands or fathers. Although all
the reformists I spoke to agreed that women could work outside the home, including in
agriculture and in business, they also indicated that women should seek permission from their
husband (or father, if unmarried) and that these men had a right to restrict a woman’s movement
outside the home. Reformist discourses, thus, have become a mechanism for men to assert
increasing control over women’s mobility and activities.
Nevertheless, some reformist women spoke positively of changes brought by Ansar
Sunna. One point they raised, discussed above, is that it allows women to escape demands on
household resources made through extended kin networks and ritual practices like hitima and
girls’ initiations. Just as importantly, Islamic law provides women with mechanisms to place
certain demands on male relatives. For instance, Nasma explained that although Ansar Sunna can
divorce like other Muslims, the process requires more steps including a meeting with the
spouses, their families, and religious leaders to resolve issues (interview, December 22, 2018).
Likewise, many reformists pointed out that although under Islamic law, women’s rights to
inheritance were limited, the law also guaranteed women rights to material support from their
fathers, husbands, brothers, and male children. As we have seen, since independence, lineages
have lost control of land, and this, in combination with high rates of virilocal residence in
Mkuyuni, has rendered women vulnerable to landlessness in cases of widowhood or divorce.
Although Islamic law gives unequal rights to men and women, it also offers women recourse not
available through either mila or state law, for instance by demanding support from a brother
following a divorce.
The gendered dimensions of Ansar Sunna are bound up with questions of social
reproduction. Many reformists I spoke to, acutely aware that Ansar Sunna and other reformist
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and Islamist movements are frequently accused of violating women’s rights, insisted that the
movement protected women through the legal mechanisms described above. However, they also
highlighted the ways in which Islamic law (as they interpreted it) gave men and women different
rights and responsibilities. As Chapter 2 showed, the gendered division of reproductive labor in
Uluguru has hardened since independence. Victoria Bernal (1994), in a study on the role of
Islamic revival in a Sudanese village, argued that the village’s changing place in the national and
global economy had led to a shift in gender relations and the division of labor between men and
women. According to Bernal, the new form of Islam that took hold at this time, part of the same
global wave as Ansar Sunna, served to institutionalize these changes. While this account is
perhaps overly deterministic, it also resonates with changes in Uluguru, where Islamic reform
reinforces the increasingly gendered nature of reproductive labor and its increasing
marginalization in larger economic structures. One reformist man told me that “men should not
help around the house” (Fazili Amiri, interview, January 3, 2019). Another explained: “There are
rights of women and rights of men…. For example, the rights of the woman are to care for the
house…and to welcome her husband. The rights of the man are to provide for the woman…and
to be the protector” (Abdul Hussein Matemelela, interview, December 3, 2018). Unlike Deodat,
who in Chapter 2 lamented that he could no longer use mila to help his wife by carrying her
pregnancy, these men argued that a stricter division of labor was demanded by God.
The rise of Ansar Sunna must be understood as emerging in the context of both the
ungrounding of social reproduction and the renegotiation of gendered divisions of labor. As cash
as taken precedence over land, both mobility and household divisions of labor have become sites
of gendered conflict. Overall, the terms have favored men but have also imposed on them
conflicting demands from their wives, children, and extended families. While some men use
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interpretations of religious law to limit women’s mobility and to justify their absence from forms
of domestic labor and ritual practice, women have also used the ideas of Islamic reform to
reallocate resources to the nuclear household from extended family obligations and to shore up
rights to material support from male family members. For both, the loss of lineage authority and
the increasing turn away from land and toward cash has led to a renegotiation of the terms of
social reproduction. However, these processes are far from complete, as the persistence of other
forms of collective care indicate. Social reproduction is not fully delinked from land but remains
in flux.
Despite the partial ungrounding of social reproduction, most of the residents in Uluguru
still work primarily as farmers who rely on rains for their crops and social reproduction cannot
be divorced from questions of rain and ecology. In Uluguru, the seasons have grown increasingly
unpredictable. Nearly everyone recalls the days when visitors to Kingalu or Kolero would return
from matambiko, silently and without looking over their shoulder. The rain would follow from
the shrines to their homes, falling abundantly on their fields and bringing forth a new harvest.
There are many theories as to why the rain has failed, although most people—including most
members of Islamic reform—attribute it to local deforestation since the 1970s, which occurred in
the wake of the breakdown of both colonial and kin-based structures of forest conservation.
However, when asked why past rainmakers like Kingalu are no longer able to guarantee rain
today, many also blame moral failings. As the last chapter showed, many in Uluguru attribute the
collapse of rainmaking institutions and of ecological control more broadly to the fact that people
have abandoned mila. These accusations apply to many people, but followers of the Islamic
reform are prominent among them. Their refusal to participate in practices of social healing like
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rainmaking and lineage matambiko has destabilized the ability of their families and communities
to bring rain.
Tausi Hamisi, a follower of Islamic reform, had a different understanding of the reason
rains had failed (interview, November 6, 2018). When I asked her about changes in the climate
in her lifetime, she said:
TH: Before, it would rain in October, September, but now it has changed. [It
doesn’t rain] until November…. The rain has decreased
JF: Why has the rain decreased?
TH: [….] People have become disobedient. They have stopped worshipping God,
and God has withdrawn his blessings.
For those who seek a return to mila, blame for the lack of rain falls on those like the reformists
who reject tradition and neglect the ancestors. For Tausi, blame lies with the neglect of God. For
both, then, the lack of rain is a result of the abandonment of collective ethics (maadili) in which
the poor behavior of some bring ruin to the harvests of everyone in the community. After her
explanation above, Tausi added, “it’s not only rain, it’s also in the economy…. God has reduced
his blessings.” By bringing rain and economic prosperity into the same frame, Tausi marked the
changing basis of wellbeing in the mountains that has resulted from partial deagrarianization and
commercialization. Both rain and money matter. However, wellbeing is still collective in Tausi’s
account, and it still depends on ethics. For traditionalists, the ethics that ensure rain were those
once taught at initiation ceremonies. For reformists, these ethics are authorized not by tradition,
passed through thick genealogies of elders or mashehe, but by the pure text of the Quran,
unmarked by place or time.
Rain remains a critical concern for Muslims in Uluguru, and the question of who can
bring rain remains as contested as it was in the nineteenth century, when “big men” struggled
over control of shrines and spirits. Today, however, there appears to be no clear answer to the
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central questions: Who has the power to bring rain? And who has the responsibility to bring it?
In cases of drought, Muslim leaders across divisions agree that collective prayer is needed to
bring rain, and during one recent drought, leaders and Muslims of all affiliations gathered in a
circle to pray for rain. Many people described this ceremony to me, which occurred before my
fieldwork, but unlike the stories of past rainmakers, this one ended in ambiguity. The ceremony
was not understood as a failure, and rain eventually resumed, but no one described the gathering
of clouds at the moment of prayer nor torrential downpour afterward. These features of past
rainmaking stories do not repeat in the present tense, either in stories of Kingalu’s continued
rainmaking nor in accounts of Muslim prayers for rain. As discourses of social healing place
ecological wellbeing and good rains at the heart of political legitimacy, the ambiguity of
contemporary accounts of rainmaking rituals—traditional and Muslim—points to a larger crisis
in authority. Under the conditions brought by liberalization, no leader appears able to ensure
social reproduction through healing the land.
Temporalities, Kinship, and the Unruly Dead
Conflicts over funerals lie at the heart of larger debates over kinship, temporality, and
relationships to place. At the center of mila is the matrilineal lineage. Ancestors regularly
interrupt the lives of the living to make demands, and the living in turn, must care for generations
past to ensure the wellbeing of those yet to come. Fertility, health, and good rains link lineage
members to each other and to the land. This relationship to place is tied to the mountains, which
is why when Luguru people living away from Uluguru fall ill, they must return to their lineage
lands to seek healing. The Sufi tariqa, in contrast, are dominated by a patrilineal paradigm,
flowing from father to child and (male) teacher to student. Like the lineage, the tariqa cares for
the dead and passes secret knowledge to new generations. The temporalities of tariqa are dense
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with personal links that bind past and present, from Muhammad to the major Sufi teachers who
arrived in Mkuyuni in the mid-twentieth century and to their adherents today. Sufi relationships
to space posit a sacred geography of graves, points in space which draw together not only
geographically distant adherents but also past and present.
Most of those in Mkuyuni live between ukoo (lineage) and tariqa, moving deftly through
the communities and geographies of each in ways that are creative, practical, and deeply
meaningful. To these possibilities, Ansar Sunna has added more ways of relating to space and to
others, but it also brings with it a critique of both mila and Sufism that threatens to undermine
both. This is because reformist discourses often prioritize a certain form of purification based on
a foreshortening of time. As Bernard Haykel notes, for followers of the Islamic reform,
“temporal proximity to the Prophet Muhammad is associated with the truest form of Islam”
(2014: 34). Texts, especially the Quran, make proximity possible; unaffected by the centuries,
the Quran bypasses generations of teachers to link current Muslims directly to moment of
revelation. In this way, kinship also appears truncated. Reformists reject genealogies, such as
those linking the movement to thinkers like Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. While Sufi time is
thick with the history of knowledge, reformists see this thickness as pollution, bida, which
obscures the true nature of religion.
Although history among reformists is a source of moral danger, the reformist vision does
not include removing all aspects of change; “science and technology” are widely embraced, as is
secular education and advances in secular knowledge more generally (Becker 2008: 267–269).
Rather than attempting to freeze time at the first generations of Islam, this point in the past
provides an anchor; linear progress in fields such as science remains grounded in an ethical
orientation toward the time of the Prophet. For some followers of Ansar Sunna, it appears clear
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which practices (from mila or tariqa) are bida, but for most Muslims in Mkuyuni, the effect of
these discourses has not been to draw clear lines but to reignite debates over what changes are
ethical. In so doing, it opens up new ways of navigating questions of kinship, community, and
authority in the wake of changes brought by deagrarianization and commercialization, which
have partially shifted the material basis of life from land to money, and which have loosened—
but not severed—ties to the sacred geographies of matambiko and tariqa. Of course, Ansar
Sunna has a sacred geography as well, but it is one that seeks to shorten and purify time and
space by removing the moral traces of history that have come between the Prophet and the first
generations of his followers and present Muslims. This geography removes graves—whether
ancestral or saintly—from sacred space and reorients the Islamic community, the umma, toward
Mecca alone.
Critically, the shifting temporalities and geographies of Islam are deeply connected to
conceptions of knowledge. Jane Guyer and Samuel Eno Belinga (1995) have argued that
knowledge, differentiated and embodied in individual persons, was a source of wealth and
political power in precolonial central Africa. In Uluguru, esoteric knowledge of medicines was
passed through societies of elders, while ethical knowledge was transmitted to youth in secret
initiations. This knowledge was personal and bound to the landscape in particular ways;
medicines, for example, required not only ingredients but visits to sacred sites for their
preparation. In short, knowledge was diffuse, differentiated, and grounded. Under tariqa,
knowledge became centralized and personified in the figure of the shehe. This knowledge was
also tied to place through genealogies that spanned the Indian Ocean. Such genealogies and the
saintly tombs that mark them, as Engseng Ho (2006) shows, pull at once toward return,
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traversing backward the paths through which sacred knowledge spread, and toward expansion,
carrying the boundaries of the Islamic world outward.
Under Islamic reform, true knowledge emerges from the Quran and the Sunna, radiating
out from Mecca and Medina as universal truth. It does so through the vessel of the text, on which
neither history nor geography leave a mark. However, beyond the unipolar orientation toward
Mecca, Ansar Sunna also produces an international space through which knowledge flows. This
global geography follows the circulation of ideas among like-minded Muslim leaders and
institutions, but in a way that remains ungrounded. Authority is thus also deterritorialized,
breaking ties to ancestral homes and to the nation. Reformists’ rejection of the nation in Tanzania
is particularly pronounced. As we have seen, the movement arose in the wake of a loss of faith in
both secular authorities associated with the socialist period and with Muslim leaders who had
become associated with them through the institution of Bakwata. The struggle between national
and international authority manifests in the fierce debates over the dates of Ramadan and Eid.
Most Muslims in Tanzania follow the dates set by the Mufti of Bakwata, declared through the
local appearance of the moon, but Ansar Sunna observe the dates set in Saudi Arabia. This global
orientation stands as a rebuke to the failed national project. By ungrounding ideas of knowledge
and authority and by eschewing genealogy, followers of Ansar Sunna reject the authority of
elders, ancestors, and mashehe alike, erasing them from the sacred map of Islam.
Yet Ansar Sunna cannot unilaterally banish the ancestors. Ancestors have agency as well.
Consider Nasma Nasoro, the businesswoman born into Ansar Sunna who argued that it was
better to spend money on a hospital visit than a hitima. Nasma was fully committed to Ansar
Sunna, and espoused a particularly conservative vision of Islam, especially related to women’s
roles. She explained that she needed her husband’s permission to leave the house, even to attend
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a funeral. She described the teachings of girls’ initiations as backward and said she did not
participate in most mila. She opposed practices of zikiri and hitima as well as matambiko, which
she described as something of the past (interview, December 22, 2018). However, when I asked
about inheriting ancestral names, our conversation shifted unexpectedly:
JF: And the issue of inheriting or ruling (kutawala) old names, do you [followers
of Ansar Sunna] do this, or do you oppose it?
NN: You know, in Ansar Sunna they oppose it, but it’s real.
JF: Why do they oppose it?
NN: They oppose it…they say it’s not real, but it’s real. It comes, truly, and if you
refuse it, it’s possible you will get very sick. […]
JF: Ah, ok, you—you haven’t inherited a name?
NN: Not yet.
JF: But if you start to feel sick, if you feel like maybe it’s a name, you’ll take the
name?
NN: Yes, I’ll take it.
Although it is easy to see ancestors as constructs and symbols, accounts from Uluguru emphasize
that they are in fact agents in the social world. Even Ansar Sunna cannot banish them entirely.
The resurgent past and the unruly dead intrude on the present in unexpected and sometimes
dangerous ways, demanding they be remembered.
What can we make of a past that has the power to return and to compel the present?
Derrida (1993) famously discussed the ways in which the dead can impose ethical imperatives
upon the living and indeed cites death as the very condition for generative return. David Gordon
(2012), writing about the political history of central Africa, has likewise shown the ways in
which “capricious spirits” have continually reemerged as historical agents which exceed and
contest relationships of power. In Uluguru, ancestors draw the living into ethical relationships
through affliction and healing. Time itself is ethical in this conception; it is produced through
227

cycles of obligation between generations—to feed, to heal, to remember, to bring rain. This
ethical time is also linked to place, as spirits link kinship to the landscape through graves and
other sacred places. Islamic reformists attempt to remake the world and to unground knowledge
and authority. They interpret history and the earthly surfaces over which it passes as sources of
corruption from which the Quran alone can pass unscathed. At the same time, Nasma’s account
makes clear that even for strict adherents to Ansar Sunna, this ideal of purified time and space is
only one of many ways of understanding that shape life. Indeed, the production of time and space
are social and—like rainmaking—exceed the grasp of individuals. Ancestors themselves are part
of this social world, and they too have a hand in shaping the temporal and geographic world they
share with the living.
Conclusion
Islamic reform in Tanzania arose at a moment of deagrarianization, commercialization,
and widespread economic crisis. It originated among young men disillusioned by the failures of
the socialist state and the tariqa. It also occurred after kinship-based systems like the lineage had
lost much of their power to provide social healing and social reproduction. The earlier followers
of Ansar Sunna, overwhelmingly young men, had not been educated in Luguru ethics through
initiation ceremonies in the forest as their fathers and grandfathers had been. Instead, they
studied reading, writing, and other standard subjects at newly built village primary schools. After
finishing school, these young men, many of them living and working in cities far from their
families, had unprecedented levels of literacy. They also had access to money that exceeded that
of their elders and of women of all ages, at a moment when needs for cash were rising. At the
same time, the economic opportunities available to them did not significantly raise standards of
living for most. Rather, earnings were sent back home as remittances and barely kept up with
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rising costs of consumer goods, education, and healthcare. This combination of precarity and
independence led many to seek new sources of authority, ethics, knowledge, and community.
Ansar Sunna arose from these circumstances along generational and gendered lines.
The new reform movement marked out different relationships to space and time, and to
knowledge and authority. David Harvey (1990) has argued that capitalist conditions and
technological innovations have produced a space-time compression around the world. As Doreen
Massey has pointed out, this should be understood not simply as a “speeding up” of global flows
but as “the spatial reorganization of social relations, where those relations are full of power and
meaning, and where social groups are differently placed in relation to this reorganization” (1994:
121). As such, it is not simply a battle between global and local. Rather, ideas of global and
local, foreign and native, unnatural and authentic, are selectively employed to stake claims to
place and to authority. Ansar Sunna is no more or less “local” than mila or the tariqa, but it
employs ideas of the global in opposition to forms of authority associated with the lineage, the
tariqa, and the nation state. The authorities invoked and listened to by Tanzanian followers of
Islamic reform are, of course, geographically and historically situated. However, the movement’s
discourse seeks to unground authority and knowledge, to clean the world from the pollutions of
thick geographies and thick histories, and to draw closer to the pure past. Genealogy and
relationships to place have been replaced by text as the legitimate basis of knowledge.
However, the movement that was once generational has changed its shape. Adherents
have grown old, and nationalist and Sufi leaders have died. Many women have also joined the
reform, finding both reprieve from burdensome expenses associated with certain rituals and a
legal framework to make demands on their husbands, fathers, and brothers. Today, the
movement marks the continued tension between land and money as grounded and ungrounded
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conditions of social reproduction. It also reflects a crisis in authority generated by the collapse of
socialism and can be seen as a creative attempt to rethink relationships between people and the
environment through a compressed and purified space-time oriented not toward sacred forests or
saintly graves but toward the Prophet and Mecca. At the same time, it also highlights another
refusal by men to participate in the work of social reproduction through a withdrawal from
rainmaking, healing, and care for the dead. As Engseng Ho wrote of the desecration of Sufi
graves by Islamic fundamentalists in Yemen, “Grave visits are to be opposed because they do
work. They create powerful dynamics of signification with the potential to create communities
based not on revelation but on something autochthonous and incipient in the grave complex”
(2006: 25). 11 In Uluguru, graves and grave visits do work, inscribing certain authorities and
creating relationships that link humans to place and past to present. They also are work, the sort
of work that ensures generations are carried safely from birth to the afterlife. For Sufi Muslims,
zikiri lies at the heart of this work, binding generations in the opening of a path to God.
The delinking of social reproduction from land and the partial deagrarianization of a
generation of young men made the work of zikiri, like that of matambiko, more difficult and
more uncertain. New global connections brought by liberalization, disillusionment with
nationalism as a basis for anticolonialism, and displacement through labor migration to cities all
changed young men’s relationship to place and family in dramatic ways. The loss of control of
land by lineages followed by over a decade of declining farm incomes partially ungrounded
economic life. The climate has also grown unpredictable and no one in power seems to be able to
restore the rains and the ecological and agricultural health they once ensured. Ansar Sunna offers

Broadly speaking, the fundamentalists in Yemen described by Ho can be understood as part of the same
movement within Islam as Ansar Sunna in Tanzania although the former were more militant and more directly
involved in contesting state power. Ho uses the term “fundamentalist” to highlight their literalist interpretations of
Quran (2006: 11).
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its followers a way through processes of liberalization, the disappearance of the matrilineal
lineage, environmental uncertainty, and the resulting crises of authority. However, it was far
from the only way in which communities in Uluguru grappled with economic, political and
ecological change.
The next chapter turns more directly to questions of the environment and the role of the
state. Tracing both ruptures and continuities in the governance of forests and water since
independence, it shows that the ungrounding of social relations brought by liberalization was
only partial. Even though many young men today still move to cities and other areas in search of
income and patterns of deagrarianization continue among Uluguru’s youth, relationships to place
and to nature continue to shape life in the mountains. The resulting struggles over water, trees,
and the climate reveal both the deepening of longstanding inequalities and the possibility of other
environmental futures that reach far beyond the slopes of the catchment.
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CHAPTER 4
‘THE FORESTS CALLED THE RAINCLOUDS’: DEVELOPMENT,
DEFORESTATION, AND THE ANCESTORS

In July 2017, The Citizen, one of Tanzania’s leading newspapers, announced that the
government had called for “people living around the Wami/Ruvu Basin to stop carrying out
human activities in order to protect the water source” (Kisembo 2017). The Wami-Ruvu basin
extends from Uluguru and surrounding lowlands to the coast at Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo,
along with additional tributaries to the northwest (van Koppen et al. 2016: 595). If this statement
were taken at face value, it would suggest the relocation of over five million people across a
broad swath of the country including several major cities (Water Action Hub 2020). However,
the article, which was fewer than 300 words long, did not garner significant attention. Even in
Uluguru, home to the headwaters of all the major tributaries of the Ruvu River and thus the area
most likely to be subject to evictions or severe limitations, the news passed quietly. The human
activities of washing laundry and motorcycles, growing corn, rice, and fruit, building homes,
raising children, and burying the dead, continued along the rivers as they had before.
The article itself was the result of efforts on an ongoing collaboration between
governmental and international organizations on a project titled “Securing Watershed Services
Through Sustainable Land Use Management in the Ruvu and Zigi Catchments,” funded through

232

the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
in collaboration with the Wami-Ruvu River Basin Office and in conjunction with the Ministry of
Water. After its proclamation that human activities would not be permitted, the brief article
offered the following elaboration:
Grace Chitanda, a hydrologist from the Wami-Ruvu Basin, said recently that if
human activities continued unabated, the basin will soon dry up. Ms. Chitanda
added that they were striving to educate the public on the importance of keeping
the area free from human activities.
She exuded confidence that the public would heed their advice for the sake of
sustaining water production, which also caters for the country’s biggest
commercial city—Dar es Salaam.
Concerns about the fresh water supply to Dar es Salaam and the central coast have motivated
interventions in Uluguru since the German colonial period, as Chapter 2 showed. Today, Dar es
Salaam is one of the fastest growing cities on earth. In 2005, the population stood at around 2.5
million, but at the time of writing, it has more than doubled, and the city is projected to become a
“megacity” of over ten million inhabitants by 2030 (UN DESA 2018). The government
hydrologist quoted in the article gestures towards the government’s deep concern with securing a
supply of fresh water for the ballooning city, while suggesting that the solution lies largely in the
education of an ignorant and harmful rural public.
A midterm report from this project offered a more significant detailing of the “human
activities” it views as threats to the watershed:
The Uluguru and the Usambara Mountains, like other Eastern Arc Mountains
ecosystems have been degraded significantly, with serious loss of ecosystems
services, especially watershed services. Threats to land and water resources
include: deforestation; uncontrolled use of fire in ecologically sensitive habitats;
inadequate soil and water conservation measures and other inappropriate farming
techniques; over-stocking and overgrazing; population pressure and encroachment
in riparian zones and unregulated and illegal water abstractions (and lack of
compliance with water basin regulations); unsustainable harvesting for firewood,
charcoal production and building, illegal gold mining; and encroachment into
riparian zones (linked to increased population pressure). This has led to increased
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erosion and sedimentation; pollution and eutrophication; decreased water flows
(and increased water demand). Deforestation is particularly severe with estimates
that as much as 80% of the original extent of forest in the Eastern Arc Mountains
as a whole has been lost (Muthui and Mariki 2018: 23–24).
This lengthy list of dangers is ultimately rooted in a Malthusian understanding of the relationship
of humans to nature, one characterized by threat, disruption, and destruction. In this depiction,
human communities “encroach,” destroying the natural system of forests and rivers that is
imagined to have once delivered a steady supply of fresh water to the coast. “Uncontrolled,”
“inappropriate,” and “inadequate” practices have destroyed a natural but delicate balance, while
a growing and thirsty population consumes the finite supply of water at ever increasing rates.
As Chapter 1 shows, such descriptions of Uluguru are not new. Now, as then, they serve
as justifications for the extension of various forms of control over resources and people in the
mountains. While in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were part of an overt
project of colonial rule, today they serve a cluster of forces that includes the state alongside its
international development partners—foreign donors and nongovernmental organizations. This
assemblage of institutions represents a range of sometimes contradictory interests and goals, but
it can often appear monolithic to those impacted by its projects and interventions. The stream of
reports it generates together form a powerful narrative that continually reinscribes Uluguru as a
site of intervention and its residents as threats to a naturally stable hydrological system. The
solutions proposed by the state and other development agencies, as this chapter shows, have
varied over time. However, nearly all place responsibility for the watershed’s health (understood
largely in terms of quantitative flows) onto rural people, and as a result, focus on changing
behaviors in these communities as the antidote to environmental uncertainty.
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Zaina Ally Rufezuwa offered a different assessment of the problems of deforestation and
shortages of water in Uluguru. An animated and witty woman in her sixties, Bibi Zaina lived
next to her brother, Mzee Rufezuwa, in the shady back corner of Kivuma Village. Mzee
Rufezuwa, introduced in Chapter 2 and whom I return to below, was one of my key
interlocutors, known for his encyclopedia-like knowledge of local history. Unlike her brother,
whose way of speaking about local history was systematic, structured by the recitation of years,
changes in administrative divisions, and shifting political names and titles, Bibi Zaina’s accounts
were livelier, but more difficult to follow. A gifted storyteller, she would let her voice drop to a
whisper at moments of suspense, then rise for a joke or a twist. While her brother was regarded
by the public in Mkuyuni as the most important expert in local history, Bibi Zaina also had an
expansive knowledge of events in the mountains and a sharp analysis of many of the changes she
had witnessed.
One afternoon in October 2018, I went with Rama, a young motorcycle driver with a
keen interest in local history, to Kivuma look for Mzee Rufezuwa. Rufezuwa was away and we
were greeted by Bibi Zaina instead. We began to talk, and I asked her a question I had been
posing to many interlocutors lately: had women gained more of a voice in their families and
communities in her lifetime, or had women’s voices been stronger before. She said they had
more of a voice now. I asked how this change had come about. “Who knows?!” she shrugged.
“It’s like how the weather changed.” She went on, explaining that these days, there was no rain,
just sun and heat. When I asked why the weather had changed, she answered without hesitation:
“Because they cut the forest.” She began to explain the problems of cutting down trees,
emphasizing the loss of sacred lineage forests that had once been home to matambiko rituals and
the logging of species of trees commonly associated with spirits. Trees like migude were being
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sold for timber, and despite the uncanny accidents that maimed or killed many loggers, the spirits
who lived in the trees were unable to stop the onslaught of chainsaws and the drive for cash. The
spirits, she said, have been left homeless. Today, these spirits are wandering Uluguru, angry and
causing widespread sickness. The illnesses cannot be cured because there is no forest in which to
carry out matambiko. Moreover, the rains are have begun to fail. “Before, we had big trees. The
rains didn’t go far,” she said. “The forests called the rain clouds.” But today, the clouds have
scattered, leaving drought and dangerous winds. Rainmaking matambiko have also become
difficult and ineffective due to the loss of sacred forests and the disdain of younger generations
for mila. The only solution, she said, was to begin to follow tradition, respect elders, and replant
trees in the places where they had been cut.
During my research in Uluguru, most people agreed that the rains had changed. A
majority said rainfall had decreased, but others noted that both floods and droughts seemed more
common than in the past. In any case, the seasons have become more difficult to predict. Most
people also agreed that the mountains used to have more forests and that they had been cut,
although there is no consensus about the timeline of deforestation. In Mkuyuni, as Chapter 2
noted, aerial photos reveal the primary loss of forest cover since 1955 came from the
disappearance of the lineage forests designated in 1930 under the authority of Rufezuwa, 1
Msume, and other lineage wajomba. Explanations for ecological and climate change in Uluguru,
however, vary widely among residents of the mountains and among those shaping environmental
policies and undertaking development projects in the region, including government hydrologists
and international aid workers. Each of these explanations stakes political claims about

The maternal uncle of Mzee Rufezuwa and Bibi Zaina. Chapter 2 discusses Mzee Rufezuwa’s informal inheritance
of his uncle’s name and position, but the name Rufezuwa was officially unoccupied at the time of my research.
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responsibility for the care of the environment, as well as claims to authority, labor, land, and
resources.
This chapter examines the contested connections between knowledge, labor, and the
environment in the catchment. Drawing on Maia Green’s (2014) analysis of the development
state and the actors who compose it, I trace the changing approaches of the state and its
development partners to the management of forests and water in Uluguru. While paradigms of
resource governance have changed significantly since the colonial period, several important
threads emerge across this history. First, official efforts to manage water and forests have
consistently been shaped by privileging of “expert” knowledge and have made the dissemination
of this knowledge from development professionals to rural people the foundation of intervention.
Second, I argue that development projects have long served to appropriate unpaid ecological
labor from ordinary people, often under coercive conditions. At the same time, this labor has
been rendered largely invisible in part through persistent depictions of nature as a space devoid
of human work. Finally, and for the same reason, development projects continue to perpetuate
and act on Malthusian assumptions which see humans as inherently threatening to nature.
Alongside these trajectories, however, this chapter traces other ways of thinking about and caring
for the environment, including practices of social healing as well as techniques of agroecology
and agroforestry. Building on the claims staked by these practices, I argue that the framework of
delinking, as elaborated by Amin (1990) and Ajl (2018, 2020) offers a possible way forward, one
which would allow for both the environment as such and environmental labor to serve as a basis
for value apart from and alongside exchange values set by the global market. As Amin and Ajl
suggest, this would entail not only a change in the organization of economic relations but a
radical political and epistemic shift as well. Such a process of delinking would begin to undo the
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subordination of social reproduction to production and thus create space for new relationships
between humans and ecosystems to emerge.
Beyond Human Activities
On the last day of 2018, I met with two staff members at the Wami-Ruvi River Basin
Office (WRRBO) in a shared office in Morogoro town. A poster on the wall promoted the
Equitable Payment for Watershed Services program, while vehicles parked outside were marked
with the logos of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and USAID. One staff member, then
the WRRBO Community Development Officer, described her role as “sensitization,” working to
explain the law and the principles of water resource management to local communities. I asked if
that teaching included a discussion of global climate change and was met with a hesitant yes. Her
colleague explained that these discussions had to occur in very general terms that rural people
could understand. When I asked whether they had investigated questions of tradition (mila) as it
related to rivers and forests, they said they had carried out a baseline survey. In Uluguru, they
identified several major challenges in their work, including the small-scale mining for gemstones
and gold along the riverbanks, the practice of farming up to riverbanks, the presence of markets
along rivers as sources of pollution, a lack of proper toilets, and population growth. They
explained that all human activities were forbidden near riverbanks. I pointed out that in Uluguru,
some people’s entire farms fell within the 60 meter no-cultivation zone along the rivers and
asked what they would advise such a person (URT 2009: 377). They said they should grow fruit
trees and keep bees. Perhaps a bit too cheekily, I asked if planting fruit trees was not considered
a human activity. The interview soured slightly, as they explained that planted fruit trees were
different from other human activities because they did not require ongoing disruption of
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harvesting and replanting like crops such as corn and that the trees could in fact be left without
human maintenance.
I shifted gears and asked about their cooperation with the UNDP on the “Securing
Watershed Services Through Sustainable Land Use Management” project which had prompted
the article in the Citizen described above. The project, the officers explained, was currently
supporting initiatives for beekeeping, raising chickens, and other livelihood activities in villages
where people were being asked not to farm close to the river. They were also engaged in a
significant afforestation project along the Mvuha River in southern Uluguru. In Mkuyuni
division and the upper Mbezi River, activities were more limited but the WRRBO was working
with village authorities to come up with land use plans and supporting the formation of the Water
Users Association (WUA) there. This WUA included Mkuyuni and ten other villages along the
upper Ruvu/Mbezi River, and had been launched earlier that year.
This interview highlighted several key themes of water management in Uluguru. The first
is the inseparability of water policy, agricultural development, and forestry in the mountains. As
Chapter 1 illustrated, these issues were deeply connected in colonial policy and remain so today,
although in changing configurations. Second, the officers showed a particular understanding of
knowledge as something to be disseminated outward from technical experts to rural people. The
baseline survey about local customs was intended primarily to identify existing problems in
water management and potential problems in the implementation of programs. It was not
understood as an opportunity to gain useful knowledge about water, forests, soil, or agriculture
from rural communities. Third, the interview highlighted the persistent framing of trees and
human activities as fundamentally different domains, even in the case of deliberately cultivated
fruit trees. Fourth, the deep linkages between state agencies and international organizations were
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evident not only from the role of UNDP in WRRBO activities in the watershed but also in the
presence of logos on vehicles, posters, and reports in and around the building. The role of
international and foreign aid organizations in steering programs related to water, forests, and
rural development has been a constant feature since the end of the colonial period, although the
details of these alliances have shifted significantly. Finally, the conversation points to an
understanding of water as a finite resource to which rural people posed a constant threat, and to
an approach to water management that centered market-driven solutions through the support for
new income generating activities.
The Development State
Maia Green has described Tanzania as a “development state,” which she defines as a
state “materially and ideologically sustained through development relations” (2014: 15; see also
Jennings 2007: 71–73). This status is manifest in the blurry boundaries between international and
nongovernmental organizations and the state visible in the jumble of signs and logos I witnessed
at the WRRBO. The WRRBO, which is answerable to the Ministry of Water, was created in
large part through funding from an international aid organization, the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA, see below), while the project we discussed was funded by
international organizations through the GEF and the UNDP. The Equitable Payment for
Watershed Services program whose posters adorned the walls of the office, another watershed
initiative, was funded through the global NGO CARE International and the Tanzania branch of
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). This tangle of state agencies, international and foreign aid
organizations, and domestic and global NGOs characterizes much of the state’s functions related
to poverty alleviation, resource management, public health, and similar domains. While these
varied organizations often have different goals and interests, the boundaries between them
240

become blurred as the state is both constituted through and materially supported by engagements
with international development institutions (Green 2014: 15–16; G. Harrison 2001). 2
As Green’s work shows, Tanzania has played a unique role in the history of international
development discourse, often serving as an early testing ground for ideas around development.
This role began with Tanganyika’s designation as a League of Nations Mandate following World
War I. The Mandate explicitly laid out an agenda that placed improvements in the lives of local
populations above extractivist priorities. In addition to explicitly calling for the elimination of the
slave trade, the Mandate stated:
The Mandatory shall be responsible for the peace, order and good government of
the territory and shall undertake to promote to the utmost the material and moral
well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants (League of Nations 1923:
155).
While the British administration scarcely abstained from extracting resources, it nevertheless had
to justify its actions through the framework laid out in the Mandate, thus generating an ongoing
discourse that served as one of the foundations for later ideas of development at a global scale
(Green 2014: 24). After World War II, colonial governments began to more clearly articulate
broad principles of development and their relationship to colonial rule, although implementation

During the Magufuli administration, relationships between the nongovernmental sector including donor-funded
civil society organizations (CSOs) and the state became more strained, as the government has limited
nongovernmental organizations’ ability to independently publish information and increased already high
bureaucratic, legal, and financial constraints on their operations. Clashes over the rights of women, girls and
LGBTQ Tanzanians became points of tension, as did issues around press and CSO repression (Amnesty
International 2019; Anna 2020; Bamwenda 2018; “Denmark Withholds Aid to Tanzania” 2018; Dahir 2020; Fallon
2017; Mumbere 2018a, 2018b; Ratcliffe 2017, 2018). Since my fieldwork ended in 2019, the emergence of COVID19 and Magufuli’s assertion that the virus had been defeated through prayer again strained relations between the
government, foreign donors, and the nongovernmental sector (Bariyo 2021; Odula 2020). These clashes provided
fuel to Magufuli’s use of nationalist and anticolonial rhetoric to shore up a broadly conservative agenda, while
allowing neoliberal, pro-business interests in Tanzania to cement their public image as protectors of “human rights.”
In this new configuration, development remained at the core of the state agenda, brought in line with socially
conservative measures and an increased role of the state in the economy through what Paget (2020) has termed
“restorationist developmental nationalism.” Specifically, Magufuli’s administration claimed it would return to a
process of development begun by Nyerere but interrupted by foreign interests. Since Magufuli’s unexpected death in
March 2021, his successor President Samia Suluhu has sent mixed signals about whether she will continue these
trends (“100 Days of Samia” 2018).

2

241

of social welfare policies was piecemeal and faced resistance from European administrators in
Africa (Cooper 1997, 2005; Eckert 2004; Green 2014: 24; Jennings 2007: 74). In British
Tanganyika, this process also corresponded with new forms of compulsory labor. While
distancing themselves from forms of forced labor used by German authorities, the British
administration found in the concept of community development a mechanism to compel
uncompensated labor, framed not as taxation but as self-help (Green 2014: 17; Jennings 2007:
75). As Chapter 1 showed, this program reached its peak with projects like ULUS, in which
residents of the mountains were forced to expend tremendous labor without compensation to
construct anti-erosion terraces. However, in the case of ULUS, beneficiaries were always
understood to be downstream water users at least as much as residents of the mountains
themselves, a point I return to below.
Following independence, the reliance on the appropriation of labor remained
foundational to development in Tanzania. The World Bank recommended that the new
government take a “a community development approach,” justified as appeals to “self-help” and
counterposed to charity. Under this plan, local communities would contribute labor, materials,
and/or cash to assist with development projects such as infrastructure construction (Green 2014:
26–27; IBRD 1961). This program was in large part driven by necessity, as the state lacked the
funds needed to lift its rural population out of poverty, a fact Nyerere explicitly acknowledged in
the Arusha Declaration six years later (Nyerere 1968). The policy of “self-help” was officially
implemented in 1962 and was critical to development efforts in the first decades of
independence. However, in theory, participation through labor was now to be accompanied by
participation in planning, primarily through the institution of the Village Development
Committee (VDC). VDCs were composed primarily of members of Village Councils, party
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officials, cooperative leaders, and progressive farmers, and could submit proposals for self-help
projects to the district level for approval. However, VDCs did not play a significant role in the
setting of broader policies and priorities of the new state and even in their more limited planning
capacities, were effectively under the control of District Development Councils, who had to
approve all VDC proposals. Beginning in 1972, a program of decentralization which purported
to alleviate these issues by shifting power from the district and central government levels to an
intermediate level, the region, ultimately served to move decision making further from the local
level, since regions, unlike districts, did not have elected councils and offered little opportunity
for community input. This change coincided with the move to compulsory villagization, a
process in which relocated communities had minimal say. Despite falling short of these ideals,
however, the ideal of participation in development planning remained official policy from the
time of independence until liberalization (Jennings 2007; Samoff 1979).
After liberalization, as the following sections show, the state’s primary focus on
questions of development and the development program’s reliance on unpaid labor through
“community development” program continued in new forms. The ideal of participation also
survived. Indeed, ideas about participation which had been developed early in Tanzania’s
socialist period influenced global trends around the potential liberatory force of participatory
planning, research, and resource management (B. Hall 1992, 2005; Swantz 2016; Swantz and
Green 2009). Although the socialist government ultimately fell short of these early ideals, the
ideals themselves continued to circulate within and beyond Tanzania. During liberalization,
Tanzania became an early adopter of participatory forest management, a move seen as a part of a
broader democratizing process (Blomley and Ramadhani 2004; Blomley et al. 2008; Vyamana
2009; Wily 2002). Later, participatory frameworks were incorporated into village governance
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and have become commonplace in development projects such as the GEF/UNDP watershed
services project described above (Chaligha 2008; Green 2000, 2003, 2014; Igoe 2003; Marsland
2006; Muthui and Mariki 2018; Pallotti 2008). As the following sections show, these
applications of participatory principles in development by NGOs and the state have produced
mixed and limited results and have generated significant debate among scholars, development
workers, activists, politicians, and Tanzanian people themselves.
Anthropologists of development have broadly argued that neoliberal development
programs serve to depoliticize poverty and reinforce relations of inequality and dependence
(Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995). But development has also produced specific class politics within
Tanzania. Within and beyond the state, development serves as a key source of middle-class jobs
for a select group of educated professionals, whose modest salaries are supplemented by a
variety of individual investments and by other trappings of status and cosmopolitan identity.
Such benefits depend on the continued separation of professional classes (those who develop)
and the rural poor (those who need development), a distinction which often hinges on ideas of
expertise. In addition to these domestic professionals, neoliberal development institutions also
support a class of foreign development professionals whose earnings far outstrip those of local
professional staff. At the same time, they contribute to the cultivation of local elites who act as
community representatives and points of connection between “local” people and “non-local”
institutions (Green 2014; Swidler and Watkins 2009). Development is at once the producer and
the product of these multifaceted and shifting relations.
Forests and Water in Tanzania
In Uluguru, policies and interventions related to water, forests, and agriculture are
inseparable. This is because the primary significance of Uluguru, from the point of view of the
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national government and international organizations, is its status as a key water catchment area
that provides fresh water to Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, and the largescale industrial and
agricultural enterprises of the central coast. Chapter 1 described the history of colonial policy,
beginning with the early introduction of scientific forestry and the reservation of forests by the
German administration. Prioritizing catchments like Uluguru, the Germans enforced reserve
boundaries with strict and violent punishment, curtailing communities’ access to firewood,
medicines, and sacred sites as well as land (Sunseri 2009). The British inherited much of the
German approach, including the forest reserves and a focus on scientific forestry, timber
production, and watershed protection. Sharing the Germans’ sense that Uluguru was becoming
overpopulated and deforested, they also demarked lineage-based forest reserves to be
administered through the Native Authority. However, some of the restrictions on forest usage
were lifted and corporal punishments were abandoned in favor of fines and imprisonment. Later
in the British period, concern over erosion became paramount, leading to the forced terracing
program carried out under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme (ULUS) in the mid-1950s. As we
have seen, this project was met with intense protests led by an unlikely coalition of nationalist
youth, customary leaders, and Sufi brotherhoods. After protests that culminated in the murder of
John Mahenge by police, the scheme was cancelled. Because of the protests’ role in sparking the
anticolonial movement in the mountains, neither the British nor the post-Independence
government found heavy-handed intervention in the mountains politically viable for several
decades.
When Tanzania gained independence in 1961, control over the ministries related to water,
agriculture, and forestry were passed on to the new government. Colonial officials oversaw the
transition and handed off their work to a group of young Tanzanians who had studied forestry,
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irrigation engineering, and other relevant fields at institutions abroad. Many had been taught by
predominantly British professors at institutions like Makerere University in Uganda.
Unsurprisingly, this new generation of experts largely followed the orthodoxies of their colonial
predecessors and tended to implement a top-down approach centering technical knowledge and
rarely consulting local communities (Hurst 2004: 104–107; Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020:
359; van Koppen et al. 2016: 592–593). Foresters found themselves in tension with the new
government, which sought to loosen colonial restrictions, including those restricting the use of
forests (Hurst 2004: 104–107). Like the British experts who trained them, these foresters paid
little attention to local uses of forest environments, focusing instead on measurable quantities of
timber.
At independence, the government also inherited colonial water policies which had vested
all water in the office of the Governor and required “rights” (now called “permits”) for water use
in agriculture and industry. Initially, this system applied only to European settlers, but prior to
independence, it had been expanded to include all residents of the territory. After independence,
control over water shifted from the office of the Governor to the United Republic of Tanzania,
but the new government maintained a centralized system of control for which any water usage
required a formal permit (van Koppen et al. 2016: 595–596). However, the management of this
system began to change with the Water Utilisation (Control and Regulation) Act of 1974, which
paved the way for a process of partial decentralization over the next several decades (URT
1974). Heavily influenced by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
which had advocated for a water basin approach since the 1950s, the government solidified
management along basin boundaries in 1981. In 1991, in the wake of liberalization and structural
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adjustment, the government began forming water basin offices to administer permits and
development projects in nine basins, including the Wami-Ruvu basin (van Koppen et al. 2016).
According to van Koppen et al. (2016: 596), these water basin offices approached water
as a zero-sum game, in which “informal water users became the target.” In other words, smallscale farmers using irrigation were identified as a major problem and site of intervention by the
government. During this time, the framework of Integrated Water Resources Management
(IWRM) came to dominate the water policy landscape in Tanzania. In theory, IWRM
emphasized three principles: equity, environmental sustainability, and economic efficiency. In
practice, it tended to prioritize the last of these, emphasizing water as an economic good (van
Koppen et al. 2016: 588–589). Influenced by donors and the tenets of the Washington consensus
and structural adjustment, proponents of IWRM argued that subjecting water to pricing and
payment would resolve inefficiencies and conflicts over the use of what was understood as a
finite resource. Collecting fees for water use permits would also fund the administration of the
watershed, effectively turning water usage into a site of taxation (Mdee 2017: 101; van Koppen
et al. 2016: 597). Priority for permits was based on a calculation of economic value, which was
fixed rather than based on potentials for growth. Under this scheme, hydropower was given
priority over agriculture. However, as van Koppen et al. noted: “The emphasis on economic
value was later somewhat balanced by considering the environment, narrowly interpreted as
quantitative environmental flows. The environment also gained a higher priority than
agriculture” (2016: 597).
The most influential organization in the development of the Wami-Ruvu Basin was the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which worked on development programs in the
watershed extensively beginning in 1994. Unlike the World Bank, which dominated policy in
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other watersheds in the 1990s, JICA maintained a stronger interest in infrastructure development
and sought to meet the needs of all users, although it too prioritized industrial and urban users in
Dar es Salaam. The Wami-Ruvu River Basin Office officially opened in 2002 with eight
government officials and two corporate representatives. Their work, guided by Japanese
consultants funded through JICA, focused on resource monitoring, awareness raising, and
pollution prevention along with the administration of permits (van Eeden, Mehta and van
Koppen 2016: 615–616; van Koppen et al. 2016: 599).
Beginning in the mid-2000s, international organizations including the World Bank
became friendly to agricultural uses of water in Tanzania, even supporting irrigation
development projects. However, this shift was primarily focused on large agricultural operations
and came in the wake of a rush of largescale land investments by private and largely foreign
capital. This shift thus offered the opportunity for “water grabs” alongside “land grabs” by
investors, coming largely at the expense of smallholders (van Eeden, Mehta and van Koppen
2016: 608–609; van Koppen et al. 2016: 600). In 2009, the Water Resources Management Act
was passed, influenced by international organizations and corporate interests. There was little
public debate over the law, which was posited as driven by technical knowledge rather than
political concerns (van Koppen et al. 2016: 598). By putting in place a tiered structure for water
administration, the act largely certified trends that began with the introduction of IWRM in the
early 1990s, including the emphasis on the permit system and move toward ostensibly
participatory governance through the formation of Water User Associations and Basin Boards.
Political ecologists have critiqued the use of IWRM in Tanzania for facilitating watergrabbing and privileging elite water users. This privileging is the result of several factors. One is
the official private sector participation on Water Basin Boards, a level of governance that does
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not include representatives from local communities. Local participation by smallholder farmers
is instead concentrated in the lower tiers of governance, most importantly the Water User
Associations, which wield less power. In addition, the importance of permits has led to the
privileging of both those purchasing larger permits at higher costs and those who have
experience with bureaucratic processes (Lankford and Hepworth 2007; Mdee 2017; van Eeden,
Mehta and van Koppen 2016; van Koppen et al. 2016). Despite these critiques, WUAs and other
IWRM structures continue to expand in Tanzania, a result of the gradual implementation of the
Water Resources Management Act of 2009 and the work of international donors.
Meanwhile, trends in forest policy followed a different timeline. Also heavily influenced
by the FAO, the post-independence government first focused on plantations and forest industries.
However, following the Arusha Declaration and the implementation of a more explicitly socialist
program, afforestation programs gained traction to meet local needs for wood. This shift
reflected both the socialist program’s emphasis on rural development and a more global turn
toward the consideration of basic needs and poverty alleviation alongside industrial
development. The afforestation effort, however, showed little success, in part because
administrators failed to consult with local communities about their needs for wood and their
concerns about pests, nutrient leaching, and other drawbacks. Non-native species favored for
timber production, such as Grevillea and Eucalyptus species, were prioritized, and technical
knowledge remained dominant and local knowledge marginalized (Hurst 2004: 104–119;
Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020: 359–360).
In the late 1970s, global forestry increasingly turned toward the social dynamics of
forests and community forestry ideals became dominant (Mnzava 1983). In Morogoro District,
as elsewhere in Tanzania, community forestry largely focused on the planting and maintenance
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of village nurseries of select species, mostly fast-growing exotics. The government typically
provided seedlings and some extension support, while village residents themselves were
expected to provide labor (“Community Forestry Training Programme” 1983; Mnzava 1983;
Shirima and Chambo 1984). However, some prominent voices including Tanzania’s Director of
Forestry, Elifadhili M. Mnzava, began to argue that greater consideration should be given to
indigenous species. Critically, Mnzava also argued in several reports that despite the emphasis
international and state agencies placed on educating rural people on the need for tree planting,
that most small farmers already recognized the need for trees and were hampered not by lack of
will but lack of resources. He also argued that rural people, especially women, had a robust
knowledge of which tree species would meet their needs and thrive in their environments
(Mnzava n.d., 1983).
At the same time, several influential forestry professors began to promote agroforestry as
a new paradigm for forest management. This was seen to meet the ideals of Tanzanian socialism,
which envisioned itself as bringing together modern scientific forms of knowledge with local and
distinctly African ones. As devised by faculty at what would later become Sokoine University of
Agriculture, agroforestry was envisioned primarily as the intercropping of trees for fuel, fodder,
and pole production along with non-tree food crops. Relatively little attention was given to fruit
trees and once again, fast-growing non-native species such as Leucaena leucoephala and
Eucalyptus spp. were prioritized. 3 The idea of agroforestry met with some resistance from both
foresters and agricultural officials, who typically viewed their domains as discrete. However, the
project’s potential to resolve multiple issues, alleviate pressure on forest reserves, and present a
more decolonial vision of rural development ultimately gained it traction, bolstered by scientific
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Faidherbia albida, then known as Acacia albida, was a notable exception (Redhead and Maghembe 1982).
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findings on its validity. Moreover, and perhaps more fundamentally, agroforestry extended the
reach of the forestry department into the peasant economy (Hurst 2004: 119–125; Lulandala
1978; Redhead and Maghembe 1982; Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020: 360).
With liberalization, however, the ideal of agroforestry lost prominence to new models of
participatory forest management (PFM), which extended the work begun under the community
forestry projects of the 1970s and 1980s but focused less on tree-planting and more on the
management of existing forest areas. 4 As with the shift of water management to basin offices,
participatory forest management offered promises of decentralization alongside civil society and
“stakeholder” participation in resource administration. 5 PFM in Tanzania quickly gained
international attention and drew donor funds from a variety of sources, including Denmark,
Sweden, and the World Bank. Two forms of PFM were implemented, Community-Based Forest
Management (CBFM) and Joint Forest Management (JFM), the former involving local or village
forests and the latter “reserved” forests in areas considered of supralocal importance due to
biodiversity or water sources (Blomley and Iddi 2009; Blomley and Ramadhani 2004; Blomley
et al. 2008; Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020: 355–356; Vyamana 2009: 240; Wily 2002). Data
from early programs in Tanzania suggests that both CBFM and JFM are more effective at
promoting tree growth and curbing cutting than either state-run or open access forest areas
(Blomley et al. 2008; Treue et al. 2014).

Village tree-planting has reemerged as a priority in parts of Tanzania since 2010 (Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020:
359–360).
5
The term stakeholder is ubiquitous in development discourse in and beyond Tanzania. Stakeholders are generally
institutions and individuals who are understood to have a stake in a project and/or who may affect its outcome. This
can include corporate and state entities, local and international NGOs, and of course, local communities.
Representatives from each identified group attend stakeholder meetings or workshops, with local communities most
often represented by elites selected by project staff (Green 2014: 64–68; see also Argenti 1997; Bächtold, Bastide
and Lundsgaard-Hansen 2020; Leary 2019).
4
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Despite these successes, however, PFM has been critiqued on several grounds. First, it
has been noted for its vulnerability to elite capture. Elites are most likely to be selected as
representatives of the community in interactions with the government and donor agencies due to
access, education, and common interests and are often able to control revenues generated from
forest management. Others have suggested that PFM serves primarily as an excuse for the state
to withdraw resources from rural areas and have suggested that tangible returns for participating
communities are scant, especially their poorest members (Blomley et al. 2008; Iddi 2003; Lund
and Treue 2008; Meshack et al. 2006; Ngaga et al. 2013; Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga 2020;
Vyamana 2009). In addition to these concerns, the construction of expert knowledge as an
exclusive and necessary component of forest management within PFM has served to undermine
the democratizing effects of PFM (Green and Lund 2015; Scheba and Mustalahti 2015). 6
Flows of Knowledge
Participatory approaches such as PFM typically involve forms of participatory research
or appraisal in which, in theory, community members and development professionals work
together to generate critical knowledge about the community and to identify project priorities.
The origins of this process lie in the thought of Paulo Freire and radical social movements of the
1960s and 1970s. 7 Early forms of participatory research aimed to decolonize knowledge creation
and to empower ordinary people to take charge of their community and its development. As we
have seen, socialist Tanzania served as an important early site for the development of these ideas
(B. Hall 1992, 2005; Swantz 2016; Swantz and Green 2009). By the 1990s, however,

Critiques from Tanzania resemble those from elsewhere in the Global South, which have shown that PFM can
perpetuate inequality and extend centralized and colonial forms of control under the guise of decentralization and
democratization (Mathews 2011; Nightingale and Ojha 2013; Poteete and Ribot 2011; Ribot, Agrawal and Larson
2006; Rutt et al. 2015).
7
Freire was invited to Tanzania in 1971 to talk about adult education broadly and research more specifically (B.
Hall 2005).
6
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participatory approaches had become standard in rural development projects and criticism began
to emerge around bureaucratization, routinization, and the curtailing of the concept’s radical
potential. Instead, critics argued, these processes, often conducted in short time frames,
encouraged a homogenizing and thin view of rural life, and only made space for only limited
forms of knowledge rather than permitting meaningful input on larger questions such as policy
priorities. Participation often did more to authorize and facilitate outside intervention than to
challenge the assumptions and priorities of states and development agencies (Cooke and Kathari
2001; Green 2014; Hildyard et al. 2001; Kapoor 2002; Richards 1995). Government and NGO
staff I spoke to about participatory processes, with few exceptions, framed them as opportunities
to identify possible impediments to pre-defined project and to find the best ways to incentivize
rural people to conform to a set of ultimately unquestioned project objectives like tree planting.
The construction of knowledge plays a particular role in these dynamics. While
participatory knowledge-making practices were originally intended to decolonize the production
of knowledge, in practice they often reinforce the differentiation and stratification of kinds of
knowledge: expert or scientific knowledge, which is understood as universal, and local
knowledge, which is place-bound and which “lack[s]… relations to other kinds of knowledge”
(Green 2014: 97). “Local” knowledge is at once reified and circumscribed, ascribed to
epistemology that is experiential and non-generalizable. Meanwhile, expert knowledge is reified
through trainings and seminars which may incorporate “local” people in (supposedly) scientific
knowledge regimes, but which ultimately maintain the distinction and asymmetrical relations
between forms of knowledge. This reinforcement of difference serves as a brake on the
democratizing effects of participatory structures and reaffirms the status of experts (Agrawal
1995; Green and Lund 2015; Janes 2016; Mosse 1994, 2001; Nightingale 2005; Ribot, Agrawal
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and Larson 2006; Scheba and Mustalahti 2015). In short, civil servants, development
professionals, and extension agents in Tanzania tend to see local knowledge as useful to
eliminating barriers to their agenda and to building consensus both “downward” (with
communities) and “upward” (with donors). They portray scientific expertise, in contrast, as
useful for determining how to understand manage resources like forests and watersheds.
The content of the “expert” knowledge produced through these relationships, however,
has a more complex relationship to science. In a recent paper, Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga (2020)
have shown that forestry education in Tanzania remains rooted in outdated, colonial-era ideas of
scientific forestry that prioritize quantifiable aspects of forest health such as timber production
and, more recently, carbon sequestration. Scientific forestry understands forests to be governed
by plant succession which culminates in a stable equilibrium (see also Larson and Ribot 2007;
Ribot, Agrawal and Larson 2006; Scoones 1999). Surveying the curriculum at the only
institution in Tanzania granting degrees in forestry, Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in
Morogoro, the study authors show that these ideas persist at the expense of both newer scientific
approaches and alternative epistemologies including those of forest-dwelling Tanzanians. They
found that forestry education at SUA focused on rote memorization and exam preparation, rather
than critical thinking or the production of new knowledge, that it excluded non-equilibrium
approaches to ecosystem and forest management, and that it repeated longstanding depictions of
humans as inherently external and threatening to forests. Although their study did not extend to
other departments at SUA, the findings of this study were consistent with my own interactions
with SUA faculty, students, and graduates across the disciplines of forestry, agriculture,
community development, and hydrology.
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SUA sits on the northern edge of Uluguru in Morogoro town and serves as the
preeminent agricultural university in the country. During my research in Tanzania, I was a
Research Associate at SUA and I have spent several months living at the campus and have
worked closely with professors and graduate students there. While SUA does support innovative
research in many fields, it tends to emphasize quantitative work, having only added an
anthropologist (Sylvester Haule) to their social science staff in 2018. Overall, the role of social
sciences and humanities at the university is small. Forestry students, for example, had no
requirements related to social sciences or political ecology at the time of my research (Sungusia,
Lund and Ngaga 2020: 362–363). The same is true for similar disciplines. Nearly all technical
experts working on issues related to agriculture, water, and forests I met in Uluguru were trained
at SUA and their attitudes reflect a singular emphasis on technical knowledge and its attendant
epistemology.
For example, when I asked one SUA-trained WRRBO employee about his
understandings of mila, he said that they would always carry out research on mila to know
whether they need to talk to men and women separately or to know what days of the week or
month might be best to set meetings. When I asked about mila related to water management, he
responded with disinterest. I also asked whether he’d heard about the history of forced terracing
in the mountains. He smiled and said yes, a farmer in Kinole had told him they’d killed a
European for trying to force them to build terraces. I corrected the record, letting him know it
was actually an African protester who was killed in the conflict, although I now wonder if I
should not have softened the farmer’s threat.
The attitudes described by Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga (2020) that posit knowledge as
static and unquestionable and that emphasize knowledge transfer from experts to passive
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students are replicated beyond the classroom in many of the state and NGO-led extension and
outreach programs in Uluguru, which emphasize beyond any other aspect the need to “educate”
rural people about proper care for forests, water, and soils. Training and outreach programs are
always unidirectional, with knowledge flowing from technical experts to farmers. Grace
Chitanda, the government hydrologist quoted in the Citizen article from which we began,
underscored the need to educate rural people about how to protect the watershed. Yet, in my
interviews with over 150 residents of the mountains, mostly smallholder farmers, nearly
everyone could recite the official scientific facts: trees protect water sources, generate rain, and
stop erosion. Lack of rain is due to local deforestation. This “knowledge” was repeated to me
nearly identically in most interviews across the three wards and at least eleven villages, by men
and women of all ages and educational levels:
There was more rain before…the major reason is human activities. Before, that
area up there was covered completely by forest, a very big [forest]…but because
of human activities, the forest [disappeared] (Hosain Shomari Kiyega, interview,
April 11, 2018).
The weather has changed…because [before], people were not numerous, so there
were even forests here, it was the opposite of what you see today. Now we have
very intense heat, and there are many people.…the reason [there is less rain now]
is deforestation. We get rain, but not as much [as before] (Mwishehe Juma, April
11, 2018).
We cut a lot of trees. We moved the rain. We cut a lot of trees (Ali Mohamedi
Ng'omanga, interview, October 4, 2018).
Before, people didn’t burn the forests. Before there was a lot of rain…. But now
people are burning the forests…. Rain is scarce…. [Before] we were protecting
the forests, we were caring for the forests…. People were caring for the sources of
water (Frank Lukas Majikupwe, interview, October 29, 2018).
Forests have declined and people have increased. People are cutting the trees. [For
this reason] there is less rain (Furaha Athani, October 29, 2018).
The rain has diminished, it’s not like before…because people cut the trees
(Abdallah Ramadhani Kambi, interview, November 5, 2018).
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When I asked people how they knew about the relationship between forest loss and changes in
rain, most said they had been taught in school or that it had been explained by the government,
but many also cited their own experiential knowledge and that of parents and grandparents who
told them about changes to the landscape. Whether people believed in these connections or were
simply offering what they thought was the “correct” answer in the context of our conversation
does not matter (although I think most did genuinely believe in the connection, even if they felt
there may be other reasons, such as loss of mila). What is important here is that even though
development projects often emphasize the need to educate villagers, the information they hope to
convey about the dangers of tree cutting and burning is already common knowledge in Uluguru.
As Green points out, development paradigms have typically posited a link between
knowledge, agency, and behavior-change (2014: 40). Because rural people in Uluguru do not
behave in ways that the government and development personnel understand as correct to protect
the watershed, the latter infer a lack of adequate knowledge among rural communities.
Education, then, becomes a perpetual solution, even though almost all village residents are
familiar with mainstream scientific ideas about deforestation, desertification, soil erosion,
watershed protection, and related topics. As development scholars have long noted, development
tends toward “technical solutions” rather than structural ones (Li 2007: 2). Education is not only
one of the cheapest technical solutions, but also serves to reinscribe the role of experts and expert
knowledge in development practices not only in planning but in implementation. However, this
does not suggest that civil servants and development professionals are ignorant of the broader
structural pressures that compel households to cut down trees, burn brush, or farm along
riverbanks. When I spoke to the agricultural officer in Mkuyuni about challenges facing the
community, he lamented the cutting of fruit trees for timber, which he saw as sacrificing long-
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term income for short-term cash flow. But, he said, people made these decisions because of
“economic pressure.” Most people simply could not wait for slow returns and had few
alternatives to meet immediate cash needs (personal communication, October 24, 2018). Like
him, many civil servants and NGO staff do understand the structural factors that impede their
attempts to change local behavior, but bringing structural change is more difficult than offering a
seminar—and agitating for structural change is, generally, not part of their job description.
Educating rural people has been a major point of intervention since the colonial period.
However, this education does not cover all knowledge, only that deemed useful in pushing
farmers to alter the behaviors identified as threats to the watershed or the environment or as
hindrances to “development.” While nearly everyone I interviewed explained local causes for
changes in rainfall patterns, only two smallholders also brought up issues of global climate
change. Both men were viewed as local agricultural experts who often attended agricultural
extension programs and disseminated agricultural knowledge to others in the community, but
each told me they had learned about global climate change not at an in-person extension training
but rather on the radio. Knowledge about global warming was not emphasized in government or
nongovernmental extension programs and where mentioned, was usually discussed in the context
of adaptation and preparation, not to cultivate political subjects who might organize and act on a
broader scale.
Nevertheless, farmers in Uluguru repeatedly made clear to me that a lack of knowledge
was not the problem. Many expressed strong desires to implement agricultural practices that
would protect the watershed, promote soil health, and bring rain. On example is Mzee Sipriani,
whose account of deforestation was examined in Chapter 2. When I asked him what could be
done to repair the rains, he replied, “It’s necessary to restore the trees.” However, he said for this
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to be possible, the government would need to provide seedlings (Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko,
interview, October 22, 2018). Others similarly told me that tree planting was important to restore
rains but suggested it would be difficult to get most people to participate without involvement
from the government. A number of farmers, especially slightly wealthier farmers, youth, and
progressive farmers were interested in the possibility of tree crops, such as teak. 8 However, some
felt that timber trees were not a good solution to combat deforestation and loss of rain because
they would be cut. For example, a woman in her late 30s in Kibwaya told us that these days,
youth were planting a lot of timber crops. Later, she told us rain had declined and that to restore
its health, people should plant trees. However, when I asked whether the trees the youth were
planting might be helping, she said no. “Those trees you just plant for a period. After ten years,
you cut them. What we need is to plant a forest. In this area, there is no forest” (Amina Hamisi,
interview, December 27, 2018). Permanent trees appeared to provide greater possibilities, but
low prices for fruits made planting fruit trees a risky option. Indeed, Mkuyuni is rich with fruit
trees already and fruits are the main cash crops for the region. However, low prices mean that
large numbers of fruits are simply disposed of without sale. Jackfruits and mangoes litter the
ground in some seasons. Spices offered better returns but upfront expenses, lack of access to
basic processing technology, and poor market access made this option difficult as well. Overall,
farmers wanted better market access, price supports, the construction of basic processing
facilities, and other concrete measures that would allow them to make a living from growing tree
crops: fruits, spices, and timber.

The composition of those who expressed this suggests that this was seen as a relatively higher cost choice at the
outset but one with the potential for long-term returns.
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“Water is the Soul of Humanity”
I met Sadiki Kassim Ndevu at the center of Ludewa Village, halfway up the mountain
between Mkuyuni and Kinole. An energetic man in his 40s, he led me behind a half-constructed
building, out of earshot of the men hanging around the shops, and immediately launched into a
detailed explanation of his work as chairman of the new Water User Association. His account
was marked by a sense of urgency and frustration, and it was a few minutes before I was able to
interrupt to ask for permission to record our conversation. The WUA, which follows a
topographic rather than administrative geography, includes eleven villages along the Mbezi
River. A training was held in March 2018, to which each village council sent three
representatives. These thirty-three representatives elected Ndevu chairman. During our
interview, Ndevu spoke passionately about the need to protect the water catchment for the future
of communities in the mountains and downstream, and he took his responsibility as WUA
chairman very seriously, expressing personal responsibility for the health of the river. “Water is
the soul of humanity,” he said. At the same time, he described his position as WUA president as
fundamentally impossible, marked by logistical challenges and broader contradictions
(interview, December 28, 2018).
He described his job as preserving, protecting, and caring for sources of water. One
component of this work, he said, was educating community members about what they should not
do, especially farming close to the riverbanks, mining gold, and washing clothes or vehicles in
the river. People were also forbidden to use irrigation or redirect water without a permit. He had
visited mosques, churches, and schools to teach about how to protect the river and had worked to
educate people individually and in groups. He often tried to intervene when he saw violations of
water policy, threatening people with fines. However, he said, most of these rules “had no teeth,”
and were impossible to enforce, both because of a lack of enforcement mechanisms and because
260

the rules were so broad as to essentially make life in the catchment impossible, were they to be
followed to the letter. Moreover, local politicians were undermining his work, promising an end
to the rules in exchange for votes in the then-upcoming 2020 elections. 9
The central government, Ndevu said, tended to prioritize urban needs and to ignore the
problems in rural areas. Because their concern was primarily about the downstream supply, they
made broad rules against “human activities” (shughuli za kibinadamu) in upstream rural areas
like Uluguru. When asked what people in rural areas should do, however, the government was
largely silent. After all, all run-off from washing or agriculture would ultimately end up in the
river, sending pollution downstream, even if the activity was done away from the river itself.
Ultimately, Ndevu described his job as impossible. Despite his efforts to stop people from
breaking the rules, he knew full implementation would make life untenable, and he had no
solutions to offer. In addition, Ndevu complained that the wealthy tended to act as if they were
above the law, leaving the poor to shoulder the brunt of regulations and work. Overall, he
described the burden of environmental issues flowing from urban to rural and from the rich to the
poor.
However, the resources that should be dedicated to alleviating these burdens, Ndevu
noted, were absent. He remarked that his work was “dangerous” and that he was called to handle
conflicts over eleven villages. These villages, while all within a few kilometers on a map, sit at
vastly different elevations on rugged terrain and to reach them, you must either walk several
hours on foot or hire a motorcycle for few thousand shillings—more than a day’s earnings for
many in the hills. He had no budget for these travels. He also wanted to plant trees, as had been
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In the end, the 2020 local elections in Uluguru were uncontested due to a nationwide boycott by opposition parties.
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encouraged in his training, but he had no budget to purchase saplings. The World Bank gives
money to Tanzania to protect water, he said, but none reached the village:
SKN: At the meetings, many times, I have asked: “you all have cars to make
visits that cost four million, six million shillings. I am doing difficult work to visit
all the sources of water at my own expense. What if I got even a motorcycle, a
million, two million shillings? I would be successful. It’s possible!”
JF: Are you paid for your work?
SKN: I’m not paid.
JF: Even a little?
SKN: Not one cent (senti)!
He described his work as “kazi kubwa” (“a big job”), which straddled ministries of water,
irrigation, agriculture, and even health, since the disposal of medicine was also a potential source
of pollution. This work was not only unpaid, but indeed, was carried out at Ndevu’s expense.
While scholars have critiqued participatory models of resource management like
participatory forest management and WUAs as serving as mere window-dressing for the
continued centralization of power and resources, Ndevu’s account shows us that this is not all
these programs achieve. Rather, they also serve as a site for the extraction of unpaid ecological
labor, not only from WUA representatives like Ndevu but all those in the catchment who have
been tasked with changing their own agricultural practices, planting trees, learning beekeeping,
cleaning up pollutants, or terracing. This is, in some ways, a continuation of the long extraction
of unpaid labor under the guise of “community development” outlined above, in which, since the
late colonial period, rural Tanzanians have been expected to contribute labor and resources in
lieu of adequate funding from the central government. However, as a focus on the catchment lays
bare, this labor does not only serve the community itself. Rather, the benefits of this ecological
labor, the water it purportedly protects, are understood to accrue downstream.
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This work is done under threat of eviction. As van Koppen et al. (2016: 601) point out,
“the overwhelming majority of informal water users in Tanzania [are] de jure criminals” under
current water laws. Because these laws have focused on surface water, assumed to be a zero-sum
game, eviction threats have been most serious in areas that practice informal irrigation. This is
not the case in Mkuyuni, where a small amount of furrow and hosepipe irrigation is visible but
only used by a small minority of farms. However, Choma Village, high in northern Uluguru,
where hosepipe irrigation is widespread, did face an order of eviction in 2006 (Harrison and
Mdee 2017). Choma was vulnerable both because of the widespread use of irrigation and
because of its location directly above Morogoro. Water shortages in Morogoro city provided the
impetus for eviction. Because this water supply was relatively local, reaching the town just at the
base of the mountains, drawing connections between urban shortages and specific upstream
villages such as Choma was more straightforward than tracing links between eastern Uluguru
and Dar es Salaam. 10 In the end, the residents of Choma averted eviction by appealing, with the
help of SUA faculty, directly to the Prime Minister. This drew the situation to the attention of
President Jakaya Kikwete, who forbade the eviction unless adequate compensation for the
relocated villagers could be raised, which proved beyond the capacity of the Morogoro municipal
government. However, Kikwete’s intervention left the door open for future attempts at eviction.
Especially in view of the Tanzanian government’s long history of mass evictions, fears of more
largescale evictions from the mountains persist (Harrison and Mdee 2017: 417–418).

It is unclear whether the shortages were in fact due primarily to water usage patterns in Choma or whether they
were an effect of the expansion of urban Morogoro on the lower slopes. In other words, what made Choma an easy
target was not the ability of the government to definitively prove the cause of the water shortages, but rather the
relative simplicity of constructing a narrative linking Choma to shortages in Morogoro town (Harrison and Mdee
2017: 417).
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The extraction of ecological labor, however, is not made explicit. It is obscured through
programs that promote “participatory” resource management, but which engage in centralized
knowledge dissemination and top-down planning. It is further hidden from view by persistent
understandings about the relationship between forests and humans in Tanzania. The study by
Sungusia, Lund and Ngaga (2020) noted the persistent belief that forests and human settlement
are naturally distinct and that humans can only serve to threaten the forest equilibrium. They
write:
Students [of forestry at SUA] believe that any divergence from their imagined
climax community—large and mature trees—is an indication of human
disturbance. Proper forest management to them equals keeping people out, so that
trees can grow to maturity and thus research their imagined climax community
(361).
Chapter 1 highlighted the inability of European explorers and colonial administrators to
recognize signs of agroforestry in Uluguru. Instead, they remarked upon the clusters of “wild”
fruit trees near human settlements as a sign of natural abundance. Human habitation was marked
by areas without trees, leading the German naturalist Stuhlmann (Chapter 1) to believe that much
of the drier areas of Uluguru had been subject to massive deforestation. Tanzania’s short period
of enthusiasm for agroforestry notwithstanding, these assumptions persist today, leading the
WRRBO officers to the paradoxical position that planting fruit trees was not a human activity.
In contrast to these views, research since the 1980s has highlighted the importance of
humans in managing forest ecosystems long considered “wild” and “natural” (Balée 1989, 2013;
Fairhead and Leach 1996). By rendering human activity as only harmful to forest ecosystems
and watersheds, the forest and water policies that dominate state and international intervention in
Uluguru render the labor of planting and tending trees, protecting water sources, and supporting
diverse ecosystems invisible. Demands placed upon smallholders emphasize the reception of
knowledge (a passive act) and the cessation of harmful activities (a lack of action). However,
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these policies in fact demand much more significant forms of labor, including travelling further
for water and wood, planting and maintaining trees, and implementing anti-erosion measures
such as terracing and clearing fields without burning. Such activities are also often gendered as
the feminization of agriculture and the deagrarianization of young men shift burdens related to
agriculture and care of the land increasingly onto women (Bryceson 1996; Deere 2005).
Moreover, the material basis of this labor is precarious. The threat of eviction means control over
land in fundamentally insecure. Cash from participatory programs is limited at best and unlikely
to be received by the most vulnerable (Vyamana 2009). Like other forms of reproductive labor,
this ecological labor is often erased in official accounts, uncompensated, and drawn out under
conditions of coercion that threaten the continuation of communities themselves.
Ecosystem Services
One attempt to manage these dynamics has been the implementation of Payment for
Ecosystem Services (PES) projects in Uluguru. The PES framework attempts to account for the
uneven distribution of environmental costs and benefits through direct payments to those
identified as managers or owners of natural resources. In a watershed framework, this means
implementing a system through which downstream water users pay upstream watershed residents
to undertake measures that are understood to protect and improve flows and water quality. The
concept of “ecosystem services,” along with the closely related concept of “natural capital,”
came to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s (Costanza and Daly 1992; Costanza et al. 1997;
Daily 1997a; Daly 1992; De Groot 1992; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; Gómez-Baggethun et al.
2010). Originally developed as a pedagogical tool aimed at educating the public about the value
of “nature” and as an attempt to make space for environmental concerns in the pro-market
ideologies that had come to dominate many international policy circles, the idea of ecosystem
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services emphasized not the work of humans tending the environment, but rather “services”
provided by non-human entities such as plants and even soils (Balmford et al. 2002; Daily
1997b; Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Grimes et al. 1994). By the late 1990s, the idea began to
take hold in policy and development circles and its inclusion in the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment in 2005 cemented its mainstream status. PES was lauded for its potential to assistant
with poverty alleviation in addition to bringing positive environmental change (Daily 1997c;
Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Grieg-Gran, Porras and Wunder 2005; Pagiola 2008; Wunder
2005). Some also hoped that the ecosystem services framework could address global inequality,
with a few early proponents noting that because benefits from ecosystem services accrue in
wealthier countries, Global North countries should transfer funds to the Global South to offset
these costs (Balmford and Whitten 2003; James, Gatson and Balmford 1999).
Uluguru was the site of an early PES pilot project implemented by CARE International
and WWF Tanzania which began in 2005 and centered on Kibungo Juu high in the southeastern
mountains. Although the project was intended to be the first stage of a larger program that would
be implemented across the mountains, it was discontinued after the pilot period, largely due to
lack of willing downstream purchasers. The project was conducted under the assumption that
declining flows downstream, along with increased turbidity, were caused, at least in part, by soil
erosion and loss of tree cover high in the mountains, although a report on the project noted “a
lack of firm evidence” to back this assumption (Lopa et al. 2012: 37). 11 When I spoke to a

The hydrological data presented has left open several critical questions. Most importantly, measurements showing
declining flows were taken at the Morogoro Road Bridge, which the article describes as “mid-way between Uluguru
and Dar es Salaam” but which is closer to the latter both in terms of the river’s route and as the crow flies. As such,
flow measurements there capture not only changes that originate high in the mountains but also significant lowland
agricultural and residential usage between. It is also noteworthy that the article suggests there has been no
discernable change in rainfall over the same period (1950s–2000s), thus presumably eliminating global climate
change as a major factor. However, rainfall data used is a dry season average of three stations in the Ruvu Basin (not
specified), even though rainfall varies significantly within the mountains and between the mountains and the
surrounding lowlands (where these measurements were likely taken, given the lack of a continuously monitored
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former staff member on the project, Acquiline Wamba, she told me that out of a desire to avoid
colonial-era mistakes by simply giving orders, the project began with a period of research in
which project staff asked community members about their needs. Ultimately, the project secured
an agreement from two major downstream water users, the Dar es Salaam Water Company
(DAWASCO) and Coca Cola Kwanza Limited, to pay for services rendered upstream, with
CARE, WWF, and village authorities acting as intermediaries. The upstream “services”
consisted of the construction of terraces (bench and fanya juu fanya chini), tree planting
(reforestation and agroforestry), the cultivation of grass strips, and “riparian restoration.” Tree
species used included a mix of timber and fruit trees, most of them exotics but with several
indigenous species also included. In addition to payments, farmers were provided with extension
services and were encouraged to use organic inputs such as fertilizer, although inputs were not
directly provided. Payments themselves were calculated on the basis of opportunity costs
associated with removing land from productive use during the first year alongside labor costs
calculated at a rate of USD 1.20 per day, the local rate of day labor at the time (Lopa et al. 2012;
Acquiline Wamba, personal communication, December 17, 2018).
While PES programs such as this may appear to compensate residents of Uluguru for
their labor in tending for the environment, the truth is more complex. Payments were directly
tied to land ownership and all payments, including those intended to compensate for labor, went
to the owner of each plot regardless of who carried out the work of planting or construction.
Despite the explicit concerns of the institutions that initiated the program with question of
poverty alleviation, it was ultimately have found to have primarily benefited middle-income

weather station in the mountains themselves). Moreover, averages obscure changes in distribution such as greater
concentration of rainfall in fewer days, which many of my informants reported and which could lead to higher levels
of erosion. In addition, declines in forest cover in the mountains in recent decades have been concentrated in the
northeast, far from the project’s target area of Kibungo Juu (Burgess et al. 2002; Lopa et al. 2012).
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farmers and to exclude the poorest in the community, who were typically landless. 12 Women and
youth were at a particular disadvantage due to lower rates of land ownership, and indeed, women
only accounted for one-third of official project participants. Moreover, households were left to
determine how to carry out the labor of terracing and tree planting and the individual recorded as
owning the land was entrusted with all payments. Notably, the project did not rely on formal
titling, which is rare in Uluguru, but it did require an individual to be designated as a de facto
owner. Those who worked on the project noted that this process seemed to favor men in cases of
joint land ownership. It also excluded land held in trust by lineages (Lopa et al. 2012; Acquiline
Wamba, personal communication, December 17, 2018). Because rented land was also excluded,
landowners were also motivated to expel renters or borrowers, leading to a loss of land access for
some (Mndeme 2016). Chapters 1 and 2 showed that associating land with exchange values and
cash income, favoring individual over collective tenure, the construction of terraces and tree
planting all served to undermine lineage land ownership and matrilineal inheritance. It is likely
that the PES project had a similar effect in Kibungo Juu, shifting some of the remaining lineage
lands to individual forms of tenure (George Kajembe, personal communication, July 2016).
The prioritization of land ownership over labor in PES is the result of two related moves:
first, the neoclassical economic practice of collapsing of nature into the category of “capital” and
basing its valuation in terms of production and second, the rendering of ecological labor as
largely nonexistent or at best marginal to the question of ecosystem services. Scholars of
ecosystem services and natural capital have pointed out the role of nature in processes such as
the production of clean water and air, which are fundamental to social reproduction. However, in

Poverty alleviation was an explicit aim of the program, and indeed, Lopa et al. (2012) explain that being at or
below the poverty line was a prerequisite when the site was selected, although they do not explain how poverty at
the community level was calculated.
12
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their attempts to calculate values, scholars of ecosystem services focus almost exclusively on
productive potential. For instance, in her influential volume, Gretchen Daily wrote, “the erosion
control service will appear less valuable in regions where low-priced subsistence crops are
grown than in areas where high-priced cash crops for export are produced, all else equal” (1997c:
367). PES is conceptualized as a payment to an owner of “natural capital” to compensate them
for limiting extraction or destruction, which would otherwise generate returns on the investment,
and some of its leading proponents have argued forcefully against the idea that PES could or
should serve as a “just reward for poor rural people who take care of the environment and
continuously produce environmental services” (Wunder 2007: 53). 13 In short, PES is designed to
transfer rents (understood as returns on investment) to landowning classes (understood as
investors), based on the profits they could otherwise derive by extracting and depleting their
natural capital.
The second, related move, relies upon the rendering invisible of ecological labor. As
noted above, “ecosystem services” were originally conceptualized as services rendered by
“nature,” independently of human labor. Humans feature in these processes primarily in the form
of “disturbance” or “disruption” (Daily 1997b; Daly 1992; Costanza et al. 1997). In this way, the
literature on ecosystem services has tended to maintain a distinction between “nature” and
humans, despite the simultaneous emergence of work in historical and political ecology showing
the role of human labor and knowledge in creating and maintaining ecosystems previously
thought of as “natural” (Amanor 1994; Balée 1989, 2013; Fairhead and Leach 1996; Fraser,
Leach and Fairhead 2014; Johannes 1989; Scoones 1999). While there were a few early attempts
to bring these two bodies of work into conversation, the results tended to focus on cultural
For an example of an approach to PES that centers labor, see van Noordwijk, Chandler and Tomich (2004: 27–
28). However, such ideas never became mainstream within PES programs.
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institutions as providing limits or solutions to the “tragedy of the commons” (Berkes and Folke
1992; Constanza and Folke 1997; Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990). 14 When the concept of
“ecosystem services” found its way into policy circles, the same assumptions typically followed.
Even where it was acknowledged that PES would in some cases require labor, this was
overwhelmingly viewed as restoration of ecosystems damaged by human activity (Wunder 2005,
2006). This was the case with implementation in Uluguru (Lopa et al. 2012). In short, PES does
not compensate for ecological labor. It obscures it.
Agroecology, Ancestors, and Epistemologies of Delinking
While PES has struggled to take root in the mountains, another approach to managing
ecological and agrarian concerns has emerged: agroecology and related forms of agroforestry. At
the time of my research, agroecological approaches to farming appeared to be of growing interest
to both smallholder farmers and progressive development NGOs in Tanzania. The term
agroecology typically refers to agricultural practices that prioritize biodiversity and sustainability
in agriculture, for example through mulching, the use of cover crops, intercropping, and the use
of organic fertilizers and pesticides in place of chemical ones. Agroecological practices are
typically low-input, labor-intensive, and suited to small-scale cultivation, although not
exclusively so (Altieri 1989, 1995, 2009; Gliessman 2000; Mdee et al. 2018; Wezel et al. 2009).
While the term dates to the late 1920s, agroecology gained prominence globally first as a field of
study and then as a social movement in the wake of the Green Revolution which brought heavily
industrialized forms of agriculture to much of the Global South in the 1950s and 1960. The
Green Revolution dramatically increased yields in many regions, including parts of Tanzania, but
These works primarily engaged with work from historical ecology rather than political ecology, and thus tended to
downplay or overlook questions of politics (Fraser, Leach and Fairhead 2014). For a similar attempt to bring
together ecological economics and the “new ecology” at this time, though outside the “ecosystem services”
literature, see Peterson (2000).
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it came under significant criticism for causing widespread environmental and social ills. In
particular, the high-input approach to agriculture adopted during the Green Revolution tended to
favor the increasing concentration of land in fewer hands, resulting in landlessness and growing
inequality along lines of class and gender (Agarwal 1994; Byers 1981; Dawson, Martin and
Sikor 2016; Griffin 1979; Holt-Giménez and Shattuck 2011: 110; Rasmussen 1986). For those
critical of Green Revolution-style industrial agriculture, agroecology has offered an alternative
pathway for agrarian transformation (Mdee et al. 2018: 2–4; Wezel et al. 2009: 505).
Agroforestry, for its part, can refer to a wide range of agriculture systems in which crops and
trees coexist (Leaky 1996; Nair 1993). It is not necessarily agroecological (Ollinaho and Kröger
2021), but in eastern Uluguru agroecology and agroforestry often go hand in hand.
Farming techniques associated with agroforestry and agroecology have a long history in
Uluguru. As Chapter 1 discussed, early European visitors to the mountains described patterns of
plant growth that are consistent with agroforestry, although they often mistook cultivated forest
farms for signs of natural abundance. At the time of my research, many farmers in Mkuyuni
maintained fruit trees on their farms and grew grains, vegetables, and root crops below.
Likewise, farmers in Uluguru employed practices like crop rotation, the planting of cover crops,
and the use of organic inputs long before explicit discussions of “agroecology” and “organic
farming” began to circulate widely (Jones 1999; Miyashita 2015). Such methods have been
attractive to smallholders in the mountains because the cost of inputs is low, because growing a
variety of crops can bolster against both ecological and market volatility, and because such
practices have proven useful in maintaining healthy soils and slowing erosion.
Interest in agroecology, agroforestry, and organic farming has begun to grow in
progressive development circles in Africa in recent years, in part as a reaction against the Gates
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Foundation-funded Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and related pushes for
high-input, commercial farming across the continent (Altieri 2009; Holt-Giménez 2008; HoltGiménez and Shattuck 2011; Mdee et al. 2018; Monjane 2018). In eastern Uluguru at the time of
my research, the main organization involved in agroecology was Sustainable Agriculture
Tanzania (SAT), a local NGO that supports the creation of farmers’ cooperatives to grow organic
crops. 15 SAT has been active in Uluguru since 2009 and uses participatory approaches to build
on and support existing livelihood strategies in the mountains (Mdee et al. 2014; Mdee et al.
2018; Joel Paul, personal communication, October 24, 2018). In October 2018, I met with a
young SAT staff member named Joel Paul in a café on the main road in Mkuyuni to discuss
SAT’s work. The organization begins a project by carrying out Participatory Rural Appraisal, he
told me, in which SAT staff listen to the needs and challenges identified by those farmers who
have expressed interest in forming a cooperative. Staff then work with farmers to develop a plan
to address as many of those needs as possible. The organization helps cooperatives get access to
credit and to develop bylaws and organizationL structures. It also provides training in
agroecological practices, marketing, crop processing, and entrepreneurial skills like record
keeping. Finally, it assists with market access by certifying products as organic, facilitating
meetings with buyers, and purchasing 25% of the produce directly from each group (Joel Paul,
personal communication, October 24, 2018).
A few weeks after I met with Joel, I attended a meeting of an SAT group in the lush
valley of Gomba at the border of Mkuyuni and Kibwaya. I had been invited by SAT’s local
Several other organizations which support agroecology were also active, including Mtandao wa Vikundi vya
Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA), the Tanzanian member organization to Via Campesina, and Participatory
Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM), a network of farmer cooperatives who work on land and ecology
issues in eastern and southern Africa. However, MVIWATA membership in Mkuyuni was small and their projects
limited (Ally R. Madenge, personal communication, December 22, 2018). PELUM carried out a land-use planning
project in several villages in the area around the time of my research but this work focused more on land rights than
agroecology (Anna Marwa, personal communication, December 21, 2018).
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“farmer facilitator,” Msakuzi Iddi. A native of Kibwaya with a primary school education,
Msakuzi had become a leader with SAT due to his enthusiasm for improving local agriculture
and the wide knowledge he had developed on the topic. Six women and seventeen men attended
the meeting, which was loosely structured and facilitated by several of the group’s leaders. 16 One
man who had attended an SAT training reported back with more information about the
organization’s broader activities and about potential financial support available for groups like
theirs. Next, a woman spoke about how the group needed to set a good example for the
community to show them what a cooperative could be. Others agreed. A discussion ensued about
purchasing a small farm on which to begin growing spices, but the group agreed more research
was necessary. The group then asked if I had anything to discuss. After explaining my research, I
asked them how the environment in the area had changed. Most agreed that the weather had
gotten hotter and drier due to the cutting of trees in the area. When I asked if there were other
factors, Msakuzi explained that emissions from factories worldwide were also changing the
climate. The group nodded. Although I had asked nearly everyone I interviewed in Uluguru this
question, this was only one of two times someone had mentioned global factors as a potential
cause of climate change. After the meeting, I walked to back to Mkuyuni with Msakuzi, who was
enthusiastic that we might find ways to work together in the future. He told me he found cloves
to be a particularly promising crop because once established, the trees were permanent and
relatively easy to maintain. Growing cloves would thus increase tree cover and provide farmers
with a potentially high-value crop. Of course, he explained, it was difficult to get a fair price
from middlemen, which why it was important to do marketing research, establish many
connections, and develop capacity for basic processing which would add value.
The gender imbalance at this meeting stands in contrast to SAT data, which show higher levels of women’s
participation in their programs (Mdee et al. 2018).
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As noted above, participatory approaches have been subject to criticism, including
critiques that they are often used to generate a sense of community consensus without
meaningfully incorporating community input and that they are highly vulnerable to elite capture.
The parameters of participation in projects like these are often narrow, with the overarching
goals rarely open to challenge. SAT appeared to me to be more responsive to farmer concerns
than many other organizations touting participatory approaches, but it also had a specific agenda:
supporting the cooperative farming of organic cash crops. More broadly, SAT avoided many of
the pitfalls of Water User Associations and participatory forest management projects because
engagement with SAT was voluntary and not at the level of the wider community. This also
means SAT was limited in its impact. It could help bring agroecology to individual farm plots
but the management of common resources like village forests or water was beyond its scope. 17
For related reasons, the SAT cooperatives I observed did not seem to be targets for elite capture.
The farming SAT promotes requires high levels of labor, making it largely unappealing to those
who can invest in non-agricultural activities or larger commercial farms outside of the
mountains. Instead, participants in the groups I observed were mostly middle-income farmers. 18
Agroecological approaches like those promoted by SAT can result in increased yields and
profits for farmers. They are also growing in popularity among farmers because of increasing
concerns that food produced with chemical inputs may be harmful to health (Mdee et al. 2018;
Miyashita 2015). Several people during my research attributed perceived increases in disease in

SAT was involved in advocating for water rights for villagers in Choma during their conflict with the Morogoro
municipal water authority described above (Harrison and Mdee 2017; Mdee et al. 2018).
18
My observations of SAT groups were limited and I did not gather data on participants’ socioeconomic status
beyond my observations at meetings and informal conversations with group members. I cannot say whether my
observations reflect SAT participation more broadly but SAT’s own data suggests a range of low- and middleincome farmers have participated in their programs (Mdee et al. 2018; Miyashita 2015).
17
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the area to the abandonment of traditional/natural foods (“vyakula vya asili”). 19 In addition,
while such farming practices and indeed agriculture in general are still associated with
backwardness for many Tanzanians, institutional support and growing global discourses around
agroecology and organic farming have begun to reframe these approaches as progressive and to
attribute more value to longstanding forms of agroecological knowledge (Mdee et al. 2018).
Institutionally supported cooperatives were only one way in which farmers sought to
maintain a healthy environment through agriculture. As we have seen, practices now glossed
agroecology and agroforestry have been continually employed in Uluguru since the mountains
were settled several centuries ago. In her research across 20 villages in Uluguru, Chie Miyashita
(2015) found that three-fourths of farmers who were not engaged in NGO-run agroecology
programs nevertheless practiced intercropping and used cover crops, while only one in five used
chemical fertilizers and pesticides. This finding is consonant with my observations in Mkuyuni.
As discussed above, many I spoke with also expressed strong support for tree-planting although
most said they were limited in their capacity to do so without financial and logistical support
such as the provision of saplings by the state.
At the time of my research, Mzee Abdallah Ally Rufezuwa, the brother of Bibi Zaina,
was widely regarded in Mkuyuni as the most knowledgeable person on local history. He became
one of my most important interlocutors and I frequently dropped by his house to discuss my
research. In addition to his work as a farmer, Mzee Rufezuwa cultivated and sold saplings in
Kivuma, Mkuyuni, and Morogoro city. One day, in August 2018, I stopped by his home to
discuss traditional healing. I mentioned that I had heard from some healers that the loss of forests
also meant a loss of access to medicine. He said this was true and then began showing me some
Duni Waziri Kibena, personal communication, June 23, 2018; Sadik Seleman, Shukuru Hossien, Nari Joseph,
Fadhiri Waziri, Ramadhani Ally Tunda, and Ramadhani Bakali, interview, January 8, 2019.
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of his saplings, which included medicinally important species that had become rare in the area.
Later in our conversation, I mentioned stories I had heard about people living and farming
beneath the earth and asked if these people were mizimu. He said yes, and that these spirits also
lived in trees, especially those species associated with powerful medicines. On his own land,
Rufezuwa maintained a variety of trees for fruit, medicine, and shade, interspersed with other
crops.
Expanding upon the work of Samir Amin, Max Ajl (2020) has suggested that
agroecology can serve as a space of “delinking” because it allows for choices that incorporate
ecological use values alongside market-based exchange values:
By not merely aggregating all agricultural technologies and their output effects,
we can think of technological choice and its relationship to ecology as part of the
delinking strategy…. They involve a series of short-term and long-term trade-offs
between productivity, eco-system, and human health, and biospheric and socioecological resilience. By giving more consideration to ‘traditional’ technologies,
we may think of the popular law of value not merely in productivist terms, but as
rooted in a holistic production of use values—including, of course, the ultimate
use value: the ecology within agriculture rests. Such a move allows for a rupture
with the law of capitalist value, breaking with its technology and breaking with its
epistemology, and truly taking local knowledges as the base for a new
development from below, appropriately informed by modern science, but as a
method of investigation and experiment rather than one necessarily bound to the
specific capitalist technologies with which it is often bundled (5).
Use value is the domain of social reproduction. Delinking in this sense would allow for the
values of social reproduction to exist alongside and not inherently subordinate to, those of
exchange. This vision stands in sharp contrast to PES, which seeks to resolve the tension
between environmental sustainability and capitalist production by collapsing nature into
exchange value. It also contrasts with PES because, far from seeing forests and farms as opposed
domains, it views “human activities” (and human labor) as potentially positive for the cultivation
of healthy ecosystems.
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However, agroecological approaches are not inherently grounded in a “delinking” from
the global market, and their ability to incorporate other regimes of value cannot be taken for
granted. Indeed, the use of agroecology in initiatives that aim to build “resilience” to climate
change highlight the ways in which agroecology can become another site for the extraction of
ecological labor and the redistribution of responsibility for environmental ills toward the Global
South and the rural poor. Holt-Giménez, Shattuck and Van Lammeren (2021) have recently
shown that using agroecological techniques without a political program that addresses inequality
and injustice may reproduce inequitable and unsustainable social conditions. 20 In such situations,
both ecological labor and “local” knowledge can be extracted and used to subsidize and expand
capitalist cycles of production.
For Amin and Ajl, delinking rests on three mutually reinforcing pillars: the rejection of
exchange values set by the global market as the basis for economic choices, a political program
of redistributive and egalitarian reform, and an epistemological opening up in which knowledge
and technology are developed in accordance with the new value regime (Ajl 2020: 4; Amin
1990: 60). SAT, like many organizations that promote agroecology, has centered the practice’s
potential to increase yields and incomes. It suggests that this increased productivity on market
terms can go hand in hand with less soil erosion, more efficient water usage, and increasing tree
cover, albeit at the cost of a significant expenditure of labor (Mdee et al. 2018). This continued
centering of exchange value is not surprising; farmers must engage with the market to meet their
own needs and an organization such as SAT that aims to raise standards of living would be
remiss to render such concerns secondary to environmental ones. Rather, what this limitation

Scholars have made similar critiques of “resilience” discourse in general, which extends beyond agroecology (e.g.
Béné et al. 2014; Felli 2016; Reid 2012; Ribot 2011; Walker and Cooper 2010; Watts 2011).
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reveals is the need for a broader political program which would support agroecology as a site of
delinking.
Mzee Rufezuwa’s careful tending of both local history and Uluguru’s trees highlights the
continued inseparability of questions of human health, forests, spirits, and farming in discourses
of social healing. Agroecology and agroforestry offer frameworks for understanding society and
nature not as separate spheres but as overlapping and interlinked. The discourses of social
healing and the mizimu spirits who reside in trees also suggest the inseparability of humans and
forests. Mizimu, “those who died long ago,” are bound up with the trees that bring rain and the
herbal medicines that heal the sick. However, these types of relationships remain largely
invisible to the development state and even to progressive, agroecology-focused organizations
like SAT. While NGOs and the state occasional note the use of forests for “ritual” purposes, they
do not explore content of these rituals, the relationships they entail and maintain, or the forms of
knowledge they enable. Yet, for many in Mkuyuni, such issues are neither irrelevant nor
incompatible with the scientific knowledge that links deforestation with an unstable climate or
agrochemicals with health concerns. Rather, they speak to the same issues—the contested but
vital concerns of social reproduction and social health. If delinking and agroecology converge in
an epistemological opening up, as Ajl tells us, this suggests not only a search for forms of “local
knowledge” legible to science, like the medicinal value of particular plants, but other ways of
knowing. Like science, the epistemologies of social healing are inflected by politics, and are
spaces of ongoing debate and change. They do not point toward a timeless and harmonious
relationship to nature, but they do suggest a regime where the supremacy of the values set by
global capitalism can be challenged. In this way, these epistemologies are not only important for
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their potential contributions to ecological and agricultural knowledge but for the kinds of politics
they make possible.
Kingalu’s GPS
The holder of the name Kingalu at the time of my research, Kingalu Mwanabanzi XV,
assumed the title in 2013 upon the death of his brother, Kingalu Mwanabanzi XIV. At the time
he inherited his position, Kingalu Mwanabanzi XV was living in Morogoro town and early in his
career, he hoped to remain in Morogoro, returning to Kinole only for ceremonial occasions. In
town, he was enmeshed in party politics and was rumored to spend time hobnobbing with
political elites. He also lived in a large, modern house and drove a Land Rover.
Prior to assuming his title, Kingalu had also converted to a heterodox sect of Islam
known as Ahmadiyya. 21 Ahmadiyya is known for its belief in continuing revelation, leading
many Muslims to view it as un-Islamic. The sect is also strongly opposed to the continued
practice of non-Islamic traditions, posing a direct conflict with Kingalu’s ritual duties. There are
a handful of members of Ahmadiyya in Uluguru, most attending a small mosque in Kibwaya.
The mosque was founded by the late Mwishehe Juma, who told me that he had personally helped
end the practice of ngoma in the area and that practicing matambiko was tantamount to
witchcraft. He expressed strong opposition to Sufi practices like hitima, ziara, and zikiri and to
the practices of traditional healers, taking a harder line than even most of the Ansar Sunna
followers I interviewed (interview, April 12, 2018). However, Kingalu had joined Ahmadiyya at
the main mosque in Morogoro town and his affiliation with the sect was little known and little
discussed in Mkuyuni. When I asked Kingalu about his religious affiliation, he told me openly

Ahmadiyya originates in Punjab and was originally brought to Morogoro town in the 1950s by self-described
“missionaries” from the group’s East African headquarters in Nairobi (Ahmed 1946; “Completed Certificate of
Occupancy” 1956).
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that he belonged to Ahmadiyya. When I asked about his predecessors, he shrugged and said he
thought they were all Ahmadiyya. However, Kingalu’s cousin Asman Kingalu Said Setembu,
introduced in Chapter 2 as the oldest member of the family and the keeper of much of Bena clan
knowledge tradition, told me he had openly criticized Kingalu’s affiliation with the sect and that
it had been a source of conflict in the family (personal communication, December 30, 2018).
Beyond the family, where people had become aware of the conversion, it was a source of
distrust, as people in the mountains wondered whether Kingalu would continue to carry out his
ritual obligations.
All this had brought Kingalu under fierce criticism from many in the mountains. Early in
our research, Gerald asked Mama Kimwe (see Chapter 2) if anyone could make rain. She said
no. “What about Kingalu?” he asked. She replied that there was no Kingalu. Confused, we said
we thought the position had been inherited. Yes, she admitted, but he lives in town and rides in a
car, so he’s not Kingalu. Plus, he’s messing around with politics. The old Kingalu didn’t leave
Kinole. Mwanahawa, an older woman and another of my key interlocutors, likewise remarked
that only tourists today would participate in Kingalu’s matambiko. “This new one rides in cars,”
she quipped. She also criticized the construction of buildings with metal roofs at Kinole. Halima
Musa, a woman in her 50s in Changa, told us that Kingalu had lost the ability to bring rain
because he had flouted tradition. In particular, he was known to stay at guest houses, angering
the mzimu. Ramadhani Jenera, who was once chairman of Mkuyuni, was also unconvinced of
Kingalu’s abilities, due to his absence from Kinole:
RJ: There [at Kingalu’s compound in Kinole], it is not allowed to build a house
with a metal roof. But the Kingalu who died [Kingalu XIV] built a big house
there.
[…]
JF: What are the consequences of this?
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RJ: He [Kingalu] says it goes with the times (“inaenda kwa wakati”).
JF: But he broke the taboos [miiko]?
RJ: Yes, he broke his taboos.
JF: What happens if you break the taboos?
RJ: You die. And he himself died.
[…]
JF: And the new Kingalu, has he broken taboos?
RJ: Yes, he doesn’t live there. He lives in Morogoro town. If he has any business,
he returns home [to Kinole].
JF: It breaks the taboo to live in town?
RJ: Yes, because ruling (utawala) means you are expected to stay right there [at
Kinole]. […]
JF: Does the new Kingalu have the ability to help people? With issues of rain,
with issues of sickness, does he have the ability?
RJ: He hasn’t shown it…. The one who died had the ability. The one who died
had that ability.
JF: Why can’t the new [Kingalu do these things]?
RJ: You know, ruling (utawala), you have work. For example, that one [Kingalu]
is the leader of the country [Uluguru]. I am not the leader. He is not here. I am
here, I stay here. (Ramadhani Jenera, interview, April 17, 2018).
As Mzee Jenera describes, Kingalu’s role is deeply connected to place and indeed, Kingalu’s
absence from Kinole was a common source of concern and anger. Chapter 1 described how the
nineteenth-century Kingalu Mwanashaa struggled to navigate conflicting sources of political
power, including his military strength, his role as a rainmaker, and his connections to Islam and
Indian Ocean trade networks. Kingalu Mwanashaa had also tried to avoid residence in Kinole,
building a new base in Mfumbwe before submitting to pressure to relocate (Alpers 2005).
Likewise, in the twentieth century, Kingalu Mwananguo sought to balance his role as a
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rainmaker with his bureaucratic position in the Native Authority by relocating to the primary
court at Mkuyuni. While Kingalu Mwanabanzi’s involvement in other forms of power is
different from his predecessors, linking him to the elites generated by neoliberalism and party
politics, his authority in the mountains remains inseparable from the sacred places that weave
kinship through the landscape.
While many critiques of Kingalu focus on his mobility and absence from Uluguru, the
metal roof on the ceremonial building at Kinole raises another set of issues. Around 90% of
houses in Mkuyuni Ward are roofed with corrugated metal and purchasing such a roof is a high
priority for most households. The building in question at Kinole, however, is a house for
ancestors who are used to thatch. Will these mizimu recognize the building and its new roof?
Will they stay or will they depart? For Kingalu, the metal roof offers protection for valuable
historical artifacts housed beneath it, allowing them to be preserved without the constant
maintenance required by thatch and without its inevitable leaks. But for those concerned about
the metal roof, these artifacts—lineage stools and other instruments of rainmaking and
matambiko—are living, material manifestations of social relationships, part of the kinship
networks and relations of care through which intergenerational relationships are maintained. The
ongoing work of tending to them requires not only presence in place but also deference to other
temporalities. The apparent contradiction—risking the preservation of sacred items in order to
preserve the architecture that surrounds them—can only be understood through the relationships
each entails.
For many, Kingalu’s behavior was a direct threat to social reproduction. Indeed, these
critiques echo the woman described in Chapter 1 who confronted Kingalu Mwanashaa in 1870
while he sat for his portrait by the visiting missionaries. Just as she warned him that his actions
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would bring illness and ecological catastrophe, contemporary critics link Kingalu’s absence and
his embeddedness in other forms of power as direct threats to the health of the land and its
people. As Abdallah Ali Kawambwa, a seventy-five year old man in Luholole, explained, loss of
control over the environment was linked both to the loss of forests and Kingalu’s loss of
knowledge and authority:
JF: Has the weather changed?
AAK: The weather has changed. It’s hotter than it used to be.
JF: Why?
AAK: The reason is like I said before, people have cut down the forests. This
leads to drought, and rain falls less often. Heat has increased.
JF: So rain has decreased?
AAK: Yes, rain has decreased.
[…]
JF: Is there anything people can do to restore the rain?
AAK: The ability has declined. The one who can bring rain is Kingalu. But now,
the situation with this Kingalu, he’s still a youth. He is caught up in his personal
affairs and modern things [mambo ya kisasa]…. He’s still a youth, he has no
ability…. Everything had to be forced on him. He tried to refuse. The name
Kingalu, he refused it, but he was compelled by his relatives [to take it]…. He
doesn’t like it (interview, October 9, 2018).
Kingalu, whose role was described by Mzee Jenera as work, is thus subject to similar criticisms
to the men discussed in Chapter 2 who refused to inherit their uncle’s names. Like these men,
Kingalu has threatened his community’s ability to control the environment by refusing to carry
out the work of tradition, leaving many, especially women, without recourse to heal the land.
However, during my time in Mkuyuni, public opinions about Kingalu began to shift.
Kingalu increased the time he spent in Kinole, visiting nearly every weekend, and sometimes
staying during the week. When I spoke to him, he was aware of the criticisms leveled at him,
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telling me that he had received explicit permission from the mzimu at Nguru to reside parttime in
Morogoro. He also told me that cars were not in fact forbidden and that prior Kingalus had not
ridden in them because the technology had not yet arrived, and not because of any mwiko.
Further, he explained that the new building with the metal roof was important for the safe
preservation of the important sacred items housed there, including the large collection of lineage
stools and several drums. Moreover, between our conversations in April and October 2018, he
seemed to become more fluent in his descriptions of his role and of clan history, although he still
called on his cousin, Mzee Asman, to answer many of my inquiries.
During both of my interviews with Kingalu, he pointed to the gold bangle on his wrist,
and said “this is my GPS.” He explained that it allowed him to see the whole world and warned
me that if I behaved poorly, he would know. In this comment, Kingalu accomplished several
things. First, he linked traditional regalia with modern technology, not only equating them but
indexing his facility with both and suggesting their ultimate compatibility. Indeed, GPS devices
had only recently achieved the technological abilities long held by holders of the name Kingalu.
It was mila that marked the future, and mambo ya kisasa (modern things) like GPS that lagged
behind. In addition, he tied this technology to a sacred knowledge that was distinctly spatial.
“Every place [popote] is visible,” he told me.
During my first visit, Kingalu also shared with me a stapled, twenty-page packet titled
“Working Plan of the Council of Chiefs of Uluguru for the Year 2018.” The document begins:
The living conditions of the residents of Uluguru [including] culture (including
ethics), economics, environment, and social services, especially health, education,
clean and safe water, road infrastructure in the mountains especially in rural areas,
and broad understanding of the struggle against the three national enemies, that is,
Ignorance, Disease, and Poverty are not yet satisfactory. Chiefs, wandewa,
washenga, and their assistants including traditional elders along with development
stakeholders have not yet done enough to engage with governmental and non-

284

governmental institutions to address the challenges facing their community
(Kingalu Foundation 2018: 1).
The document describes the organization’s vision (“to unite the community of Uluguru and its
surroundings for sustainable development”) and objective (“to bring development to the Uluguru
community and surrounding areas by fulfilling their responsibilities to develop, strengthen,
improve, protect and sustain their cultural heritage and to use surrounding resources
accordingly”) (1). It outlines accomplishments from 2017, which include the passing of a
resolution and strengthening relationships with the government and “development stakeholders,”
and outlines upcoming goals, including opening a museum and “building capacity” through
“seminars, workshops, and short-term and long-term training” (1–2). The latter are intended to
“build the capacity of community members to bring about development without negatively
affecting their ethics, tradition, customs, and culture (maadili, mila, desturi na utamaduni)” (2).
This document, which reinscribes the role of Kingalu and other “customary” leaders in Uluguru
in the language of development, speaks to the role of development discourse in Tanzanian
politics. Rather than juxtaposing mila and development, the document brings them into harmony
and positions customary authorities like Kingalu as bringers of development alongside
governmental and nongovernmental authorities. Importantly, it also positions the accompanying
organization, the Kingalu Foundation, as a legitimate recipient of development funds. Indeed,
one of Kingalu’s reasons for showing me the document was to ask whether I had any
connections to potential donor organizations. In this sense, it is typical of development
documents as described by Green: “Project documentation is not intended to present an objective
account of a social and economic situation, or a discursive assessment of how best to address the
kinds of issues that might come under the ambit of current policy concerns, but to support
financial transfers” (2014: 62).
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Near the end of my fieldwork, Kingalu was in the midst of organizing a major ceremony
around the return of a traditional Luguru stool to Kinole. The stool, it was said, had been stolen
or purchased by Europeans long ago but had caused considerable trouble for its new owners, its
spirit demanding return to Uluguru. 22 It was brought back to Kinole and Kingalu organized
several ceremonies to “cool” the stool and welcome it back to its proper home. I was told he held
a tambiko ceremony for only Luguru lineage elders and was planning a more public ceremony to
which I was invited. However, the event was repeatedly postponed and ultimately did not take
place before my departure from Tanzania. Rumor had it, the delays were largely because Kingalu
hoped to negotiate the attendance of President Magufuli or at least some high-ranking
government officials. This move would serve to bring into alignment Kingalu’s involvement
with party politics and his customary authority as a rainmaker and keeper of Luguru tradition,
although ultimately, he failed to draw Magufuli to Kinole.
Kingalu’s attempt to consolidate his political position by bringing into alignment mila,
development discourse, and party politics, like his efforts to balance residence in Morogoro town
and at Kinole, is reminiscent of Kingalu Mwanashaa. In the nineteenth century, power built
through access to Indian Ocean trade, the growing role of guns, and the emerging presence of
Europeans vied with the politics of rainmaking. Today, it is the intertwined politics of
development and political parties that offer competing geographies of power, with the center of
gravity resting in Morogoro and Dar es Salaam rather than Bagamoyo. In this new constellation,
Kingalu’s GPS serves as a claim not to a particular geography but to geography as such, to a

I was unable to ascertain the origin of this stool. Images of the stool shared on Facebook and by the media show a
tall three-legged stool with a high back and arms, which contrasted with the shorter, backless, three-legged stools
kept by lineage heirs in Mkuyuni as well as the similar clan stools kept by Kingalu at Kinole (Mwananchi Digital
2019; Chief Kingalu 2019). It also did not feature the carved figures of the high-backed “Luguru stools” typically
pictured on auction websites. Whatever the origin of this stool, I heard numerous stories in Uluguru about lineage
stools having been sold to white collectors in the past (see Chapter 2).
22
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broad authority legible in terms of modern technology but rooted in the esoteric knowledge of
mila. Because claims on Kingalu are often articulated in terms of his entanglement with political,
technological, and economic regimes outside the mountains, this claim to space can also be
understood as a response which authorizes his movement through space. On the one hand, the
GPS shows that the knowledge attached to his position extends beyond the mountains, parallel
the claims by Kingalu and his predecessors to regional, national, and even global rainmaking
powers. At the same time, it serves to mediate his absence from any space at any time,
suggesting he is always everywhere.
Although public opinion of Kingalu in the mountains remained deeply divided during my
research, not all saw him as having abandoned tradition. Others blamed Kingalu’s critics and
those who failed to respect him, arguing that he had been unable to successfully bring rain due to
a lack of popular participation in mila. Several elders explained that Kingalu was powerless
unless he was requested to make rain by the residents of Uluguru, and that they must cooperate
for rainmaking to be successful. Because some individuals had withdrawn from mila, those who
continued were severely hampered in their efforts. As Masunya Ramadhani Maulidi, a traditional
healer in Kivuma, put it:
Now, only a few people go to Kingalu. They go when they have problems, like
when they need money…. If the sun is shining a lot [there is a lack of rain] in
Kivuma, you can collect some money and take it there [to Kingalu] and pray for
rain, and it might rain only right here. It won’t even reach Mkuyuni…. But before,
everyone would go together and pray, and the rains would come (interview,
August 13, 2018).
For this reason, many people, among them Mzee Rufezuwa and Bibi Zaina, were adamant that to
restore the ecosystem, it was necessary for young people to stop disrespecting Kingalu and the
followers of tradition. The lack of unity in the community made the environment spiral
increasingly out of control.
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Conclusion
Uluguru has long been subject to pessimistic predictions that it cannot support its
burgeoning population and that it is destined for environmental catastrophe and economic
decline. This narrative, first issued by German naturalists and colonial authorities in the late
nineteenth century, was repeated by British administrators in the final decades of colonial rule to
justify the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme and again by researchers in the 1990s during Tanzania’s
long period of economic contraction (Jones 1996; Magayane 1995; van Donge 1993). It has also
been reproduced in numerous project documents in recent years that justify intervention in the
mountains for the sake of preserving the watershed. Yet, as we have seen, over a century of
predictions that the mountains would soon become uninhabitable have not come true. Recently,
researchers have challenged the narrative that communities in Uluguru are doomed to decline,
finding instead that people in the mountains have used a diversity of livelihood strategies within
and beyond agricultural production to support their families and to achieve rising standards of
living (Harrison and Mdee 2017; Mdee et al. 2018; Ponte 2001). Likewise, although there are
signs of environmental problems such as declining soil fertility and tree loss in some areas,
farmers in the mountains are also engaged in forms of ecological work through what today might
be termed agroecology and through the planting and tending of trees (Jones 1999; Mdee et al.
2018). These practices, although often fragmented and carried out under conditions of economic
constraint, challenge the narrative of irreversible decline. Such practices have a long history in
the mountains, one marked by continual change as farmers respond to new conditions and
incorporate new information.
At the same time, the declining power of lineage institutions has resulted in uncertainty
about who is responsible to care to for the environment and how they should do so. Moreover,
economic demands that require mobility rest uneasily alongside place-bound aspects of social
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reproduction such as matambiko and care for forests and water sources. Those who do manage to
carry out this work often see benefits accrue downstream. The appropriation of ecological labor
and the extraction of resources (especially water) have gone together in the catchment since the
colonial period. As a result of these convergences, technical solutions without political content
offer little promise to alter longstanding patterns of impoverishment, inequality, and
environmental harm.
As an assemblage of national and international institutions, the development state
exercises significant control over Tanzania’s forests, watersheds, and land. It has the capacity for
a range of engagements with the environment and has embraced different models of natural
resource management over time and even simultaneously. However, despite the varied
approaches of the state and its development partners, several features have tended to recur. First,
it has centered technical and “expert” knowledge which must be disseminated to rural people to
change their behavior. This flow of knowledge reinforces the boundary between professional
classes who bring development and rural people who need it. Especially since the breakdown of
socialism in the 1980s, development projects have also served to depoliticize questions of natural
resource governance and poverty alleviation by proposing technical solutions to social problems
rather than opening possibilities for structural change (Ferguson 1990; Li 2007). Magufuli’s
resource nationalism marked a partial shift away from this trend but it focused on export
commodities and had a limited impact on policies related to forests and water in Uluguru. At the
same time, development projects have extended the control of the state over the everyday lives of
rural people. Development has also been a site for the extraction of forms of unpaid ecological
labor since the colonial period.
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Work that disaggregates the state is helpful for understanding both contradictions and
consistencies in the state’s approach to development and the environment (Green 2014; Shivji
1976; Verdery 2002). The different and changing approaches of the state to managing natural
resources and ecological change reflect the different priorities of agencies like the World Bank,
UNDP, and JICA as well as the varied interests of foreign development experts, politicians, local
project staff, and other groups who constitute the state and carry out its day-to-day operations.
Projects come into being through negotiations among these groups and tend to support their own
perpetuation, reinforced by patterns of project-based employment. Significant financial transfers
move through the state to enable this process. To say that development professionals tend to
promote strategies for development that are built around their expertise and that perpetuate
opportunities for their employment is not to suggest that these experts do not really believe in
ending poverty and protecting the environment. Most who took the time to speak with me cared
a great deal about these issues. However, despite the ability of individuals to act against their
class interests, the development state is still largely apparatus of a “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”
working under parameters and values set by global capital (Shivji 1976). As long as this is the
case, it is likely to perpetuate these patterns and to work against radical political, economic, and
epistemological change.
Kingalu’s attempts to reframe his authority in the language of the development state are
an index of development’s power. At the same time, the shifts in his engagement with mila in
response to popular criticism suggest that the politics of social healing remain a potent
counterforce. Despite Kingalu’s claims to transcend space and place through his GPS,
obligations placed upon him by his critics continue to bind him to the mountains. They demand
his labor in a system of care that includes both the dead and future generations and they hold him
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accountable when the rains fail. Such discourses, of course, exist alongside many others—those
of science, Islamic law, and even the embers of Ujamaa. Nor does Kingalu bear sole
responsibility for the rain, even under the paradigm of social healing. Other authorities may be
implicated in changing weather patterns, including the President, as can the youth who disrespect
tradition, the elders who fail to pass on their knowledge, and men who refuse to inherit lineage
names. The persistence of discourses of social healing are due in part to their capacity to
encompass a multiplicity of viewpoints. Yet, in each case, human and environmental wellbeing
are linked through intergenerational relationships which weave past and future through the
landscape.
The politics of social healing are thus distinctly spatial. As Cindi Katz reminds us, social
reproduction is less mobile than production (2001: 709–711). The process of ungrounding
described in Chapter 3 can only be partial. A politics rooted in social reproduction such as social
healing, then, is bound to place in ways that come into friction with the ungrounded and mobile
demands of global capital. It is tempting to see “place” in this sense as a natural conjuncture, a
more authentic realm that can resist the ecological and social harms of modernity and
development. However, I use the term here instead in Doreen Massey’s sense, as a locus of
relations that stretches beyond the local and that is always both porous and contested (1994: 4–
5). The political demands of social healing in Uluguru emerged through the same struggles
which rendered the mountains a site of unequal relationships across space. Seen this way,
objections to Kingalu’s movement are not objections to movement as such but rather to the
uneven relations to place shaped by a global economy that both demands and curtails mobility.
As production recedes from social reproduction not only economically but spatially, the material
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and social resources created through the labor of Uluguru’s residents constantly flow away from
the mountains. It is in this context that social healing demands a return.
These asymmetrical spatial relations have also made efforts to care for the environment
in Uluguru into sites for the extraction of ecological labor. Chairman Ndevu’s attempts to protect
the watershed according to the terms of the WUA, Mzee Rufezuwa’s careful tending of his
saplings, lineage elders’ work to guard the sacred forest at Kolero, and SAT members’ use of
cover crops and organic fertilizers all stand as examples of such work. Like other forms of
reproductive labor, ecological labor is at once obscured by and essential to the functioning of the
capitalism system. The persistence of ecological labor reminds us that consumption, extraction,
competition, and depletion need not define our relation to the non-human world. However,
meaningful relationships of care have become coerced in the face of impending ecological
disaster as well as more immediate threats of eviction from the catchment by the state. Such
coercion ensures the work will continue even under conditions of increasing material scarcity
and political constraint. The result, then, is the increasing fragmentation and precarity—but not
the disappearance—of these forms of labor.
Masunya Ramadhani Maulidi, quoted above, remarked that today, people visit Kingalu
on an individual basis but that rainmaking is not possible without a more collective participation
in mila. He also commented that some go to Kingalu when they need money while others bring
money to get rain, but only for their own fields. The connection drawn between money and the
loss of rainmaking abilities can be understood as a conflict between exchange values and
practices of social and ecological healing. Money itself is not new in Uluguru. As Chapter 3
discussed, it has increasingly come to serve as the material basis for social reproduction. Yet, as
Marx (1990) long ago showed, money and the exchange value it represents conceal human
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relationships. Exchange values determined on a global market have come to dictate the terms of
life in Uluguru as elsewhere, but other relationships and other values have persisted despite these
pressures. These are evident in practices like matambiko and agroforestry.
Amin’s (1990) conceptualization of “delinking” is useful to imagine how a new economy
might be constructed in which alternate values and the politics and epistemologies that emerge
from them are pried loose from the dictates of the global market. Although Amin’s work focused
on largely on economics of production at the national scale, I have argued, building on the work
of Ajl (2018, 2020), that we can carry “delinking” further to challenge the subordination of
social reproduction itself. In this sense, delinking would allow not only the emergence of regimes
of values grounded in social reproduction, but also the flourishing of other ways of knowing
alongside of and in dialog with science. Critically, this would entail not only a rejection of
attempts to collapse nature into exchange value, exemplified by PES programs, but also a deeper
interrogation of frameworks that see humans and nature as necessarily distinct and opposed.
Under these conditions, agroecology and agroforestry can serve as part of a broader program of
radical change in which new relationships with trees, waterways, and the climate can be built.
The deep tangle of connections residents in Uluguru describe between human illness and
environmental damage speak to relationships that exceed and evade the dictates of global capital.
Social healing provides a framework for tending these relationships, one which challenges not
only the values established by the market but also the temporality of development. Instead of a
vision of progress which defies the binds of space and place, the politics of rainmaking answer to
a past that remains present in the landscape. The wandering spirits described by Bibi Zaina,
dislodged from their homes by social and environmental change, place ethical demands on the
living: to care for the dead and for the natural places where they reside. Similarly, residents of
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Uluguru draw on the language of social healing to make demands on Kingalu and others, calling
them to answer to values delinked from circuits of global exchange. The demands of social
healing are not monolithic, nor are they inherently liberatory. However, by moving against the
currents of capitalism and by placing social reproduction at the centers of politics, they offer a
space from which to begin building a different future, one in which those in power are held
accountable when the rains fail and one in which the environment and the human work of caring
for it lie at the heart of value.
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CONCLUSION

Uluguru is a nexus of social relations, traced through the winding paths of rivers and
through the movement of people, commodities, money, and knowledge across and beyond its
slopes. Its history can be told in many ways, but it cannot be disentangled from struggles over
nature, from nineteenth-century conflicts over rainmaking shrines and mizimu spirits to forced
terracing in the 1950s and to “sustainable development” projects today. The relationships that
render the mountains a water catchment traverse scales, at once reinscribing and troubling the
bounds of “global” and “local.” An economic geography shows Uluguru at the frayed margins of
the map, inescapably bound to the centers of capital but with only fragmentary access to its
circuits of value. An atlas of nature, however, would place the mountains in the center, the
nucleus at the heart of a tangle of streams and rivers that wind outward from its peaks. If “water
is life,” as myriad social movements tell us, the catchment is where life is remade and sustained
(Estes 2019).
It would be easy, then, to project onto the mountains the image of the womb. However, as
I have argued in the preceding chapters, we must begin by “historicizing rather than
ontologizing” both the relationship between humans and nature and gender itself (Coronil 1997:
26). Social reproduction is political. As Deodat’s recollection of a time when men could carry
pregnancies powerfully reminds us, even the most biological dimensions of reproduction are
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shaped by social relations (Chapter 2). Social reproduction’s attachment to certain bodies and
certain places is not ordained by nature but rather is a product of history. To confront the
inequalities it entails, then, requires not a romantic valorization of those tasked with carrying out
its labor, but an examination of the relations of power which structure the uneven distribution of
its costs.
Cindi Katz (2001: 709–710) has argued that social reproduction is less mobile than
production. As a result, she wrote, “there is a rejigging of the geography of social reproduction
so that the costs of social reproduction…are borne away from where most of the benefits accrue”
(715). Drawing on Fernando Coronil’s concept of the global division of nature, I have argued
that one manifestation of this rejigging has been the shifting of the environmental costs of social
reproduction toward the Global South (1997: 29). This can be seen in uneven circuits of
ecological exchange and in the widespread dumping of waste in poor countries (Doringer et al.
2021; Givens, Huang and Jorgenson 2019). It is also visible in the appropriation of land and
nature in the Global South for carbon sinks and wildlife preserves (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones
2012; Green and Adams 2015; Nelson 2003; Neumann 1998). However, it is not just resources
and land which the unequal division of nature demands—it also extracts largely unseen and
unpaid forms of ecological labor.
The uneven distribution of this labor does not only fall along a North-South axis. It is
also structured along the multiple overlapping and interlinked divides of race, class, and gender
and the asymmetrical relations between urban and rural spaces. In this way, environmental crises
serve to reproduce and deepen longstanding forms of inequality. At the same time, ecological
labor has been rendered largely invisible, rarely glimpsed in official accounts and seen as
marginal to questions of sustainability. It has been obscured by the depiction of nature as a space
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outside of human activity and by the discursive reduction of the rich range of relationships
between humans and ecosystems to the anemic paradigm of extraction and harm. In Uluguru, the
labor of environmental care encompasses many things: the forced construction of terraces in the
1950s, the planting of trees and filing of permits today, and the longstanding work of matambiko,
mila, and rainmaking. Which of these forms of work is effective in ensuring the health of the
environment remains open to debate, but struggles over its distribution animate politics in the
mountains.
Social reproduction is a powerful framework because it can illuminate the connections
between gender, environment, and labor across multiple scales. The “unhinging” of social
reproduction from production and its subordination to the laws of exchange value underlie the
increasing exploitation of women’s labor and cascading crises of care around the world (Katz
2001: 710). This has also marked a path of environmental disaster, as the demands of the market
erase the value of both ecosystems and the labor that tends them. Everywhere, the work of
sustaining life has been rendered increasingly invisible and precarious, its material basis and its
fruits alike appropriated by the endless appetite of exchange value. Global divisions of nature
and labor also shape the contours of these processes, retracing the lines marked by old colonial
maps. Seen in this way, the climate crisis is inseparable from the structures of racism, poverty,
patriarchy, and colonialism.
I noted in the introduction that in the face of these interconnected crises, Katz has called
for “a politics focused around social reproduction [which] reconnects culture, environment, and
political economy in opposition to capitalist globalization across a wide and differentiated
terrain” (2001: 718). I have argued throughout this text that social healing offers such a politics.
Discourses around rainmaking and social healing place questions of social reproduction at the
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heart of political legitimacy and have served as key sites of political critique. As Katz cautions,
social reproduction is not in itself revolutionary. This also true of rainmaking. In the nineteenth
century, it served to bolster Kingalu’s political consolidation even as it provided language to his
critics. Today, it also appears in service of power. For example, in one interview, a man named
Ali Ramadhani told me, “from long ago [zamani] until now, rain has increased. There was a time
when it decreased a lot…. Now there is a lot, even flooding.” When I asked why, his wife
interjected. “There is a new president” (Ali Ramadhani and Tausi Mohamed, interview, May 17,
2018). While rainmaking can serve as a site of social criticism, it can also be used to bolster
power and to justify undemocratic and regressive politics. What makes rainmaking important,
then, is not its specific content but its premise, the centrality it gives questions of social
reproduction and environmental wellbeing in political struggle. Moreover, rainmaking, whether
used in support of or against established power, shifts responsibility for ecological crises and
other crises of social reproduction upward onto those in power, rather than downward onto
individuals. When the rains fail, those in power must be held to account.
Social healing places human health, environmental flourishing, and care for the dead at
the heart of political struggle. If capitalism has subordinated social reproduction and the use
values it entails to the tyranny of exchange value and the logic of the market, the language of
social healing moves in the opposite direction, grounding its claims in use values which are
always situated in place. In this sense, it resonates with Amin’s (1990) call for delinking as a
rejection of the capitalist law of value and a turn instead to values determined within the nations
of the Global South themselves. Such an undertaking, Amin suggested, would stem the flow of
value away from the South and would allow those at capital’s margins to develop on their own
terms. Drawing on Ajl’s (2020) expansive reading of Amin, I have argued here that delinking
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suggests one possible path toward the creation of system of value which places social
reproduction at its core.
Social healing not only challenges the structures of value wrought by global capital but
also upends the totalizing sense of time it imposes on the world. Rainmaking is bound up in
unruly temporalities, in which past and future generations make demands upon the present. The
politics of rainmaking is shaped not only by the living but by ancestors who strike their
descendants with illness or bless them with rain. It is also shaped by an obligation to future
generations, highlighting the inseparability of human and agricultural fertility. When Bibi Zaina
suggested that deforestation had rendered the ancestral spirits homeless (Chapter 4), she
suggested a responsibility to the past and future bound up in the protection of forests. Her
statement can also be understood as a critique of the growing precarity of social reproduction—
ancestors and elders cannot care for future generations because the resources needed have been
appropriated, privatized, and lost to other logics. The result is illness. Indeed, many in Mkuyuni
told me that illness had increased and people no longer lived as long as in the past. I expected
explanations for the rise in illness to relate to the proximity brought by villagization and its
attendant risks of pathogens like cholera as well as witchcraft. However, most often, I was told
that it was an imbalance of relationships to ancestors and the loss of mila that had caused the
crisis in health, opening people to new diseases like high blood pressure and diabetes. Discourses
of social healing provided a language which could bring into the same frame questions of
ecology and questions of bodily health—both crises of social reproduction related to a loss of
control over the environment. Through this discourse, the breakdown of relations of care
between generations remained central.
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These temporal relations are bound up with nature, linked to sacred sites in the landscape
including springs, pools, and forests, as well as sacred species like pythons, baboons, and the
yellow migude trees that still dot the landscape. Because these sacred places and sacred species
also marked the abodes of ancestors and other helpful spirits, their loss too was implicated in the
crisis of social reproduction. The breakdown of intergenerational connections and the breakdown
of the environment were one and same. As we have seen in Chapter 3, kinship itself was woven
through the landscape, with graves and natural places composing a sacred geography to which
the wellbeing of the living was tied. This complex relation of space and time, humans and nature,
exceeds the relationships wrought by global capitalism, which disciplines time through regimes
of speculation and debt. It invokes land in its multiplicity, not as capital but as a place of
intersecting lives. Here too, the discourses of social healing provide a space to think beyond the
limitations of other forms of politics and to imagine radically different forms of relationality.
Such an imagination is not inherently revolutionary, but it could be.
Thinking with rainmaking and the catchment also offers the possibility for critical and
counter-topographies. The catchment is the product of an uneven topography that distributes the
costs and benefits of environmental change and environmental labor unevenly across the
landscape. Katz (2001: 719) argues that “topographical knowledge is integral to maintaining and
advancing uneven development.” Such topographical knowledge, claimed by government
hydrologists trained at SUA and by Kingalu through his GPS, permits the perpetuation of
political and environmental inequality. At the same time, the topography of the catchment offers
other possibilities. The rivers and streams of Uluguru only mark a site of competition when water
is understood as a zero-sum game. Viewed from the farms along the river, they trace vectors of
inequality and extraction but also suggest forms of interconnectedness and potential solidarities.
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Rituals through which lowlanders visited (and still visit) Uluguru to pray for rain can be spaces
of inequality, but they have also been sites of cooperation and reciprocity among farmers at
different elevations and in different climate zones.
Beyond this, the catchment can allow us to think counter-topographically (Katz 2001:
720–726). To think counter-topographically is to read topography along the grain, tracing the
horizontal elevation lines across space to draw connections between spaces typically considered
disparate. A true counter-topography is beyond the scope of this research, which remains bound
to one small mountain range in Tanzania. Yet, it could be read as part of a counter-topography,
considered alongside other thick accounts of catchments, mountains, forests, glaciers, and similar
sites where indigenous people, forest-dwellers, and peasant farmers work to maintain the world’s
clean water and air. Such a reading would provide a richer understanding of capital’s relationship
to place-bound reproductive labor and allow for organization along the lines of social
reproduction across physical and political boundaries.
In the Introduction, I suggested that one of the major themes of discourses of social
healing was the way in which they tended to center questions of labor, expansively defined, over
and above relations of property. This was especially true in gendered conflicts over tradition,
when women complained that men had withdrawn from their roles in the lineage and in
matambiko (Chapter 2). Work was also the basis of the WUA Chairman Sadiki Kassim Ndevu’s
demands for increased material support from the international organizations that had tasked him
with protecting the watershed (Chapter 4). While he was doing the difficult and dangerous work
of protecting the Ruvu, NGO staff appeared sporadically in pricy vehicles to give seminars
before disappearing again toward the cities below. Claims based on labor, whether those of
Ndevu or those of women whose uncles had run away from their names, were not usually framed
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as demands for wages, but rather for the material conditions of social reproduction. This labor,
moreover, was often envisioned as necessarily collaborative. The work of mila had fallen
increasingly on the shoulders of certain people, but their failures to bring social healing were not
a result of a lack of time, skill, or energy. Rather, it was because the work itself required a
collective effort. The atomization of labor meant that the institutions of social healing had lost
much of their ability to bring rain. Individual afflictions could be treated by waganga, but the
loss of an ability to work collectively had resulted directly in environmental breakdown. The
lack of cooperation was expressed most often in generational terms, with elders claiming that
youth disrespected mila and youth claiming that elders had failed to teach them the knowledge
they needed to participate. At the heart of this fissure lies the rupture of villagization and the real
loss of knowledge it entailed, especially among men. At the same time, many I spoke with in the
mountains, both youth and elders, were working to rebuild collective institutions of social
healing and care, albeit under conditions of precarity and constraint.
None of this should be read as a romanticization of the matrilineal lineage, which as we
have seen, was also a site of gendered and generational oppression epitomized in the sale of
wapwa into slavery. The vision of villagization aimed ultimately not to atomize but to build new
structures of collective work and self-determination. It was a project most of my interlocutors
valued both for what it could have been and for the benefits it actually brought. It made room for
new forms of social reproduction through the construction of schools, clinics, and the
provisioning of cleaning water. These forms of social reproduction, as we have seen, were not
adequate to replace the institutions they ultimately served to dismantle, but neither were prior
structures adequate to provide for new and rightly desired forms of self-development—access to
allopathic medicines, literacy, and expanded forms of knowledge. For this reason, as well, it is
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essential to avoid the romanticization of poverty. As the Introduction explained, the conditions of
life toward which social reproduction is oriented can and do expand. Today, they include cell
phones, school uniforms, and metal roofs. What is necessary is not to cling to old structures and
old thresholds of life, but to create the space for the building of collective institutions, under old
or new names, that will center social reproduction in its messy richness.
I ended nearly every interview by asking people about their hopes for their children. I
expected that some would speak of their children getting salaried jobs and moving out of
farming, but to my surprise, the response was almost universal: for their children, people wanted
a good education, good health, and land in the mountains on which to farm. These modest
desires have been rendered precarious for myriad reasons, among them the rising costs of
education and healthcare, unfavorable agricultural markets, and an increasingly volatile climate.
As the costs of climate change accrue in places like Uluguru, on the margins of the global
economy, humanity needs new forms of politics which place responsibility for social
reproduction at the center of demands on the state and on capital. These politics must center
labor and build spaces for collective action, care, and self-determination by working people and
the generations past and future with which they are entangled. Discourses of rainmaking do not
offer a simple solution, but they do offer a possible starting point. Highlighting the inseparability
of human and environmental health, the need for collective action, and the responsibility of those
in power for current crises of social reproduction, they invite us to answer the threat of
ecological death with a renewed struggle for social healing.
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INTERVIEWS 1
Mkuyuni Ward
Changa Village
Abdul Hussein Matemelela. December 3, 2018
Adija Ramadhani. August 22, 2018
Asha Ramadhani Msisimizi with Moshi Athmani Ali Parainda. August 22, 2018
Asha Ramadhani Msisimizi with Moshi Athmani Ali Parainda. August 29, 2018
Asha Selemani Matikula. August 15, 2018
Beatrice Maliseli Kibena. June 7, 2018
Fabian Msanango Mwamienda. August 30, 2018
Habiba Rajabu Malekela. August 15, 2018
Habiba Rajabu Malekela. August 20, 2018
Halia Saidi. August 20, 2018
Halima Musa. August 29, 2018
Hamisi S. Bangati. June 6, 2018
Hamisi S. Bangati. May 12, 2018
Jovin Rafel Lipeluke. August 30, 2018
Juma Mange. December 13, 2018
Laurence Paulo Dimoso. June 6, 2018
Laurence Paulo Dimoso. June 7, 2018
Ratifa Ally. December 18, 2018
Salum Omari Uhuru. December 13, 2018
Tausi Idi Digonile. December 3, 2018
Waziri Abdallah Musa. December 18, 2018
Kibwaya Village
Abdallah Ramadhani Kambi. November 5, 2018
Abdallah Shomari. December 5, 2018
1

This list excludes interviewees who requested anonymity.
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Abdul Rahman Thabit. November 5, 2018
Adija Ramadhani Saidi. April 11, 2018
Amaji Rajabu with Ali Rajabu. April 12, 2018
Angela Kunambi. September 20, 2018
Fadhili Ally. December 15, 2018
Hamisi Mustafa Magana. January 20, 2019
Hosain Shomari Kiyega. April 11, 2018
Idi bin Rashid Msiku. January 10, 2019
Joseph Mkoba. April 24, 2018
Justina John. April 18, 2018
Justina John. April 24, 2018
Justina John with Saidi Ramadhani Mleke and Anita Modesti. September 4, 2018
Ladislaus Joseph Fungafunga. September 20, 2018
Lea Mattai. June 21, 2018
Mfalme Fundi Mfalme. December 5, 2018
Mohamed Salum Dogero. December 12, 2018
Moshi Majeshi. November 6, 2018
Mwanaisha Waziri. December 15, 2018
Mwishehe Juma with Waziri Mwishehe. April 11, 2018
Mwishehe Juma with Waziri Mwishehe. April 12, 2018
Ponsiani Michael. June 21, 2018
Richard Augustin. December 14, 2018
Ritha Rogurt, Antonia Amani, Moshi Rajabu, Pauline Amandus, Grace Gerald and Hadija Salim.
January 5, 2019
Seleman Hussein Rajabu, Sadiki Abbas Saidi, Dhalau Hussein Gogo, Mengi Juma Sumi and
Juma Shaban Mshumi. January 5, 2019.
Kivuma Village
Abdallah Ally Rufezuwa and Zaina Ally Rufezuwa. January 1, 2019
Abdallah Ally Rufezuwa with Halima Lajabu Dagila and Nasoro Ramadhani Rufezuwa, June 27,
2018
Fatuma Ramadhani. June 23, 2018
Kimwengesa Shabani. June 23, 2018
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Malama Omari. December 6, 2018
Masunya Ramadhani Maulidi. August 13, 2018
Masunya Ramadhani Maulidi. June 28, 2018
Omari Asman Lubamande. April 17, 2018
Omari Asman Lubamande. April 23, 2018
Ramadhani Jenera. April 17, 2018
Ramadhani Jenera. April 23, 2018
Waziri Saidi Sadala. August 13, 2018.
Madamu Village
Ali Ming’walu. June 4, 2018
Hamisi Ally. January 9, 2019
Idi Selemani Ming’walu. June 18, 2018
Idi Selemani Ming’walu. June 25, 2018.
Maimuna Kambi. June 18, 2018
Maimuna Kambi. June 29, 2018
Mariam Stepan Lugonzo. June 25, 2018
Maulidi Sile. January 9, 2019
Shabani Ramadhani Milagilo. October 10, 2018
Silili Robert Mgogole with Kilua binti Ali Magola and Mariam Stepan Lugonzo. June 4, 2018
Zaina Athmani Zengwe. June 29, 2018
Mkuyuni Village
Abdallah Mwenyemvua Godi. June 14, 2018
Ali Mohamedi Ng’omanga. October 4, 2018
Ali Ramadhani with Tausi Mohamed and Zainabu Ali. May 17, 2018
Ali Ramadhani with Tausi Mohamed. June 1, 2018
Amida Ramadhani. January 3, 2019
Amina binti Ismaili. June 14, 2018
Asia Abdallah Kungugu. June 12, 2018
Asia Abdallah Kungugu. June 28, 2018
Damasi Ricardo Mgonge [resident of Nyingwa]. September 7, 2018
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Fazili Amiri. January 3, 2019
Franki Lukas Majikupwe. October 29, 2018
Furaha Athani. October 29, 2018
Halima Rashidi Mgoli. June 14, 2018
Maria Stefani Kasian Msawanga. November 1, 2018
Mtelebure and Nongelahi. January 4, 2019
Mwanahwa Lajabu Juma. April 9, 2018
Nasma Nasoro. December 22, 2018
Omari Abdallah Gunewe with Salumu Omari. December 20, 2018
Omari Ahmedi Budi. December 20, 2018
Ramadhani Juma. September 6, 2018
Ramadhani Mohamedi Ngalawa. January 6, 2019
Ratabu Ismaili Maumba and Omari Ahmadi Budi. June 27, 2018
Sadik Seleman, Shukuru Hossien, Nari Joseph, Fadhiri Waziri, Ramadhani Ally Tunda, and
Ramadhani Bakali. January 8, 2019
Stamili Abdallah. September 6, 2018
Tatu Ramadhani, Asha Rashidi Ngalawa, Jamila Aziz, Atiba Omari, Zakia Salum, Sharif
Abdallah, Majabu Mbegu and Neema Omari. January 8, 2019
Mfumbwe Village
Abdallah Sepengo Matiwili. May 14, 2018
Ali Setembo Kiloko. August 14, 2018
Maheshi Juma Setembo. June 2, 2018
Muhando. August 14, 2018
Ramadhani Ali. June 2, 2018
Kibuko Ward
Kibuko Village
Alenesia Peter. January 2, 2019
Bernadette Andrea. December 4, 2018
Shomari Kungugu. November 5, 2018
Peter Andrew Peter. December 4, 2018
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Romania Beno. January 2, 2019
Veronika Vincent. December 29, 2018
Luholole Village
Abdallah Ali Kawambwa. October 9, 2018
Anna Thomas. December 29, 2018
Fatuma Kambi Lukwele with Jafari Dashidi Hamisi. October 3, 2018
Juma Shabani Gonza and Mwajuma Mohamedi. January 8, 2019
Nulu binti Salum Gasi with Asia Idi Rajabu and Kidume Pesa Mohamed. January 8, 2019
Omari Ismaili Ngalawa. October 22, 2018
Shomari Ramadhani Kilana with Zaidani Ramadhani and Kosmas Nikolas. October 9, 2018
Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko, Deodat Gaspar Kunambi and Berinada Spiria. October 3, 2018
Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko, Deodat Gaspar Kunambi and Berinada Spiria. October 22, 2018
Mwalazi Village
Bubu Rajab Samani. September 19, 2018
Duni Waziri Kibena. June 23, 2018
Kinole Ward
Kinole Village
Kingalu Mwanabanzi XV with Asman Kingalu Said Setembu. April 21, 2018.
Kingalu Mwanabanzi XV. October 20, 2018
Ludewa Village
Mwanaisha Chande, Zaina Juma, Amina Mbega, Tausi Mbega, Asha Ally, Hadija Ramadhani,
Asia Selemani Mfomi, and Aziza Ramadhani Shomari. October 31, 2018
Sadiki Kassim Ndevu. December 28, 2018
Uliza Suapanga, Mrisho Ramadhani, Hussein Nasoro, Abu Omari Jangama, Abdu Mohamed,
and Ahmad Idi. October 18, 2018
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Other Locations
Lanzi Village
Kifimbo Msomba. October 27, 2018
Njaithi Isumailo. October 27, 2018
Tegetero Village
Magoma XVIII with Dach Ismail. October 6, 2018
Magoma XVIII with Dach Ismail. December 8, 2018
Religious Leaders
Pst. Bernard Mhoji. Free Pentecostal Church of Tanzania, Mkuyuni Village. June 17, 2018
Pst. Daniel Ezekiel Kusaga. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania, Mkuyuni Village.
January 4, 2019
Mwalimu Hashim Rajabu Chahano and Jumbe Rashidi Mohamedi Mili. Mkuyuni Mbagalala.
December 29, 2018
Mwalimu Idi Amri Waziri with Issa Ramadhani Kambi Kinga. Tariqa Qadariyya, Changa
Village. September 1, 2018
Fr. Joseph Shukuru. Roman Catholic Church, Mwalazi Village. December 12, 2018
Pst. Joseph William. Tanzania Assemblies of God, Kibwaya Village. December 14, 2018
Kambi Mbilikila and Imamu Rajabu Shabani with Idi Ally and Muki Buya. Tariqa Qadariyya,
Mangala Village, September 29, 2018
Sheikh Magoso bin Ahmedi and Jumaa bin Shehe Othmani Mbokeleni. Tariqa Askariyya,
Kibwaya Village. September 17, 2018
Katiba Maulidi Tamim Tondolla. Mkuyuni Village. August 30, 2018
Msawanga Ally. Mkuyuni Village. August 23, 2018
Mwishehe Juma, Ismaili Mwishehe and Waziri Mwishehe. Ahmadiyya, Kibwaya Village.
September 4, 2018
Fr. Philipe Neri Mkude. Roman Catholic Church, Morogoro. October 30, 2018
Fr. Philipe Neri Mkude. Roman Catholic Church, Morogoro. December 10, 2018
Pst. Salome Galaba. Full Bible Gospel Fellowship, Mkuyuni Village. June 27, 2018
Pst. William Mercury Paulo. Tanzania Assemblies of God, Mkuyuni Village. March 21, 2018
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Additional Interlocutors
Additional contributions to this work were made through conversations with A. H. Banza,
Abdallah Ally Rufezuwa, Abdallah Mwenyemvua Godi, Adamu R. Lung’okwa, Adija Ally
Gubwe, Adija Rashidi Ngalawa, Ahmad Mjeuri, Ahmadi Idi Debwe, Alawi Selemani
Mbwawawa, Ally R. Madenga, Ally Salum Chamwenyero, Ally Tamimu Tondolla, Fr. Aloyce
F. Mwenyasi, Amina binti Sefu, Amina Shomari, Anna Marwa, Anthony Stephani Chalice
Magonga, Aquiline Wamba, Asha Mohamedi Shomvi, Asha Ng’omango, Asha Rashidi
Kangungu, Asia Abdallah Kungugu, Asman Kingalu Said Setembu, Augustino Ernest, Azizi
binti Mwinyi, Bangati Mohamedi, Beatrice Maliseli Kibena, Berinada Spiria, Pst. Bernard
Mhoji, Deodat Gaspar Kunambi, Diego, Fr. Diflata, Mzee Donge, Duni Waziri Kibena, Eutropia
Kunambi, Fatuma Kambi Kuwele, Fatuma Rajabu, Fuko, Godrey Alfons Mkude, Hadija Omari,
Halima Ali Kondo (Mama Kimwengewa), Hamisi Ally, Hamisi Athumani Mndeng’o, Hamisi
Bongwa, Hamisi Haruna Ismail, Hamisi Hussein, Hashim Rajabu Chahano, Hosain Shomari
Kiyega, Hoseni Magota, Hussein Hamisi, Husseini Ismaili, Idi Selemani Ming’walu, Ismail
Rajabu, Jafari Dashidi Hamisi, Joel Paul, John Kassambili, Fr. Joseph Shukuru , Juma Jikwaya,
Juma Mbokeleni, Juma Mung’uja, Juma Samata, Jumanne Hamisi, Kassim Hussein, Kassim
Jashidi Juma, Kibena Mjanja, Kitegulo, Kititu Abdallah (who shared traditional songs), Laurence
Paulo Dimoso, Liyonga Ally Shungu, Maganga Nosoro, Makala Tuyuyu, Maneno Hussein,
Mango bin Mango, Maulidi Tamim Tondolla, Mijigwa Makokola, Msakuzi Iddi, Msawanga
Ally, Musa Mjeuri, Mwanahawa Lajabu Juma, Mwanaisha Mohamed Kamba, Mwanaisha
Rajabu Waziri, Mwangila Mbwali, Mwatabu Doya, Nickbar Mwanana, Nickson, Omari Asman
Lubamande, Omari Kondo, Omari Rajabu Waziri, Pascale Stephan, Paulo Hilaly Dimoso, Fr.
Philipe Neri Mkude, Ramadhani Bakali, Ramadhani Jenera, Safia Rajabu Msumi (Mama Kesse),
Saidi Saidi Msimbe, Sakina Nyumayo, Salome Galaba, Samson Gabrieli, Selemani Mweishehe
Kibwende, Shebani Mohamedi Ngalawa, Shomari Kungugu, Shomari Ramadhani Kilana,
Shukuru Jenera, Siasa Maneno Juma, Sipriani Kasiani Changadiko, Stamili Mohamed Kamba,
Ukombozi Fundi Mfalme, Uliza Suapanga, Wandema, William Mercury Paulo, Yahaya, Yulien
Mizola, Zahoro Juma, Zaina Ally Rufezuwa, Zalia Issa, Zawadi Chui, Zena Ramadani Sadala,
and Zeti Idi Mbana. Abdallah Ally Rufezuwa, Ally Tamimu Tondolla, Asia Abdallah Kungugu,
Eutropia Kunambi, Mama Kesse, Mama Kimwengesa, Mwanahawa Lajabu Juma, Ramadhani
Bakali, and Ramadhani Jenera served as key interlocutors and collaborators throughout this
research.
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